# MODERN REVIEW

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# COMMENT

## "Freedom For The Thought We Hate" [1]

We certainly cannot be suspected of any tender feelings toward the American Communist Party. Indeed all those associated with *Modern Review* feel very strongly that Stalinism and all it stands for presents a most serious threat to all the values we hold dear. But to the witch-hunt that is now shaping up in Washington, we are most vigorously opposed. We repudiate purges of such a nature precisely because we take seriously the values of democracy and freedom which the Communist parties abhor.

William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, has excellently stated that legislation to outlaw the Communist Party is "tantamount to a declaration of voluntary bankruptcy of the ideas and ideals of American democracy." It is easy to grant democratic rights to those with whom you basically agree. The real test comes only when these rights are also to be conceded to those who oppose them. Free speech, free inquiry and freedom to organize are the mainstays of the American tradition.

This will not be the first occasion upon which the wide divergence between American ideals and American realities will be noted in foreign countries. Any attempt to outlaw any party will be taken as further proof that America's advocacy of democracy in the world is pure hypocrisy and pretense.

Quoting again from President Green's statement: "Do we hold the achievements of American history in such contempt and value our heritage so cheaply as to have no faith in their ability to compete successfully and overwhelm the teachings of communistic dictatorship?" This is indeed the issue. The idea that one can kill the germs of Communism through decrees and red-hunts can only have grown in the minds of people who think that the most efficient way to deal with human beings is through police action. This is precisely Stalin's own approach. Furthermore, nowhere in the world have the police been able to stamp out Communists. They have succeeded only in driving them underground and placing the crown of martyrdom on the heads of these spurious "leaders of the working class" who are in fact nothing but conscientious employees of the Kremlin.

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[1] In his dissenting opinion in the case of the *U.S. vs. Rosika Schwimmer* (1928), Justice Holmes wrote: "If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other, it is the principle of freedom of thought — not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought we hate."

Do those who advocate police measures really believe that the American labor movement is so weak that it is itself unable to deal with infiltration of its ranks by Stalinist agents? Is American labor a babe that must be benevolently protected from the BIG RED WOLF? We are suspicious of the tender solicitude recently displayed by the American Legion and other organizations that are only too often to be found in the front ranks of the attack against American labor.

The American Civil Liberties Union points out in a recent statement the loose definition of "Communism," "subversion," and "disloyalty" in the proposed bills to outlaw and gag the Communist Party. Most of these definitions could easily cover suppression of any kind of radical or even liberal expression of thought. It is not difficult to fathom what some of the Senators who sponsor the bills understand by "Communism." Any attempt to break down the system of white supremacy in the South, any defensive move against some of the plans of the National Association of Manufacturers could easily be made to fall into this category. Shall we really be so naive as to assist in placing a law on the statute book that can be used some day by a reactionary administration to start a wave of persecution against the liberal and labor movement that will make Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer of post-World War I fame seem a tyro in the fine art of repression?

Most of what has been said above applies also to the recent Executive Order of President Truman on loyalty among government employees. We quote again from the statement of the American Civil Liberties Union: "The Order is so broad in its scope and substance, so lacking in sufficient safeguards necessary for the protection of individuals and wanting in clarity of procedure, that it constitutes a menace to civil liberties."

The Order provides that "reasonable doubt" of the loyalty of a government employee is sufficient grounds for discharge. Any one who knows anything about the operation of government bureaus can easily understand that this opens the door to the most unbearable kind of snooping and petty persecution. Any one caught reading *The Nation* or receiving an invitation to a dinner sponsoring a liberal cause can be made into a potentially disloyal employee.

The odious doctrine of guilt by association now seems about to become an American principle; "sympathetic association" with others presumed to be guilty is now to be taken as sufficient cause for dismissal.

While big scale witch-hunts are organized which at best can catch only the small fry, those who really stand behind the Communist Party go scot free. Two million government employees are to be investigated at a cost of between 15 and 20 million dollars to the public treasury, but nothing is heard about the demand of Norman Thomas, James T. Farrell and other well-known socialists and liberals for a grand jury investigation of a number of top leaders of the American Communist Party in connection with the murder of Leon Trotsky and others. The murder of Carlo Tresca has been "investigated" with a strange kind of laxity. No light has yet been thrown on the circumstances surrounding the "suicide" of Kritvitsky or the disappearance of Juliet Stuart Poyntz.

The NKVD has many of its agents working with impunity inside America's borders — to ferret them out would be a simple act of public hygiene. No new laws are required for this. Since when, for instance, has it become legal to plot assassination in the U.S., and carry the plot through to a "successful" conclusion which is the clear import of Louis Budenz' recent revelations?

The outlawing of the Communist Party, however, and a campaign of hysterical snooping against "reds" can accomplish no purpose except to discredit and defile the very idea of democracy.

## Secrets Of Yalta

Publication of what is called the complete text of the Yalta Agreement reveals that at Yalta the Big Three decided to dismember Germany. The word "decided" in the connection, however, may not be very accurate. There was no such formal decision. The dismemberment of Germany was merely mentioned as one of the tasks of the occupying powers, together with those of demilitarization and denazification. This part of the agreement was secret. It is published now, almost two years after VE-Day. And obviously this secret part was forgotten long before it was published, for none of the Big Three did anything to implement it. None of them wants a dismembered Germany. The French want it and for serious reasons, although even from their point of view the reasons against dismemberment may prove stronger than those for it. In any case, the French know that their cause is hopeless because the Big Three—their Yalta Agreement notwithstanding—are trying to achieve the unification of Germany, not its dismemberment.

This part of the Yalta Agreement has remained a dead letter. We certainly don't regret this fact. But it is the height of irresponsibility to indicate a decision of such tremendous import by only a word, to keep this word secret, and then to forget about it.

This may be considered only an utopian desire, but the best—and most logical — course now would be to scrap the Yalta and Potsdam agreements entirely and seek a more sound foundation for peace-making. To save itself from a new catastrophe, the world needs a fresh start.

There is, however, a more modest demand to be insisted upon. The publication of the "complete" text is not yet complete enough. There were some other agreements made and the citizens of a democratic country have the right to know all of them as well as to know whether or not they are still considered valid and binding by their Government. The existence of at least one still unpublished agreement is known and cannot be denied.

On February 8, 1946, the Lithuanian-American Council addressed to the then Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, a letter seeking clarification of the citizenship status of displaced persons from the Baltic states. George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, replied for the State Department on March 1, 1946. In the published "complete" text of the Yalta Agreement there is not a single word about repatriation of displaced persons. But now let us quote from the State Department's reply (emphasis ours):

> For your information it may be stated that Esthonians, Latvians and Lithuanians are not repatriated to their countries of origin against their will. Such persons are not included under directives concerning repatriation applicable to Soviet citizens *under the provisions of the Yalta Agreement.*
>
> It is the policy of the United States Government to repatriate to the Soviet Union only those persons who fall within the terms of *the agreement reached with the Soviet Government in February at Yalta* providing for the mutual repatriation of all Soviet citizens liberated by the American armed forces. The United States Government considers that only those persons are covered by the above-mentioned agreement who were both citizens of and actually within the Soviet Union on September 1, 1939 and who come within the following categories:
>
> 1) were captured in German uniforms;
> 2) were members of Soviet armed forces on or after June 22, 1941 and were not subsequently discharged therefrom;
> 3) on the basis of reasonable evidence have been found to be collaborators with the enemy having voluntarily rendered aid and comfort to the enemy.

> Other persons of Russian origin are not be repatriated unless they so desire.[1]

The text of *this* Yalta Agreement has never been published. Yet it cost the lives of thousands of Russians who were delivered to the Soviet Government although they were political refugees. This was done in implementation of an agreement that remained unknown to the American people. And it is still unknown whether or not the United States Government considers this agreement still valid.

The obligations of a government of the people are obligations of the people. For more than two years the American people have been kept in ignorance of the fact that they were pledged to participate in the dismemberment of Germany. And even today they still do not know whether or not they know all they need to know about their obligations.

## Mixed-Up Economy

The House of Representatives majority, in its drive for reduction of the budget, chooses its objectives carefully. The "economy axe" seems to have a curious propensity to fall precisely at those points that are most vital for the American labor movement.

Unless House action is upset in the Senate, the U. S. Department of Labor and the National Labor Relations Board will find themselves unable to accomplish their vital tasks. Some $12,000,000 was lopped off the Labor Department's funds for the coming year and the NLRB was slashed 40% under what the Bureau of the Budget recommended.

The cut in NLRB funds will seriously endanger its operations. The Board now has a backlog of more than 5,000 cases—the largest number in its history. It takes about twenty months currently to process the average case. The proposed cut would mean the dropping of fifty employees and would thus considerably lengthen the already overlong waiting period in obtaining rulings from the Board. One scarcely needs imagination to realize that this budget slash was motivated much less by a desire of economy than by the will to hamstring and discredit the NLRB which has done important work in investigating and straightening out cases of unfair labor practices. The action thus falls into the pattern of the current drive of reactionary interests against the labor movement.

The cuts in the Department of Labor's budget do not seem to stem from any more commendable motives. The U. S. Employment Service suffers a slash of fully 80% in the appropriation asked by President Truman. Since the main current activity of the Service is to supervise standards of public employment offices now returned to state administration, it is easy to see that the House members from certain states in which state unemployment benefits are being administered in a rather unorthodox fashion, to say the least, consider this an excellent opportunity to end, once for all, the hated federal supervision.

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[1] *Lithuanian Bulletin*. Published by the Lithuanian-American Council. Spring issue, 1946.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics is to be cut back 40% from its present operating fund. Its cost-of-living and family budget statistics have often provided embarrassing evidence used by labor in its collective bargaining negotiations.

The Division of Labor Standards, which sponsors safety activities, improved compensation laws and trained factory inspectors is completely abolished. Thirty-six thousand is all this country can spare to see to it that child-labor laws are properly enforced. The Children's Bureau, now under the Federal Security Agency, is to be cut 20% in funds for its program for maternal and child health. The U. S. Conciliation Service budget to be pruned 25%.

Thus a Congress that has failed to check the rising cost of living, that shows only the tenderest consideration for the drive of big business to increase its share of the national income can find no better victim for the "economy axe" than the already inadequately maintained governmental services which have some concern for the plight of labor and the common people.

We live in pixilated times indeed. Fifteen to twenty millions are to be spent "investigating" every man and woman in federal service while twelve millions are "saved" by crippling the Department of Labor. This is labeled "economy" by the type of mentality which evidently thinks the best way to lower living costs is to suppress the cost-of-living index.

## Tight Rope Act

It has been amusing during recent months to observe the antics of the French Communist Party in its frantic efforts to appear patriotic to France while at the same time carrying out the dictates of its masters in the Kremlin. Many a tight-rope feat has been performed which will excite the envy of past-masters of the profession.

The recent performance in the French parliament in connection with the Indo-China question, however, exceeded all past ones for sheer brilliance. For weeks the French Communist Party had been carrying on a barrage of sharpest criticism against the handling of the Indo-Chinese situation by the French Government — a government in which some of their most prominent members hold key positions. The simple-minded party members must have gained the impression from reading the party's press that the line had changed again and that they were back in the good old days of violent anti-imperialist agitation.

But the Government felt itself forced to ask for new military credits to sustain the campaign against Indo-Chinese independence. The situation now became complex indeed. If the Communist deputies were to vote the credits, it would be a slap in the face of the gullible party members and fellow-travelers who had been whipped into a frenzy on the isues of colonial oppression and freedom for the colonies. If they refused to vote them, it would mean the crackup of the governmental coalition and possible exclusion of the CP from its most strategically important advance posts in the state apparatus. Debate raged violently in the Central Committee until at last some one had an inspiration. The CP deputies should abstain from voting while the Communist ministers were to vote for the Government!

Comrade Duclos explained: "Without ministerial solidarity there is no government worthy of the name. At the present moment it is difficult to govern France without a coalition. . . . We thus have pushed the spirit of conciliation to the limit."

The military credits for Indo-China were voted: 411 votes for and *none* against, with the Communists (except for their ministers) abstaining.

Now if the nationalistic French peasant who, because of his general discontent, recently has supported the CP asks whether or not the Party is supporting the French military efforts in the colonies, the CP militants will point with pride to the vote of the ministers. But if the French workers, indignant about the colonial campaign, want to know the stand of the party, the leadership will point with equal pride to the action of the deputies. For the simplicity with which it accomplishes the seemingly impossible, the CP rivals Columbus with his egg. It has, moreover, given us a French version of the principle behind the success of any good Tammany politician; namely, to be all things to all men.

The Party's honor has been saved, it's governmental position safeguarded, and if it is no longer quite innocent, it is at least a political *demi-vierge.*

# FATE OF THE ARTIST IN AMERICA

**Kurt List**

What has happened to the artist is one of the most piteous and recurrent questions of American society. The pursuit of art was never more fashionable, the number of people calling themselves artists never greater. And yet—irrefutably—there is no wholly valid art today, and the artists who might produce it are dumb. What has happened? A thousand incidents explain. Here is one:

Early in the year Artur Rodzinski refused a new contract as conductor of the New York Philharmonic-Symphony Orchestra on the grounds that valid performances were impossible so long as box-office minded manager Arthur Judson made the binding selections of music, guest soloists and guest conductors. Rodzinski was so patently right that public opinion burst into righteous flame. The musical press deplored the situation it had always known existed, and Rodzinski went off to Chicago to rehabilitate the orchestra there at a smartly diminished salary.

Judson shivered out his *crise* in silence, let all editorials go unanswered hoping, possibly, that the point of the Rodzinski skirmish would be missed. For it was a great deal more than an artist's resignation for principle's sake. It was a revolt against the musical monarchy of which Judson is king.

Concert music in the United States is effectively controlled by just two agencies—Columbia Concerts and the National Concert & Artists Corporation. They have split the country between them by tacit agreement, and today no artist can manage a successful concert tour without the backing of one or the other. Towns eager for a concert season must accept packaged concert series from the agencies. The price of Heifetz is Heifetz plus whichever artists the agency is promoting this year. But the monopoly reaches even further. Each artist's program is printed in advance, a hash of tired, over-played classics and musical trash, and

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sent out before him, so that the concert level of the whole country is kept at precisely zero.

Now, in addition to being manager of the New York Philharmonic-Symphony Orchestra, Judson is also president of Columbia Concerts. His control of guest artists permits him the interesting ritual of sending Judson, orchestra manager, to pay Judson, artists' manager. But his control of the artist and his program is actually his more valuable weapon.

Judson has maintained his grip on American musicians cunningly. He does not accept just any artist for Columbia Concerts. Each one must toil for years, finance his own concerts in Carnegie or Town Hall, wring top-notch reviews from New York's notoriously jaded and unreliable musical press. Then, when Judson accepts him, each artist's programs are tailored to a kind of Gallup poll idea of what the people want. They satisfy neither genuine music lovers nor snobs, but the public has come to accept them as standard concert fare, just as it accepts relentlessly plugged fashions or movies.

For Judson to allow Rodzinski to escape his authority was to threaten his entire musical empire. So instead he risked throwing open his system of monopoly to the public, trusting that they would not see that Rodzinski's real purpose was to retrieve classical music in America from commercial interests. Significantly, Judson is still king.

To live in an age which keeps just *one* art in stocks is frightening. The intermittent closing of the theatres in England after the tidal burst of Elizabethan drama stunted a development which was never resumed. The biblical stricture "Thou shalt not make unto me any graven image" deflected the entire Jewish race from sculpture and painting, burying an artistic fruition of conceivably great proportions. Assuredly, the abandonment of one art is disastrous. But what about an age—*this* age—in which all arts are abandoned? For literature and visual expression—theatre, movies, painting—are as effectively stoppered as music, and it is precisely through the processing-for-the-masses which Arthur Judson practices that this has been done.

The mortal illness of the cinema and the pernicious effects of the museum system on art have been explored past any possible usefulness. But consider the theatre. The only mature art expressions in a decade have been revivals of the plays of Shakespeare, Chekhov, and George Bernard Shaw. Indeed, the era has been so sterile that *The Little Foxes, The Iceman Cometh,* and *The Glass Menagerie* have successfully masqueraded as plays of weight and consequence. Probably the most enjoyable productions to go on the boards have been the deft, resourceful Broadway musicals. But even their shapeliness is going. The average show which does badly in an out-of-town try-out is returned to rehearsal to be revitalized by a new-born race—the show fixers, gag men, orchestral arrangers and melody makers. Today it is a rare production which reaches Broadway bearing some relation to the script turned in by the authors who receive credit for it.

Literature is similarly lacquered. Publishing houses uniformly maintain staffs to re-cast their books in the bloodless, radio announcer English and Cinderella incident admired by the book clubs. The great slick magazines openly re-work their contents, and now even the art-minded "little" magazines keep their editors as busy "simplifying" and "clarifying" as is legally possible. Then gleaming ahead of all publishing endeavor is the Luce empire—the gigantic end product of pre-masticated culture.

### *Art — A Commodity*

The perennial justification given for the strangulation of art in the United States is that thus culture is brought to millions. It is true that as a civilization spirals up the frustrations of those who enjoy it mount to the point where art is an important factor in making life bearable. Undeniably the millions need art. But here too, civilization has something corrosive on hand, for it forces art, like other things people need, to be sold as a commodity. It insists that esthetic values pay their way. When they don't, they are snipped and cellophane wrapped until they do. If an artist's personality is submerged in the making of profits, the loss is written off as unavoidable. If an artist's standards are dissolved in the making of war propaganda, the loss is written up as glorious.

What is actually under the box top labelled "culture" is a watered down, unreasonable facsimile. For, as Oscar Wilde remarked, art is quite useless. It cannot be purveyed. But a commercial commodity which is tricked out as art is not only purveyable, it buttresses the system which produces it. *The Moon Is Down* made dying at the hands of the Nazis romantic, even desirable. The depression movies, the theatre, made hard times palatable by fictionally attacking the society which had produced them, thus sending audiences home able to live purely on vicarious experience. The Federal Arts Projects actually propped the government through the catharsis in fiction which they effected. But valid artistic creativity supports no one dishonestly or superficially. Its effect cannot be prearranged; it reports tragedy at the scene of the accident. And the millions don't want it—even for twenty-five cents. The actual dilemma of art and civilization at our juncture is this: that civilization insists on formula production, that art vanishes in face of it.

### *Routes To Limbo*

Practical thinking on outs for art has mired everywhere. One group has placed genuinely great works on all the country's counters—Beethoven's chamber works, Giotto's paintings, there is even a widely distributed Modern Library edition of Joyce's *Ulysses*. To explain these titanic structures to the public a whole industry has evolved. It incorporates the appreciation racket, the digest novel business, the succulently processed book clubs, the pack of reviewers and book writers who can explain anything down to imbecile level. This is an art industry at no point concerned with art, interested in debasing all coin.

Principled attempts have been made to induce the government to subsidize the arts. Many have lost heart in face of the disastrous consequences in Russia, where the government has taken over the esthetic direction as well. But more have realized that money from Washington is a mad hope. Subsidy is essentially a hangover from the feudal system of patrons. Now that the war has destroyed the last cultural traces of it, subsidies are wiped away in Europe. Even the Vienna State Theatres, backed for centuries by the Austrian government, have been thrown on their own—and are bankrupt. To expect subsidies in America, where there is no feudal tradition to begin with, is to anticipate a millennium—particularly in view of the current attitude toward government subsidies for anything.

Of course, the position of the artist is historically wretched. Poverty and misunderstanding are every school child's idea of the accoutrements of genius. But at least in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries creativity was *possible* — if the artist were willing to starve out his life or abdicate sleep and work at night. Consider Melville or Ryder, or the composer Charles Ives.

Now civilization has made even this impossible, for today's important new media physically cannot be reached by the individual artist without commercial help. The radio, movies, the theatre, newly developed electric musical instruments, mural painting—who can work on any of them without the support—and esthetic tyranny—of enterprise? The final, decimating blow to the artist has come from the unions, whose insistence on union scale wages also in non-profit making experimental groups cut off the non-commercial movies, theatre groups and concerts which could have skimped into production had concessions been made to them. The artist's problem now is not a question of making a living—but of dealing with a talent which he can nowhere exercise.

Retreat has been the single, unhealthful out. There has been a return to older forms—poetry, chamber music,—which can be created with no reference to the world. Today the whole medium of art is still in stagnation.

What other courses are open to the artist? He can go knowingly into business. There is lay-out and illustration for the painter, the magazines, movies and radio for the writer, Tin Pan Alley and orchestral arranging everywhere for the composer.

Or he can take more "serious" routes, perform as a virtuoso controlled by concert managements. He can work as a composer or painter, and depend on prize competitions judged by committees whose thinly disguised commercial standards actually dictate his work. Of course, the "serious" career possibilities are not only rending to the sincere artist, but require capital and sterling connections.

Both outright business use of art and the delicately camouflaged "serious" pursuits have this in common: they snuff out real creativity. For an artist who may not explore his medium, or extend it, is bound and gagged.

The unpleasant consequences for the artist himself in today's conditions cannot be over-emphasized. If he is genuinely kinetic he works purely for ego-satisfaction. He sees his art as an extension of his personality into immortality. He cannot compromise with commercialism —its evanescence jabs at his core *raison de travailler*. For even the maddest artist cannot delude himself that his work on a Hollywood movie or a Lucky Strike illustration will live beyond a few months' span. He must throttle his ego-urge of creation then, to make a living commercially. If he cannot, he must retreat from the market to the older art forms of the nineteenth century.

That this means stagnation at a time when decisive new media wait for exploration, we know. But a composer can easily guess at the sound of a chamber work—may even perform it with the help of friends—while drawing sound conclusions about a never-performed symphony is almost impossible. And a poet can calculate the effect of his work on his friends by reading to them, which the large scale novelist never can. Only in small forms can an artist see by himself what he is doing. Palpably this writes *finis* across theater, radio and movies, where creation and execution are one. But what is to be done when all media are closed to adult work?

### *The Art Of The Intelligentsia*

One of the stinging disappointments of the era has been the deterioration of the narrow stratum of intelligentsia which backed *avant-garde* art in music and painting, which created the once forceful "little" magazines. That intelligentsia is still here—in fact, to superficial critics it has increased gigantically. Actually the group has presided at the watering down and mass dissemination of the pseudo-art which is now tagged *avant-garde*. This new product is perfectly adjusted to commercial processes, and though the same people are behind it who backed the genuine article, it is going like hot cakes. The little magazines, which take advertising and need circulation, publish no more "unacceptable" fare. Even leftist political expression has been so infected by commercialism that it needlessly adheres to market values.

The art practised by the intelligentsia in small music societies, small galleries, little theater movements and little magazines is now distinguishable from straight commercial enterprises largely because it is presented without the finish and gloss that make movies and radio sporadically bearable. However, four underlying characteristics are discernible.

1) Intelligentsia art embraces the large issues of the day, then reduces them to fairy tale (popular) proportions. At important points it merges—in issues if not always in treatment—with the commercial arts. Pseudo-psychoanalytic criticism pervades the literary magazines at the same time that psychoanalysis invades the movies. Mysticism is fashionable in both fields to the extent that *The Razor's Edge,* a book with shallow, pseudo-Indian metaphysics, enchants as arty a critic as Cyril Connally .

2) The technique of intelligentsia art encompasses aspects of the twenties' vanguardism. It is as illustrative as a Norman Rockwell cover, but it attains its ends with surrealist symbols which have not yet had universal acceptance. By adapting a technique whose purpose was to exploit the art medium to its limits and then only superficially accepting these exploitations, the intelligentsia artist literally scraps his me-

dium. For his motor force is extra-art—plot, issues, etc. How easy it has been for national advertising to take it over *in toto.*

3) The art of the intelligentsia is much concerned with discovery of "new" values. Their key revelation has been rural America. They have fallen on the folk idiom, rolled in the soil, and produced the music of Copland and Harris, the painting of Benton, the dance of Martha Graham. But at no point have they understood even the small, dry branch of American folk life they have chosen, preferring to candy it over with poster chauvinism. They have departed neither from a proper art medium nor a genuine cut of history. It is impossible to ignore everywhere the multifoliate life of the American city, particularly since it is the single feasible motor for an American culture. Yet, intelligentsia art confines its whole cycle to an air-conditioned barn. The elevation of "real" jazz to a respected esthetic position, and the viciousness with which the jazz cliques support what is "real" is all part of this. The junking of actual cultural growth is logically succeeded by the exultation of bar room entertainment. The Nazis point the example. But even in view of the clean logic of the situation the support which the intelligentsia have gained for their red earth contingent and the other, above mentioned species of *Kitsch* is astounding. The wealthy Museum of Modern Art is there prodding the bland, illustrative work of Dali and Tchelitchev. Art Of This Century, the Guggenheim gallery, sponsors the slick, pseudo-esoteric illustrations of Max Ernst. Philanthropic organizations like the B'nai Brith sound the commercial note openly by calling their annual music competition "The George Gershwin Award." And finally we see the no-nonsense Pepsi-Cola Company putting down dollars for art shows, and commissioning paintings for advertising.

4) Intelligentsia art is "progressive"; it says so loudly itself. So when it rejects the technique of the twenties it makes another substitution for the art-essential. The whole ideology of liberalism is invoked. Art is made groin high—so that it reaches the people. Tolerance, social consciousness, above all, Stalinism, become its business. By utilizing the most academic and reactionary of means, the intelligentsia maintain that they arrive at progressive art.

These four qualities are, in essence, intelligentsia art. They do not, necessarily, occur at once in every work. But they are always latent, always a possible next step.

### *The Esthetic Dilemma*

Logically, but also tragically, the pernicious chic of *avant-gardism* has led the more honest art groups to distrust it. Like the artists, they have turned back to the past. Currently *Partisan Review* is re-examining the values of Tolstoy, Dostoevski, Flaubert and Henry James at the expense of vital modern esthetic problems. Rather than identify themselves with the pseudo-Marxists, the Stalinists, or the art sociolatry, they avoid social issues altogether. The International Society for Contemporary Music largely performs composers now in their sixties. It rejects the younger generation summarily when they prove to be experimental. Everywhere the honest little groups have lost the courage to compromise themselves, to carry on the aggressive criss-cross which brings out fresh creativity.

The bereft American artist has not even the assets of the European. He has no tradition from feudalism in which to take root. And the wave of experimentalism which produced Melville, James, Rider and Ives has been dissipated by the chauvinism which alone has exacerbated many artists into silence. Where can the American go without central direction, feeling of era, or school in the older, cohesive sense? He must live wholly in himself—or sink into market civilization.

This is peculiarly ominous now. The last years have seen the old forms of art—the media themselves—wrung dry. The just aging generation examined the propensities of form, and evolved art through medium for the very sake of medium. Consider the ultimate exploitation of large scale fictional design in the Proust novel. Beyond this lies the work of Joyce, containing the whole Proust mechanism, and a vast new range of semantic values. The word, even the syllable, is physically segmented until the implications of sound swell with the implications of sense. And in Eliot resides the distillation of both Joyce and Proust, the last possible advance into associative values, where the word, the syllable, the type itself is worked to the end of the vein.

In painting the same absolute traversal has taken place. Color and composition have gone through the liquefaction of the impressionists, the formal presentation of the cubists to Mondrian. With his restoration of the medium to its own two-dimensional surface and his conclusive exploration of that surface, painting has reached an impasse.

The music of Schoenberg is another total utterance. Through reestablishing the equality of every tone of the temperate system, through seemingly exhausting all their relationships to one another, Schoenberg has evolved music in which the pattern of the medium has become the pattern of the whole work.

If this is true for the medium of music it is the over-all tendency in every art. The restoration of medium for medium's sake has resulted in complete abstraction. It has cancelled out ideology, incident —all things which are not medium ideas. Seventy years ago Walter Pater said, "All art constantly aspires toward the condition of music." Today art has reached that condition. The natural terror of many artists in face of this has touched off a return to pseudo-realism. But it is no more than a return, for the media are exhausted. The solutions lie in the new media.

Historically, this is not new. Architecture was a most percussive art form so long as it remained a community event. When the raising of a cathedral or a palace in the immediate surrounding of the lord of the manor or the township was everyone's concern, architecture was a great expression. But just after the baroque period, as cities became decentralized and landlordism ceased, building became an individual enterprise with only technical and utilitarian value. Obviously, an art form can stop existing when the underlying form of social solidarity has changed fundamentally.

The traditional values, created for an extinct class of patrons who supported and understood them, have clearly lost their social relevance. The times demand new media and they are here—the movies, radio, modern stage. But shackled to industry they are limited to confines of the basest nature which admit no development. At every point the artist is facing conversion to a manufacturer. Paradoxically, the society which needs his best efforts, which has even created media to contain them, is at the same time spending its best energies to destroy them.

Behind us is the feudal tradition when creativity was treated as a luxury, left relatively free, held accountable for nothing but ever forthcoming great works. Here with us is the society which commercializes and deflects, which tampers with the entrails of art, which demands time-clock production. Ahead of us? If it is a society like ours there is no hope for the artist. Only a sea-change can save him—a sea-change which will permit the simultaneous preservation of a cultural tradition and progression. There must be a society which will protect art both physically—from wars—and ideologically—from the sticky fingers of the popularizers. Such a society is predicated, of course, on the turnover of the world. It suggests a long wait.

# GERMANY AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

## George N. Shuster

All that really needs to be said about Germany has been put into simple and lucid English by Mr. Herbert Hoover in two reports which reflect the thinking of nearly every well-informed economic observer who has gone abroad since the war. These reports are concerned in the main with three facts of the utmost significance. A starving Germany must get food. This it can secure only if it is able to sell the products of its industry. And it can sell them either with Anglo-American help, or through collaboration with Russia. But as things are now collaboration with Russia will mean, in the short or the long run, incorporation of the German state in the Russian military and political orbit. Incorporation would obviously fatally imperil the security of the Western World.

What I have to add here is a kind of gloss to these simple verities. It makes not a particle of difference whether one despises all Germans, or whether one is fond of some of them. The history that will inevitably be made during the immediate future is wholly independent of all such random emotional exercises.

Germany is the only modern industrial power in Europe. It has only two rivals and they—Sweden and Switzerland both—are too small to weigh heavily in the balance. If one excludes shipping and possibly aviation, British industry is not comparably advanced. For years this has depended neither on modern methods nor on the support of applied science. Its success has been attributable to the ready availability of raw materials of special quality. Textiles and ceramics are major illustrations. The war wrought no appreciable change. While some German factory areas were heavily bombed, and while the Russians have transported huge quantities of German equipment to their own plants, the ratio of German superiority inside the continental area has not been seriously affected. It is a striking fact that

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although housing suffered grievously under the rain of bombs, so that the shortage of homes is past remedying during the immediate future, industrial potential can in many places be easily and quickly restored.

Prior to the war, German labor was recruited in large measure from the rural districts of the East. Sons of farmers for whom there was no room on the ancestral acres went off to the factories of the West. Today this process of migration has been greatly accelerated, by reason of the transfer of populations from the Eastern districts and from the Sudetenland. Indeed this forced wandering has compelled many thousands of skilled workers to look for new jobs. One must reckon also with the impact of returning soldiers on the economy. Many of these can no doubt be absorbed temporarily by the building trades. But the great majority will have to find work in industrial plants if they are to be employed at all. Thus, if the so-called Morgenthau Plan envisaged an agricultural Germany, it may be said to have produced exactly the opposite results. It has vastly increased the number of potential members of the industrial trade unions.

The amount of available arable land has meanwhile been gravely curtailed. In 1930, German agriculture was able to maintain a modest but still reasonable standard of living provided imports of wheat were obtainable. Supplies of potatoes and sugar beets were ample, and even the milk supply was reasonably satisfactory. Henceforth, unless the Yalta agreements can be revised, Germany will be stripped of its most productive agricultural areas and thus doomed to starvation unless it can acquire sufficient food in the world market. It is of course clear that restoration of the country's former boundaries is suggested by elementary common sense. But since that and power politics are two different things, we must be prepared to reckon with the worst.

Here is an outline of what the situation may be like. A labor movement, the ranks of which have been swollen out of every proportion to the nation as a whole, must have for its goal the improvement of the lot of the worker. Meanwhile, however, save in terms of real estate, the word "middle class" has been stripped of all significance. There are no accumulations of capital. The banking system has been completely and utterly wrecked, industries are to all intents and purposes operated by the military authority, and available sources of raw materials will undoubtedly be nationalized. Holdings of foreign capital have been liquidated and practically every valuable German patent has been turned over to some alien property custodian. Possibly some few Germans—artists and speculators among them—may prove signal exceptions to an everywhere prevailing rule of poverty. But by and large class differences will have disappeared save for the traditional divergence between worker and peasant, artisan and professional man.

Labor union leadership will therefore be face to face with a kind of socialism which in all probability no theoretician ever envisaged. For it was always assumed that the worker would acquire collectively a prosperous economy. Now he must confront an industrial system not only badly in need of rehabilitation, but likewise compelled to support a larger segment of the population than was dependent upon that system even in its palmiest days. It must reckon with still other handicaps. The sources of power available to German industry are limited. There will undoubtedly be a lien on Ruhr coal for the benefit of France and other countries. Upper Silesia will have been ceded to Poland, and the Saar may well be administered—if not owned—by France. Germany cannot in any at present recognizable way increase its supply of hydroelectric power. It owns no tropical lands wherein industrial alcohol could be cheaply produced. I imagine that any access on its part to atomic energy would be barred. Finally it has no reserves of oil, and its stocks of timber have been depleted.

Now it is obvious that no lesson of recent history is more obvious than this. Whereas the capital for the reconstruction of German industry came from the United States and Great Britain, the capital earned through industrial production came in the main from Russia. The Treaty of Rapallo and the Dawes Plan are the twin poles round which the economy of Germany turned after World War I. As a result of the first, trade agreements were written with Russia which enabled German industry to earn a large share of what the investment funds made available by the second cost in terms of interest and amortization to be repaid. The tariff policies of the United States would have rendered any German repayment in the form of services rendered quite impossible. What was contributed from this country to the stabilizing of the German balance of trade came almost entirely from the tourist.

We may be sure that when German labor begins to take serious stock of its assets and opportunities, it will again weigh carefully the chances of doing over again what was done before. That is, German management will inquire into the outlook for securing a trade agreement with Russia, and for getting capital loans from the United States. And one may say that if this set of twins could be born a second time, Germany might eventually master its problem. But it must be doubted that history will repeat itself. Every available sign points to a Russian resolve to establish economic autarchy and to produce such manufactured goods as will be made available to the Russian people. In addition, both Sweden and Great Britain have become competitors for the business. On the other hand, there are no indications that American capital will be diverted to Germany with anything like the lighthearted nonchalance which characterized the twenties.

Precisely here lies ample proof of the unbounded stupidity of the Nazi movement. Had Germany come out of the crisis of 1931 committed to a program of peace it could undoubtedly have added to the profits which accrued from the trade agreements with Russia all those other gains which later on resulted from barter agreements with the Balkans. I should imagine that no more effective propaganda against Hitler could be found than that which is implicit in these statements. On the other hand, we ourselves might well take a look backward and see that if our financial policy had been more flexible before and after 1929 the severity of the German crisis would have been far less taxing. It is likewise clear that Russian maneuvers during that same period also contributed to the debacle. The principal fault lies, however, with the Germans and in particular with the young German intellectuals of the period.

I suppose, therefore, that German labor will be tempted to look upon inclusion in the Russian orbit as a possible remedy for its present ills. This inclusion would insure participation in the Russian economy. Since there is no indication that realism will cease to be the stock-in-trade of the gentry of Moscow, it is entirely conceivable that in exchange for political and social solidarity they might accord a share in the task of building up a viable Russian orbit economy, and even agree to arrange the kind of partition of Poland which became a *fait accompli* at the time of the Stalin-Hitler pact. This prognosis of the future must haunt anyone who thinks, even as it has haunted such astute observers as Walter Lippmann and Allen Dulles.

Of course there are serious objections to such a solution from the German point of view. Quite apart from peasant and religious opposition, acceptance of the terms under which inclusion in the Russian orbit could be arranged would be extremely distasteful to German labor itself. Sinking to the level of a Russian labor union would be a bitter pill, but even harder to swallow would be the inevitable military implications. The German worker could be surer of nothing than that he was being fitted into the war plans of the Russian general staff. But he may be driven eastward through sheer inability to envisage any other solution of his difficulties.

On the other hand, what has he to gain from an Anglo-American orientation? The British situation is critical. On the one hand the psychology of the British worker is a curious amalgam of pride in his war-time achievement, of inability to readjust himself to peace-time conditions, and of uncertainty about the future. We are witnessing the liquidation of the Empire. Who could have fancied, twenty years ago, that he would be some time observing the inability of a once mighty power to hold even the life-line of the Mediterranean? And if one then goes on to say, well, there is always America, what answer can be expected to the quest of German labor for a livelihood? The economy of the United States is mechanized for mass production. Already the average citizen is reckoning with a business recession just around the corner. He is feeling some of the effects of the migration of workers to factory towns and of the addition of women to the ranks of labor. He will feel them to a far greater extent before normalcy returns. How then can one suppose that the United States can be induced to revamp its tariff policies in order to make room for German merchandise in quantities sufficient to give any sort of lift to German earning power? We shall undoubtedly feed capital to Germany in small doses. Perhaps we shall find the German scene a place on which to leave gratuitously our agricultural surplus. But beyond these things there is little we can reasonably be expected to do. Nor are we likely to concede to the Germans any large portion of the South American market. There is, at least, no present indication of a desire to do so.

Accordingly I conclude that any thoughtful German who reasons in economic terms merely is almost certain to decide that the future makes more sense inside the Russian sphere of influence than it possibly could inside the Anglo-American orbit. It will do no good to be under any illusions in this matter. But if one then proceeds, as a number of Americans isolationists have already proceeded, to infer that acceding to this logic would be a good idea, one cannot well be absolved from a charge of being singularly irresponsible. For every extension of Russian hegemony is an ominous threat to the stability of our civilization.

There is another solution. If we can create a federal Europe on the basis of a uniform European economy, and if we can assign to Germany its proper role in that economy, we can establish a system which the vast majority of Europeans would undoubtedly prefer, lessen the tension between East and West, and incidentally greatly aid the Anglo-American cause. Here some definitions are in order. By a "federal Europe" we do not mean a "United States of Europe," unless we are thinking of the ultimate political objective. We should have in mind rather the establishment of a number of regional groupments, or federations and their inter-relationship. Thus we can envisage a coming together of the nations bordering on the Mediterranean, of the Scandinavian countries, of the nations grouped round the Danube, and (more generally) of the peoples of Western Europe. If, so much having been accomplished, we could proceed to think of a convention or "treaty" associating these regional groupments in an over-all European society, we should have laid the basis of a viable European economy.

In practice, to be sure, the story would have to read backward. That is, a viable European economy can only be established with American help. By saying that loans or gifts of capital would be made only to Europe as a whole and strengthening all those who realize that the traditional culture of the Old World can survive only if it is suffered not to become the prey of rival predatory national ambitions, we would also make sense. The sources of industrial power available on the Continent can suffice only if they are frugally and intelligently husbanded. Hydroelectric power generated in the Alps must be routed to every country. Coal and oil must be distributed. Industry can to some extent be decentralized, but it cannot prosper if it is merely organized in rival units.

But to my mind the most important argument in favor of a federal European structure is this. The Continent can be gradually disarmed without upsetting the economy. Everybody knows that the reason why military establishments received so much popular support was because they furnished both employment opportunities and chances for advancement. The Germans estimated in 1931, for example, that if they could increase the Reichswehr from 100,000 to 300,000, they could give employment to another 300,000 men at the very least by reason of the demand for uniforms, cantonments, rifles, canteen supplies, etc., and still assume that there would be no increase in the number of offensive weapons. The economic importance of a military establishment cannot be brushed aside. There is in history no nation which has ever been able to dispense with a military force from the point of view of employment and of what the psychologists call *Geltungsbeduerfniss* (i.e., need for acquiring prestige). This is specially true of European countries by reason of their age-old military traditions. The depressing effect upon Italian morale of the abolition of the Italian navy, for example, has been commented upon by every observer. Here, we may remark in passing, is still another source of attraction to the Russian orbit. For everybody knows that the Russian would grant to the countries which assented to control by the Communist Party a large measure of militarization under terms laid down by the Russian general staff.

Federation, if intelligently planned, would have to insist upon European disarmament in the military sense. For it could succeed only if both we and the Russians agreed to make of the Continent a neutral zone possessing no armed force which might at a moment's notice be lured into the camps of the East or the West. But it would be quite possible, I think, to set up a large organization of a semi-military character, recruited on a Europe-wide basis, the purpose of which would be the creation and maintenance of public works that were in themselves beneficial rather than economically profitable. The leadership of such organizations would be in the hands of engineers rather than of fighting men. It would enlist those who saw it in golden opportunities for advancement. It would gradually transfer to the arts of peace energies which have hitherto been utilized for war. I believe that psychologically the labor movements of Europe could be induced to give their whole-hearted support to such an idea. I even think that eventually the pattern established might prove to be a model to be followed by all nations. For we know that we simply cannot fight another war and survive. But at the same time we cannot maintain a proper economic balance in densely populated areas without something like an army. The European labor force would have an added value. It would enable Germans, Italians, Frenchmen, Poles, and others to live together and compete fairly for opportunities open to all. One must not blink at the semi-military implications. This type of organization is rooted in human nature, and no good can come from denying the fact.

I am firmly convinced that if the United States is willing to invest five billion dollars in a Europe so constituted, and if it is able to solve in an intelligent manner the engineering problems which are involved, there is a good chance of success. The only other chance I see is a fight. We might succeed in defeating the Russians and driving them to the Urals. Then neither the Germans nor any other European people would be induced to enter the orbit of Moscow. But anybody who can look ahead to such a scrap with equanimity is quite a different sort of person than I happen to be. There are enough ruins in Europe now. To multiply the number of starving children and dishonored women, of maimed men and broken hearths, is surely not the way in which to plan a decent future for mankind.

The strongest argument against federation is that advanced by men who fear that inside any such arrangement the Germans would have preponderance. I concede that it is an argument. But under any scheme which is advanced save that of continued occupation of Europe by all the victorious powers, and of continued handouts by the American taxpayer, the Germans will be preponderant anyhow. If the Russian orbit is pushed westward, the effect of a Communist Germany will unquestionably shape history. If Germans in any great number are absorbed by France, that country will become German. As a matter of fact, the only impressive thing about M. Bidault's proposal is that it calls to mind the invasions which marked the fall of the Roman Empire. Then Slavic tribes pushed westward into Germany, and the Germans went into Gaul. It is my firm belief that any federation of Europe will of necessity leave the Germans in a strategic position. But if military ambition is translated into pacific ambition, what difference will German preponderance make?

No, the sole vital question is whether we — we Americans — are willing to sponsor a dynamic plan of European organization. I hope we can muster the courage to do it. So far we have been thinking almost exclusively in narrowly nationalistic terms. Our interest in Greece is obviously based on concern about a possible Russian thrust toward the route to Dakar. If the Russians have the Mediterranean, they will be close to us — close in terms of planes able to carry bombs. It seems to me that while at the moment we may have to think that way, we shall either come up ultimately with some far more significant idea or we shall perish. For we have begun to think in terms of Maginot Lines. That way lies death! Incidentally, we simply can't keep on wheedling money away in terms of 250,000,000 dollars a shot.

I come back to German labor. No one can predict what it will decide to think or do, even as nobody can describe what is its present state of mind. But at least no harm can come from trying to think of the German worker in terms of mind. The word "psychological" as currently used is too thin to serve any useful purpose. For we are concerned not merely with attitudes, or urges, but also, and primarily, with the impact of reality upon the thinking human being. We might, perhaps, say that the German problem is one of consciousness face to face with the facts of the German past and present. The American does not often have to think of the United States as the German must think of Germany. This country is big and young enough to run away in. One can always pick up and go somewhere else — run away from the Negro situation in Mississippi, or from the minority dislikes of New England. But in Germany there has long since been a policeman just outside every door, either one's own or somebody else's.

It is necessary at this point to remember that the German people lost several struggles for freedom. Always they were never quite strong enough to put up barricades or to stop their being overrun. Only once, since the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War more than three hundred years ago, has it been possible for a German to rejoice heartily in his national heritage. That was after 1870; and then the evil aspects of a Prussian rule spoiled the occasion for all except the chauvinists and the simpletons. Likewise it was possible only once during the post-medieval time to be wholly proud of German cultural achievement. That was within the brief span of years when Goethe and Schiller threw off the bonds of French cultural domination which had weighed heavily during a century. Even the world of nature has been partly shrouded from the German spirit except when it ventured across the Alps and reveled in the Italian sun.

I have recorded a conversation with Rudolf Hilferding, held in the years after 1933. "Characteristic of Germany," he said, "is *Gesinnunglosigkeit.* The German does not cling firmly to political, social or even religious views, if these are not protected against assaults from authority. When it comes to a choice between personal support of a point of view, no matter how right, and surrender to an order received from on high, even the greatest German spirits have proved dualistic. That is, they will take an idea home with them and coddle it privately while submitting outwardly to the dictation of the state. This separation between the inner and the outer life is not a question of racial heritage or anything of that sort. It is the legacy of history. For the story of the German past is a story of reactionary resistance to every revolution. Every time freedom has been struggled for, the end has always been further enslavement."

Those words may have been tinged with bitterness, but they are substantially correct. Father Max Pribilla and others have restated them recently in various contemporary German periodicals. All of which means that German pride has never been able to manifest itself in the warm humanitarian language of such Englishmen as Charles Dickens, or in the amusing braggadocio of the Southern French. It has been compounded of crowing rancously over military victory and of loud self-praise after commercial or organizational success. Of this sad truth the best Germans have been gloomily aware. The relative cultural emptiness of their outbursts of pride has haunted them. And so their efforts to conceal their uneasiness made them awkward in the company of others and unsteady in their own minds. They have always known of their failure to solve their political problems. And so they have tended to be harshly jealous of the success of other peoples, and likewise ashamed of their own immaturity.

The German labor movement, surely one of the great liberalizing forces of Central Europe, has been no exception to this rule. In the old days it was admirably organized, loyal, uncompromisingly decent, and well-informed. It avoided racketeering like the plague. Moreover in its better moments it was hard as nails. But when it tried to be proud of its German character it shifted about like a dull-witted boy at a spelling bee. Under such circumstance efforts to reform it by trying to elicit an expression of culpability, of guilt for the crimes of Hitler, was a singularly inept proceeding. Somebody said the other day that the rule for German re-education must be "Tell them how to rebel." Instead we have insisted upon attempting to make them subservient, in a new and perhaps more degrading sense.

No, the job to be done on this psychology is a task of arousing some sort of wakeful sense of democratic achievement. It is fearfully difficult. Otherwise the same old ultra-nationalist elements which have always returned to dominate will dominate again. For they are the only ones who, within the recollection of those now alive, have ever won out. The rest — the labor movement in particular — is to blame for having failed against Hitler. Yet precisely this is not new to it. For generations there was always failure. Failure under Baron vom Stein. Failure in 1848. Failure in 1933. How can we make them believe that they will not always fail?

The query is of utmost importance. If the liberal elements in Germany do not acquire firm faith in their ability to achieve a victory, the basic problem of how they are to cooperate with the Western World cannot be solved. This world exacts confidence in the democratic process. The other way out is to accept the universe of Stalin, wherein orders come down from on high. There is grave warning in the record of the recent past. Effective resistance to Hitler came only from the comparatively small group of those, Social Democrats as well as Christians and Conservatives, who had acquired through personal contact with Anglo-Saxon countries some sense of personal prestige. Goerdeler and the rest had measured themselves according to British and American standards. As a result they were willing to risk their lives. German labor, on the other hand, was incomparable in its loyalty to its private views. But it did not know how to rise. It waited for somebody to tell it what to do.

Unless we can help to get over waiting for somebody to do that, the cause is hopeless. It is too bad that we as a people know so little about the German psychology. We know how to fight the Nazis, but we do not know how to kindle a spark in the hearts of those who aren't Nazis. In my opinion, at least, this is the great and dangerous American weakness. We have proved ourselves to be a generous folk. We are practical. We know how to make friends. But we do not understand the art of influencing people.

The disappointing corollary to all this is that we have received little asistance from the British, who have become cramped and worried and sensitive. Their spokesmen in Germany are more serious and intelligent than are ours. They read more and they think a great deal more. But they haven't any dynamism at all. I can only hope that during the final hours that remain before the fate of the European world is decided the great, long shadow of Lincoln will be thrown upon the landscape of the world. Perhaps it is the light of the freedom which that shadow symbolizes which can still point the way ahead. For at present it is very dark — darker certainly than at any moment since this Republic was born, and darker possibly than at any time since the now distant days of Caesar Augustus when a child was born in Bethlehem.

## Corrections

*Modern Review,* Vol. I, No. 2, April 1947.

Line 13 on Page 116 should read: ". . . Agricultural Leader at a village near Nikolajev by the Black Sea. . ." This error occurred in editing and is not the responsibility of the author of the article, Mr. Josef Guttmann.

On Page 126 one line is missing at the end of Leon Blum's article. The close should read: ". . . the revolutionary transformation of the regime of property and production is not an end in itself, but rather the necessary means and indispensable condition for the liberation of the human personality. This, indeed, is *the* end, the final goal of Socialism."

# VISIT TO A GERMAN HOSPITAL

### Fenner Brockway

I have arranged to go this afternoon to the hospital. The car drives through blossoming orchards to the village of Langenhorn, twelve miles outside of Hamburg. The head of the hospital is Dr. Bansi, the greatest nutrition expert in Germany, one of the greatest in the world. Before the war his pre-eminence was recognised by appointment to the Health Commission of the League of Nations.

We turn up a drive, dotted with people visiting patients. The average English hospital is a barrack-like affair: not so this. There are many homely buildings standing amidst grass and gardens. We drive up to the main building, and Dr. Bansi, with two nurses in the background, is standing on the steps to welcome me. He is a little man, clean-shaven, dark, going bald, friendly yet direct and decisive of speech. I'm led into a reception-room and am rather taken aback by the impressive group awaiting me—four or five doctors in white hospital suits and as many sisters and nurses in uniform. I'm introduced and led to a table.

On the table are two trays and a newly-painted cream-coloured tin box. My attention is directed first to the trays. The smaller one is about 30 inches by 18. The larger, about 36 inches by 24. On the former is the total day's ration for the normal adult German citizen. On the latter is the total day's ration for patients in the hospital suffering from physical defects.

Honestly, the collection of foodstuffs on the smaller tray would not satisfy the average Englishman for one meal. There are two-and-a-half slices of dry bread, a big potato, fragments of meat and fish, and mere spoonsful of other articles. The tray and its pathetic collection of tit-bits reminds me of the dolls' party games which children play, with tiny morsels of food for their toy tea-sets.

This is a day's ration *on paper.* In fact, many of its items are often unobtainable. Potatoes, for example, haven't been procurable for months. When this happens, other items are increased or substitutes

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FENNER BROCKWAY was for many years a leader of the Independent Labour Party of Great Britain. Recently he left it to join the British Labour Party. This selection is taken from his latest book, *German Diary,* published in London by Victor Gollancz Ltd.

given. As I have already found, hard turnips, which would ordinarily be given to cattle, are the staple food in most homes.

On the second tray, the rations are larger. For example, there are 4¼ slices of dark bread instead of 2½. The calorie value of the diet for physical cases is about one-third higher than for adults outside.

Dr. Bansi begins to talk and the doctors and nurses group themselves round us to listen. He gives me in fifteen minutes more *facts* about the food situation than I've got from all the other people I've consulted. The 2,800 calories allowed to British civilians represents the normal ration which we have at home. It is between two and three times as much as the basic ration of the German people.

The next striking fact worthy of record is this. *The rations of the Nazi prisoners in the internment camps is considerably higher than the rations of ordinary German civilians.* This is not because the British authorities love the Nazis, but because they found that the disease and death-rate threatened to become so alarming on the usual ration that they simply had to increase it.

Dr. Bansi hesitates a moment. "I could cite so much evidence of the increasing starvation," he remarks, "that I don't know what to select." He begins to pour out facts, whilst I jot them down in my note-book.

Hospitals everywhere report that malnutrition cases are growing steadily, says the doctor. "The whole population in the British zone receive such a small ration that each individual is like an engine which is burning not only fuel but its own body," he explains. "They cannot live and work on the food which they eat, so they are living and working on the reserve of energy which is in their muscles. *It is a kind of cannibalism.* They are living and working by eating themselves."

He describes how he and his colleagues at the hospital have proved this by a careful investigation of the "intake" (food consumed) and the "output" (urine and excreta) of the patients. I cannot follow all this, but I do understand that they have been able to itemise the elements which are lacking for the maintenance of health. Some of these elements are present in yeast, which they have been able to obtain from wood, but yeast is still without the necessary amino-acids. "We need cystins," proceeds Dr. Bansi. "This is how we get it to enable the malnutrition cases in this hospital to recover." He stretches his hand across the table and places the newly-painted cream-colored tin box in front of me. He raises its lid—*and it is full of human hair!*

I gasp, and look again into the box. The contents are beautifully clean and soft, but there is no doubt that what I see is human hair. I look into Dr. Bansi's face. "You are getting this necessary food element from human hair?" I exclaim.

"Yes. Our researches at the Hamburg Chemical Institute have shown how cystins can be extracted from it. We are now collecting all the hair from our patients when it is cut, immunising it, and extracting the food element which is lacking. The patients then eat it mixed in their foods. You shall eat some for yourself."

"Is this being done anywhere else in the world?"

"Not so far as we know. We have only just begun it. The results have proved so satisfactory that we are now making arrangements to collect hair from all the barbers in Hamburg."

I am stunned into silence. There is something that revolts me in the idea that human beings should be fed on human hair. It's in the nature of the cannibalism which Dr. Bansi has already instanced. But, I reflect, it is better that human beings should be fed on their discarded hair than on their living muscles. . . . My thoughts are interrupted by a movement in the group of doctors and nurses who surround me. "Let us pass on to the malnutrition ward," Dr. Bansi is saying.

There are forty-two cases. I cannot describe them. I look from one bed to another and want to look away. Faces yellow and grey, foreheads and cheeks streaked with deep furrows, eyes which show the fear and pain and exhaustion which have been undergone. I try to recollect where I have seen such faces before. It was in the film of the Belsen camp. . . . Thank God Dr. Bansi is talking. It distracts my attention from this horror. He is saying that when the malnutrition cases come into the hospital their weights have gone up: that surprises me. I look at these ugly human forms again and, at his direction, feel the bodies with my hands. They are puffed out with water. I press my fingers on their legs: it is like pressing a half-sucked orange—the dent remains in the squashy flesh until the water gradually fills it up. Two nurses lift a sheet: Dr. Bansi slaps the thigh of a patient and invites me to do so. The thigh is like a hot water-bottle, with the water gone luke-warm.

These patients are suffering from malnutrition dropsy. When the water has been drawn from their bodies, the skin hangs on the bones as though there were no flesh, no fat, no muscles—just skeletons covered by crinkled skin. Cannibalism is the right word. These humans have lived on themselves until there is nothing but bone and skin left.

The water extracted, the weight falls with a bang. Then comes the difficult task of building up their bodies on a diet which is below human need, building up the flesh and muscle from yeast drawn from wood and from cystins extracted from human hair.

As I leave the ward a nurse approaches with a plate on which there are fingers of toast covered with a brown paste. "Taste our special food preparation," invites Dr. Bansi. "Including the cystins from human hair?" I ask. "Yes," he replies. I am a vegetarian, but I am too intrigued to decline. The doctors and nurses watch me with interest as I bite and swallow. "Not bad," I comment. The taste is not unlike fish-paste.

We cross the gardens to another building. "I want you to see the mental patients," says Dr. Bansi. They are grouped in a living-room around two tables. Some of them stand as we enter, making a tableau. It is the most ghastly tableau I have ever seen. I cannot glance at these men and women a second time: I turn and have gone in thirty seconds. The face of one of the women will haunt me as long as I live: a young woman, little more than thirty, but with the suffering of ages in her eyes. It is not madness which horrifies me in these faces, but hunger. White, hollow faces with a pain and appeal in their eyes which are unbearable.

I cannot speak for a time and I do not hear what Dr. Bansi is saying. Then I pick it up. These mental patients do not get the extra ration allowed to physical cases. They were deliberately starved under Hitler; they are starving now under the British Occupation. It was found that Nazi prisoners could not exist on the 1,048 calorie ration and it was increased; but these prisoners of the mind are still left to the torture of existing on it. They never have anything beyond it: no one ever brings them anything from the country or a prize from the black market or scraps from the tables or dustbins of the British. They go all round the hours hungry, until a merciful death ends their physical and mental pain. A lethal chamber would be humane compared with this ordeal.[1]

I have only an indistinct memory of saying good-bye to Dr. Bansi and his colleagues. I am so shaken that I feel nothing except an utter exhaustion. The car rushes me back to Hamburg.

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[1] When I returned to London I drew Mr. John Hynd's attention to this barbarity. He replied that the original instruction to increase rations in hospitals had been misunderstood. Because asylums were not specifically mentioned, the increases had not been given to mental patients. He has sent a new instruction requiring that the increase be immediately extended to mental patients.

# SOCIALISM AND PSYCHOLOGY

**Victor Serge**

The social changes which have occurred in the 20th century surpass both in complexity and extent the revolution that socialist thinkers of the 19th century envisaged. On the one hand, technology has developed to a level which was inconceivable a century or century-and-a-half ago. On the other, science has made such strides that the great synthetic systems of the eighteen hundreds seem almost naive in retrospect. This is especially true in relation to the Science of Man. The work of the founders of modern psychology—Wundt, Breuer, William James, Freud, Jung, Alfred Adler, Koehler—was scarcely begun when Marx died, and it is only now that it is beginning to influence social life to any considerable extent. The Red Army in 1918-20 was the first to give its soldiers ideological instruction; the American Army recently the first to submit its recruits to psychological examination.

Marx certainly did not ignore, as is the case with many of his followers, the complexities of human motivation. "Men," he wrote in the *Eighteenth Brumaire,* "make their own history, but not just as they please. They . . . have to work upon circumstances as they find them, have to fashion the materials handed down by the past. The legacy of dead generations weighs like an alp upon the brains of the living." This, indeed, opens wide the window for study of the "human soul," and sounds like a presentiment of Freud's Super-ego. Yet Marx's methodology, dominated by his analysis of capitalism and by his desire to liberate the exploited, gave rise to certain misconceptions. Production for human need seemed to him the "first principle of all human existence and consequently of all history." (*German Ideology.*) As if one could use the expression "first principle" in this connection except as convenient shorthand terminology! Human activities constitute an indivisible whole within which the instincts of self-preservation and reproduction (perhaps also of death and destruction) are served and directed by the brain. These activities clearly do not involve first or

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second principles. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to reproach the founder of scientific socialism for not having anticipated the results of future research. It was more than half a century after he laid the basis of his work that knowledge of the character of man was amplified and extended by new theories of the influence of pre-natal development, of the early years of childhood, of the fundamental role of the libido—all factors that play a more important part in the formation of individual character than does material production. Marx's theories in regard to exploitation are in no way rendered invalid by this fact. His recognition of the dominant role the system of capitalist production plays in determining mores and intellectual currents also remains valid.

Socialist thought, as it crystallized in the 19th century when it became the thinking of that social movement which provided the most powerful thrust toward renewal and innovation, often proceeded (as usually is the case with militant doctrines) through broad, schematic over-simplifications. The science of the 19th century sufficed it for a time; it no longer suffices. To meet the exigencies of our day, socialism must enrich itself with the newly-acquired knowledge of the motivating factors determining human conduct. To that end it must shake the great stabilized movements out of their mental inertia.

It is no longer possible to counteract successfully religious belief with militant atheism, stemming from anti-clericalism, since it is evident that the roots of religious faith are buried deep in the subconscious and unconscious—in fact at a subsoil level far below that reflected in the teachings of the churches.

We can no longer neglect the role irrationality plays in both individual and mass behavior. The last of the old Bolsheviks who counted on the "just theory" to rally the working class have gone down to defeat.

Nor is it any longer permissible to ignore, over and above the mentalities of social classes, the importance of biologically conditioned character and temperament set during the first period of childhood. Whatever man's social position, he has at his disposal more or less nervous energy. In other words, there are men of dynamic character (in the working class movement these often constitute the revolutionaries) and less dynamic individuals (who often constitute the moderates). Marx, Bakunin, and Trotsky were exceptional personalities who can serve only in a vague way as models for the average man.

It is no longer possible to ignore mass psychology which has been inadequately studied but the importance of which cannot be doubted if one takes into consideration phenomena such as the panics which spread through armies and nations, lynchings, meetings whipped into a frenzy by irrational agitation, the life of whole populations subjected to the totalitarian process which crushes individual, human personality. Under this heading, we must also consider various forms of mental contagion and mass psychosis—especially that of the "conspiracy"—which inhuman regimes exploit to the full.

Scientific socialism banked on "consciousness." It appealed to the "conscious proletarians"; it placed its trust in the power of the rational. It can no longer remain blind to the fact, however, that passionate rationalization—particularly in times of crisis—prevails over objective reasoning and that consequently attainment by man of a state of clear consciousness is infinitely more difficult than the humanists of the 19th century believed.

An influential current in socialist thought from Rosa Luxemburg to Herman Gorter centered its hopes in the "spontaneity" of the masses. These hopes have generally been frustrated. When this "spontaneity" manifested itself in exceptional cases, it was the product of special circumstances. Furthermore, the way was paved for it by proper education. Spontaneity can also serve diametrically opposed ends. One must not forget the extreme malleability of intellect and mass emotions under the stimulus of a bureaucratic apparatus and propaganda.

Revolutionary schools of thought, stimulated by the victories of the Russian Revolution, have attempted to derive from it principles of conduct and political action applicable at any place if not at any time—an effort, let it be noted in passing, that led to various forms of degeneration and often to political suicide. Thus an opposition movement to which I belonged in Soviet Russia attempted by agitation to revitalize a revolution that was dead; in other words, it demanded of the masses efforts of which they were no longer capable. (I wish in no way to blame opposition movements that had the courage to struggle against the mounting totalitarianism; I desire here merely to point out that psychological illusions contributed to their defeat.)

It may be helpful in this respect to take into account the significantly brief duration of the great revolutionary movements of recent times. The Russian Revolution, in its more or less spontaneous phase, lasted only about 18 months—from March 1917 until the autumn of 1918. Later it became the tool of the Bolshevik State. The flame of the German revolution of November, 1918, was practically extinguished by January, 1919; three months later it flickered only in sporadic defensive reflexes. The Spanish revolution, which was a magnificent reply to the attack of the generals in July, 1936, lay in agony by May, 1937; its impetus spent in less than a year.

The relations between mass and leader raise other but related questions. We have known the Era of Militants, men of initiative and devotion who became impromptu leaders. They were sufficient for a good organizational beginning. But today organizations—sometimes embracing millions—require professional leaders who are real technicians and who have little contact with those they direct rather than represent. This holds true even in the democratic countries. Organizations of the totalitarian type are to be recognized by their adoration of The Chief, by the hierarchical order that prevails in their cadres, by the partially occult structure of The Apparatus. And one must admit that their attraction for certain layers of the masses is greater than that of their democratic rivals. The tendency toward *caudillismo* manifest among certain relatively backward peoples of Latin-America offers sufficient proof of this even if we leave out of account entirely the great totalitarian systems within which the people no longer have any choice.

In many instances psychology reveals to us only how (and because of what interests) the collectivity shapes man, that "domestic animal" *par excellence.* In others, it reveals the superficial and tenuous nature of consciousness as compared with reactions of deeper and more obscure origins. If it were possible to establish statistics in the field, it would certainly be found that balanced personalities (i.e. personalities adjusted to a style of living in harmony with the development of man and society) are in the minority even in the most prosperous countries and that even in these countries their influence is dangerously counterbalanced by that of other minorities driven by primitive instincts or clearly ailing from the psychological point of view. To illustrate this we have only to mention the fact that the Nazis were able to select sadistic personalities *in all countries* they occupied and turn them into torturers. Even the most summary observation reveals that there are elements among all peoples which are psychologically predisposed for such tasks: the "terrors" of civil wars have shown them at work.

It is no longer necessary to stress the role of economic factors and of the class struggle in the historical catastrophies of our time: the reign of totalitarianism in Russia, the assumption of power by the Nazis, the wars of conquest of the Third Reich, the extermination of the Jews. Yet one must also admit that economic developments and social conflict do not follow a rigid and clearly intelligible—much less predictable—deterministic pattern. Driven by events, individuals and collectivities react according to aspirations that are more unconscious than conscious—sometimes according to traditions which seemed forgotten, according to temperaments, neuroses, instinctual elementary compulsions. Fear appears more often as a powerful motivating force than does economic interest. I have been deeply impressed by the remarkable study of Dr. Bruno Bettelheim dealing with the behavior of interned anti-Nazis in German concentration camps.[1] His remarks confirm my own observations made—at a lesser degree of intensity—in various prisons,[2] and, at a terribly depressing degree of dilution, during daily life in a great totalitarian country, the USSR, while it was in the grip of famine and terror. The inmates whom Dr. Bettelheim describes believed that even the most adamant characters, men most conscious of their personalities, could not resist for more than six years the "extreme conditions" of this captivity designed to destroy personality. This statement may appear arbitrary, but it coincides with my own conclusions which were reached under conditions much less "extreme." Without taking into consideration studies of this nature, it is impossible to understand anything about men under totalitarianism.

The seeds of totalitarianism exist in all modern societies since they are as much rooted in the despotism of the past as in the possibilities opened to the state by modern technology. We are indebted to Erich Fromm for one of the best studies of the socio-psychological soil in Europe in which these seeds thrive.[3] A certain "freedom," which in fact should be given another name when it means for the ordinary man in the street nothing but privation in a blind alley, plunges him into an intolerable state of sensitivity regarding his isolation, powerlessness, degradation, and frustration. In such a situation, rational thinking becomes a hindrance and burden to him insofar as it involves certain moral imperatives. This anguished man tends to abdicate his personality, to submerge himself in the collectivity which promises him security through obedience. The Chief, by thinking for him, frees him from responsibility, initiative, doubt, and permits him to place himself again in the situation of an infant under the authority of the Father. This is certainly a very old psychological attitude which seems to stem from the tribal origins of society. The Pope is still termed "Holy Father," the Czar of Russia, just as the priest, was affectionately called

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[1] "Behavior In Extreme Situations," Bruno Bettelheim. *Politics,* 1945.

[2] *Les Hommes Dans La Prison,* Victor Serge. Paris, Rieder, 1930.

[3] *Escape From Freedom,* Erich Fromm. Farrar & Rinehart, New York, 1941.

"Little Father," and now Stalin is referred to as the "Genial Chief," "Our Sun," and "Father of the Peoples."

Curiously these profound traits common among masses that are hungry and have lost their bearings are also to be found among us who live in relatively prosperous countries and reflected in the behavior of numerous intellectuals seduced by the prestige of power, inclined to adoration of The Chief, and even more inclined to surrender the severe liberty of looking facts in the face. They are guilty, in a word, of treason to objective knowledge. It is developments such as these that have caused psychological problems to acquire a practical importance in our eyes that is at least equal to that of the immediate economic factors.

The best proof of this is to be found in the astonishing parallelism between two series of different, even opposed, historical events. A totalitarian regime established itself in one country (Russia) after a victorious socialist revolution and in another (Germany) as an aftermath of counter-revolution fomented by the reactionary forces of capitalism which felt themselves endangered. The social origins were opposed; the economic bases were originally opposed; yet there was a common psychological denominator, and, emerging later, planned economies, though of different types. I think that in both cases in addition to the rootlessness of the masses and the great sense of insecurity, the exhaustion of intellectual capacity as a result of long periods of undernourishment and nervous tension ("extreme situations") must be taken into account. Many ordinary human being readily surrender independent thinking when they can no longer exercise it easily because of over-exertion or when it imposes moral obligations that are too burdensome.

Socialist optimism did not foresee such psychological regression, although the barbaric methods of repression that were employed in the name of "order" during the social conflicts of the 19th century provided material which might have been studied with benefit. The execution of some thirty or forty thousand Communards (1871) was the first attempt in our epoch aimed at the mass liquidation of a whole category of the vanquished. The political mechanism of this event was thoroughly studied, but not so its phychological roots.

Socialism proceeded from an over-simplified concept of man. It did not plumb the frightening depths. It maintained that the working class was ethically superior to the reactionary bourgeoisie and left to the latter the sorry monopoly of crimes against humanity. Revolutionists had no doubts in this respect concerning themselves. A little introspection in the light of a minimum of psycho-analytical knowledge would have been exceedingly rewarding for them. It is easy to cite a few psychological errors committed by revolutionists, the consequences of which can scarcely be calculated.

On December 20, 1917, the Council of Peoples Commissars of the Russian Revolution, comprised of Marxists embued with a profound belief in socialism and meeting in the midst of difficulties that were considerable and yet not impossible to overcome, decreed the creation of an Extraordinary Commission of Repression, the Cheka. These men, without doubt, were haunted by memories of the bloody repressions to which the working class had been subjected in the past and of persecution of which they themselves had been victims. It was natural that the new regime should create efficient organs for internal defense. There were about twenty men around the table, composed, most of them well versed in the lessons of history. They were free to set up various types of institutions: martial courts, popular tribunals, selected juries, a High Court. . . . They established instead a secret Inquisition that pronounced judgment without listening to the defense, that sentenced without consulting files and reports—usually without even seeing the accused. They granted this Inquisition, as its principal arm, the power of capital punishment—the abolition of which had been promised in their program. No doubt all other procedures which they considered presented serious handicaps. The unpopularity of a revolutionary regime that meant dictatorship and rationing would have become clear in the course of public trials; professional defenders of those accused by the regime could have easily proved embarrassing since they would have faced inexperienced prosecutors. But it can no longer be open to question that the dangers presented by an Inquisition —which in due course became the keystone of an anti-socialist regime (and which eventually resulted in the execution of several of its founders) was the greatest danger. The psychological decisions taken on that day merit a searching analysis. We would probably discover that the roots of these decisions were in the realm of a subconscious dominated by fear, by a certain atmosphere that surrounds power, by rancour and distrust of the masses which might be stirred to unforeseeable reactions, etc. I know personally that many of the Old Bolsheviks hated the Cheka and I could name well-known names in this respect. The Cheka contributed to victory in the civil war (hasn't-this-been-said-often-enough?), but, by becoming a target for hatred, by mobilizing a great part of socialist democracy against the government, it also deepened the civil war and eventually discredited the Revolution outside of Russia. By choosing in 1918 to take the easy course, by opening the way for and selecting a personnel of sadists and obsessed human beings (who went so far at one time as to propose in writing the re-establishment of torture—a proposal that Kamenev was then ordered to counter in sharp form) the Cheka promptly became a ferment of social perversion. If the men around the table had paid more attention to psychology (above all to their own psychology), they would have avoided this fatal error.

On another occasion, the Bolshevik leadership decided to entrust the direction of the administrative services of the Central Committee—the post of Secretary General—to a man who was obviously narrow-minded, uncultured, but esteemed for his obstinate and even cruel firmness—demonstrated by the first volleys at Tsaritsyn. This meant placing a premium on administrative willfulness as against the qualities of intelligence, general culture, and high idealism which other candidates possessed. One did not think about it; one did not take notice of it. Lenin drew back only when it was too late. He also professed the dangerous fetishism of "iron discipline" which signified nothing if not violation of conscience.

All this proceeded from a revolutionary mentality that had not analyzed itself and thus was in no position to guard against the deadly germs contained within itself. There was no lack of danger signals from the outside—but these came mostly too late. And it should be stressed in this regard that the development of consciousness on the part of individuals and groups stems from their interior life and can not be easily influenced from outside if the appropriate techniques are not at hand.

Quite recently we have witnessed how the great socialist parties in France and Italy committed dangerous psychological errors which resulted in a sharp decline in their influence. The stupifying lack of understanding of the nature of totalitarian Communism, the purely emotional attachment to illusions fostered by the myth of "the revolution of 1917," the fear that inspires Stalin's power, and political opportunism led them to a situation in which an anxiety-ridden population came to confuse them with the Communist Party. Thus they appeared as "brother parties" of the CP—less energetic, weaker, less insistent, less attractive and more disposed to capitulate. There is nothing more dangerous than the confusion of antinomies, especially if it appears to be a confession of weakness.

When political decisions are to be made, the character of the people who make them is a determining factor which in no way is to be confused with the personal or group interest involved however basically important the latter may be. Ideology draws upon character and in turn sustains it. Socialist ideology, however, that leans heavily upon knowledge of economics and history, as well as upon the rich practical experience of the labor movement, still evinces an insufficient knowledge of psychology.

Financial concerns, big industry, the police, the army—sometimes very discreetly—set up psychological laboratories. Though the official doctrine of the USSR is singularly backward in this respect, CP militants share the advantages of the teachings of the Moscow schools. All functionaries of the N.K.V.D., all secret agents follow courses in applied psychology, and the adroitness of camouflaged Communist propaganda cannot be contested nor its success denied. Meanwhile independent trade union movements and socialist organizations fail to give psychology even a secondary place in their study groups.

The principal points of socialist programs—concerning the economy, labor legislation, social security for workers, nationalization of key industries and transport—are, because of the general trend of events, very much in the forefront of political life today in many countries. In Austria, a Catholic majority has voted for the nationalization of basic industries. Recent history demonstrates, however, that economic reforms are not sufficient within themselves to guarantee the rights of workers or of citizens generally. Our epoch imposes upon the socialist movement the essential duty of becoming the defender of true democracy, i.e. of the freedom and dignity of man. Democracy, freedom, dignity—these very clear concepts are frequently the object of impudent falsification possible only because ideas have lost a part of their traditional significance in the struggles of the modern world while their new significance (i.e. a significance in tune with the possibilities of our time) remains unanalyzed. This now indispensable task, in connection with which the works of Karl Mannheim and Erich Fromm must be mentioned, cannot be accomplished without the aid of psychology.

# FRANCE'S FOUR-YEAR PLAN: ITS MOTIVE AND MEANING

### Gelo and Andrea

In December 1945 the French Government, then presided over by General de Gaulle, decided to set up a National Council of the Plan for Modernization and Equipment of France. In January 1946 this body was asked to formulate, within six months, the country's first comprehensive economic plan. This four-year plan, which came to be called the Monnet Plan after Jean Monnet who headed the Council, was finally published in November of last year.

The plan does not create an essentially new situation; it only inaugurates a new stage, though an important one, in a development that began after "the liberation," or more precisely after the end of hostilities. The peace-time managed economy, which had already superseded the war economy inherited from Vichy, was now provided with directives to allow it to develop in a more orderly and rational manner.

It is not our purpose to give a detailed account of the plan. Economic journals will certainly publish extensive studies on this subject.[1] Rather we shall attempt to outline the motives behind the plan and the political, social and economic conditions and consequences likely to flow from its being put into effect.

### *Modernization Cannot Be Neutral*

The Monnet Plan is not simply a program for reconstruction as a result of war damage. It was conceived with the guiding idea that modernization and equipment come first. The general report on the plan assumes that the only course open is to reconstruct rationally and quickly, and it specifies: "If one should attempt immediately to direct the totality or the greatest part of available resources towards recon-

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[1] For a brief summary of the Monnet Plan see "French Plan for Reconstruction," *Modern Review,* March 1947, p. 79.

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GELO and ANDREA are independent French socialists who were active in the Resistance and have contributed frequently to *Politics* in this country and to *Pensee Socialiste, Masses,* and *Libertes* in France.

struction . . . this reconstruction itself would suffer."[2] At the same time, the report assumes, this is the only means to insure a favorable population balance and progressively raise the standard of living not merely above what it is now but even above the pre-war norm, "to the level of more developed nations."

How can the French farmer, for example, attain standards comparable to those of the American farmer as long as an agricultural worker provides for only five consumers in France as against twenty in the United States? How can a French skilled worker enjoy conditions similar to those of an American skilled worker as long as the present discrepancy of productivity between the two countries persists? In the U.S. it takes 600 man-hours to produce an automobile; in France 3,000 man-hours are required. Four French miners produce four tons of coal a day; in the U.S. one miner produces the same amount. The list could be prolonged indefinitely. Such discrepancies are in no way surprising if one remembers that the age of French machine tools average 25 years, against nine years in England and six in the U.S.[3] By creating a productive apparatus such as the plan envisages, state its authors, France will "rapidly march toward a degree of prosperity which she has never known." And this "while at the same time insuring the (economic) independence of the country by development of basic production and lowering of cost price levels."

Finally, military security would result from the expansion of productive forces, since "today the only way to have an Army that is a real force is to create industries without which an army provides only the illusion of security."

Undoubtedly in order to attain those goals, a well-developed industrial potential and a high degree of productivity is necessary. The authors of the plan conclude, therefore, that with modernization and equipment realized, *the various tasks will be harmoniously accomplished.* This appears logical.

Yet is it true that all of these tasks can be accomplished simultaneously by the plan? This would assume that modernization and equipment are processes which are socially neutral. But they are by no means neutral. Their pace and structure vary according to the goal of the plan. Whether this is a program for expansion of productive forces aimed at progressive fulfillment of the material and cultural needs of men, or whether it is designed to take into account the ambition of France to intervene economically as an independent factor in the political and economic rivalries of the Big Powers remains to be answered. No plan can serve these two masters at once. Since a conflict exists between the two aims, it is important to discover which purpose dominates.

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[2] All quotations unless otherwise specified are from the text of the *General Report on the Plan for Modernization and Equipment* (2nd Sessions of the Council of the Plan, November 1946).

[3] *The French Economy in the World,* Fourastie and Montet. Paris, 1946.

### *Dominant Objective of the Plan*

The statemen who direct the political life of the Fourth Republic and who are seeking to institute a planned economy are haunted by the idea that France, so long as she remains economically backward, is condemned to lose, sooner or later, her national independence. To illustrate what this means, examples are usually drawn from the days of the German occupation. But even if subjection were to take milder forms, it would be rejected nevertheless by the fathers of the plan. In the words of Andre Philip, present Minister of National Economy, who, since the days of the Algiers government, has been one of the most fervent advocates of a planned economy, they want a France that is "neither the slave of a powerful enemy nor of a protecting friend."

The Communists, of course, do not really want an independent France. But it is not possible simply to sweep France into the Russian orbit as in the case of Yugoslavia or Poland. In order eventually to align France at the side of Russia, it is necessary first to see to it that she does not now become a dependent of the U.S. This is why French Communists at present support an economic policy which happens also to coincide with national policy.

Statesmen and political parties thus see only the two alternatives; either to build France into a power that carries weight in international councils or permit her to become "balkanized." But to create a productive apparatus sufficient to safeguard independence in the face of the Big Powers means, under present circumstances, to enter the arena against these powers. It also means — whether one likes it or not — imposing certain laws on the trend of modernization which counteract any trend toward increased well-being. Any plan conceived and integrated into the framework of the present-day world of national rivalries will assume — as did the managed economy of war-time — a character of national defense in which everything else is subordinated to power interests.

### *The Irreducible Conflict*

In the present international situation, the demands of economic independence exert more immediate pressure than those of military security. France, having lost the greater part of her foreign investments, must try to pay for her imports as soon as possible by exports, for otherwise, in the wake of deep and prolonged indebtedness, she would become the victim of economic, and eventually of political, dependence. But the plan cannot work without heavy imports of equipment, machine tools, coal, oil, etc. This is why, although the country suffers from extreme privation, the Government seeks to limit as strictly as possible all import to those products which are essential to maintain the power of the country. Above all, the Government must increase its exports to the maximum even if this means "sacrifice of the needed for the indispensable." But the authors of the plan envisage that "probably from 1948 on, international competition will again be in full swing." Therefore the necessity arises to accelerate modernization and equipment "especially of the great export industries (textiles, mechanical construction) . . . so as to lower costs of production . . . the *sine qua non* of an increase in exports." In short, the question which the report itself raises (i.e. the pace of modernization) is decided by the pressure of international competition. "Either France makes haste or she loses the race."

The magnitude of the task can be measured if one considers that — according to the report — French industry, backward and exhausted since the war, should by 1950 be prepared "to bring forth if necessary a great army." Even if this should be delayed, if "the program of reconstruction of the French army should be based on ten years of peace in Europe" as M. Coste-Floret, Minister of War and a member of the Popular Republicans, stated in his speech of March 8, 1947, the rearmament demands even then are bound to have repercussions upon the program of production, since "the true measure of a country's war potential from now on depends upon the degree of development of its heavy industries — especially of the steel and mechanical industries." Thus steel production which was 6.2 million tons in 1938 and dropped to 4.2 million tons in 1946 is to attain 11 million tons in 1950. And it is already projected that it will be increased to 15 million tons during a second four-year plan. If this program should be carried out, France would become the largest steel producer of continental Europe.

It is not in the least astonishing, therefore, that the plan deliberately envisages food supplies reaching their 1938 level only by 1948 or 1949. Housing will remain in even a more precarious state. And the promises for the future? Can they be kept? It is obvious that there can be no possibility of fulfilling them as long as the investment and export programs which have priority are incompleted. The dominant objective of the plan will impose on the French economy the necessity of "existing and developing under a regime of priorities that stands *in need of continuous adjustment.*" The rules that will govern the adjustments have been fixed. It will be the interests of building up power which will determine the percentage of all resources that is to be alloted to investments and exports on the one hand and to domestic consumption on the other.

If difficulties arise in foreign markets, if weather conditions interfere with the harvest, if any kind of bottlenecks develop, the consumer will always be the principal victim. And it is obvious that bottlenecks are bound to occur, especially since the "imperative objectives" are enormous while the estimated resources are often merely hypothetical: foreign credits not yet granted, foreign manpower not yet arrived in the country, coal imports that are questionable to say the least, and even an export program which calls for tripling exports between 1946 and 1950.

Even in the long run one cannot envisage attenuation of the excessive rhythm of investments, since the economy of the countries which France seeks to equal will not remain stationary.

In the final analysis, it is the autarchic nature of the plan which runs counter to an increase in human well-being. The authors state specifically that "the greatest efforts should be directed towards the development of the resources of the homeland and the overseas territories in oil, wood, fats, etc." This is contrary to the principle of international division of labor which is an essential characteristic of all progressive planning. Such planning demands that in order to obtain optimum results for development of well-being, each country must specialize in the production of those good for which it is best suited, whereas the remaining products needed should be obtained by exchange with other countries. To renounce this principle means to deprive a country of the most favorable conditions which development of its productive forces would enable it to attain. A national managed economy, even if it assured the highest degree of domestic productivity, even if it set records in certain branches of production, would still, as a whole, mean waste of energies and resources.

### *Framework of Planning*

The Monnet Plan is born of a situation which is characterized by an enormous discrepancy between urgent economic tasks and available resources. This unbalance will be indefinitely prolonged despite all efforts to right it, because the aim—determined as it is by power rivalries—acts in such a way that the tasks, ever renewed, ever increasing, always run far ahead of what is possible of realization.

These conditions cannot be attributed to contingencies inherent in an especially unfavorable situation. Any over-all plan that is animated by national interests carries within itself this law of development. This continued unbalance causes a special kind of transformation of the economic, social and political structure of society. The neo-liberals are wrong when they label the consequences of this development "socialism." But those—among them many representatives of the European labor movement—who look upon this development as a spring-board to socialism are just as wrong. The whole transformation, in fact, has nothing to do with a transition to socialism. A socialist economy is to be characterized essentially by its orientation toward satisfying the material and cultural needs of the masses—including, of course, the need for leisure and individual freedom. A completely different rhythm of investments from that of a national managed economy would result from such an orientation. A socialist economy, of course, will aspire to ever-increasing fulfillment of needs: i.e. it will make investments designed to bear fruit in the future, sometimes even only after generations. But it will never sacrifice the present generation to generations yet unborn.

The conditions and consequences of the Monnet Plan do not arise from planning *per se,* but exclusively from planning placed at the service of national interest, which is inevitably a power interest. The neo-liberals from Hayek to Walter Lippman and Mises charge socialism with attempting to plunge society into serfdom and barbarism. They would be correct if a national planned economy and socialism were synonymous. But in reality these are two alien worlds.

### *Social and Political Consequences*

With the inauguration of the Monnet Plan the pace of the profound transformation of the social structure which began earlier will increase. In the economic sphere this means that the autonomous capitalist economy, regulated by the laws of the market, will be replaced by an economy regulated by measures of state. This evolution is not without important repercussions in the social sphere, even though private ownership of the means of production has been eliminated only in certain key industries. The bourgeoisie is profoundly weakened and loses its leading role in society. A new body of administrators who no longer depend upon the "power of money" enters upon the scene. They will leave their profound imprint upon society as a whole.

The report on the plan expresses the hope that planning will not bring bureaucratization in its wake, that the managed economy will develop along the lines of a *"concerted economy."* This implies that no measures or decisions would be taken prior to widespread discussion and without voluntary acceptance by those whom they would affect. But, as we have demonstrated, the dominant objective of the plan is contrary to the continual amelioration of the conditions of existence. The program of production and distribution, therefore, cannot permit control and correction from below if it is not to be deflected from its imperative objectives by the mass of workers who want less austerity and more well-being. But it is clear, on the other hand, that directives handed down from above can never be anything but the dictates of the central planning body. The lower echelons will be left only the task of supervising and carrying them out. In a planned non-bureaucratic society all decisions would be preceded by discussion; in a bureaucratic society propaganda turned on after the decisions have been made takes the place of open discussion. It is in this spirit that the report provides for a huge propaganda campaign to insure the acquiescence of the population.

Under such conditions, the body of economic administrators naturally develops into a bureaucracy of a new type, branching out in all directions and concentrating power at the top—a power without equal in an autonomous capitalist economy, even under monopoly capitalism. Furthermore, the bureaucracy does not confine itself to the economy but tends to seize upon the whole social life.

In Vichy's managed economy the bureaucracy of the organizational committees, of the distributing offices, etc., was recruited almost exclusively from the ranks of industrial and banking magnates, and from the top layer of the civil service. In the Fourth Republic the structure of the managed economy was revamped and the old cadres eliminated, for the most part through The Purge. The three parties that now control the state—Popular Republican (MRP), Socialist (SFIO), and Communist—also control the recruiting of the new bureaucracy whose cadres stem mostly from these parties and from various professional organizations. The bourgeoisie—not a negligible element at the base of the MRP—has its representatives in this bureaucracy. It seeks, moreover, to maintain in top positions of the apparatus those members of the old state administration who were not too compromised under Vichy.

The bureaucratization is inseparable from a profound change in the character of the political parties and of the state which tend to free themselves from the control of socio-economic forces (classes). This does not mean that a party which has become relatively "independent" can free itself completely from the social layers which constitute its base. But it no longer defends their particular interests, even though it does not "betray" them to the class enemy. It subordinates them to national and other power politics. The Communist Party today has almost completed this evolution, whereas the other parties suffer it without relish and sometimes with vigorous opposition from below.

The new kind of state that emerges is no longer an instrument of a class—be it bourgeoisie or proletariat—which would force it to move according to its particular interests. It determines salaries and prices, for example, not according to class interests but in relation to the plan. If it places profits before wages, this is not because it is the servant of capital or in order to grant concessions to capital, but rather because such distribution of national income is more in tune with the demand for maximum satisfaction of investment needs.

### *The Plan and Democracy*

All social forces must accede to the planned tasks. But since the dominant objective of the plan is contrary to the particular interests of large masses of the population, it appears that the plan carries within itself not only the bureaucratic forms peculiar to a managed economy but also the seeds of dictatorship.

It appears that sooner or later totalitarian dictatorship will become synonymous with bureaucratization. There can be no doubt that democratic liberties will be curtailed. And yet a managed war economy oriented toward national power and strongly bureaucratized did not eliminate democratic political forms in war-time England. This was because the managed economy functioned in a climate of National Unity.

National Union means coalition of the main parties in the government, together with collaboration between the government and organizations representing economic interests of different classes,—and this with an over-all spirit of national sacrifice animating the majority of the population. Thus unity in action of all classes—consciously limited in time—is possible only in the face of an overwhelming, common and immediate danger. There can be no question of such a National Union in France today, though certain elements of such union appear to be realized. This appearance arises not simply from the fact that each single party is too weak by itself to eliminate its rivals, but also because all parties have a common interest, which, under certain conditions, minimizes their antagonism sufficiently to make coalition governments and coherent action possible. The policies of each of these parties demand speedy creation of a modern and powerful industrial potential. Furthermore, all parties recognize that such a potential cannot be created if France's economy is based on the laws of profit. This is why all of them tend toward national planning.

Also the Government enjoys the collaboration of the great professional and industrial organizations exactly as would be the case under National Unity. Among the thousand personalities who participated in the inauguration of the plan were delegates of the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), National Council of French Employers (CNPF), Christian Unions (CFTC) and General Confederation of Agriculture (CGA). The CGT has been especially quick to endorse the plan in its general outlines, and has specifically endorsed, despite strong opposition from its rank and file, the re-establishment of the 48-hour week embodied in the plan.

The French masses today do not feel that there is an imminent danger which menaces them and also the whole nation. Premier Paul Ramadier, in a recent speech at Nimes, declared: "The elevated motives which inspired our action during the Resistance are no longer present — at least not in the same degree." It is not that the workers consciously oppose the development taking place — they still ignore everything about the plan except its name. They do not see that the wage freeze, restoration of the 48-hour week, etc., are dictated by the exigencies of national interest. Since they still live in the ideological framework which dominated the labor movement during pre-war capitalism, they continue to blame their privations on the profit system. It is true, nevertheless, that their resistance prevents development of a spirit of National Union.

These facts naturally tend to further the development of the tendencies toward an authoritarian regime which are inherent in the evolution of a managed economy. But the situation in France is very specific in this respect. Until now, it has been the Communist Party rather than the State which, through the intermediary of the CGT, exercises its authoritarian control over the masses. It was the Communist Party which forced them to accept additional hours, Sunday work, work during vacation periods, speed-up, etc. In certain factories work discipline has been imposed with a quasi-military rigor unknown under pre-war capitalism. If the Communist leaders can maintain their hold on the workers, despite the growing discontent at the base, this will be achieved (apart from the authoritarian methods introduced in the CGT and employed, under its guidance, at the point of production) because of the so-called "democratic" incentives which the unions favor strongly: premiums for higher output, appeals to the instinct of workmanship through the posting of honor rolls, work competition and appeals to careerism through the alluring prospect of posts to be obtained in the apparatus of the managed economy, the unions or the state.

The Communist Party thus fulfills a function essential for the plan. It turns the unions into an instrument of service for executing it. It is essentially to the interests of planning that the unions acquire greater coercive power over the workers and even that there be created single, all-inclusive unions. Indeed, this is advocated by the Communists but vigorously opposed by the SFIO and MRP. This reaction is understandable since the CGT today is not an instrument in the hands of the Government but in the hands of a single party, the Communist Party, which could utilize any increase in CGT power to the detriment of its political rivals. This is why the MRP seeks greater participation of the Christian Unions in the institutions and structure of the managed economy, whereas the Socialists back oppositional movements within the CGT and even tendencies toward splits.

The Communists, on the other hand, for as long as they lack key positions in the state apparatus, do not generally favor reinforcement of state authority. They fear this would play into the hands of their most dangerous adversaries, the Gaullists whether the latter are inside or outside the MRP. It is because of this very special configuration of forces that the antagonism of the three parties acts as a counter-force to the anti-democratic tendencies inherent in the managed economy.

Because of the precariousness of this situation, the discipline the CP is able to exert in the unions is also precarious. Despite all the terror, all the techniques of calumny and intimidation used by Communist leaders, they do not possess sufficiently reliable means of coercion to eliminate or even hinder the growth of oppositional currents whether inside or outside the CGT. And as it goes with the unions, so it goes with everything else. Though the democracy is hybrid, it gives the opposition elbow room for action.

It is difficult to believe that the managed economy can progress satisfactorily under such conditions and that it can achieve its aims. The bottlenecks and crises that will develop will be complicated by struggles between parties on the one hand and by increased resistance of the masses on the other. Every crisis will again bring up the questions: Shall we slow down the pace of the plan or scrap it altogether? Shall we take "energetic" measures which, because of their unpopularity, would demand a coherent government? But the brief history of the Fourth Republic has already demonstrated more than once that the rivalries of the parties render speedy solution of the economic problems difficult or impossible. The parties, if they want to strengthen their position, are forced to give way to the demands of their members and sympathizers—be it only in order to provide more leeway for their maneuvers—to a degree that is incompatible with the exigencies of the plan. In order to insure efficient execution of the plan, it would become necessary progressively to liquidate democracy. But this is difficult to do under present circumstances.

Can the managed economy of the Fourth Republic continue to develop under such unbalanced circumstances or will it break down? Or will evolution lead from stage to stage, through culminating economic and political crises, until it results in the elimination of one or the other rival political forces and the establishment of dictatorship?

For the time being, the political situation permits strengthening of opposition of the laboring masses against the planning measures. This opposition is not yet conscious of the real problems and lacks political orientation. Nevertheless it is strong enough to create crises within the CGT which have led to several splits and which have made it possible for syndicalists and socialists to increase their influence.

On the other hand, a beginning is being made in the direction of ideological clarification. *Pensée Socialiste,* organ of the SFIO left wing, and *Masses,* organ of the Socialism and Liberty movement, provide evidence of this. Thus the way is opening for the advancement of another alternative which opposes socialist planning to national planning.

# RUSSIAN COLONISATION

### Walter Kolarz

The Russian historian Klyuchevsky said truly that the history of Russia was the history of a country in process of colonisation. His words referred to Tsarist Russia but are no less true of Russia today. Russian colonisation in former times, i.e., the spread of the Russians from a nucleus in Central Russia to the Black Sea, Caspian Sea, Baltic Sea, Arctic Ocean and Pacific Ocean, was only to a slight extent an achievement of the central Government and its organising abilities. In the main this triumphant colonisation of a continuous territory covering a sixth of the globe has been due to the enterprising spirit of the Russian common man, to the action of fugitive serfs, to outlaws combining in small Cossack bands, to officers acting without orders.

The first steps leading to the establishment of Russian rule in Siberia, Kamchatka and the Pacific shore were taken independently of the central Russian Government. Thus the leaders of the Soviet State today can claim that the gigantic Russian realm was not forged merely by armed force but has been created primarily by the genius of the Russian people. From the point of view of Soviet ideology there is not only no reason to be ashamed of this creation but every reason to be proud of it. Soviet ideology of the Stalin period has never accused the Tsarist regime of grabbing too many lands, of advancing the borders of Russia too far; but, on the contrary, of violating the interests of the Russian people by timidity in its policy of territorial expansion even to the extent of abandoning territories to other States.

The Soviet leaders fully grasp the fact that the might and size of Russia have been conditional on successful colonisation and they also realise that the preservation and consolidation of the USSR today depend on the same means. Therefore in order to develop the huge territory, to industrialise, to exploit the great natural resources, in short to carry out the Five Year Plans, the leaders are determined not only to continue the old policy of colonisation but to intensify it.

Successful colonisation on the large scale needed in the vast spaces of the Euro-Asiatic plain can be effected only by a big people, a tough, stubborn people used to hardships and privations and with experience in colonising activity. This is why only Russians and Ukrainians can

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be depended on for colonising purposes to any extent worth mentioning. The non-Slav peoples are certainly used as far as possible, but it is clear their part can only be a limited one. Even the more numerous of these peoples, in most cases, are unable to cope with the reconstruction tasks of their own areas. Moreover there are many peoples in Russia who for decades or even centuries have specialised in certain branches of economic activity either as hunters, such as the peoples in the Far North, or as cattlebreeders, such as the peoples of the steppe, or as merchants. These peoples cannot easily switch over to the particular type of activity which in the interest of the Soviet State has to be carried out in their territories.

Hard facts, statistical and economic, dominate in the Soviet Union and they deprive the declared theory of Soviet policy on nationalities and even the Federalist Constitution of 1936 of a considerable part of their foundations. The Soviet Government, engaged in large-scale planning, is guided exclusively by practical economic considerations and does not pay much heed to the local national interests of any of the peoples of the Union. If a measure benefits the Union as a whole, it has to be carried out whatever the effects may be on a constituent Soviet Republic, Autonomous Republic or Autonomous Region. This is the guiding principle of the Soviet central power in relation to the "180 peoples" of the Union and one should always bear it in mind in order to view Soviet policy on nationalities in the right perspective. It means in practice that the central Government does not hesitate to "Russianise" a given "national Republic" for economic reasons if the Republic in question cannot provide sufficient man-power to implement the Five Year Plan within its own territory. The vast areas allocated to the non-Russian peoples are in many cases arbitrary creations, their frontiers often mere "lines on a map" not coinciding with economic units. The sixteen Soviet Republics are "States" according to Soviet legal theory but in numerous instances they are not States in the sense of living organisms. They have not been created by historical developments nor by the will of their peoples nor do they owe their existence to some particular physical features, but have their origin in a decision taken by the Soviet leaders or even by the supreme Soviet leader. This applies particularly to such creations as the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic, the Moldavian Soviet Republic and the Soviet Republics of Central Asia. Republics which were taken over into the Soviet State en bloc by military operations such as Georgia, Estonia, Latvia are of a different nature. Originating from political and economic units gravitating round a centre, they bear characteristics of statehood in the sense of political and economic geography even though their actual State functions are extremely limited.

The drawing of the internal Soviet frontiers has been in many cases experimental. These frontiers have been changed by decree just as they were created by decree. Whole slices of territory have been cut off from one Republic and added to another. "Capitals" have been moved according to changing economic necessities, for instance in the case of Kazakhstan: first from Orenburg to Kzyl Orda then from Kzyl Orda to Alma Ata.

In view of these facts it is obvious that the Soviet regime has not respected its own artificial creations when weighty economic interests of the Union as a whole have been at stake. In carrying out practical economic measures the Soviet leaders have refused to be prisoners of the propagandist formulae they themselves proclaimed in the field of policy on nationalities. They have applied their policy of planning without regard to the national interests of the minor peoples. When plans demanded regional sub-divisions, for instance, these were formed and termed "Central," "South" or "East" ignoring national names and frontiers. Thus there is a Ministry for the oil industry in the Southern and Western Regions, another one for the Eastern Regions and behind these matter-of-fact terms the names of the oil-bearing national Republics like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Bashkiria tend to disappear.

Stalin's Five Year Plans put the Russian people firmly in control of wide spaces previously the unchallenged property of "small peoples," primitive hunters and fishermen; they secure to the Russians a majority in areas where non-Russians were formerly dominant numerically; they have been instrumental in bringing about the emergence of Russian towns in alien surroundings.

## *The Gold Republic*

A few examples will show the effect of the Five Year Plans on the small Soviet peoples. Only some of the more developed peoples with Republics of their own need to be considered here because from their fate conclusions can easily be drawn as to the future chances of the more primitive, smaller peoples who are not political or economic factors but belong rather to the realm of folklore and ethnographic science.

The largest Autonomous Republic within the Russian S.F.S.R.[1] is formed by the Yakuts who live in a widespread area on both sides of the Lena river. They are a Mongoloid people speaking a Turkish language and have achieved a higher level of civilisation than the Tungus and other more primitive peoples in their vicinity of whom they became the masters. The formation of the Yakut A.S.S.R.[1] which Soviet propaganda would describe as the "dawn of a new life" for the Yakut people has meant the economic development of Yakutia, the exploitation of the formerly badly neglected natural riches of this vast country, but every new factory founded there, every new mine opened in the Lena goldfields diminishes the influence of the Yakuts in their own country and decreases their chances of making a substantial contribution towards the economic prosperity of their homeland.

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[1] Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.

Before the beginning of the first Five Year Plan the Yakuts numbered 82% of the inhabitants of Yakutia and the Russians 10.5%, the rest being Evenki (Tungus), Chinese, Tartars, Germans and others. Among the Russians who settled there in Tsarist times were many who used the Yakut language and not a few of the Russian peasant settlers forgot their own tongue and ended by using Yakut only. The Soviet Five Year Plan transformed the formerly sporadic Russian colonisation, amounting to less than the annual natural increase of the Yakut people into a mass colonisation thus paving the way to the triumph of the Russians in the "Gold Republic." The Russians built the mining and industrial centre Aldana, the population of which exceeded 50,000 in the second Five Year Plan period. The Yakuts formed a negligible minority of barely 10% of the workers in what had become the heart of the new Yakutia. As early as 1936 over 70% of the people working the gold and tin mines, and tanning and leather goods factories and the power stations of Yakutia were Russians while Koreans and Chinese took second place with about 15% and only after that came Yakuts, Evenki and other local peoples. The town of Yakutsk, where the number of inhabitants rose from 7,000 on the eve of the First World War to 50,000 on the eve of the Second, has acquired an overwhelming Russian majority.

Recounting these facts implies no charge against the Soviet Government which acts in accordance with the inescapable economic bases of progress. Nothing is farther from the mind of the Government than extermination of the Yakuts by violence. On the contrary they get great opportunities but it is just these which are the beginning of the end of a Yakut people. A Yakut can become an engineer, a university professor or a high civil servant but the factual price for this advance is full acceptance of the Russian language and Russian culture and finally integration with the Russian people, not as the outcome of any compulsion but as a natural consequence of occupying an important post either in Moscow or in any of the large Russian centres in Siberia.

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[1] Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic.

The Yakuts as a collectivity also have their chances. They are given newspapers, books, schools and other cultural institutions; but, in the light of Russian colonisation of their homeland and the paramount superiority of Russian civilisation, the most generous gifts in the cultural sphere can be no more than a stepping-stone towards amalgamation and absorption by the Russians. One can almost figure out the approximate date by which the Yakuts will be such a tiny minority within the Russian sea that it will be no longer worth-while to preserve for them the appearance of an Autonomous Republic. It may be decided then that a kind of reservation, an "Autonomous Region" somewhere in the Far North should suffice until perchance this too has to disappear as an anachronism.

### *A Coal Republic*

While the gold of the Lena goldfields will peacefully exterminate the Yakuts, the coal of the Pechora coal basin will be fatal to another people of the North at present occupying the largest Autonomous Republic of European Russia, namely the Komi, called Zyryans under the Tsarist regime. In 1926 the Komi Republic had 282,100 inhabitants scattered over 145,000 square miles. Over nine-tenths of the population was Komi, only six per cent Russian. A guide book of the Soviet Union published in 1928 pointed out that hunting was the main occupation of the people and added that Ustj Sysolsk was the main town of the then Komi Autonomous Region, a town "founded in 1780 to Russify the Komi people." It is an indisputable fact, however, that the Russification of the Komi area made less progress between 1780 and 1928 than between 1928 and 1946. Paradoxically enough, only when Ustj Sysolsk was given the Komi name of Syktyvkar and became the "capital of the Komi A.S.S.R." was there any major influx of Russians into the territory of which Syktyvkar was the centre. Even after the first 20 years of the Soviet regime, during which industrialisation had been carried out on only a moderate scale, the number of workers and officials amounted to 53,000 with Russians forming a very strong element.

The real story of the Komi Republic begins only after the first 20 years of Soviet power. It is a remarkable story testifying to the self-sacrificing spirit of the Russians and their gift of adapting themselves to the worst possible climatic conditions. It also reveals the inexhaustible wealth and illimitable possibilities of the country while showing the hardships imposed on the Russians by the Kremlin for the sake of broadening the economic basis of the USSR. Shortly before, during and after the Second World War, the development of the Komi Republic decided its future. It will have to become predominantly Russian as the Komi themselves cannot make a substantial contribution towards exploiting the fantastic riches of their country. The first post-war Five Year Plan is an important landmark in the transformation of the Republic into a region where the Slavs will triumph.

The Komi Republic will become known to the world for two things: the Pechora coal basin, which covers three fifths of the entire territory and the Northern Pechora Railway, "the northernmost railway of the world," which carries the coal to Leningrad.

Pechora coal is of high quality, better than Donbas coal, say Soviet geologists. The basin is reported to be richer in coal than the Donetz coal-mining region and deposits have been discovered at thirty different points, though only at three has mining actually been carried out so far. The Pechora area, where winter lasts for eight to ten months, has already become the fifth largest coal producing centre of the Union and during the new Five Year Plan period this "Polar Donbas" as it is sometimes called will become the fourth largest coal district. This means that Vorkuta, the centre of Arctic coal-mining, will have to outgrow or at least emulate the growth of Karaganda, the mining centre of Kazakhstan which at present holds the fourth place. The significance of this can only be understood if one realises that Karaganda was one of the great miracles of the second pre-war Five Year Plan. Within five years Karaganda developed from a tiny unknown locality into a city of 150,000 inhabitants. The Kazakh people who, after the Uzbeks and Tartars, are the third largest non-Slav people of the Union could not keep pace with this growth. Workers had to be brought from Central Russia and the Ukraine to keep the new coal-mining centre going. In the Pechora Basin the Komi will be even less able to staff the mines already working and those which soon will be working. A beginning towards transforming Vorkuta into a second Karaganda seems to have been made already. The Vorkuta district, which in the 1937 elections had just 1,000 voters and a single polling station, boasted 23 polling stations and 650 canvassers during the 1946 elections to the Supreme Soviet.

The Northern Pechora Railway, destined to be the lifeline of the Komi ASSR, was only completed after the beginning of the recent war and has only been working on its full length of 700 miles since 1942. After the Turksib it is the second largest railway constructed under the Soviet regime and will, in itself, play a role in Russian colonisation similar to that of the Trans-Siberian Railway in the last decades of the Tsarist regime and to a lesser extent that of the Turksib in the twenties and thirties of the present century.

The Pechora Railway not only requires a considerable maintenance staff but along the line a large number of Combines have sprung up producing building materials for the two new "industrial giants" in the Far North — the Arctic Oil Combine *Ukhtomkombinat* and the coal-mining Combine *Vorkutugol.* Moreover settlements of railway workers are developing and may be the nuclei of new towns. A Soviet journal, *Oktyabr,* recently published an account of Izhma, one of the stations on the line. At the beginning of the recent war Izhma was a place without women and children but things have changed and there is now a school with 300 children. "The children were somewhat pale from lack of sun but they were strong and healthy," says the writer and adds that among them were Russians, Ukrainians, Byelo-Russians and Komi — mentioning last the people which gave the territory its name. The same reporter found that the soot factory of Gora Krutaya, likewise near the railway, "the northernmost soot factory in the world" was partly staffed by Russian women and youths who came from Maikop in the Caucasus, a distance of nearly 2,000 miles.

In other "Republics" the work of Russification is far easier to carry through than under the harsh climatic conditions prevailing in the north of the Komi Republic. For instance in three of the national Republics situated on the Volga and Kama rivers: the Mordovian ASSR, the Mari ASSR and the Udmurt ASSR. In Mordovia the Russians had a solid majority of 57.6% as early as 1926. In the Mari Republic the Russians and Mari were numerically equal even before the industrialisation period. The Udmurt Republic offers a particularly instructive example showing that the growth of a single Russian town can make the national existence of a small people problematical. Both the Mordovian and Mari peoples, in Tsarist times, had been continuously pressed eastwards by Russian colonisation and were split into various small groups by strips of Russian settlements so that it was difficult to form national Republics for them. To the Udmurts (formerly Votyaks) the greatest threat is the development of Izhevsk, capital of Udmurtia. Izhevsk possesses famous ironworks which became one of the biggest war factories during the First World War. Later on, in the first Five Year Plan period, the population of Izhevsk nearly doubled, it exceeded 116,000 and in 1939 had reached 175,000. Thus Udmurtia was administered from an almost completely Russian town. In 1926 the Udmurti still formed 52.6% of the population, but through the steady influx of Russian workers into the Republic they have long since become a minority.

### *Russian Advance in Central Asia*

The advance of the Russian and Slav element so conspicuous in the small national Republics of the Russian Soviet Federation is no less pronounced in the Central Asia Soviet Republics which are direct members of the Soviet Union. A people like the Kazakhs, over three million strong, is less likely to be swept away by the Russian advance than Yakuts or Komi numbering only a few hundred thousand each, but the pressure is sufficiently strong to change little by little the ethnographic character even of such an important Republic as Kazakhstan. In 1926, the only year for which detailed ethnographic statistics are available for all parts of the Soviet Union, the Kazakhs numbered 57% of the inhabitants of the Republic bearing their name while there were 19.8% Russians, 13.2% Ukrainians and 10% various Asiatic peoples. It would not be surprising if the percentage of Kazakhs today had dropped below 50% owing to the striking increase of the urban population with its strong Russian element. Only 9% of the inhabitants of Kazakhstan had lived in towns in 1926 against 17% in 1933 and 27.7% in 1939. More new towns are being built during the present Five Year Plan period. Temir-Tau recently came into prominence as "the youngest town of Kazakhstan." It is still in process of construction and is reputed to aim at housing 100,000 people. Where will they come from?

While the Tsarist Government favoured Russian and Ukrainian peasant colonisation in this territory, the Soviet regime needs Slav colonisation primarily to exploit the wealth of non-ferrous metals there, 2,100 deposits of which were discovered after the Revolution. Kazakhstan ranks first in the world for its chromium deposits and possesses 57.4% of all copper in the Union, 56.3% of all lead and 49.8% of all zinc, in addition to its coal, oil and silver. Thus the economic interests of the Union can easily justify pumping an unlimited amount of man-power into the "mineral pantry of the USSR, Kazakhstan."

Other Republics in Central Asia offer less opportunity for the investment of man-power and capital; but, owing to their scanty populations, even a moderate influx of Russians can have important consequences for the ethnical composition. Turkmenistan, for instance, is still mainly a desert Republic, thinly populated and with a number of oases. The great hour of Turkmenistan will strike when the irrigation of the Kara Kum desert, an age-long dream of the Turkmenians, will have made substantial progress and the desert regions of today will then be transformed into cotton plantations. But when that time comes the 1,253,000 people which Turkmenistan had on the eve of the Second World War will not suffice to develop economic activities over the 171,000 square miles of the Republic.

Even without far-reaching irrigation projects the industrial potential of Turkmenistan is already large enough to require considerable assistance from outside, not only for management personnel but also for workers in many categories. There are oil wells, a textile industry and the Caspian Sea port of Krasnovodsk, "Central Asia's Gate to the Sea" which has great importance for internal trade as it links the five Central Asia Soviet Republics with the Caucasus and the Ukraine. A recent report on Krasnovodsk published in *Trud* said that among the dockworkers were Russians, Kazakhs, Turkmenians and Moldavians.

In Tsarist days, when the present Turkmenistan was a recent acquisition of the Empire, there was little interest in sending there more Russians than were necessary to assert the State authority. Consequently in 1926 the Russian population of the Republic amounted to a bare 5.8% while the various Turkmenian tribes formed an aggregate of 77.9%, Uzbeks numbered 9.8% and the rest was divided between Tartars, Kazakhs, Persians and Armenians. The change in ethnical composition which has taken place since the first Soviet census is shown in the composition of the Turkmenian Supreme Soviet elected in 1947. Russian deputies number 22.2% and there are also a few Ukrainian and Byelo-Russian members while the Turkmenians have 65.8% of all deputies. However they had only 55% of the male members of the "Turkmenian Parliament," Russians and Ukrainians had the lion's share of the rest, while 90% of the women members were Turkmenians. Thus the male element seems to prevail among the recent Slav emigrants as is typical of the pioneer stage of every colonisation.

In a third Central Asia Republic, Kirghizistan, a comparison of the census figures of 1926 with the composition of the Supreme Soviet elected in 1947 shows a similar increase of "Europeans" at the expense of Asiatics. In 1926 there were 66.6% Kirghiz, 11.1% Uzbeks, 7% Russians and 6.5% Ukrainians, disregarding certain smaller groups.

In the Supreme Soviet elected on February 16, 1947 there were only 56.6% Kirghiz and 4.3% Uzbeks as against 25.1% Russians and 8.7% Ukrainians.

### *Urban Colonisation: Far North and Far East*

While the increase of the Russian element in most parts of Russia is simply the consequence of the need for man-power resulting from economic planning, there are areas where Russian colonisation has both a strategic and an economic character, such as certain parts of the Soviet Arctic along the Northern Sea Route and the Soviet Far East where Russia has had to counteract Japanese pressure. On the very eve of the recent war this kind of strategic colonisation was particularly encouraged by the creation of a special Central Settlements Board attached to the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR. (Decree of June 27, 1939.) Both in the Far North and Far East the colonisation is primarily characterised by the emergence of new towns.

There is nothing of which the new Soviet generation is prouder than the "mushroom towns." Places "which had not been on the map before" played a very big part in the propaganda campaign preceding the recent elections to the Supreme Soviet as a striking example of the greatness of the present epoch. Yet "mushroom towns" are not a new feature confined to the Soviet period of Russian history. Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries the founding of new towns practically never ceased, but it is true that the Soviet regime has carried out the task in a more organised, systematic way. The growth of old towns and the founding of new ones are decisive in making Russia more Russian than it has ever been. This is particularly true of Arctic Russia where such towns as Norilsk and the port of Igarka on the Lower Yenissei have appeared. Norilsk, with 30,000 inhabitants, is a mining centre with the largest reserves of nickel in the USSR. Igarka was formerly a fishing village and in 1928 only seven Russians lived there. Today the port has 25,000 inhabitants, chiefly Russians and Ukrainians.

The reverse side of the medal is the comparative decrease of the native population in Arctic Russia. Between 1926 and 1935 the number of natives in the total population of Asiatic Russia north of the 62nd parallel plus certain Arctic regions of European Russia fell from 56% to 35%. Today it is probably about 20% if not less. The area in question is under the command of the *Glavsevmorput* (the Northern Sea Route Administration) and covers two fifths of the entire surface of the Soviet Union. Despite having even now only two million inhabitants, it has been a much-advertised parade ground for Soviet policy on nationalities. Numerous experiments have been carried out in this immense area, cultural institutions founded, new peoples discovered, alphabets and literatures invented. Nevertheless, the real dominant history-making factor in the Far North is Russian colonisation.

Both brutal coercion and self-sacrificing enthusiasm assist the birth of the new Soviet towns. The old Russian method of promoting the advance of civilisation with the help of exiles and outlaws has not yet been abandoned. An outspokenly pro-Soviet writer, Ruth Gruber, who went to Igarka shortly before World War II, found that half the population of this Arctic town consisted of "disgruntled farmers who had opposed collectivisation in the Ukraine and Siberia." Magadan also, on the northern shore of the Okhotsk Sea in the Soviet Far East, became known as a town where people took up "forced residence."

Little is said officially about this aspect of colonisation in the USSR. On the other hand official propaganda has played up to the utmost extent the "heroic tale of Komsomolsk," the city on the Amur founded in 1932 by members of the Communist Youth League who gave the town its name. In 1937 Komsomolsk had 60,000 inhabitants. During the war its population far exceeded 100,000 and according to some estimates reached 300,000. The heroism and spirit of adventure of Russian youth had indeed played their part in the building of the new city. This youth came from all parts of Russia, thousands of miles away, and during the first stage of the great experiment lived in wretched dug-outs as building workers. For the Soviet generation, Komsomolsk is not only a technical but also an ideological achievement because it is a city without a past, inseparably linked with the new epoch. Perhaps an even more telling though less known expression of this epoch is a far smaller town in the north called Atka, founded shortly before World War II and now "the largest locality of the Kolyma valley," situated on the bank of the easternmost of the Siberian rivers falling into the Arctic Sea. The name Atka, which at first glance seems to have an exotic Asiatic flavour, is in reality an expression of the unromantic technological mind of present day Russia. It is simply an abbreviation of *Avtotraktornaya Kolonna* (Motor Tractor Column), a tribute to the role of motorised transport in a territory without a railway.

The Soviet Government issued a number of special decrees providing tax privileges, higher pay and longer vacations for all new settlers in the Far East and Far North. Theoretically all nationalities of the Soviet Union may benefit from these decrees; in practice they encourage almost exclusively Russian and Ukrainian colonisation. The building up of the vital Russian bulwark in the north, Murmansk, was largely due to the special status granted to people ready to settle down in that district. Between 1928 and 1935 the population increased tenfold, rising to 212,000. Murmansk was used as a purgatory for members of the former Russian ruling class who were permitted to become full citizens when working in this new Soviet city.

### *Asiatic "Counter-Colonisation"*

While Russian and Ukrainian skilled workers and "technical intelligentsia" are brought into non-Russian or sparsely populated territories in the East and North, members of the non-Russian nationalities are directed, as unskilled workers, to the industrial centres of Western Siberia, European Russia and the Ukraine.

This migration to the West is particularly marked among the Tartars, the largest non-Slav people of the USSR. It started under the Tsarist regime when 30 to 35,000 Tartars went to the Donetz Basin to work as coal miners. At the time of the first Five Year Plan the number of Tartar miners in the Donbas increased considerably and a large number also went to the other big mining centre, Kuzbas, in Western Siberia. Towards the end of the first Five Year Plan period there were 60,000 Tartars in the Donbas, 20,000 in the Kuzbas and 20,000 in the Ivanovo district of Central Russia, working in the cotton mills.

It is an unwritten Soviet law that as many nationalities as possible should be represented among the workers in the big new factories of all-Union importance such as the famous Stalingrad Tractor Works —a gesture to demonstrate that all the peoples of the Soviet Union keep the industrial giants going. In fact there have been representatives of 30 nationalities in the Tractor Works and other factories in the Stalingrad region and among them Tartars and Kazakhs were the most numerous. The situation of the unskilled Asiatic workers under Russian foremen is by no means enviable to judge from official Soviet publications complaining in numerous cases about the insufficiency or even non-existence of political and cultural work among the groups of Tartars, Kazakhs, etc., in the big industrial centres.

Asiatic workers who go to predominantly Russian areas are indirectly taking an important part in the success of Slav colonisation. By going West they free Russian man-power for colonisation purposes in the East and North and their migration also reduces the strength of their own peoples within the respective national Republics. Objectively they serve the triumph of the Russians no less than the Russian colonisers themselves.

### *Post-War Tasks of Colonisation*

The flow of Russian colonisation did not cease during the war, for the needs of the war economy demanded the opening-up of new territories, the founding of new settlements. Moreover the evacuation of millions of people to the East implied a further strengthening of the Slav elements, including many assimilated Russian and Ukrainian Jews, in the Central Asia Republics and the Far East.

The first post-war Five Year Plan, while continuing in many ways the colonisation policy of the pre-war Plans with their "man-power investment" in the Far North, Far East and Central Asia, has also new targets due to the territorial aggrandisement of Russia. The full economic integration of the Baltic States with the Soviet economic system and the elimination of the last traces of their former economic individualities is an important aim of the new Plan.

The man-power problem facing Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, due particularly to the mass exodus of refugees at the time of the Red Army advance into the Baltic States in 1944-5, is being solved in the usual way—by bringing Russians into the country. A report on Estonia published in the Soviet illustrated journal *Ogonyok* speaks of Russian mining engineers, workers and experienced miners "participating in Estonian reconstruction work" and similar reports are available from the other Baltic States. In the end the Baltic Republics will be no more "States" in the sense of economic units than is the "Metal Base" Kazakhstan or the "Cotton Republic" Uzbekistan.

Apart from being destined once again to assist the economic plans, post-war Russian colonisation serves to consolidate the Soviet Union's victory over Germany, Japan and to a lesser extent over Finland by transforming the newly acquired border territories not only into military and economic bulwarks of the Union but into ethnically Russian lands. The new colonisation drive launched by the Soviet Government after the end of hostilities in Europe and East Asia is more openly Russian in character than the colonisation before the war which, though actually Slav, was carried out under the anonymous screen of "Soviet People" and "Soviet Youth." Moreover for the first time, Russian colonisation is affecting territories which the Tsarist regime never succeeded in annexing, like East Prussia; or which the old regime abandoned voluntarily, like the Kurile Islands; or which were ceded after a lost war, like Southern Sakhalin.

# INTERNATIONAL PRESS

## *WHAT IS JUSTICE?*

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, CP fellow-traveler and prominent French Existentialist, contributes a long essay, "The Yogi and the Proletarian," to the October and November issues of *Les Temps Modernes,* the review edited by Jean-Paul Sartre. Merleau-Ponty seeks to discredit the interpretation of the Moscow Trials advanced by Arthur Koestler in *Darkness At Noon* which has only recently been published in a French edition. This CP sympathizer's backhanded defense of the trials has aroused something of a furor in French literary and political circles. Perhaps the best reply to Marleau-Ponty comes from Emmanuel Berl and appears in the February 1947 issue of *Revue de Paris.*[1] Unfortunately we have space for only a few extracts from the lengthy exchange, but they should be sufficient to give the reader some idea of the main points at issue. We begin naturally with Merleau-Ponty's attack on Koestler.

After discussing some of the main points of Koestler's exposé of the plight of the accused in the Moscow witch-hunts, and censuring Koestler for his "ignorance" of true Marxism and lack of understanding of the real motives of both the accused and the accusers, Merleau-Ponty proceeds to quote from a number of Stalinist apologists for the trials and finds their position essentially well-founded if not always judicious in detail. He then continues as follows:

The guiding idea of the Moscow Trials, according to which opposition is treason, finds its counterpart and justification in Franco's system of the Fifth Column. One may say that here Communism follows in the footsteps of Fascism but this who-started-it approach is childish. The development of Communism expresses the aggravation of social conflict and the decomposition of the liberal world just as much as it causes them, and if Communism helps to accelerate this trend, it is because violence can be overcome only by creating through violence. The liberal world, which assumed that there was disagreement on means only — not on ends — and that all opinions could somehow be reconciled and composed, has finally broken down.

During the sharp and violent struggles of the Resistance, men discovered that there is no middle way. Then men condemned each other to death because they had different notions as to what the future held in store. Intentions no longer counted; only acts could be considered. The purge trials, which still continue in France, maintain the tradition of revolutionary violence that emerged in France after the resistance period. Death sentences have been accepted by the public even when, as in the case of the Laval trial, court deliberations were cut short. Public opinion would have approved even if there had been no debate whatever. Yet the Government, judges and even common conscience, having lapsed again into attitudes of pre-war days, shrink from the idea that one may condemn somebody for his ideas. This is why the prosecution almost always seeks to discover bad intent. One breathes a sign of relief when it can be demonstrated that the political passions of the accused have caused him to plot against his country and its liberty and that he sought power, glory, money. But suppose, as sometimes is the case, the charges on these counts cannot be sustained. Even then, if a single victim of collaboration comes forward to testify against the accused, condemnation should be automatic. It is possible that neither Laval nor Petain decided one day to "sell out" to Germany. But even if this is so, they cannot be absolved as men who have simply made a mistake. Whatever their motives, their decision to collaborate nevertheless seems criminal to us. What is really meant when collaborators are condemned as criminals is that no historic development is inevitable and that the proposition "Germany will probably win the war" was not, in 1940, a simple statement of belief, but rather an attempt to give something that was not decided the seal of irrevocability. History does not recognize the absolute objectivity of neutrality and this apparently innocent exercise of judgment is in actuality an act of taking sides. *Laissez faire* is also *faire.*

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[1] For another devastating answer to Merleau-Ponty see Jules Monnerot's "Liquidation and Justification," *La Nef,* February 1947.

But, one may ask, how can we know all this about the events of 1940? It is to be deduced from the fact of Allied victory. This victory proved clearly that collaboration was unnecessary and thus transforms it — no matter what the individual desired or intended — into treason. The men who have been abandoned by history, who intended to become accomplices only, suddenly find themselves the instigators of crimes suggested by history. And they cannot seek excuses or reject a part of the responsibility. For while they were following the apparent trend of history, others worked against it, staking their lives on a different future.

We can be completely impartial only with regard to a past that is extremely remote. In respect to the recent past, those who judge are in a specific situation; either they will emerge victors or perish. To demand that purge juries provide "guarantees of impartiality" is evidence of the fact that one has never actually taken sides, for, had one done so, one would realize that if the historical decision is to be radical, it must be partial and absolute. Only those who displayed an active will are entitled to pass judgment; only those who took active part in the Resistance now have the right to punish, or absolve, collaborators.

When we witness prosecutors who have accused Communists in the past now accusing collaborators, always in the name of the State and legality, we come to realize that impartiality is contemptible here and partiality just. Even the idea of objective justice does not make sense in this connection, since it would compare modes of conduct which are mutually exclusive and between which reason alone is insufficient to decide.

The purge trials reveal a hard concept of responsibility. What is to be judged is not what men wanted to do, but the results of their action in the light of subsequent history. Both sides of the Resistance struggle presented an absolute choice consecrated by martyred dead. Any "impartial" arbiter between these choices is disqualified because of this, any "impersonal" judgment is thereby rendered illegitimate. These developments take place in an absolute sphere of will which liberals cannot fathom. Good or bad, honest or bought, courageous or cowardly, the collaborators remain traitors to the Man of the Resistance—traitors objectively and historically from the moment the Resistance became victorious.

Historic responsibility transcends the framework of the categories of liberal thought: intention and act, circumstances and will, objective and subjective. It crushes the individual through his acts, mixes the objective with the subjective, imputes circumstances to the will. It thus substitutes for the individual, as he himself thought and felt, a role and a phantom which he does not recognize but in which he must come to recognize himself since this is how he appears to his victims. And today his victims are right.

This experience of our war period enables us to understand the dilemma of Rubashov and the Moscow Trials. Bukharin never met Hitler. When Bukharin was tried the enemy was not on the territory of the USSR. But in a country which since 1917 has known little else except limit situations, it is not surprising that even prior to the war and before the invasion, opposition was treated as treason. Whatever the Opposition intended, even if it sought a more secure future for the Revolution, it remains true nevertheless that it weakened the USSR and that therefore its action can be treated objectively as treason. The events of 1941 attribute this character to it in retrospect. Just as in the case of the trials of the disinterested collaborators, the Moscow Trials are a drama of subjective honesty and objective treason.

To all this, Emmanuel Berl, under the title "The Innocent and the Phantom," replies:

The powers-that-be do not like innocense. It detracts from their triumphs. Unbridled force imprisons and massacres in vain if it cannot make the innocents cease to be innocent, cannot make them guilty of crimes they did not commit. The powers can do anything they choose in relation to the lives of their victims; they can do nothing to their innocence. One can burn Joan of Arc at the stake but one cannot make her confess that she prefers Satan to Jesus Christ.

This is the short-term limit and long-run menace for tyrants. Since they cannot keep innocence from being innocent, they fear that someday it will keep them from being tyrannical. They are apprehensive of the mysterious appeal exerted by the innocent through rejection of the sentence which crushes him. The tyrant would like to see the victim acquiesce in his punishment.

It is thus easy to understand that the more exasperated the violence, the more irritating innocence becomes. It is also easy to understand why those who flatter the powers steel themselves more and more against innocence as the powers become more brutal.

The more innocents are persecuted, the more the idea of innocence is confused. Many intellectuals do not seem to understand these days what is meant by the word. It gets in their way. During the Occupation, the concept was discovered to be not sufficiently Aryan in content. Since the Liberation, it is found to be vaguely reactionary. It seems to me that the confusion between the just and the unjust stems more from the disaster we have experienced than from the Revolution of which we always speak.

During the war I witnessed atrocious excesses. None of them horrified me as much as to find, coming from the pen of a reasonable man whom I believe to be honest, such a completely serene negation of innocence as such.

Merleau-Ponty evidently believes that it is very natural to say: "Opposition is treason and treason is opposition!" This would seem to dispose finally and completely of many historic cases of injustice which history until now has attributed to judicial error or to political vengeance.

The great advantage of this new doctrine is that while in the past the accused knew better than the accuser whether or not he was a traitor, now the accuser knows better than the accused whether or not the latter is an oppositionist. Merleau-Ponty poses the the hypothetical case in which the prosecution cannot prove either conspiracy against country or against liberty, nor the intention of the accused to gain power, glory or money. In that case it seems to me the normal thing to do would be to acquit the defendant. Merleau-Ponty, however, considers it sufficient to condemn him if a single victim of collaboration testifies against him. The witness does not know whether or not the accused has been guilty of conspiracy, but he may have lost a child because of some denunciation. The accused, of course, had nothing to do with this act. All that matters is that the witness has suffered, and pronouncing the defendant guilty will console him to some extent.

Merleau-Ponty states that "bourgeois justice is in the last instance based on the past, revolutionary justice on the future." Thus the accused is left without any way out. He thought he had simply to prove that he did not collaborate with the Gestapo, but that is of interest only to bourgeois justice. From the revolutionary viewpoint, the question is whether he should be considered a possible oppositionist (i.e. a traitor) in the future. The fact that he did not commit treason in 1943 does not necessarily prove to the judge that he will not commit treason in 1953. What Merleau-Ponty considers "revolutionary" at this point, I can only consider absurd. The greatest revolutionaries have constantly been mistaken about the future conduct of individuals.

All this signifies in the final analysis is that from the point of view of historic responsibility, everybody is what the masters of the hour want him to be. We know already that the reasons of the strongest are always the best. Merleau-Ponty's originality consists in demanding that the condemned cease having a good conscience even if he has not committed the crime for which he is condemned. If Merleau-Ponty wants to carry this reasoning to its logical conclusion, he will have to say that innocence is an aggravating circumstance for the accused. He is accused as an oppositionist and because we know that "opposition is treason." His historic responsibility is engaged by the phantom he has become to his victims who today are all-powerful. His innocence can only get in the way of repressive action, the legitimate character of which we must recognize. He embarrassed the government as an oppositionist. He embarrasses it even more if he is innocent. Thus he adds a supplementary treason to that of which he is already accused.

Once bourgois justice is forgotten, the framework of liberal thought shattered, once historic responsibility is determined by revolutionary justice, the only recourse that remains for the accused is to say that he is guilty even if this is false. The Jews, for example, should have understood what they seemed to others if not to themselves; they should have accused themselves of ritual crimes, though they had not committed them, in order to please their executioners, who stated that they had been their victims and who were thus within their rights during the days of the pogroms.

This is where we have arrived today! The whole of France was in turmoil in the days of Dreyfus. Men risked their careers and their personal happiness rather than to assent—be it only by silence — to something which they considered unjust. And today a man who teaches philosophy to the youth of this same France to which Zola spoke can write in an important review that an oppositionist can be a traitor even if he has not committed treason, even if he is not even conscious of being an oppositionist. He can state that it is a bourgeois prejudice to seek to discover whether the accused has, or has not, committed the crime with which he is charged.

Should we be astonished that the atmosphere in this country has become so heavy, so troubled, that one sees great fear and little joy in the eyes of its people? The phantom has indeed taken the place of the man. When somebody speaks, we no longer listen to what he says but only try to find out whose tune he plays. Of what importance is a man? Of what importance is an idea? The image supplied by the various propaganda services is more important.

What does it matter if everybody, if spirit itself, is crushed by this "historic responsibility" which transforms white into black, transmutes good into bad and cupidity into abnegation, so long as the masters-of-the-hour can imprison whomever they choose, so long as the masters-of-tomorrow — even less than the masters-of-today — will not have to reckon with the humble but often triumphant resistance that human conscience opposes to tyrants?

This certitude of injustice engenders confidence in trickery. Everyone knows that he can be condemned for what he has not done, but he is confident too that he can escape the most merited sanctions if he takes sufficient care of his "phantom," if he is quick enough to sing the proper cynical palinodes, if he secures enough guarantees from his victims at the time he persecutes them — remembers in time that tomorrow they may be right. Merleau-Ponty teaches us that one can be condemned as a collaborator without having collaborated, but others will teach us that matters can be arranged in such a way that even though one has collaborated, one need not be indicted as a collaborator. *Crime is no longer a risk when innocence is no longer safeguarded.*

Thus everyone is reduced to a fumbling effort as in a nightmare to distinguish between right and wrong. In the face of the double scandal of abusive repressions and inconceivable immunities, it becomes futile even to attempt to separate the true from the false! In this world that has become phantasmal, frozen words resound in the air. Everything becomes unreal, inconsistent, trite, except the Great Fear which beams its waves of anxiety on this society-in-tension.

## *BETWEEN HOPE AND DESPAIR*

The German weekly *Der Ruf*, published in Munich by a group of young democratic German intellectuals with socialist leanings, has gained a wide hearing in Germany because of its outspokenness and intellectual calibre. Among its foreign contributors are such men as Arthur Koestler and Stephen Spender. An article "Between Freedom and Quarantine" that appeared in the January 1, 1947 issue seems to us to be as significant a contribution to the current discussion of "the German problem" as has come out of Germany itself.

Winter (the unsigned article begins) has spread its white mantle over Germany. The snow that falls on fields and towns covers ruins and tombs. The ovens are unheated, people are badly clothed, children under-nourished. Everyone, freezing and hungry, tries to save himself through the coming dark months.

The spiritual and political disorientation caused by the lunatic course of domestic and foreign policy serves to heighten the feeling of hopelessness that overshadows life in Germany. The German people don sack-cloth and ashes. It has become a people that lives between freedom and quarantine—a people that is to be educated to the highest forms of social freedom and self-determination behind a Chinese wall of collective guilt. The two-faced aspect of political concepts has never engendered greater political and spiritual insecurity than in our times; never were the contradictions of a supposedly unitary policy more glaring than today.

The Potsdam declaration speaks of the responsibility of the German people for the misdeeds of its rulers, but it also states that the victors have no intention of destroying the German people. They desire, on the contrary, to create the possibility for peaceful and democratic reconstruction.

The insecurity of German life began then. Ours became a life between collective imprisonment and collective education for freedom. We were placed in the grip of continued changes and complications with the most drastic swings from one extreme to the other—from the bondage of the guilty to the freedom of the politically educable.

It is scarcely possible to demonstrate the advantages of the democratic way of life to a people in the garb of penitents. A people does not perceive things intellectually; it perceives intuitively and reacts collectively. It cannot think on two levels and in two categories. It suffers the hunger, cold, the common misery and reacts primitively and instinctively. The conclusions it draws are simple and clear. They may be wrong, but they will always be to the discredit of the order in which it is forced to live. Thus hunger, cold and misery, the consequences and prerequisites of the penance the people must do, will also block every attempt to educate this same people to a democratic way of life and toward the highest forms of social freedom.

This situation also creates a calvary for those positive German forces who for years desperately fought the Nazi horror regime and who hailed the day of liberation as the overture to a new and freer life. These are now desperately at work seeking to stem the floods which, with growing misery, threaten to wash away the embryonic beginnings of German democracy.

Occupation authorities are not liked. They have never been liked in all history. The Prussians were not liked when they occupied France and the French were not liked when they occupied Germany. Peoples do not change. What was true in the last century holds true today. A people may esteem the representative of an occupying power; it cannot love him. No internationalist idea stressing the need for a larger human community can possibly erase this primitive feeling of a people.

But, on the other hand, there has never been a situation in which a people forced to accept occupation could simply reject all relations with the occupation authorities, except when it consciously gambled with its existence and its future. No one expects us to rush overjoyed into the arms of the occupational authorities. We have not yet forgotten that sentence which appeared in the New York *Times* shortly before the end of the war: "Germany is now a country where the men have no dignity and the women no honor."

This is why we have no particular regard for those who have sacrificed all dignity for material or other advantages. The name of that Norwegian who served as the prototype of a whole species of political turncoats is mentioned frequently in German conversation. We believe that such people serve neither the occupation authorities nor the German people. The former will obtain only false and misleading advice; the latter lose, under such circumstances, the dignity and honor upon which the New York *Times* commented. We thus believe that the defamatory word "collaborator" stigmatizes that form of "collaboration" which, for example, is prepared unconditionally to smash up the factories even though the people suffer the pangs of want.

The other kind of collaboration of which we speak is possible only in an atmosphere of open criticism, mutual consideration and complete freedom of expression. But here again, with increasing pauperization of the people, with complete breakdown of economic life before one's very eyes, the previously mentioned contradiction comes to the fore. It is the discrepancy between the obedience of the culprit, the penitent, and the disobedience of the democratic citizen who determines his own destiny in full freedom.

Great parts of the German people today reject this collaboration. They reject it, though they require no decisions of de-nazification tribunals to provide an alibi. This rejection is not dictated by enmity but by deception. Any thought of revenge in the face of the ruins and of the spiritual and moral catastrophe in which they live appears to them an absurdity. They know that European nationalism is no longer valid, that it is no longer in tune with the times. They search for a path leading toward a United Europe, toward a new European order that will overcome the narrowness of national states. But they have not rejected their own nationalism in order to embrace a foreign nationalism or in order to pull the chestnuts of imperialist interests out of the fire.

They do not only speak of Europe, they mean Europe. They do not only speak of peace, they live peace. They have looked to France as the logical exponent of a new Europe. But they encountered a narrow-minded, petty nationalism which considers furtherance of separatist tendencies in Germany to be the only guarantee of its own security. They witnessed the overbearing attitude of a victor for whom Freedom, Equality and Brotherhood are apparently not for export. That sentence in the Communist *Humanité* (names of newspaper should be changed when they reverse their position) in which that paper expressed its indignation over the fact that Kurt Schumacher spoke to a British Minister "as an equal to an equal" was a slap in the face of all Germans of good will. There is no possibility of collaboration on that basis. Such an attitude drives even those who stand for that socialist concept which once led to the founding of *Humanité* into the wilderness of political isolation.

What devil drives the European Left into the trap of nationalism? Coming from them, whose duty it is to further the common task of socialist construction, it can only sound ridiculous. We in Germany still think there is a difference between Karl Marx and Cardinal Richelieu. Or is that sentence from Marx that "no people that oppresses another people can be free" completely forgotten?

If we are a people with lesser rights, non-equals, a people composed of children and murderers, then any collaboration becomes illusory. All that remains is the isolation of quarantine and skepticism regarding those concepts of freedom we hear expounded year in and year out over the foreign radio stations. We are certainly fully aware of our past. We know what has happened and how it continues to bear fruit. We understand the revulsion and dislike of the smaller nations. But we do not think that clear-headed European statesmen should now take over the arguments with which a gang of mad politicians trampled European freedom into the mud.

These methods which were taken over from the adversary and which now threaten to ascend like a spiral into the infinite are those identified with the course of least resistance, with the easiest way out. We know very well that they are alluring for those who seek a road out of the present dilemma. And yet—we must put an end to them if Europe is not to die. We are only a people that lives between quarantine and freedom. We want collaboration under all conditions—but not at any price. It may be that from our point of view, and this is the viewpoint of a beaten and humiliated people wearing sack-cloth and ashes, it is possible to visualize the dangers more clearly than from any other vantage point on this torn continent. It may well be that one must spend a decade in bondage and years rubbing shoulders with a race of penitents in order to fully appreciate freedom and to understand the dangers which threaten it. It may be that this road through the black night of Germany, through hunger, cold and privation provides us also with our great opportunity. We shall stand the trial, because we shall not relinquish the belief that someday we shall escape quarantine and win through to freedom.

## *ITALIAN SOCIALIST SPLIT IN RETROSPECT*

*Europe Speaks,* a socialist magazine published in London, devotes its March 1947 issue to the "Crisis in Italian Socialism." In the opinion of the editors of this publication, the split in the Italian Socialist Party (P.S.I.U.P.) lacked "any objective justification." Among the reasons given for the split are "the inability to resolve conflicts between personalities, created by incompatibility of character, and the over-development of doctrinaire ideological argument, as well as the lack of experience and tradition in practical compromise." All this, says *Europe Speaks,* was the result of "legacies of many years of emigration and underground work." The conclusion is that "if there had been in the Socialist Party of Italy a strong influence within the executive able to hold together two, or rather three, conflicting groups, the present crisis could have been averted."

Another part of the same article, however, scarcely confirms this evaluation of the past. Apart from conflicts of personalities and ideological divisions in the Italian Socialist Party, the international situation has had a great —perhaps decisive—influence on the split. It may be wrong to dismiss Nenni as simply a Communist fellow-traveler. But he has never ceased to believe that eventually Russia will gain control of Europe. As early as 1939-40, he was the only Italian socialist leader who did not condemn the Stalin-Hitler pact. "On the side of Stalin and Hitler, there is more socialism than on the other side," he then declared. Nenni believes that nothing would be worse for Italy than that it should appear as a supporter of the anti-Soviet, pro-American camp in Europe.

Saragat and Faravelli, on the other hand, believe that Italy should look to the west. They do not favor a western bloc; they are genuine supporters of a European federation. But if the choice lay between a western and eastern bloc, they would side with the west where they see more prospects for democracy and freedom. Because they are opposed to a revolution in Italy which, they hold, would lead to a Communist dictatorship, their political perspective is a gradual advance inside the given democratic framework.

It is evident that the difficulties of holding together groups with such divergent views on internal and international policy were tremendous. In order to suggest a *modus operandi* and tone down these sharp contradictions, the article adds: "But the will to reach some practical political compromise and to eliminate or diminish personal conflicts could have been fortified by an interest common to all—the interest in preventing the reactionary forces in Italy which are gathering strength from staging a come-back."

In the same issue *Europe Speaks* reprints an article on Nenni and Saragat from the Swiss *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*. The article contains the following portrait of Saragat:

"Giuseppe Saragat is a much more complex personality (than Nenni). He comes from a bourgeois family and was born in Turin where the political climate is more temperate than in the Romagna (Nenni's home province). He enjoyed the advantages of a good education and studied economics. At an early age he joined the socialist movement. He, too, was driven into exile by Fascism. Until 1930 he lived in Austria, and was considerably influenced by the views held in the socialist circles of Vienna. Like Nenni, he went to Paris to help in the work of the anti-fascist movement there. Some of the writings which he published appeared under the title, "Marxian Humanism and Marxian Democracy."

While Nenni's main center of operations was the market place and the streets, Saragat was at home in the study, in literary and philosophical circles. He is said to possess an expert knowledge of modern French literature and of the most up-to-date interpretations of Marx.

Saragat, tall, slim and distinguished, combines many elements in his character. He not only builds upon Marx and Hegel, but also finds solace in Goethe, Leopardi, Tolstoy and Johann Sebastian Bach. He appreciates the heavy sacrifices that the Communists have made in recent years for the sake of freedom, but at the same time he is repelled by their ruthlessness which threatens to destroy the fruits of that struggle. He knows that a world in which there is such complete disorder can be rebuilt only by tremendous collective efforts. But he refuses to admit that the creative forces of the individual must be crushed in the process by shock troops who act without inhibitions because they have transferred the responsibility for decisions as to right and wrong to an authority which thinks for them. He knows that the masses will be moved only by slogans; yet he hates party cliches which kill intellectual honesty.

While speaking to the Constituent Congress of the new Socialist Party of Italian Workers (P.S.L.I.), Saragat stated that we are living in a period of decadence of socialist thought.[1] Never before, he declared, has there been such abasement of thought in the labor movement as in this period when socialist opportunities "are knocking at the door." It is one of the absurdities of our times that there is such an eclipse of socialist consciousness at the very time when capitalism is shaken and is ripe to be replaced by a new social system. The reason is that the proletarian revolutions which occurred in the last decades attained victory in backward, essentially agrarian, countries, in which the only choice lay between rightist or leftist dictatorship. But in Italy the situation is different. The task of the new party is to create a broad socialist movement in which all working men and women should be bound by a pact of fraternity and solidarity. Then we will create the real prerequisites for solving the problems of our national life.

The old "fusionist" Socialist Party is unable to fulfill this task. We (says Saragat) have to give back to the Italian people a consciousness of the value of socialism. The working class is struggling to liberate not only itself but all men. Modern socialism must be profoundly democratic. Democracy is not an "instrumental method," but the living substance of our doctrine. Today an anti-democratic reformism is considered the last word in political wisdom. Our idea is that there should be an anti-reformist democracy.

As for the principles of the new party organization, Saragat outlines the new type of socialist discipline as opposed to that of the Communists. Party discipline (he states) signifies the devotion of all members to the common cause. It may demand sacrifices including even sacrifice of our own life. But it is the right of all men to decide in the last instance in their own conscience what is good and what is evil, what is right and what is wrong. We cannot, for the sake of formal discipline, delegate this inalienable right to the Party, which can impose all sacrifices except the sacrifice of our moral conscience.

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[1] The full text of Saragat's speech is published in the bi-weekly *Critica Sociale,* January 15 and February 1, 1947 issues.

# BOOKS

## *JOURNEY TO THE DARK SIDE OF THE MOON*

### *Bertram D. Wolfe*

One of the few books in my childhood home was called *The Prisoner of Devil's Island.* From it I learned how men had rallied in every land to the defense of Captain Dreyfus. Later there were Mooney and Billings, Sacco and Vanzetti. The first two spent the best years of their lives in a California jail; the latter went, innocent, to the electric chair. Yet we ourselves were not made to share their fate for venturing to challenge the "reasons of state" that jailed or executed them, and our indignation was solaced by the thought that lovers of freedom in countless lands had rallied against this cruel injustice, thus making it — so we thought — harder for any government to perpetrate similar outrages in the future. Out of these protests, the outlines of a world conscience seemed to be emerging. Even in the midst of war, while Russia and America were allies, our ambassador to Petrograd looked down on a sea of men and banners, and cabled to the President of the United States: "Who is *Muni?* The Russian workingmen demand that he be set free."

But the world has been moving backward since then with such startling speed. Men have gotten used to frameup, imprisonment, enslavement, extinction, not of solitary victims, but of thousands and millions, of whole classes and races and nationalities, of all the inhabitants of whole areas and countries. "No attainder of treason," reads our Constitution, "shall work corruption of blood." Yet children are today held responsible for the sins of their fathers—or for the nationality, or social origin, or for the language and culture and loyalties they imbibed with their mother's milk. Our own land which prohibits "involuntary servitude" in its Constitution has turned over German war prisoners to be used as slave labor. The land which was shaken to its foundations by the Dreyfus case employs such slaves. Whole areas of other lands are being emptied of Hungarians or *Volksdeutsche* or Italians (men, women, the aged, the sick, the pregnant, little children) with less care for their fate than if they were cattle. Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Poles, strain all the inadequate means of Russian transport on their way to Siberia. Slave labor has become a permanent social feature and a steadily enlarging part of the economy of the land where "the workers rule" and where labor has been "freed of its chains."

When Dreyfus was called spy and traitor, Mooney dyamiter, Sacco and Venzetti payroll robbers and murderers, men of good will everywhere

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insisted upon going beyond the official state label, demanding hearings, rehearings and again rehearings. But now the give-a-dog-a-dirty-name-and-you-can-hang-him technique has been standardized, streamlined, elevated into a state principle. Men who still arrogate to themselves the label of liberal or progressive sanction the technique, provided only it come from a state they feel emotionally attached to or be leveled against some unknown men, women, and children of a people against whom they have managed to work up an all-embracing hatred.

## II

If the spirit was bruised as we watched the concentration camps of Germany fill up with Socialists, Communists, Jews, and oppositionists of all sorts and could not convince many of our fellow Americans that this was really happening in the "enlightened twentieth century," how much deeper was our anguish when we saw millions being sent into Russian concentration camps in the name of the very ideals we had counted on as bulwarks against injustice and exploitation. Into the endless wastes of Asia and the Siberian Arctic, nomads were herded for resisting forced settled existence; peasants for opposing the "collectivization" of their land; heretics for the major heresy of wanting to decide in some small measure the nature of their jobs, or place of work, or conditions of labor, or private thoughts; critics of some specific measure of the regime which the regime itself might next day have to recognize as wrong. And the friends of all these people, their wives and children and relatives and associates and subordinates, and aged parents.

I have forced myself to read all I could get on this painful subject from Chernavin's *I Speak for the Silent* to the unthinking side-remarks of enthusiastic reporters on Russia like Quentin Reynolds and Wendell Willkie ("Between the airfield and the town of Yakutsk," wrote Willkie casually, "we looked for the usual concentration camp, but there was none, or at least we never came across it.") I thought I knew what life among the submerged and the damned was like and had become inured to it, until I took this journey, with a nameless author, using the experiences of the surviving remnant of over a million Poles who were driven under guards, guns and dogs to the place whence almost no one has ever returned before, the "dark side of the moon."[1]

## III

The book is written with sensitive skill and artistry. The author was wise to remain nameless, not merely for the protection of her friends and relatives still in Siberia or in "liberated" Poland. Nor because it will compel the apologists for Stalinist totalitarianism to discuss, if they dare, the facts she raises, instead of diverting attention to the slander of the person of the author. But there is a more important reason for anonymity. It is not a single person's experience and cry, it is a collectivized experience distilled from thousands of letters, diaries, conversations, reports, documents: the anguish and agony of an entire people.

When on September 17, 1939, the Russian Red Army struck the retreating Polish army in the back, set up its first concentration camps for officers and soldiers, and then began deporting all socialist and trade union leaders, all teachers and cultural leaders, all officials and active members of political parties — all possible leadership — it looked as if none of them would ever be heard from again. But in June 1941, Hitler attacked his partner, and Stalin needed Polish manpower and the support of Britain, which had gone to war when Poland was attacked. Thus a turn of fate made it possible for a few hundred thousand out of over a million to return, sick, starved, ulcerated, vermin-ridden, in rags, to tell their stories of what goes on "on the dark side of the moon." General Sikorski made all these documents available to the author. She sifted them to eliminate the most brutal and exceptional cases, to take out available accounts of torture and even any detail that was not typical of countless cases. She shies away from the murders in the Katyn forests, barely touches on the death of Erlich and Alter. She strikes out the cries of anguish, suppresses her own emotions. presents the bare facts with such restraint that it is the reader who is forced to react. If only the author would cry out at intervals in anger we could applaud her indignation and relieve our feelings. . .

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[1] *The Dark Side of The Moon.* With a Preface by T. S. Eliot. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 299 pp. $2.75.

IV

In the beginning, the Poles thought that the brutality they met with was an animus of Russians against Poles, but in time they recognized that they were simply being treated like the Uzbeks who couldn't settle down according to plan, like the peasants who did not want to go into collectives, like the workingmen who wanted to move from one factory to another, like the Communists who continued to repeat a quotation which was out of date — in short, the jailers were simply treating them as they treated their own people.

Not only Poles worked in the Arctic cold under dog and gun, in rags, with feet wrapped in tattered fragments that froze by day and thawed out partially but never dried at night. Indeed, having come more recently, the Poles for a while had better raiment than the other prisoners. Not only they were denied the right to gather the firewood of the endless taiga which might have warmed their barracks or the berries that might have stopped scurvy and ulcers. Not only they were waked up at 3 a.m. in some camps and 4:30 in others. Not only they were worked twelve and fourteen hours a day. Not only they were set impossible "norms" and starved because they could not make them. Not only they were beaten and shot when they fell from exhaustion. Indeed, through it all they were sustained by a hope forever denied to their fellow Russian prisoners, the hope that some turn in the "war for the liberation of Poland" might rescue them from the hell which only death could end for the others.

Over a million Poles made the trek to the camps and forced labor areas, and how many died there we can know by subtracting the pitiful remnant from the original total. But the same journey has been made by unnumbered millions of Russian citizens who can nexer expect to return. More live at the bottom of the social pyramid in slavery than the entire number of industrial workers in pre-revolutionary Russia! Thus the dark side of the moon tells us what the moon itself, what the "bright side," is like. Unobtrusively, often unconsciously, these reports supply a running commentary on what "labor norm" means ("in actual practice no one, not even the strongest, comes within reach of accomplishing this norm at all"); what "rations" mean; what protection of the laborer means ("out of a camp of 10,000 goldminers, 2,000 died in a year of exhaustion"); what housing and clothing is like ("tents without floors on frozen mud . . . we returned the six kilometers each day chilled and soaked to the bone to . . . lay on the shelves in all our clothing succeeding by morning in drying out a portion on our bodies . . . when one died in the night we concealed the body beneath the bunks for as long as we could endure the stench so as to receive the dead man's ration of bread"); what safety measures are like ("Little Wadzia, fourteen, worked over molten lead . . . went quite yellow like a lemon . . . I (age 15) once did her work . . . the smell and vapor of the lead were so terrible that by evening I went off in a faint"); what rest homes; vacations; creches mean (more children died in this filth in their frozen rags than could ever have been accommodated by all the creches in Russia); what the "higher democracy," the "classless society" and "socialism" signify in Russia. Worse than the cruelty and starvation, the slave-driving to death, the cold and the filth, was the inescapable degradation of character and remorseless destruction of the human spirit that affected jailed and jailers, Poles and Uzbeks and Russians, scientists, artists, engineers, former "free" laborers and peasants, former state leaders and NKVD guards alike, in a world in which all citizens have come through long enforced habit to think of human beings as material to be subordinated to machines and production figures, taken up, set down, used, set to work, used up, destroyed. How can pity and fellow-feeling continue to endure where pity for a victim is itself the gravest of all heresies, automatically condemning him who shows it to descend along with him who aroused it, into the lowest depths of this inferno?

I cannot recommend this book as pleasant reading. To go through its documented, restrained, misery-steeped pages has been an intolerably painful experience to me. How many times have I put it aside in the last few nights because I could stand no more! Yet it must be read, every word of it, by every one who would understand our time or keep the earth a fit place for human habitation. For, as the brief and sober preface of T. S. Eliot points out, this is not merely "the story of what happened to Poland, and of what happened to innumerable Poles, between 1939 and 1945. It is also a book about the U.S.S.R. . . . about the Europe in which we now live . . . indeed a book about the world in which we now live."

# COMMENT

## A Not-So-Innocent Voyager

> ***There is nothing more terrible than energetic ignorance.***
>
> **—Johann Wolfgang Goethe**

Henry A. Wallace has now returned to the editorial desk of the *New Republic* after a barnstorming tour in quest of the Common Man of England, Scandinavia and France. The tour was certainly a success in terms of publicity received. While the New York *Times* allotted only a short notice to Mr. Wallace's Madison Square Garden speech shortly before his departure, we have been afflicted for weeks with long and tedious reports on speeches made by, and receptions given to, the great man from Iowa in various European countries. Mr. Wallace's recent twists, turns and equivocations had plunged his stock to a new low with the American people, and, like an aging prima donna who can hope to refurbish past glories at home only through some triumphal tour abroad, he had high hopes that an European tour would serve to bring him back into the limelight in the U.S.

Overseas reaction to the appearance of new stars in the American sky always involve a considerable time lag. Boogie-Woogie was already a thing of the past here when it became a fad in Europe. The auspices thus seemed propitious.

And yet results must have disappointed Mr. Wallace. By and large, the European peoples have remained impervious to the assault of his corn-fed verities. They are surfeited with platitudinous generalities and yearn for serious, independent analysis, for level-headed grappling with the problems of this atomic age—and that is precisely what Mr. Wallace is constitutionally unable to provide.

In all his many speeches Mr. Wallace was notoriously long on generalities and markedly short on specifics. So one cannot blame the *Manchester Guardian,* among other publications that reported in much the same spirit, for feeling that "the total result is slightly disappointing." Mr. Wallace was unsparing in his criticism of the Truman doctrine and of American imperialism, but all this would have sounded a little more convincing to his audience had he not remained so conspicuously silent concerning Russian imperialism. After all, the peoples of Europe—at least those who have not fallen completely under the sway of the Soviet myth—have had sufficient contact with Soviet realities to understand the predatory character of the Russian regime.

Mr. Wallace stated some excellent ideas such as the need "to start an overall program for reconstruction of Europe," but does he really believe that it isn't widely known in Europe that even the most modest proposals in this direction such as the allocation of European coal supplies, the various recommendations of the world food conferences, of the U.S. Sub-Commission on Devastated Areas, etc., have always been vigorously opposed by the Russian delegates in the name of the principle of "national sovereignty"? Did Mr. Wallace expect Europeans to ignore Russia's tremendous claims on Europe's wealth in the form of reparation payments which, if allowed to stand in full, would forever wreck any possibility to reconstruct Europe? Did he expect any serious liberal or socialist in Europe to forget what Russian imperialism has meant to the national and social freedom of those countries that Russia has over-run completely or has even partially integrated in its vast empire?

The phrases of indignation over American policy in Greek and Turkey must have sounded singularly hollow coming from one who has never dared to raise his voice in defense of the basic freedoms of those many nations that have fallen prey to Stalin's drive for imperialist conquest.

While in England, Mr. Wallace enjoyed the support and backing of a sizeable section of the British Labour Party, but in France his support had shrunk so far that he was almost exclusively limited to dependence upon the Communist Party. And this is as it should be.

Mr. Wallace first achieved fame by becoming a successful experimenter with hybrid corn. The hybrid kind of democracy he now attempts to peddle is an obnoxious and dangerous variety that will find acceptance only among those who have been over-exposed to the winds that blow from the East.

With his great show of idealism and missionary ardor, his eager ignorance of international problems (once removed from the sphere of meaningless generalities), Mr. Wallace might possibly have done a great deal of harm abroad. Judging from the reception he received, however, it seems that the danger that Europe could mistake him for a typical representative of American liberalism is passed. It seems to be rather generally understood that he represents nothing but the totalitarian or hybrid variety.

## Germany S O S

The disastrous turn the food situation has taken recently in Germany has received little attention in the American press. Few people seem to realize that rations in the industrial sections of Western Germany, in the Ruhr valley and Hamburg area have reached a death level. The word "starvation" is often used loosely, but the 700 or 800 calories, which is now all the average consumer in German industrial centers is allowed by the ration boards, means starvation in the literal sense of the word. This caloric value is actually less than one-third of the absolute minimum that nutrition experts hold is necessary to satisfy body requirements.

The level of around 1,500 calories which is the theoretical standard set by occupation authorities and which is in itself insufficient has become completely meaningless as rations handed out often represent less than half this figure. Although the bread ration (on paper) continues to be 2,500 grams a week for the average consumer, for instance, only 1,500 grams a week are actually being distributed. In fact the whole food distribution system is breaking down.

In addition to bread, the average German consumer is entitled to buy seven ounces of meat a week, five ounces of flour and cereals, less than two ounces of fat and three-quarters of a pint of skimmed milk. This adds up to less than 700 calories a day and it is doubtful if even this is available in all communities.

Public desperation has recently been increased by an official announcement that the caloric values of various foods have been "reassessed." The official caloric value of 100 grams of meat was formerly set at 155 for instance. It is now rated at 160. The same amount of fish formerly rated at 136 is now 140 and so on. The starving consumer is thus receiving smaller quantities than previously under the pretext that experts have found the caloric value to be higher than heretofore estimated. We have heard about feeding hungry people by multiplying loaves and fishes but to feed them by reducing loaves and fishes through re-evaluating their caloric content is surely a modern miracle.

The reasons for the breakdown in food distribution are varied and many. American wheat deliveries have fallen nearly 300,000 tons behind schedule in the last four months. Deliveries from Eastern Germany are negligible. Food collections in the West are also behind schedule because German farmers are reluctant to part with their produce for currency that has become almost valueless and no industrial products are available for exchange. Economic unification of the Western zone has been bungled thus far. The whole scheme is becoming lost in a maze of divided responsibilities and official red tape. German authorities have been given responsibility on the lower level, but without any possibility of coordinated economic planning. They are constantly being interfered with by various British and American officers working only too often at cross purposes.

In the background, moreover, there is the whole problem of the economic future of Germany. The Level of Industries Plan, which limits production of nitrate fertilizers to about one-third of the prewar output, is still in force and continues to hamper any agricultural reconstruction on a soil that is desperately in need of chemical fertilizer to regain its former productivity.

Recently there have been strong representations made to the occupation authorities by the German trade unions and city and provincial administrations. These have declared unanimously that a complete breakdown of normal activities and grave disorders on the part of desperately hungry men and women are unavoidable unless immediate relief is forthcoming.

Germany today has no government or administration of her own. She is a charge of the occupying powers. But any charge carries with it a commensurate responsibility. For better or worse Germany now *is* our problem and the threatening catastrophe, if it is allowed to occur, will be attributed to us. Not only moral conscience but political self-interest demands an immediate acceleration in food shipments to Germany and a long range program that scraps the unrealistic economic premises of two years ago in order to attempt to make Germany into a functioning part of a prosperous European economy.

## French Interlude

The unauthorized strike of 32,000 workers of the nationalized Renault factory in Boulogne-Billancourt demanding an hourly wage increase of 10 frs. led within a few days to fundamental changes in the French political situation.

The French Communist Party, which dominates the Trade Union Federation (CGT) had originally opposed this strike. On April 29,

M. Henaff, a leading member of the CP and general secretary of the Paris trade union federation, asked the strikers to go back to work, but when this appeal was of no avail and continuance of the strike threatened to turn the workers from Stalinist control, the Communist Party decided upon an abrupt about-face and gave its "full support to the legitimate demands of the workers."

Since continuation of the wage-freeze was one of the cardinal points of the Ramadier government's program, Ramadier immediately demanded a vote of confidence from the French Assembly which had just convened. When the Communists voted against an Order of the Day that reaffirmed the previous stand on the wage-freeze, Ramadier declared this to be a rupture of ministerial solidarity and asked for the resignation of the Communist ministers. The Ramadier government remained in power, the Communist ministers were replaced, and judging by results of the vote of confidence (360 deputies for the Government and 186 against), the new coalition excluding the Communists enjoys a comfortable majority.

These are the main facts about the recent French ministerial crisis. A few additional remarks, however, seem to be in order.

First, it seems rather clear that the CP has left the Government reluctantly. The whole Communist strategy in France since the days of the liberation was predicated upon turning France into a strong vanguard of Stalin's Empire. In order to build a France militarily and economically powerful, yet closely tied to Russia, the French Communist Party scrupulously avoided any strategy even remotely resembling Leninist tactics. It had become the champion of a strong and disciplined army, of a drive for all-out production, for the "eternal rights of the French fatherland." Penetration into the state apparatus and control of the economy through previously "colonized" unions became the overriding aim.

In recent months, however, the CP was caught increasingly between the need to continue these tactics for reason of Russian power politics and the discontent that simmered within its working-class rank and file. The workers came to loathe the eternal appeals for increased production while the proclaimed recovery failed to make itself felt in the working-class budget.

Complete CP control of the union movement also began to arouse resentment among rank-and-file unionists. Thus in the elections for the local councils of the social insurance system in which all French wage-earners have a vote, the CGT candidates received only approximately 60 per cent of the votes whereas the Christian Trade Unions received from 20 to 25 per cent. Since the official membership of the Christian Unions is to that of the CGT only slightly over the ratio of one to ten, this means that many CGT members voted for the rival federation to express their discontent.

Outbreak of the unauthorized strike at the Renault factories, previously a CP stronghold, is another case in point. It seems therefore—and the mild statements on the revamped Ramadier government in *Humanité* and from the lips of Duclos tend to confirm this impression—that the CP was most reluctant to leave the government and was forced to this step only by its fear of losing its mass base.

The prospects are that the Ramadier government will have fairly smooth sailing in the immediate future. The Renault strike has been settled. Nevertheless, the discontent that now reigns among the mass of the French people will hardly be allayed. The CGT may not start an out-and-out drive against the Government right away, but it can scarcely be doubted that it will continue to press for wage increases that the Government has evidently made up its mind to deny.

Thus the CP will again be in a position to pose as the champion of working-class interests, while French Socialists in the trade unions, who will be forced to defend the actions of a government in which the SFIO has a leading part, will be in an almost untenable situation.

The drive that started a few months ago to make the Socialist Party a real force again in the union movement and to wrest control from the CP, thus will suffer a most serious set-back. One may well doubt whether the advantage of getting rid of the Communist mortgage on the Government will outweigh the loss of influence in the union movement that seems certain to follow. The rupture was bound to occur eventually, but instead of chosing a favorable occasion, the SFIO has been put into a position of accepting the break on an issue which is bound to be unpopular among the workers.

The debate in the National Council of the SFIO revealed that the party was almost evenly divided on the proposition of whether or not to support the Ramadier government with the Communists in opposition (2125 votes *against* support of the Ramadier government and 2529 *for* it).

The polarization of political forces that has been going on in France for many months has now been carried one step farther. De Gaulle's new political organization, the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* received 810,000 applications for admission in the first days of its existence. This startlingly large number demonstrates graphically the growing discontent with the Government among large sections of the middle class.

Ramadier's government may have smooth sailing for some time, but between the rapidly growing menace both on the Right and on the Left, one wonders how long it will be able to stay on its perilous middle course.

## Sanctions Against Monaco

After long and thorough deliberations, the Military Committee of the UN has reached the conclusion that the new international organization cannot invoke sanctions against "big powers" but can apply them successfully only in the case of weak countries guilty of aggression—providing, of course, that these culprits do not have any high-powered friends. This conclusion is completely satisfying because it is a well-established historical fact that aggression is always committed by small and weak states whereas the great powers are always the victims of aggression. It is natural, therefore, that the results of the Military Committee's deliberations have been widely and enthusiastically acclaimed by the general public.

But the Committee accomplished more than has been made public. We have succeeded in obtaining from a first-hand source information which until now has remained "top secret." The Committee prepared an elaborately detailed plan for military sanctions in a specific case which, though hypothetical, may become a tragic reality at any moment. The existence of the plan was not revealed because it involved some very delicate questions beyond the competence of the Military Committee and which therefore had to be cleared with the Security Council.

We consider it our duty, however, to reveal the truth about this really epochal achievement. The Committee prepared a complete system of military sanctions for the case of an aggression by the principality of Monaco against France. The possibility of such aggression is extremely serious. The fact has not been sufficiently publicized that the Monaco government intends to ask for rectification of its French frontier in order to gain at the expense of its neighbor no less than 0.003 acres of territory of great strategic importance.

The prevailing impression that Monaco has been practically incorporated into France and that the Monaco people consider themselves French is completely wrong. It is also not to be overlooked that the Government and people of Monaco have been strongly influenced by what may be termed the "Marx - Engels - Lenin - Stalin - Molotov - Vyshinsky - Duclos - Pieck - Foster - Paul Robeson doctrine of absolute sovereignty." Finally we have to bear in mind that in the case of aggression by Monaco the UN would be called upon to face a sea power with an area of 7.99 square miles and a population probably reaching 25,000 (1939 census estimated 23,973). In view of Monaco's being a sea power the Military Committee elaborated an exceedingly cunning combination of naval, aerial and ground forces to crush the military might of the potential aggressor. In order to respect necessary secrecy, we can reveal nothing more except that the Committee decided not to use the atomic bomb because of the danger to fish life in neighboring French waters.

The question arose, however—and we are glad to inform our readers that General Spades-Diamondsov, Soviet representative, raised it—what should be done with the Monte Carlo Casino, which is an international institution and therefore must be saved from destruction. This is particularly important since the International Bill of Rights expressly provides for the international freedom of gambling—this "education of daring, fighting will" as the Soviet representative so happily put it in a two-hour speech indicating that his country would veto any system of sanctions not respecting the rights of gamblers.

The Committee finally proposed, as the most satisfactory solution of the problem, that a new casino (an exact replica of the present one) be built in a completely independent and well-defended country—in the Ukraine or Korea for instance. It further proposed that four to six hours' advance warning be issued in case of application of sanctions in order to permit all gamblers to leave Monte Carlo in special planes for the country sheltering the new casino.

We have no doubt that the Security Council will either accept the solution proposed by the Military Committee or find a better formula. It is still to be hoped, however, that this aggression can be prevented because Monaco, powerful as that little principality is, may be expected to hesitate before it decides to wage war against the combined forces of 55 united nations which include this country, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China. Also she can ill-afford not to take into account some non-members of the UN such as Bulgaria and Albania which are rather certain to become involved.

# FROM SOCIALIST UTOPIA TO TOTALITARIAN EMPIRE

Raphael R. Abramovitch

"Columbus sailed westward in search of a new route to India. But where he landed was not India—it was an entirely different continent. A similar thing happened to Lenin. When he set out in 1917 he thought he was building a classless international socialist society. But what he achieved is a very different thing indeed."

In approximately these terms (I am quoting from memory), Professor Ustryalov, leader of a group of Russian emigres who were seeking a road back to Russia, characterized the historic balance of Leninism in the early 1920's. Ustryalov was sure he knew the exact landing place of Lenin's ship of state. In the heyday of the New Economic Policy, when Lenin was skilfully conducting his "deep strategic retreat," it was natural for a man like Ustryalov to conclude that Lenin was moving irrevocably toward re-establishment of a "normal," i.e., a capitalist society.

We know now how wrong the Russian professor was. But on one point he was right. The "continent" on which the Bolsheviks finally landed is entirely different from the one that they expected to reach. It is not the beautiful Utopia of which Lenin dreamed when he ordered the uprising of November 1917. It is a new, dark world whose existence Lenin did not even suspect.

## *Marxian vs. Narodniki Theory*

Vladimir Ilyitch Ulyanov first stepped upon the stage of Russian history not as "Lenin" but as "Tulin" and "Ilyin." Under the first pseudonym he published (1895-6) two articles on the economic evolution of Russia; under the second his famous book *Development of Capitalism in Russia* appeared in 1899. These writings were not the

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condemnation of capitalism that an outsider might have expected from a revolutionary Marxist. Lenin's avowed purpose was to prove that capitalism with all its evils was developing rapidly in Russia, that nothing could stop its advance, and that this evolution was historically progressive in relation to the pre-capitalist economy of backward Russia. The conclusion, therefore, was that this development should not be opposed at that historical phase—though this did not mean ceasing to fight capitalism as a system or failing to organize the working class for its eventual destruction.

Lenin's (or Ilyin's) book was part of a broad ideological offensive of Russian Marxism against the primitive, utopian thinking of the so-called "Narodniki" (Populists) who regarded capitalism as a kind of "Western" plague which could and should be avoided in Russia. Narodniki theory was based on the assumption that the Russian peasant—with remnants of a primitive collectivism in his rural commune (*Mir, Obstchina*)—would be capable, once freed from Czarist despotism and the domination of the landowners, of organizing his economic and social life along socialist lines. Why, they asked, should the Russian people be "pre-cooked" for socialism in the boilers of capitalist factories? Russia could get along without capitalism and its exploitation, its big cities and slums, its tuberculosis, prostitution and poverty, its child labor and violent social contrasts. Come the Revolution, the Narodniks argued, and the Russian people would just skip capitalism, immediately establishing a socialist society, a free commonwealth of peasant communes and cooperatives of artisans and workers.

Against this semi-anarchist, romantic concept based on the ideas of Bakunin, Lavrov, and Sismondi, the first Russian Marxists opened fire as early as 1883, when the famous "Group for Liberation of Labor" was founded in Geneva by George Plekhanov, Paul Axelrod, Vera Zassulich, Leo Deutsch and others.

The Russian Marxists argued that the idea of skipping the capitalist phase of social evolution was a reactionary and utopian notion. Instead of fighting and deploring the development of industrial capitalism, Russian Socialists were called upon to view it as a progressive step, preparing the way for the emergence of new forces, especially the rise of a class of industrial workers, who were to constitute the revolutionary force for the overthrow of Czarism. This revolution was envisaged as essentially an anti-feudal, democratic, bourgeois revolution. It would free the peasants from the remnants of feudalism and give them the land necessary for free production; it would release the productive forces of the country by removing the dead hand of monarchist cliques and permitting modern capitalists and industrialists to take over the helm; it would guarantee social rights for the workers and enable them to build strong organizations which in due time would lead the industrial proletariat in the struggle for Socialism—a struggle to be conducted simultaneously and coordinated with that of the laboring classes of the more advanced capitalist countries for the same goal.

This concept of Russian Marxism found its expression in the official program of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party (founded in 1898). It was also the guiding idea behind the famous *Iskra* published by Lenin, Potressov, Martov, Plekhanov and Axelrod from 1901 to 1905. It remained the common ideology of the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks even after the rift of 1903, for while there were numerous bitter political and tactical controversies between the two factions, none involved the fundamental concept of the revolution. "Get out of the way," wrote a prominent Bolshevik in *Iskra,* addressing himself to the Russian bourgeois democrats, "get out of the way and let us show you how to make a real bourgeois revolution."

### *Lenin Changes His Mind*

When Trotsky and Parvus, later supported by Rosa Luxemburg and a few Polish socialists, began to advocate within the Russian Social-Democratic Party the theory of a "workers' government" or "permanent revolution," Lenin was distinctly cool or even hostile to the idea and remained so until approximately 1915.

During the last years of the First World War, however, Lenin changed his mind. He became more and more convinced that capitalism, which had started the war, could not finish it. Liquidation of the war and establishment of peace, therefore, was to be achieved by a victorious proletarian revolution in all advanced European countries. Lenin no longer saw any reason for maintaining the traditional distinction between the "bourgeois" revolution and the "Socialist" Revolution, between a minimum and maximum program. Relying on the coming World Revolution, which in his opinion could be nothing short of a Socialist Revolution, he turned his back on the idea of "making a revolution for the bourgeoisie" and launched the struggle in the Party for re-orientation of its whole strategy.

At the first All-Russian Congress of Soviets in June 1917, with the Bolsheviks representing only a small minority, Lenin made his famous declaration that his party was prepared to "take over" immediately. Many of his friends, while also advocating seizure of power and an immediate Socialist Revolution, regarded it rather as an hopeless experiment. "Maybe we'll remain in power only a few weeks but we'll establish a historic precedent, like the Communards of 1871, and then die at the barricades."

Lenin's new policy met real opposition, however, in the ranks of the non-Bolshevik Socialist Left, from those who, like the Bolsheviks, were opposed to the war and belonged also to the so-called "Zimmerwald" bloc. At a joint meeting of all "Internationalist" and "Zimmerwald" groups in Petrograd (June 1917) a lively discussion between Lenin and Trotsky on one hand and many other prominent Left Socialists on the other revealed that the Lenin-Trotsky faction was resolved to proceed with the "proletarian revolution," abandoning the traditional, anti-utopian attitude of Russian Marxism.

Lenin refused to heed the Marxist warning. He also refused to admit the inevitability of final defeat and the prospect that he might become a second Thomas Muenzer or John Bellers. Not glorious martyrdom but power was his goal. With a shrewd twinkle in his half-closed eyes, he would repeat what he had written in one of his articles of that period:

> After the 1905 revolution, Russia was ruled by 130,000 landowners. They ruled by means of constant force over 150 million people by pouring unlimited scorn on them, by subjecting the vast majority to hard labor and semi-slavery. And yet we are told that Russia will not be able to be governed by 240,000 members of the Bolshevik party governing in the interests of the poor against the rich.[1]

The Utopian trend in Russian Socialism finally prevailed over the Marxian. Lenin, who began his career in the 1890's as an anti-Utopian Marxist landed twenty years later in pure Utopia, combining Bakunin's peasant revolt with Tkatchev's method of minority dictatorship and Marxian phrases about the "dictatorship of the proletariat." The Russian proletariat in 1917 was still a small minority of the working population and even this thin stratum was not entirely with Lenin. The streets of Petrograd were deserted on the historic night of November 6th. Only the armored cars of the Bolshevik military conspirators were speeding to the strategic points to which they had been assigned by the "Revolutionary Military Committee." When the workers of Petrograd awoke next morning, they learned with a mixture of stupefaction, curiosity and apprehension that *their* dictatorship had been established.

Utterly unlike the jubilation with which the March revolution was greeted by the masses of the Capital, the November uprising occurred in an atmosphere of mass passivity. Only one idea aroused enthusiasm in the working-class quarters of the city. This was the idea of a coalition government of *all* Socialist parties which was being advocated by Left Socialists and the Vikzhel (Trade Union of Railway Workers and Employees). But this move for unity, which was also supported by a large portion of the Bolsheviks themselves, was frustrated by Lenin, Trotsky, and apparently Stalin.

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[1] See "Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power," *Lenin's Collected Work.* Vol. XXI, Book II, p. 34. International Publishers, 1932.

### *The Great Dilemma*

In retrospect, we can see that Lenin was wrong in almost every political prediction, international or domestic, that he made in those days. The war *was* liquidated by the "capitalists" and not by the "victorious revolution of the proletariat." This revolution, Lenin's only possible theoretical justification for attempting a Socialist Revolution in backward Russia, did not materialize. "Soviet power plus electrification" did not bring Socialism to the Russian masses. And so on.

But in one respect Lenin proved to be right—amazingly so. Contrary to all prognoses his party succeeded in maintaining power and dominating the immense territory, if not yet for "a thousand years," at least for decades.

Lenin's revolution was clearly an Utopian revolution in the sense that Marx and Engels used this term. The Bolsheviks seized power in a country in which 80 per cent of the population were peasants, in which the social, economic, cultural and material conditions were not ripe for domination by the modern proletariat. Modern industry was only beginning in Russia. And did not Frederick Engels expressly warn the "leaders of extreme parties" against just such experiments? In his remarkable study, *The Peasant War in Germany,* written in 1850 under the fresh impact of the frustrated 1848 Revolution in France, Engels wrote:

> The worst thing that can befall a leader of an extreme party is to be compelled to take over a government in an epoch when the movement is not yet ripe for the domination of the class which he represents. . . What he *can* do depends not upon his will but upon . . . the degree of the material means of existence, the relations of production and means of communication. . . What he *ought* to do . . . again depends not upon him. . . Thus he necessarily finds himself in a dilemma. What he can do is in contrast to all . . . his principles and to all the present interests of his party (class); what he ought to do cannot be achieved. In a word he is compelled to represent not his party or his class but the class for whom the conditions are ripe for domination. In the interests of the movement itself he is compelled to defend the interests of an alien class and to feed his own class

> with phrases and promises, with the assertion that the interests of that alien class are their own interests. Whoever puts himself in this awkward position is irrevocably lost. . ." [2]

As we see, Engels indicates here two alternative policies for a leader of an extreme party who comes to power "prematurely." He can insist on representing and defending the interests and aims of his class and suffer eventual defeat at the hands of the hostile classes; or he can agree to defend the interests of an "alien class" (or group) while feeding "his own class with phrases and promises . . ."

Engels believed that either way the course of the leader of the Utopian party was "irrevocably lost": in the first case politically and physically (Thomas Muenzer and his New Jerusalem, the Paris Commune, the Bela Kun revolution in Hungary); in the second case, morally, ideologically, and therefore also politically in the long run.

But has not the Bolshevik experiment proved that Engels—with all his worries about the maturity of society and of the movement—was wrong? Has not Lenin established beyond all doubt the fact that a revolutionary party can not only seize power temporarily but can also hold it for decades even if conditions are not yet ripe for working-class domination?

Engels, writing about a century ago, could not be expected to foresee the domination technique of modern dictatorship. The kind of dictatorship he witnessed was of a very primitive and "inferior" type as compared with that of a Hitler or Stalin. But Engels never stated that a Utopian regime must under all circumstances perish *physically.* What he said by implication was that such a regime, if it would survive, could do so only at the price of sacrificing the interests of its own class to the interests of "alien classes."

This is exactly what happened in the case of the Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia. Lenin and his successor managed to remain in power only by systematically sacrificing the most vital interests of the working class they professed to represent to the interests of their domination as a party. As irrefutably established by Rudolf Hilferding,[3] this party (the Bolshevik Party and the dictatorial machine it has created) has become the "alien class" (or social group) to which Engels refers. The Utopian revolution succeeded in holding the seized power because it transformed itself into a totalitarian regime which managed to make

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[2] *The Peasant War in Germany* by Frederick Engels, p. 135. International Publishers, New York.

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[3] See "State Capitalism or Totalitarian State Economy," by Rudolf Hilferding in this issue of *Modern Review.*

itself independent of the economy, of the people, and to become identified with the "State."

### *Moment of Decision*

Many of the Bolshevik leaders realized early—Lenin himself probably only in February 1921—that their revolution had failed. The World Revolution had not come to their rescue. Bela Kun's forces in Hungary were crushed; the Spartacus uprising was beaten; France and England remained calm; the desperate efforts of the Red Army to cut through Poland in order to join the German revolutionists failed and ended in a costly military defeat for the Soviets; World Capitalism began to stabilize itself. At the same time the domestic situation of the Soviet regime was becoming more and more hopeless. Socialization of industry was decreed, but production could not be resumed because of lack of fuel, raw material, manpower. Transportation deteriorated. On the agrarian side of the economy, the peasants—only recently installed on the land they had seized from the gentry with the blessing of the Soviet Government—obstinately refused to accept the "socialization of agriculture" proclaimed by Lenin. When the Government, with the support of the hungry urban population, attempted to enforce this by requisitioning, etc., the peasants, proclaiming they were Bolsheviks but not Communists replied with revolts and sabotage. In addition, in February 1921 during a general strike of Petrograd workers, the sailors of Kronstadt (most of them sons of peasants and half-anarchist Communists) staged their famous revolt, demanding a change of agrarian policy, free trade and "free and honest" Soviets not ruled by Communist Party force and trickery.

Tukhatchevsky and Trotsky quelled the Kronstadt uprising and by cruel terrorism saved Lenin's power for the time being. But it became clear to the Bolshevik leaders that they were getting themselves into exactly the position predicted by Engels. What they should do in the interests of their program and party ideology, they could not do; and what they could do did not correspond with the wishes and aims of the party. They were "irrevocably lost" if they did not think and act fast—and they knew it.

At this turning point of the Russian Revolution the Bolsheviks were faced with a momentous decision. They could accept the plan repeatedly advanced by the Mensheviks and other Socialists which would have meant restoring political democracy, forming a coalition government of all Socialist and democratic forces, and accepting a fair social and economic compromise between workers, peasants and intellectuals. The economic system of such a Russian democratic republic would have been a "mixed" one, with key industries remaining in the hands of the state, with transportation, foreign trade and banking government regulated, but with free trade and industry in the smaller brackets and completely free agriculture—though the Government was to encourage by propaganda, with credits, and by setting up model enterprises the cooperative and collective forms of farming.

The adoption of this plan, which anticipated by more than 25 years the platform of the present British Labour Government, would not have overcome, of course, all difficulties but it would have made Russia a democratic semi-socialist republic, with fair chances of survival. It would have stimulated Russian economic development; credits would have become available from abroad for industrialization, development of natural resources, re-equipment of agriculture with modern machines and tools, etc.

Internationally, a democratic Russian republic would have become an important element in furthering democracy and social rights all over the world and might have played a most valuable role at the peace-table. As to international Socialism, the forces of organized labor throughout the world would not have been weakened but on the contrary greatly strengthened by the existence of a democratic semi-socialist regime in mighty Russia.

This—the setting up of a democratic Russian republic—was the course the Bolsheviks might have taken in 1921. But this would have meant surrendering the power of their one-party dictatorship. It would have meant sharing power with other political parties and forces, which in turn would have meant competition in open struggle for support of the masses. In short, this would have meant abolishing the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

After three years of unlimited power the Bolsheviks were psychologically incapable of accepting any solution involving such a sacrifice. The maintenance of power at all costs and without restriction had become an obsession—a matter of group self-preservation—for the leading Bolsheviks and their "machine."

Thus, while they accepted that part of the Menshevik program which asked for concessions to the peasants and urban middle-class, while they were prepared even to grant "concessions" to foreign investors, and while they made their peace with World Capitalism, concluded the Rapallo pact with Germany and took part in the Genoa conference,—there remained one thing they would never agree to do, i.e., introduce political freedom in Russia. They sacrificed the interests of the working class in order to safeguard the exclusive power of the

Party, meanwhile feeding the people phrases and asserting that their (the leadership's) power-interests were identical with the interests of the masses.

### *The New Economic Policy*

Introduction of the New Economic Policy was accompanied by abolition of the last vestiges of political and spiritual freedom in the country. In the very same speech in which Lenin announced the new course, he announced also that "the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries will be kept, with mildness, in prison." A strange amalgam of semi-bourgeois economy and stern Communist dictatorship was evolved. The classic bourgeois slogan, "Enrich Yourselves," became the official slogan of the "proletarian government."

The peasants in the villages began to enjoy some of the fruits of the agrarian revolution, but at the same time it became increasingly evident that the original equalitarian concept of the agrarian revolution (i.e. division of the land into very small estates) was not feasible economically. There were not sufficient tools, machines, and horses for the new farmers. Many of them, therefore, were not able to support themselves on their newly-acquired land and had to seek employment as farm-hands. This was to be expected and there was no real danger from this rebirth of the small and middle-sized farms managed along the lines of free trade. On the contrary, this development provided the basis for an almost miraculous revival of agriculture and a considerable improvement in urban as well as rural living. The country began to breathe more freely again after the terrible years of "war communism" (1918-21) and the ordeal of the 1921-22 famine, during which approximately five million lives were sacrificed to this Utopian "experiment." In the NEP period Russia's economic development went forward rapidly. By 1928 the standard of living (real wages) of the average industrial worker reached its peak, surpassing slightly the pre-1914 level.

Then came a new crisis. This was not a real crisis in the country, but rather a crisis in the Bolshevik party caused by the fact that the peasants, not receiving an adequate amount of industrial goods for their farm produce, refused to accept the prices fixed by the Government and withheld their produce from the market.

Actually there was nothing wrong with the demand of the Russian peasant for an adjustment of farm in relation to industrial prices. Had not Trotsky himself—at that time still one of the most powerful leaders of the Government—indicated that prices were out of line? Nevertheless the Bolsheviks leaders received the shock of their lives when it appeared that their calculations were being upset by the farmers. When they introduced the NEP, they were confident of their ability to keep the "capitalist" farmers in check. Trotsky, who was inclined to use picturesque "bon mots," fascinated his audience at one of the first post-NEP congresses by saying that the party was keeping its hands on the "pruning knife" with which it could lop off any social or economic shoots which might grow too fast or in the wrong direction and thus threaten to spoil the pattern of the proletarian landscape. But now the knife didn't work; the shoots (more prosperous farmers or *kulaks*) were getting out of hand.

Once again the Bolsheviks were confronted with a crisis that demanded quick decision. The NEP had reached its limit and did not work any more on the old lines of 1921. Something drastic had to be done. Once again, as in 1921, Russian Socialists—this time from abroad as they had been driven into exile—urged the solution of a democratic, semi-socialist republic, pointing out that workers and farmers are by no means antagonistic classes with irreconcilable interests. But again this was inacceptable to the Bolsheviks—and for the same reason. It meant the end of Bolshevik dictatorship, the exclusive and unlimited power of their party.

### *Collectivization and Industrialization*

Forced "collectivization" of the Russian farmers began in the fateful winter of 1929-30. A struggle—actually an undeclared civil war—ensued. Hundreds of small and scattered peasant revolts and Red Army mutinies occurred during this period. But in contrast to 1921 the Central Government was much stronger, the rebels incomparably weaker than at the time of Kronstadt. For the first time in history it was demonstrated how irresistible the power of a modern dictatorship can be if applied ruthlessly, without inhibitions, against a people demoralized, disorganized and rendered materially and politically helpless by complete absence of political freedom. The scattered resistance of the peasants was crushed by the most brutal and inhuman repressions.

What followed was an unimaginable human and economic catastrophe. Complete disruption of agrarian production was accompanied by extermination of millions of head of livestock. Many animals died of neglect, but the greater part were slaughtered by the peasants themselves to keep them from being "collectivized." A man-made famine followed. Four to five million died as a result of this war started in cold blood by a so-called "workers' and peasants' government"—a war conducted solely in the interests of the Communist Party which had decided at all costs to maintain its political monopoly.

Collectivization in the field of agriculture was only a prelude to "industrialization," i.e., to the series of "glorious" five-year plans which made such a deep impression all over the world. Having subjected the rebellious peasantry to its will and made itself master over the rural economy, the Government was now free to speed up in its own way and on its own terms the development of lagging Russian industry.

The industrialization drive conducted by the Bolsheviks was to be characterized by three features: it was to be a "short-cut" pushed at a breath-taking pace; it was to be accomplished without a sufficient accumulation of investment capital; it was to concentrate on heavy industry, the production of the means of production rather than of consumers' goods.

All these special characteristics of the five-year plans contributed to making the industrialization process an extremely wasteful and painful one from the viewpoint of the Russian masses. Utter and complete disregard of the immediate needs and interests of the people, of human lives and of human welfare, became the most striking characteristic of the program designed to make Russian society "ripe for Socialism."

When the Bolsheviks undertook the First Five-Year Plan, the capital accumulated during the seven "fat years" of NEP was absolutely insufficient for such a grandiose project. Most of the financing had to come out of current national income. Huge investment in buildings, equipment, etc., meant withdrawal of a great part of this income from consumption. And as the industrialization program was concentrated in the field of heavy industry, consumption by the population had to be restricted still more. For year after year the Government had to keep the workers and peasants on the brink of starvation in order to secure the means necessary to carry on the industrialization program. It was literally industrialization by mass starvation.

Real wages of workers dropped sharply in 1928-29 (first year of the plans). From the peak reached early in 1928, when the standard of living of the Soviet worker more or less equalled that of the Czarist pre-World War I period, the average wages of Soviet workers declined steadily until by 1932 they averaged 50 per cent below the 1928 level. This was the lowest level in Europe and real wages stayed there. A Rumanian peasant or Polish worker of the 1930's lived like a "bourgeois" as compared with their respective counterparts in the USSR.

### *The "Totalitarian Spiral"*

It was a superhuman feat to keep 170 million people on what was virtually a starvation diet year after year and at the same time force them to work at an increasing tempo. No regime in the world could have managed it except a totalitarian dictatorship of the most cruel and ruthless kind. Once this goal had been set for the nation, no form of government other than a totalitarian despotism was possible. Only by extremes of terrorism, compulsion, and enslavement, accompanied by intense propaganda, could the masses be held in check and made to bear the cruel privations to which they were subjected. Thus the economic program of the ruling party determined the political form of its regime. And vice versa only an unlimited and total party dictatorship could have advanced such an economic program and have carried it through. Each economic "success" strengthened the Party's and Stalin's politial grip on the people. Thus economic and political factors alike merged in reinforcing the dictatorial power of the ruling party and accentuating its totalitarian character. The "dictatorship of the proletariat" which had seized power in order to liberate labor and to protect the working masses from exploitation and abuse had reversed its function: it had now become the instrument of the total state for enslavement of workers and peasants, for squeezing out of them the surplus product, for exploiting and abusing them in a way in which no capitalists or land magnates of modern times had ever dared to do.

The period of collectivization and industrialization wrested from the Russian workers whatever little freedom they had left. All freedom of movement within the country and freedom to change jobs vanished. Everyone became tied to his city or village, to the factory in which he worked. Rigorous control over working conditions, wages and hours was established and drastic punishments unheard of in relation to free workers were introduced. Even minor "crimes," such as coming late to work, became punishable by imprisonment or deportation to a concentration camp. At this time huge concentration camps (numbering in the hundreds) were set up all over the USSR. In these camps millions of Soviet citizens were (and still are) working as slaves in the literal sense of the word and under the most inhuman conditions.

The state-controlled "trade unions," which at the beginning had the task—in principle at least—of protecting the workers and representing their special economic and social interests, were completely transformed during this period into a state instrument for keeping the workers quiet and forcing them to comply as much as possible with the superhuman requirements set by the regime. At the same time the economic necessity of creating incentives for speed up plus the political interest of the dictatorship in having a social stratum materially concerned in the survival of the regime led to the introduction of a system of highly differentiated wages and salaries. This resulted in the creation of a social pyramid in which the contrasts between rich and poor are as stark as they ever were in countries under the old feudal or early capitalist order.

It is not only money wages and salaries that count in Russia; it is this *and* the sum total of remuneration in commodities, services, special privileges, etc., that the favored ones get from the Great Employer, the State. For the politically privileged this may include such items as better housing, special rations, the right to purchase at exclusive "cooperative" stores, a car, special schooling for ones children, a summer house, permission to buy foreign goods at a low rate of exchange, etc.

A new, hierarchically differentiated, "pyramidal" society has arisen in Soviet Russia during the last two decades, a society of the totalitarian or absolutist type. At the peak of the social pyramid there is a new "aristocracy," a highly-privileged upper stratum consisting first of the Party, then of the higher brackets of the civil, economic and military administration, the police and all other branches of the government. The war added, as a very important element, the higher ranks of the Army—the "new victorious army" in which a junior lieutenant's pay is 1,000 rubles a month while the private receives 10.

### *The Dictatorial Party*

The original assumption underlying Lenin's idea of a "proletarian dictatorship" was that the dictatorial revolutionary government, representing the working class, remains constant, unchangeable in its ideology, morality and sincerity. This was the only guarantee against the government becoming a clique and degenerating into a selfish social group which would use its unlimited power for ends that had nothing to do with the welfare of the proletariat.

This guarantee might seem valid on the theory that the period of dictatorship was to be of very brief duration, if it were only—as Marx had planned it—for the purpose of overpowering the resistance of the capitalist classes against the majority government. But when, as in Russia, the period of dictatorship is extended to three decades or more, the problem arises how to keep the ruling minority party from degenerating. At the beginning of their rule the Bolsheviks maintained that their party would remain democratic no matter how dictatorial the regime it might set up for the country. Dictatorship for the people at large; democracy (internal democracy) for the Bolshevik party—this was the concept. No political opposition was to be permitted in the country, at Soviet or union elections, etc. But in the party itself opinions were to be discussed freely and ruling bodies elected democratically. The party was thought of as a democratic island in a dictatorial sea.

Soon, however, it became clear that the trend was in quite a different direction. Lenin's advice to his comrades never to use terrorism against dissenting leaders in the party was disregarded by his successor. The logic of the "dictatorial spiral," which in due course became a "totalitarian spiral," began to work almost automatically. It became apparent that if opposition was allowed within the party, its ideas and slogans could not be kept within the closed doors of party caucuses. Both the Opposition and the Majority will seek support for their respective sides from the party membership. Heated discussion will ensue, rumors will fill the air, and what began as a private party discussion will soon, with all its pro's and con's, become public property. (In 1926 the joint Trotsky-Zinoviev-Kamenev opposition was still able to organize street demonstrations, not to mention secret mass meetings in the woods.) But the circle of party members permitted to participate in internal discussions became narrower and narrower. Freedom of information and speech even at party meetings became more and more restricted. By the 1930's such "rights" became the exclusive privilege of the central bodies of the party. Eventually, as all opposition in the country comes to be regarded as a potential danger to the party and the regime, no opposition or dissention can be tolerated within the party either. The decision of the Central Committee becomes party law, and then gradually the "Politbureau" and all-powerful Secretariat supersede the Central Committee.

The authority of the Secret Police, at the head of which was placed a member of the Politbureau, was gradually extended—until not even top-ranking members of the Communist Party itself were immune from their snooping. Every party leader (with the exception of Stalin himself) has a "dossier" in the Secretariat and at NKVD headquarters. Almost his every word is recorded and analyzed by highly-trained specialists.

Thus the party, which long ago ceased to be any kind of a "democratic island," is ruled from above by the same totalitarian methods that are applied to the country as a whole. The dictatorship of the proletariat has become the dictatorship of a few men, in fact of one man, who, with the aid of an immense but absolutely obedient machine, rules both the party and the country with an iron hand.

A party which becomes an integral part of a totalitarian regime based on collectivization and industrialization forced through at the cost of millions of lives, ceases to be a party in the traditional sense of the word. It becomes a totalitarian "microcosm," a miniature replica of the state which it rules. Intellectual and spiritual freedom die out. No evolution, no independent thinking, no dissention is permitted or is possible. The word of the Party Chief replaces theories, discussions, analyses, exchange of views. All this inescapably leads to moral and ideological degeneration. Thoughtless and blind obedience, allegiance, loyalty to the Chief (in Russia "The Father of the Peoples"), even servility become the highest virtues of a good party member and take the place of sincere convictions.

The younger generation is trained in uncritical discipline; it is kept in ignorance of the facts, fed with falsified and distorted information about the world-at-large, about its own country and even about the history of its own party; raised in a spirit of amorality and limitless Machiavellianism which kills in the soul of this youth every notion of decency, humanity, pity and compassion toward the "enemy"—the "enemy" being anyone who disagrees with the party line of the moment. These young men and women have no inhibitions, no regard for human suffering or human life, no respect for human personality or human liberty. Their philosophy, their notions of Good and Evil, of Right and Wrong have nothing to do with our concept of human values. They don't understand us, democrats or socialists of the democratic variety, and we are very much mistaken if we think we understand them. They are to us what the "Marsians" were to the Man in H. G. Wells' novel, and we are for them very much the same as the human beings were for the "Marsians." The idea that Communists and democratic Socialists, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, are still two branches of the same great movement, differing only in methods but basically identical in ideology and aims, is an anachronistic and entirely erroneous notion.

### *Transition — From What To What?*

Many Socialist writers still think of Russia in terms of a "transitional system." They refuse to admit that the Soviet State belongs to a new category. In their opinion, there are only two possible kinds of social systems: Capitalism and Socialism. A country like Russia in which capitalism has been abolished, they believe, *must* become a socialist state. As the establishment of a socialist economy requires time, a period of transition must be expected. What we have now in Russia, therefore, is a transitional stage on the road from capitalism to socialism.

This purely abstract and theoretical reasoning does not correspond (alas!) to reality and is not based on facts. It suffices to contrast 1917 with 1947, to confront the point of departure of Bolshevism with the present situation in Russia to come to the inescapable conclusion that the last two decades of Russian history really have marked a transition—a transition not from Capitalism to Socialism but from Utopian revolution to Totalitarianism. A new and third category of social systems has arisen which differs fundamentally from the two classic systems.

The formation of a totalitarian society presupposes more than superficial changes in the political or economic constitution of a country. It is a process that cuts deep, that transforms the very structure of the whole society, its "tissues," its cellular processes, its "biochemistry." New social forces emerge; new attitudes between groups and between men and men are formed; new psychological approaches and reactions, a new social and political morality develop; a new mechanism of "administering things and governing people" is created.

Is this process, once it has been set in motion, reversible? Is it possible that a society which—successfully and definitely—has been transformed into a totalitarian state can change the general direction of its evolution and begin to develop into a democratic collective?

Every system has its own "natural laws" of evolution which affect not only the people but also the ruling groups. Two of the totalitarian states which we have had the opportunity to observe and study, the Third Reich and the Fascist Corporate State in Italy, perished. But neither of them fell because of internal evolution "in reverse"; they were crushed by sheer physical force from the outside. In the case of Germany, even in the very last moments when it became clear that the war was lost, the ruling party was able to frustrate all moves of internal opposition forces directed against the Party or Fuehrer. The dramatic collapse of all anti-Hitler plots in Germany confirms this observation. The situation in respect to Italy was similar despite the fact that at the very end it was obscured by the presence of foreign armies.

The natural law of a totalitarian system is expressed in the "totalitarian spiral." No evolution toward democracy has ever become apparent in such a state nor has this system ever been seriously threatened as yet by a revolution from within. The helpless and completely "atomized" population, deprived of every possibility and means of obtaining information, of organizing or securing even the rudiments of political education in the spirit of democracy, makes it almost impossible for the citizens of the USSR to resist in any way the all-powerful government and its ubiquitous secret police with their informers and "living detectophones" in practically every group, every house, and even—in many cases—inside the family.

The natural trend of a totalitarian regime is to perpetuate itself *ad infinitum*—"for a thousand years to come." It is *not* to seek a road back to democracy which would mean surrendering power. It would require much more space than is available in a magazine article to demonstrate fully that up to now there has not been the slightest indication that the social, political and ideological processes in Soviet Russia following victory in war are beginning to move in a different direction. What we know is that socialist Utopia has turned into totalitarian "realism" of the most accomplished kind.

# STATE CAPITALISM OR TOTALITARIAN STATE ECONOMY

**Rudolf Hilferding**

The concept of "state capitalism" can scarcely pass the test of serious economic analysis. Once the state becomes the exclusive owner of all means of production, the functioning of a capitalist economy is rendered impossible by destruction of the mechanism which keeps the life-blood of such a system circulating. A capitalist economy is a market economy. Prices, which result from competition among capitalist owners (it is this competition that "in the last instance" gives rise to the law of value), determine what and how much is produced, what fraction of the profit is accumulated, and in what particular branches of production this accumulation occurs. They also determine how in an economy, which has to overcome crises again and again, proportionate relations among the various branches of production are reestablished whether in the case of simple or expanded reproduction.

A capitalist economy is governed by the laws of the market (analyzed by Marx) and the autonomy of these laws constitutes the decisive sympton of the capitalist system of production. A state economy, however, eliminates precisely the autonomy of economic laws. It represents not a market but a consumers' economy. It is no longer price but rather a state planning commission that now determines what is produced and how. Formally, prices and wages still exist, but their function is no longer the same; they no longer determine the process of production which is now controlled by a central power that fixes prices and wages. Prices and wages become means of distribution which determine the share that the individual receives out of the sum total of products that the central power places at the disposal of society. They now constitute a technical form of distribution which is simpler than direct individual allotment of products which no longer

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RUDOLF HILFERDING, internationally famous Marxian economist and one of the leading theoreticians of German Social Democracy, died at the hands of the Gestapo in France in 1941. This article was written for the *Socialist Courier*, a Russian-language magazine now published in New York, and appeared in its May 1940 issue. Parts of it have been quoted frequently in English-language publications, but this is the first time—to our knowledge—that the complete text has been offered in translation. The article was written in reply to a theory advanced by a British socialist, R. L. Worrall, in the London magazine *Left* (December 1939) to the effect that the economic system of the Soviet Union is actually *state capitalism.*

can be classed as merchandise. Prices have become symbols of distribution and no longer comprise a regulating factor in the economy. While maintaining the form, a complete transformation of function has occurred.

Both the "stimulating fire of competition" and the passionate striving for profit, which provide the basic incentive of capitalist production, die out. Profit means individual appropriation of surplus products and is therefore possible only on the basis of private ownership. But, objects Mr. Worrall, did Marx not consider accumulation as an essential ear-mark of capitalism and does not accumulation play a decisive role in the Russian economy? Is that not state capitalism?

Mr. Worrall has overlooked one slight detail; namely, that Marx refers to the accumulation of *capital,* of an ever-increasing amount of the means of production which produce profit and the appropriation of which supplies the driving force to capitalist production. In other words, he refers to the accumulation of value which creates surplus value; i.e., a specifically *capitalist* process of expanding economic activity.

On the other hand, the accumulation of means of production and of products is so far from being a specific feature of capitalism that it plays a decisive part in all economic systems, except perhaps in the most primitive collecting of food. In a consumer' economy, in an economy organized by the state, there is not accumulation of values but of consumers' goods—products that the central power wants in order to satisfy consumers' need. The mere fact that the Russian state economy accumulates does not make it a capitalist economy, for it is not capital that is being accumulated. Mr. Worrall's argument is based on a gross confusion between value and use value. And he really believes that a socialist economy could do without accumulation!

But what then (and here we come to the basic question) is that central power that rules over the Russian economy? Trotsky and Worrall reply: "Bureaucracy." But while Trotsky refuses to consider the bureaucracy as a class (according to Marx a class is characterized by the place it occupies in the process of production), Worrall makes an amazing discovery. Soviet bureaucracy in its structure (which unfortunately he does not analyze) differs "basically" from any other bourgeoisie, but its function remains the same—the accumulation of capital. The fact that, despite great structural differences, the function can remain unchanged is, of course, a miracle that cannot occur in nature but seems (according to Worrall) possible in human society.

In any case, Worrall accepts this as evidence that Russia is dominated by a bourgeois class and thus by state capitalism. He clings obstinately to his confusion of capital and the means of production and seems unable to conceive of any form of accumulation other than capitalist accumulation. He fails to understand that accumulation (i.e. the expansion of production) in any economic system is the task of the managers of production; that even in an ideal socialist system this accumulation can result only from the surplus product (which only under capitalism takes the form of surplus value), and that the fact of accumulation in itself does not prove the capitalist nature of an economy.

But does the "bureaucracy" really "rule" the economy and consequently the people? Bureaucracy everywhere, and particularly in the Soviet Union, is composed of a conglomeration of the most varied elements. To it belong not only government officials in the narrow sense of the word (i.e. from minor employees up to the generals and even Stalin himself) but also the directors of all branches of industry and such functionaries as, for exemple, the postal and railway employees. How could this varigated lot possibly achieve a unified rule? Who are its representatives? How does it adopt decisions? What organs are at its disposal?

In reality, the "bureaucracy" is not an independent bearer of power. In accordance with its structure as well as function, it is only an instrument in the hands of the real rulers. It is organized as an hierarchy and subordinated to the commanding power. It receives but does not give orders. Any functionary, as Trotsky justly puts it, "can be sacrificed by his superior in the hierarchical system in order to decrease any kind of dissatisfaction." And these are the new masters of production, the substitute for capitalists! Stalin thoroughly exploded this myth when, during the last purges, he ordered shot, among others, thousands of industrial managers.

It is not the bureaucracy that rules, but he who gives orders to the bureaucracy. And it is Stalin who gives orders to the Russian bureaucracy. Lenin and Trotsky with a select group of followers who were never able to come to independent decisions as a party but always remained an instrument in the hands of the leaders (the same was true later with the fascist and national-socialist parties) seized power at a time when the old state apparatus was collapsing. They changed the state apparatus to suit their needs as rulers, eliminating democracy and establishing their own dictatorship which in their ideology, but by no means in practice, was identified with the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Thus they created the first *totalitarian state*—even before the name was invented. Stalin carried on with the job, removing his rivals through the instrument of the state apparatus and establishing an unlimited personal dictatorship.

This is the reality which should not be obscured by construing alleged domination by a "bureaucracy" which is in fact subordinate to the government to the same extent as are the rest of the people. This is true even though some modest crumbs from the master's table may be doled out to it—without, of course, a guarantee that other crumbs are to follow and at the price of constant danger to their very lives. Their material share does not constitute any important portion of the social product. Nevertheless, the psychological effect of such a differentiation may be quite considerable.

Important economic consequences flow from this fact. It is the essence of a totalitarian state that it subjects the economy to its aims. The economy is deprived of its own laws, it becomes a controlled economy. Once this control is effected, it transforms the market economy into a consumers' economy. The character and extent of needs are then determined by the state. The German and Italian economies provide evidence of the fact that such control, once initiated in a totalitarian state, spreads rapidly and tends to become all-embracing as was the case in Russia from the very beginning.[1] Despite great differences in their points of departure, the economic system of totalitarian states are drawing close to each other. In Germany, too, the state, striving to maintain and strengthen its power, determines the character of production and accumulation. Prices lose their regulating function and become merely means of distribution. The economy, and with it the exponents of economic activity, are more or less subjected to the state, becoming its subordinates. The economy loses the primacy which it held under bourgeois society. This does not mean, however, that economic circles do not have great influence on the ruling power in Germany as well as in Russia. But their influence is conditional, has limits and is not decisive in relation to the essense of policy. Policy is actually determined by a small circle of those who are in power. It is their interests, their ideas as to what is required to maintain, exploit, and strengthen their own power that determines the policy which they impose as law upon the subordinated economy. This is why the subjective factor, the "unforeseeable," "irrational" character of political development has gained such importance in politics.

The faithful believe only in heaven and hell as determining forces; the Marxist sectarian only in capitalism and socialism, in classes —bourgeoisie and proletariat. The Marxist sectarian cannot grasp the idea that present-day state power, having achieved independence, is unfolding its enormous strength according to its own laws, subjecting social forces and compelling them to serve its ends for a short or long period of time.

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[1] Writing in 1940, Hilferding is naturally referring to the German Nazi and Italian Fascist economies at this point.—EDITOR.

Therefore neither the Russian nor the totalitarian system in general is determined by the character of the economy. On the contrary, it is the economy that is determined by the policy of the ruling power and subjected to the aims and purposes of this power. The totalitarian power lives by the economy, but not for the economy or even for the class ruling the economy—as is the case of the bourgeois state, though the latter (as any student of foreign policy can demonstrate) may occasionally pursue aims of its own. An analogy to the totalitarian state may be found in the era of the late Roman Empire, in the regime of the Praetorians and their emperors.

Of course, from a social democratic viewpoint the Bolshevik economy can hardly be called "socialist," for to us socialism is indissolubly linked to democracy. According to our concept, socialization of the means of production implies freeing the economy from the rule of one class and vesting it in society as a whole—a society which is democratically self-governed. We never imagined that the political form of that "managed economy" which was to replace capitalist production for a free market could be unrestricted absolutism. The correlation between the economic basis and the political structure seemed to us a very definite one: namely, that the socialist society would inaugurate the highest realization of democracy. Even those among us who believed that the strictest application of centralized power would be necessary or inevitable for the period of transition, considered this period only temporary and bound to end after the suppression of the propertied classes. Together with the disappearance of classes, class rule was also to vanish—that class rule which we considered the only possible form of political rule in general. "The state is withering away . . ."

But history, this "best of all Marxists," has taught us differently. It has taught us that "administering of things," despite Engels' expectations, may turn into unlimited "administering of people," and thus not only lead to the emancipation of the state from the economy but even to the subjection of the economy to the state.

Once subjected to the state, the economy secures the continued existence of this form of government. The fact that such a result flows from a unique situation primarily brought about by war does not exclude a Marxist analysis, but it alters somewhat our rather simplified and schematic conception of the correlation between economy and state and between economy and politics which developed in a completely different period. The emergence of the state as an independent power greatly complicates the economic characterization of a society in which politics (i.e. the state) plays a determining and decisive role.

For this reason the controversy as to whether the economic system of the Soviet Union is "capitalist" or "socialist" seems to me rather pointless. It is neither. It represents a *totalitarian state economy,* i.e. a system to which the economics of Germany and Italy are drawing closer and closer.

(*Translated by Nina Stein.*)

# AMERICA THROUGH SOVIET EYES

## Stephen Hart

An extremely important political event took place in Moscow a few months ago. It was so important that even now, when considerable time has elapsed, one can hardly find in the Soviet press a political article or news item not closely connected with it. And the event was kept in such secrecy that the press has never revealed exactly when it occurred. Soviet newspapers still refer to it as to the session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party "held in Moscow in February," without giving the exact date of these meetings.

The Central Committee is a large body which never decides anything. All political decisions are made by the Politbureau, if not by Stalin himself. The members of the Central Committee convene rarely —only when new and important directives are to be conveyed, through members of the Central Committee, to the rank and file of the party.

In recent years, the meetings of the Central Committee have always been secret. But one has only to read the Soviet press in order to learn what new directives have been given. The press is now busily engaged in popularizing a new set of slogans.

Many of these slogans are so nonsensical that it seems incredible that Stalin and his propagandists could possibly believe them. Do they believe, for instance, that "Churchill once again tries to organize the United States of Europe *under the leadership of Germany*"? (*Pravda,* April 3). They certainly do not. But they want the Russian people to believe it and they have already "sold" this idea to millions inside Russia who have access to no other sources of information. It is for them that the party has worked out a new manual of slogans embracing the most important political matters.

Let us examine this manual more closely.

### *The Fate of Reginald Davis*

We begin with the United States as Moscow sees it. From innumerable articles, news items and other features published in the Soviet

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press shortly after the Session of the Central Committee it is clear that the present line of propaganda can be summarized as follows:

The United States followed friendly policies toward the Soviet Union until President Roosevelt's death. When Truman became President, this country became "reactionary" and is now supporting the fascists in Italy, reactionaries and even Nazis in Germany in order to prepare an imperialist war against Russia. President Truman is the man who changed U.S. policies. He personifies the reactionary, post-Rooseveltian America. In the addled mirror of the Russian press, President Truman is a dictator who does exactly as he pleases. This distortion is of course intentional. Soviet propaganda takes into account the mentality of the Russian people. To the latter, who have grown up under dictatorship, one man always personifies the policies of every country.

All recent political articles have conformed to this pattern. Soviet literature expresses the same slogans even more distinctly. Many writers have unquestionably been mobilized for this task after the session of the Central Committee, for the press is now full of short stories, poetry, etc., dealing with "American imperialism." The most interesting single piece of propaganda in this field is a play, written by W. Koshevnikoff and I. Prut and entitled *The Fate of Reginald Davis.* It has been published by *Literaturnaia Gazeta,* leading Moscow literary weekly, and will be produced shortly in Leningrad and Moscow.

The play was obviously written in haste. Its authors simply put into it all the new party slogans, without regard for the aesthetic aspects of their work. Their knowledge of America was not great, but they pooled what scraps of information they had and provided their protagonists with such "American-sounding" names as "Mr. Drinker," "Mr. Barnum" and "Mr. Mayflower." (The first two are privates; the last, probably because of his noble name, is a captain in the U.S. Army.)

The hero, Lt. Reginald Davis, is an American who has "always believed in President Roosevelt's ideas." He was sent to Yugoslavia during the course of the war as an instructor and made many friends among Tito's partisans there. Wounded by the Germans, Lt. Davis was evacuated to an American hospital. He left this hospital after the war and was then attached to the American forces in Italy.

It was then that his troubles began for, as the authors explain it, "President Roosevelt died in the meantime and the U.S. Army became a reactionary force, supporting fascists." Lt. Davis has ample opportunity to see these changes in the little Italian town of Castelnuovo.

All the political power in this town is still in the hands of the fascists, who are being supported by American officers. The fascists have arrested all the anti-fascists and have put them in the local prison. In one of the first scenes of the play, the warden of the prison, a notorious fascist, is playing cards with the judge—also a fascist—in the office of the prison. Enters Lt. Davis who demands the release of the imprisoned anti-fascists who were his friends during the war and who have not yet been tried. The fascist judge puts his cards aside, orders the prisoners to be brought in and, using the old fascist code of criminal procedure, simply tells them that they are sentenced to seven years each. He then resumes the interrupted card game and informs Davis that now that the prisoners have been duly sentenced, he regards the incident closed.

All this is fantastic enough, but what follows is still more so. Davis meets a man named Cardona, who was an important fascist leader during the war. Davis and some American soldiers shadow Cardona. Cardona happens to be going to a "meeting of representatives of thirteen legal and many illegal fascist organizations." Davis endeavors to arrest Cardona, but the people at the meeting throw out Davis and his friends. He returns, however, with a British patrol under command of a sergeant. The British sergeant refuses to arrest Cardona and makes uncomplimentary remarks about President Roosevelt instead. "What about your Churchill, that old *Shljucha?*" asks one of the Americans. (*Shljucha* means something between a street-walker and a pig.) A free-for-all ensues and Lt. Davis and his men are not only thrown out this time, but also arrested by the British and brought to the American military prison.

It is here that Lt. Davis meets "Private Barnum of Canyon City, Oregon." Barnum tells Davis the "facts of life" as they pertain to American activities in Italy and also relates his personal story. For no reason whatever evidently the American Army had decided to close down a home for Italian children in Castelnuovo. Private Barnum was ordered to get the children out of their beds in the middle of the night and turn them into the streets. He refused to carry out such an inhuman order and his superior officer had him arrested.

But the American Army, according to this play, not only turns Italian children out of their beds in the night; it also expels the poor Italian peasants from their villages for the sole purpose of stealing their belongings, which the officers then send to America. This is one way for Americans to get rich quick in Italy today. Another is to buy land from the expelled peasants for a few *liras*. An American officer from Texas tells Davis that he has bought acres this way. He plans to sell them at a large profit, then return to America and marry. This officer, of course, is a "reactionary" American, which accounts for the fact that he is not a prisoner in detention barracks, but rather is the warden of these barracks.

Another play, written much along the same lines, has already been produced simultaneously and with great success in many theaters throughout the Soviet Union. It is the new Konstantin Simonoff play, *The Russian Question.*

Mr. Simonoff visited the United States in 1946. One of his earlier plays, *The Whole World Over,* is now playing in New York. The action of *The Whole World Over* is laid in Moscow and all the protagonists are extremely nice people indeed. The scene of Mr. Simonoff's new play, however, is America and all the protagonists, with but one exception are scoundrels. As the plot of *The Russian Question* has been reported widely in the U. S. press, it is unnecessary to recount it here. The impression that Soviet audiences must gain from it is that America hates Russia and intends to attack her. This is exactly what the Soviet propagandists want them to think.

### *A German-American Anti-Russian Front*

Hitler killed millions of Russians and his troops razed thousands of Russian towns and villages. Little wonder then that the Russians still hate and fear the Nazis.

Soviet propaganda exploits this factor to the full at present. The newest trick consists of connecting the Nazis with "American reaction."

A characteristic article, illustrating this, appeared in *Pravda* (April 6, 1947) on the occasion of the death of one Arthur Rechberg. Herr Rechberg, who was a prominant German industrialist and an influential right-wing politician, died recently in Bavaria.

The *Pravda* article begins with Herr Rechberg's biography. This biography is only partially correct, and, as everybody knows, half-truths are often worse than lies. *Pravda* writes that Herr Rechberg helped to form an anti-Russian front of the Western powers—including Germany—shortly after World War I. This is correct. But it is equally true—and *Pravda* doesn't say a word about it—that Herr Rechberg changed his views subsequently and became an active supporter of a German-Russian alliance long before World War II. It is also a well known fact—but *Pravda* does not mention this either—that Rechberg, who backed Hitler financially and politically before

World War II, ceased to do so when Hitler attacked Russia. He was of the opinion that this was a fatal blunder and told Hitler so. The result of this conversation was that Herr Rechberg was sent to a concentration camp and remained there until American troops freed him.

So much for the biography of Herr Rechberg. Far more important, however, is the question: *Why* did *Pravda* go out of its way to falsify this biography? The second part of the article answers this question clearly. *Pravda* asserts that after his liberation from the camp Rechberg was brought to Bavaria and that a large chateau was put at his disposal by the Americans. Herr Rechberg's "castle" soon became "a center of anti-Russian intrigues." He sold the Americans his old idea of a German-American anti-Russian front and organized, with American support, a sort of a central office for anti-Soviet propaganda. This office—obviously through American channels, for Germany does not possess any—has broadcast to the world a number of "slanderous anti-Soviet rumors." One of them was the rumor of a large German army in Russia, organized by General von Seydlitz, the former President of the "Free German" movement in Russia.

*Pravda* ends its article with the intimation that German imperialists still present a great danger. This may be true, but the implications of the article go much further than that. What the Soviet paper is trying to do is to create in the minds of its readers a strong connection between the German imperialists and "American reaction."

### *New Stalin Build-up*

There is considerable speculation in America as to who has been chosen as Stalin's successor. No basis can be found in the Soviet press for such speculation. Stalin does not seem to be looking for a successor. Quite the contrary: he is going strong, stronger than ever—if not physically, then at least politically.

None of the resolutions of the Central Committee are carried out with more zeal and thoroughness than those concerning the person of Stalin. The party has obviously decided to lift Stalin's popularity to new heights.

To fulfill this task, hundreds of thousands of party members have been mobilized. In almost every town, special party groups were organized immediately after the session of the Central Committee for the sole purpose of preparing lectures about Stalin's life. Other groups travel from town to town with mobile exhibitions of documents and photographs illustrating Stalin's biography. The themes of the lectures are always the same: "Stalin's military genius," "Stalin's friendship with Lenin," etc. This campaign is now in full swing and, in some places—for instance in Kiev—not less than eighty party agitators are simultaneously busy holding meetings on this subject. Telegrams from other towns regularly published by *Pravda* show that similar meetings are being held everywhere throughout the Soviet Union.

This is not all. Almost every issue of *Pravda, Isvestia* and other papers throughout March and April carries a greeting for Stalin, which is always featured on the front page in the largest type possible. The papers pretend that these greetings are sent by groups of peasants, workers and soviet officials from various towns and villages. Their identical wordings show, however, that they originate from a single source.

In all the greetings "Stalin's military genius" is stressed. The same theme is emphasized in numerous short stories and movie scenarios, published in the Soviet press during the weeks following the meeting of the Central Committee in Moscow. All these stories and scenarios are shaped after one model: *The Battle of Stalingrad,* written by Nicolai Virta. Virta is not a good writer, but lately he has become something of a Voice of the Kremlin in literary matters. To do away with any doubt on that score, he introduces his scenario with the remark that he has had "long and numerous conversations with all the protagonists of his work before he put it on paper." As the only protagonist in Mr. Virta's scenario is Stalin himself, the full conformity of the author's views with the highest authority possible cannot be questioned.

In this scenario, Stalin not only personally works out all the strategy plans for the defense of Stalingrad, but also carries them through, giving orders to attack here or to retreat there, directing supplies into the beleaguered town, etc. Only two men, Georgy Maksimilianovitch Malenkov, and Marshal Alexander Mikhailovitch Vassilewski, help Stalin, but all they do in Virta's scenario is to express their admiration for Stalin's military genius. Neither Molotov, nor Zhdanoff nor anyone else is even mentioned.

As for Molotov, an indication of his exact status in the Soviet hierarchy at present is to be found in a telegram which recently appeared in *Pravda.* It reports that the Rumanian puppet government has made Stalin an honorary citizen of Rumania. On Molotov, the telegram continued, was bestowed honorary citizenship of Klusk (a remote and almost unknown town in Rumania), while Vishinsky received a Rumanian Order, and no honorary citizenship whatsoever. In other countries, such a news item would have little significance, but in the Soviet Union it is important indeed. Anyone familiar with the Soviet rites knows that all "honors" stem directly from Moscow.

The second point, which the press has stressed in recent weeks, relates to Stalin's role in the Russian civil war. *Pravda* (March 17, 1947) gives a full page to this theme (25 per cent of its entire space). Nothing in the rigidly controlled Soviet press is accidental except typographical errors: every item and every article has some hidden meaning, and so has the story describing Stalin's exploits in 1917-20.

*Pravda* reminds its readers that even then Stalin forecast the possibility of an anti-Russian front of all the Western powers, including Germany. Soviet Russia's victory over all her enemies at that time is explained not only by Stalin's military genius, but also, and especially, by the fact that he demanded "self-determination for all nations" . . . which would join the Soviet Union. For, as Stalin has always maintained, real "national freedom," as well as "social liberty," exists only in the "Soviet Union of Free Nations."

It is interesting to note that only two names are mentioned in *Pravda*'s article: those of Stalin, and, far less frequently, Lenin. Mr. Molotov is again not mentioned, although he played an important role at the time. This omission, of course, is not accidental either.

### *Does Russia Want War?*

The largest Soviet literary monthly *Novyi Mir* recently wrote that "millions of people outside the Soviet Union are enchanted with the last Soviet novels" which enjoyed such popularity all over the world that even the capitalist press was forced to praise them highly, even if insincerely. Another Soviet magazine remarked that there is nothing strange in that, for "the Soviet writers are the only genuine successors of the once great world literature." The latter, according to the magazine, is dead; foreign authors' books lack "artistic value," and all that non-Soviet writers do at present is to "run in a vicious circle, without ever getting anywhere."

The artistic values of works like *The Fate of Reginald Davis,* or *The Russian Question* are perhaps not as great as their authors think, and it is certainly regrettable that the Soviet people are being so badly informed about foreign literature. Much worse, however, and far more dangerous, is the way the Soviet press misinforms its readers in respect to important political events abroad.

Almost the only Americans whose opinions are widely quoted in Russia are Messrs. Henry Wallace, Johannes Steel and Max Lerner, Senator Claude Pepper, and Congressman Marcantonio. They represent, in the Soviet press, *the* Voice of America. The most influential and important publications in America, according to the Russian press, are: *The Daily Worker, PM, In Fact, Reader's Scope,* and the *New Republic,* in this order. Russian articles on foreign affairs are based mostly on these publications. Thus, Truman's doctrine is represented as highly unpopular in the United States and opposed by nearly everyone, except a few reactionaries and warmongers.

In the past few weeks a coming economic collapse in America has been the main theme of the Soviet press. The Soviet Union expects the depression to begin any moment now, and wishful-thinking often replaces any attempts at serious analysis on this score. It is a reasonable supposition that this was one of the most important reasons behind the collapse of the Moscow conference. The Russians no doubt feel that it will be much easier for them to talk to Americans after the "big crash."

Russia certainly doesn't want war—at least not yet. She is not ready for it. The only item from the Central Committee agenda that was dealt with directly in the press concerns "the agricultural front," and the directives clearly show the deplorable state of the Soviet agriculture after the war. But a totalitarian regime always relies on wishful-thinkers, on yes-men, and on people who would rather send in a false report that sounds good than a true one which might make unpleasant reading for the dictator. We know how inaccurately Ribbentrop informed Hitler before the war. Only God and Stalin know what kind of information is furnished the Kremlin by Soviet representatives abroad. But in reading the Soviet press, one gets the uncomfortable impression that the men in the Kremlin are already poisoned by their own propaganda so far as the United States is concerned. They certainly do not believe in the wholly fantastic adventures of Messrs. Drinker, Barnum and Mayflower in the Italian town of Castelnuovo: this is propaganda for the masses. But they do seem to believe that Americans are "soft" enough to make it possible for them to go to ridiculous lengths. And this is the most dangerous aspect of Russian-American relations.

# WHAT'S IN STORE FOR LABOR?

**Aaron Levenstein**

The current legislative drive against the unions is serious business. As this was written, labor still hopes for a successful Presidential veto. But whatever happens next, labor has already suffered a setback. There is no reason to believe, however, that enactment of the law will wreck the American labor movement, as some of the Republicans seem to think.

Most significant consequence for the unions will be the effect on public opinion. An indictment which does not result in a conviction is still an ugly affair. But even if the indictment is sustained—if the final bill becomes law with or without the President's signature—the labor movement will not be destroyed, though some of its activities will be considerably hampered.

What makes this crop of proposed laws interesting to the student of labor trends is that they put the seal of recognition on developments which have occurred spontaneously without much public awareness. The bills are, in a sense, a formal concession that labor has grown up, that its decisions affect the whole community. Fifteen years ago, the importance of the workers in our economy hardly impressed the public. Today everybody knows that we cannot survive without labor. The organized workers have the power to hurt the public—a power that derives from the fact that labor makes a direct contribution to the public welfare, day after day, by staying on the job, producing our goods and giving us our services. The legislation is a back-handed tribute to the importance of labor.

Unfortunately, Congress does not recognize the implications of its own assertions that labor can tie up the nation. The workers possess that power, not because they have exercised a manipulated monopoly in strategic corners of our economy, but because they are the final repository of economic energy and utility. Their refusal to work during periods of strikes touches our daily life only because their willingness to work most of the time makes it possible for the community to survive.

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The present legislative drive, which is based on labor's power over the public, has been stimulated by distorted evidence of what labor has done with its power. The truth is that the unions have wielded their power reluctantly, with no great zest for striking. Even in the coal situation, the hysteria of last November which culminated in the injunction against Lewis and the miners was hardly justified by the facts. The miners were out of the pits for 17 days, at a time when the country had a 40-day supply of coal above-ground. This country had known much longer and much more serious coal strikes: 25 years before, Lewis had led a five-month walkout; in April of last year, a 59-day strike.

Yet it remains true that when labor downs tools, the rest of the country is affected. But certainly nothing proposed in Congress today —at least in the plans of House Labor Committee Chairman Hartley or Senate Committee Chairman Taft—touches that problem. The bills all rest on the assumption that the issue is a *labor* problem; actually, it is a *labor-management* problem. Strikes are not the result of a unilateral labor decision; they are the consequence of labor-management decision, that is, of an inability of both labor and management to arrive at agreement. Nevertheless, these laws isolate the responsibility of the unions, leave management untouched—in fact, encourage management to withhold agreement. That was demonstrated clearly in the case of the telephone workers. On the eve of the strike, House Committee Chairman Hartley introduced legislation to restrain the phone unions from striking, the only effect of which was to advise the executives of the telephone companies that they need not settle.

Congress is now trying to corner the unions. Its techniques are so varied that it will be impossible to discuss all of them within the space of this article. But it will be enough to cite the major objectives in order to demonstrate how irrelevant and far from the mark, how lacking in understanding, our legislative solons are—whatever their objective may be.

For instance, there has been much to-do about the employer's rights under the Wagner Act, and the emphasis has been put on amending the law. Congressional ignorance on this question would do shame to any sophomore who has taken a course in labor legislation. For the Wagner Act is not what it used to be.

For some time now the National Labor Relations Board has been retreating from the stiff policies it followed during the first years of the Wagner Act. A completely new majority of the Board has been functioning for many months without too much regard for the original precedents. Today labor lawyers who used to predict with uncanny accuracy how the Board would vote have been reduced from prophecy to guessing.

## II

The Wagner Act forbids employers to interfere with their workers' choice of a collective bargaining agent. Very early in its existence the Board had to decide what constituted interference. A threat to discharge a worker for joining the union clearly interferes with his freedom to choose between bargaining collectively and dealing individually with his employer. But what about an employer's mere statements of opposition to union organization?

The Board, in the first years of its existence, took the view that any expression of hostility to the union was coercive. As the NLRB saw it, the employer's superior economic position gave his words greater meaning than any ordinary expression of opinion. It was not unreasonable for a worker to suppose that disregard of his boss's opinion about unionism might cost him his job. The economic power of the employer over the worker could easily transform his words from mere persuasion into coercion.

So it was that a newspaper publisher who made the statement that the CIO's Newspaper Guild "was not a reputable organization" was held to have violated the Wagner Act. (A federal Circuit Court later reversed the Board on the ground that the employer had already been negotiating with the Guild at the time he made the statement.) Another employer, the M. E. Blatt Company, had posted a notice during a union drive which read: "It has come to our attention that a group of our employees has met to form an organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and we wish to repeat that it is not necessary for any employee to join any organization in order to continue in our employ." The Board held this was a violation, and was upheld by another Circuit Court.

In pursuing this policy, the Board was upheld by the Supreme Court, which adopted the same logic and emphasized the employer's duty to remain "neutral" during an organizing campaign. "Intimations of an employer's preference, though subtle, may be as potent as outright threats of discharge," said the Court.

Now the Board leans the other way. The employer may make any statement he wishes, provided that it contains no threat and it is not part of a whole pattern of anti-union behavior.

Recently the Board exonerated the Bausch and Lomb Company which had issued a leaflet disparaging unions engaged in organizing its workers. The company had even warned the employees "that the security of their employment depended upon their refusal to affiliate with either of the labor organizations campaigning for their support." This represents a real change in the Board's policy. *The Board did not wait for Congress to change the law.*

In practical terms, however, this reversal of Board policy will make little difference to the unions. Whether or not an employer tells his workers that he is opposed to their unionizing, his opposition is usually inferred by the employees. Actually, the whole notion that the employer must remain neutral when organizers are at his gate was pure myth. The workers knew that the boss didn't like it. At most, the new dispensation of free speech gives the employer only the relief of self-expression in public.

In this respect Congress is seeking to legislate what is already the fact. When asked by Senator Ives, in the hearings on the pending legislation, whether he opposed amending the Wagner Act to give employers free speech, John L. Lewis suggested that all Congress needed was an amendment "saying that employers who think that they are deprived of the right of free speech should read Section 8. I do not oppose that."

## III

The halls of Congress have rung with eloquent speeches demanding that the unions be compelled to bargain with the employers. In recent years, employers have complained that they are required to bargain collectively but that no similar obligation rests on labor. If strategy, or sheer cussedness, led the union leaders to sit on their haunches and refuse to negotiate, there was nothing the employer could do but try to out-sit them.

Now the Board has come so close to the Congressional effort to make bargaining a two-way obligation that it is hard to determine whether Congress is following the Board or vice-versa.

The Board has begun to scrutinize labor's bargaining tactics to see if the union leaders are making a bona fide attempt to negotiate. As yet it does not order the unions to bargain and it is reluctant to see Congress impose such an obligation. But as Chairman Herzog told the Senate Labor Committee: "In all candor we must express a doubt whether, in practice, such an amendment would prove particularly useful to the employers who urge it, because it merely imposes upon labor organizations the obligation to perform the very function that they were created to perform." Actually, Herzog's fear is that Congress would substitute for the duty to bargain a mere duty to meet, talk and then go home without a genuine effort to reach agreement.

The opening wedge in forcing unions to negotiate sincerely came in the case of two daily newspapers published in St. Petersburg, Fla. There the Typographical Union had walked out after refusing to discuss or bargain about certain of its "work rules." The employer had then been charged with a refusal to bargain because of statements he had made about not dealing with strikers. When the issue came to the full Board in Washington, the members were unanimous in clearing the editor and his company. Herzog, Houston and Reynolds joined in a statement that put a new obligation on unions. They conceded that they did not have the power to order unions to negotiate, but they made it clear that the Board would no longer use its power to assist unions that don't bargain. They held that on the basis of the facts in the case, the employer had not refused to bargain; but even if he had refused, he was excused from doing so because of the union's refusal to negotiate. In the past, the Board had insisted that the employer had a "continuing obligation to bargain." Now for the first time the duty was being lifted from the employer's shoulders.

The Board members said: "The test of good faith in bargaining that the Act requires is not a rigid but a fluctuating one, and is dependent in part upon how a reasonable man might be expected to react to the bargaining attitude displayed by those across the table. It follows that, although the Act imposes no affirmative duty to bargain upon labor organizations, a union's refusal to bargain in good faith may remove the possibility of negotiation and thus preclude the existence of a situation in which the employer's own good faith can be tested. If it cannot be tested, its absence can hardly be found."

In other words, if a union doesn't show good faith at the bargaining table, the government will not compel the employer to continue bargaining.

In strategic terms, this can make a real difference to the unions. One of the tactical advantages that a John L. Lewis or a Petrillo has enjoyed no longer exists. Given this kind of situation, a union's success will depend on sheer economic pressure, on the power of the strike, rather than the backing of the NLRB.

Thus Congress has been winning some victories—even without the enactment of legislation. The unions are aggrieved. The *CIO News* complains that "the NLRB is adopting a policy of promoting industrial unrest, raiding and disruption."

Actually, though, there will be little practical effect on the unions that are already well organized. They are powerful enough now to protect themselves against unfair labor practices, discriminatory discharges of union members and refusals to bargain. It may well turn out that the Wagner Act was important only as a springboard for union organization, and that its present usefulness is limited to localities, particularly in the South, where unionism has no foothold. But even there, Congress is having its own way without amendment of the Act by curtailing the National Labor Relations Board appropriations.

## IV

Congress has also been preoccupied with the question of the closed shop and other contract clauses requiring workers to join a union or maintain membership. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, by the end of 1946, some 7.4 million workers were employed under closed shop or union shop agreements; another 3.6 million under maintenance of membership. In trying to legislate against "union security," Congress is directing its attention to a well-established institution, so well established that it is unlikely that any substantial change can now be effected by legislation. The institution is too well entrenched.

For a long time it has been debatable whether the closed shop is as important to the unions as they seemed to think. Unions in other countries have prospered without such devices. It may even be that the major reason for labor's interest in the issue here has been a reaction to the open-shop campaign waged by the National Association of Manufacturers at the turn of the century. A weak labor movement needed "union security"; a well-organized movement has other resources for keeping its membership—the obvious value of organization in terms of wage increases; the benefits of union welfare funds; representation in grievance procedure; etc. It is pretty late in the game for an open-shop weakening of the unions.

Certain special circumstances, however, may make it desirable for a union to keep the closed shop. In the event of depression and a loose labor market, the closed shop helps a union get preference in employment for its own members. If another union is bent on raiding, the closed shop slows up the drive, makes the substitution of a rival union as the bargaining agent extremely difficult. Some employers, despite the Congressional fulminations against the closed shop, are for it. They have learned that they must deal with unions—and they would rather not be involved in wars between them. They have learned that the closed shop is a stabilizing influence in their labor relations.

As for the unions, by and large, the closed shop has been reduced to a convenience, at most—hardly a necessity. As long as a union enjoys exclusive bargaining rights under the Wagner Act by virtue of a simple majority, the closed shop is not too vital. In the days when an employer was free to withhold simple recognition from a majority union, the closed shop was a guarantee of negotiations for contract renewal once the old agreement had expired. Now the Wagner Act has eliminated such fears of what will happen when the current contract comes to an end—recognition will continue.

As this is written, both the Senate and the House have voted to ban the closed shop. In addition, it should be noted that the National Association of Manufacturers has been quite successful in the state legislatures. To date, some 15 states have taken steps to ban or limit union security in one form or another—and most of the other states are considering similar laws. The unions are preparing to contest the constitutionality of the statutes. But whether they win or lose, the history of the next few years will show that the high hopes pinned on such prohibitions by the reactionaries are not justified. Again, the unions have already won a hold on their membership and will not lose them because of a statute or a union security contract clause.

But one serious consequence of the legislation would be an outbreak of individual violence in plants that have functioned under the closed shop. It is too much to assume that men who have worked only with union brothers for decades will suddenly permit non-union members to walk into their shops—particularly if union members are known to be unemployed.

## V

On one important issue the current attempt to whittle down labor's legal rights has failed completely. The National Association of Manufacturers concentrated heavily on industry-wide bargaining, hurling charges of labor monopoly against the unions. But "atomization" of the international unions and strait-jacketing collective bargaining on a purely local level have been decisively defeated. The Senate voted it down and the House conferees have agreed to go along.

Industry itself is split on the issue. Many of the larger companies don't object to industry-wide bargaining. They prefer to see more or less uniform wage standards and working conditions because the effect is to drive their marginal competitors out of business. For instance, the recent increase granted by the American Woolen Company to the Textile Workers is interpreted in some quarters as a deliberate company plan to get rid of competition.

Most unions are aware of that problem, and confine many questions to local bargaining. They have no interest in driving companies out of business, leaving their membership without jobs. As a result, they have made concessions, though naturally they have tried their utmost to keep wage rates uniformly high.

A recent study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics reveals that nation-wide bargaining is prevalent only in seven industries: coal mining, glass, elevator installation, automatic sprinkler installations, pottery, stoves and wallpaper. In addition, several industries, like shipping, longshoring, fishpacking, paper, clothing, hosiery and textiles, bargain on a regional basis wider than that permitted under one of the rejected Senate bills. Such legislation would have affected company-wide bargaining in some mass production industries where plants are located in different communities.

What these proposals really aim at is the war-accelerated tendency to narrow geographical differentials and introduce consistency in working conditions. (That is a major issue in the current coal negotiations, with the southern group of operators refusing to bargain alongside the northern.)

Of course industry has no unanimous enthusiasm for local bargaining, either. If competition gets keen—as it must before long—management may want some safeguard against undercutting by low-wage employers. In addition, many employers don't like the idea of being picked off singly by the unions—the tactics used by the United Auto Workers in the first-round bargaining that began November 1945. Then the union concentrated on General Motors, forcing it to fix the wage-increase pattern. After that, the unions in each of the other companies stood firm for the same demand.

It is hard to see how anything in a ban on industry-wide bargaining could prevent that from happening. Technically, a bill could prevent any international union from requiring its locals to sign contracts containing uniform minimum standards. Actually, that is a legalism which can't work. It is based on the assumption that local unions will be happy to take less favorable settlements. Congress is laboring under the delusion that the local unions do not support their international leaders' "excessive" demands. Of course, there will always be instances of individual groups differing with their parent organizations, but by and large the workers will back their leaders in any maneuvers necessary to circumvent a ban on industry-wide bargaining, even if it became law.

## VI

The miscellaneous restrictions that are thrown into the omnibus legislation sought by the Republicans set up elaborate formalities to govern the negotiations between labor and management. For instance, the House Bill would require that employer and union receive each other's proposals and counter-proposals; discuss them at not less than five conferences within 30 days; take a strike vote under government auspices after negotiations have broken down. Cooling off periods, new mediation services, reorganization of the National Labor Relations Board personnel are among other devices intended to prevent strikes.

A number of the sections in the proposed laws would simply make it an unfair labor practice for the unions to engage in coercion or violence. Unions would become suable for any wrongful acts. While these sections are disturbing because they condemn labor in the court of public opinion, the fact is that existing state laws cover such situations. There is no reason to believe that a federal law covering the same ground would alter the picture appreciably.

Some provisions call for internal policing of the unions, disciplining of members, publication of financial reports, etc. In addition, sympathy strikes and boycotts, mass picketing, striking for feather-bedding contract clauses, jurisdictional disputes, would be outlawed.

Many of these proposals are based on an exaggerated notion of the abuses prevalent in labor unions. There are, to be sure, many real ones—conceded by labor. Insofar as they are the result of economic fears—for instance, feather-bedding—the legislation solves nothing, though it attempts to strip the unions of a weapon they have used to meet the problem of depression and unemployment. But the enforceability of such provisions is rather doubtful. If a union may not strike for a feather-bedding provision, what's to prevent it from demanding impossible wage terms and compromising only when the employer volunteers a feather-bedding clause to reach a settlement? Mr. Petrillo will have little difficulty in defeating the intent of the legislators.

The big objective in the legislative drive, however, presents a grimmer picture—restoration of the injunction in labor disputes that threaten the "public health or safety." Enactment of these provisions would indeed turn back the clock. The assumptions on which the legislation is predicated go to the roots of the democratic right to strike.

It is assumed that labor has no right to strike where the public is directly affected. Workers engaged in key industries are to have fewer rights than workers engaged in luxury or minor industries.

It is hard to understand the distinction. Apparently, a coal miner —precisely because he renders a greater service to the nation—is to enjoy fewer freedoms than the worker who produces hair-pins. The railroad-worker who makes it possible for our city populations to eat is to have a secondary status in our society.

Certainly, the strike of the key worker is more serious for the community. But here again we return to the basic fact which the current bills ignore—namely, that strikes are the product of difficulty between industry and worker. Because the coal miner is essential to all of us, we are asked to reward the mine owner, facilitate his refusal to bargain sincerely, make it easier for him to deny decent wages to his employees. Such legislation is an invitation to management in the key industries to play the recalcitrant. It is, in effect, an incitement to more obstinate bargaining, greater friction and more strikes.

There is validity in the argument that labor owes a responsibility to the public. But responsibility is not a one-way street. If labor is to be responsible to the public, then the public owes a responsibility to labor. The public hardly has a right to ask of labor that it consider our welfare if we fail to give attention to labor's needs. Does the public have the right to tell teachers that they "must not strike against the state" when the public has been apathetic about the pitiful standard of living to which the teachers have been reduced? Does the public have the right to tell the steel workers that they must not strike when the public has failed ignominously to protect labor's standard of living and has tolerated the destruction of OPA and the consequent rise in living costs?

But there is another implication in this notion that workers in key industries may not strike because of the public welfare. If the industry is so vital to the whole nation that we dare not permit the workers to strike for better wages, then it is also true that we cannot leave the industry in the hands of those who have the power to provoke strikes by refusing to grant decent wages and working conditions. The argument will have to cut both ways; if it's too essential to be left even partially in the hands of its workers, it's certainly too essential to be left to private management.

Perhaps our Congressmen, who are now blasting labor for its iniquities, are implying more than they realize when they demand government action against the unions.

# ARE THE GERMANS PARANOIACS?

## Nicolas Calas

In our century, science, history, art are permeated with psychology the way culture, in the nineteenth century was obsessed with biology and in the eighteen with "nature." By replacing the fetish of organism and the goddess reason with a new gadget called the unconscious, second-rate minds believe that they have discovered the key of wisdom.

The well-known Swiss psychoanalyst, de Saussure, traces the German fixation on Hitler to the Prussian ideal of a strict father. According to this view, all manifestations of Prussian culture, from the philosophy of Kant to the judicial theories of Jhering, the political ideas of Bismarck and the *Führerprinzip,* were predetermined by the Prussian family organization.

Another psychoanalyst, a non-Freudian one this time, Erich Fromm, a few years ago enjoyed a wide success with a book in which he explained how the German middle class suffered from a pathological need to escape from freedom. A third psychologist, of the school of Abram Kardiner, Geoffrey Gorer of the Yale Institute of Human Relations, who had been entrusted during the war by the British government to make secret researches, attaches great importance to the toilet training of the Japanese infants. He even believes that the poor opinion of the United States held by prewar Japanese governments resulted from a bad nursery education.

Other psychologists think that paranoid trends were institutionalized in fascist Germany. This is the opinion of Richard Brickner whose theories were seriously discussed two years ago in New York at a congress of psychiatrists. According to still other psychiatrists, however, fascist leaders are not paranoid but show strong symptoms of a compulsion neurosis.

It must not be assumed that once the psychopathological explanation was set rolling that the detectives of the soul were going to

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limit their diagnosis to Germany and Japan. Professor Edward A. Strecker of the University of Pennsylvania does not hesitate to declare that the isolationists are schizophrenics and prisoners of the thought. Even mild conservatives become the targets of his new psychological offensive, provided they are unfortunate enough to be religious. *Partisan Review,* a magazine that prides itself for both its radicalism and spirit of independence, under the leadership of the very brilliant Sidney Hook, conducted three years ago a whole campaign to prove that anyone who dared believe in God was the victim of a failure of nerve.

In France, Wladimir Brabovitch, shortly before the war made the important discovery that the precariousness of liberal regimes is attributable to vegetarianism. Apparently insufficient meat provokes a negative response to conditioned reflexes and turns dogs and men into docile subjects of tyrants.

### *Historical Explanation of Psychologism*

This great popularity of psychogenetic explanations of political phenomena comes as the liberal reaction to fascist racial theories. There is good reason why racial theories should have found in Protestant countries a climate favorable to their development. Racial theories are an adaptation to the needs of a scientific-minded environment of the Biblical idea of the chosen race. Ideas of the Old Testament, which had been dramatically revived by left-wing groups of the Reformation, such as the Anabaptists, Pietists and Puritans are still able to stir deep emotions among ardent Protestants. There where the Anabaptist movement has left its mark on the culture of a people, all appeal to the masses will gain strength whenever it is able to reawaken, under a modernized form, the belief that the audience has a special mission to accomplish because it belongs to a chosen people. If, however, this chosen race theory appeals to certain Protestant elements of our time, it is abhorrent to the less sectarian and more liberal minded Protestants who cling, with equal vigor, to democratic individualism which Protestantism has also staunchly defended. In their counter-offensive against fascism it was imperative for the liberal Protestants to develop a theory that would neutralize the devastating political effects of racial theories; they had to oppose indiscriminate mass appeal and bolster individual resistance to collective pressure. Owing to one of those ironic contradictions of which history is full, Protestantism, which has a consequence of individual self-confidence and is an outgrowth of the development of private enterprise, overestimated the psychological strength of man when it abolished confession. Deprived of this means of achieving an inner security, each time modern man became a victim of doubt he felt unbearably isolated. The social function of psychoanalysis has been to serve, in a Protestant or atheist world, as a substitute to the Catholic form of confession. While it is the belief in confession that accounts for the slow progress of psychoanalysis in a Catholic environment, it is the totalitarian hostility to individualism which explains both the boycott and persecution of psychoanalysis in totalitarian states.

If faith in individualism accounts for the confidence psychoanalists enjoy in democratic countries, an abuse of psychological methods of explanations and an over-estimation of psychiatric cures will inevitably provoke strong reactions.

### *Criticism of Psychological Explanations*

The psychological theories by which social phenomena such as fascism and totalitarianism are explained fall into two groups, depth psychology and behaviorism.

When Richard Brickner and his followers accuse Germany of being dominated by paranoid types and list among paranoid characteristics the tendency toward megalomania, the sense of mission and the tendency toward exaggeration, the historian may well wonder if psychologists have not simply invented a new equalitarian theory to justify their predilection for intellectual and political mediocrity. Without megalomania neither the Pyramids nor the Cathedrals nor Rockefeller Center would have ever been erected; without a sense of mission humanity would have been deprived of the services of Saint Augustine and Martin Luther. As A. A. Brill has correctly remarked: "All successful rulers who attained their position through their own efforts were preponderantly schizoid . . . In some great men the schizoid factors furnish the necessary perseverance toward the attainment of great objects." [1]

If psychiatrists had a knowledge of history they would have seen that doctors of the body and the soul did not wait for Freud and Jung before accusing their opponents of falling the victims of mental diseases.

In our time mental diseases have become a substitute for witchery. Already in the beginning of the nineteenth century a Jesuit alienist,

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[1] A. A. Brill: "The Schizoid Concept in the Neurosis and the Psychosis" in *Schizophrenia,* Vol. V., published by the Association for Research in Neuroses and Mental Diseases, 1928.

Hartmann Griser, diagnosed Luther as a "maniac burdened with endogenous neurosis inclining to autochthonous ideas and complexes." [2] The vocabulary is slightly outdated, but the accusation does not differ essentially from those brandished upon similar occasions by our psychiatrists.

The difficulties psychology is faced with each time it attempts to explain historical phenomena, such as fascism, is not overcome either by shifting the emphasis from schizoid or paranoid personality traits to the dialectics of the Oedipal Complex. If Kant's obsessive devotion to duty can be accounted for in terms of a fixation on a too severe father or of an over-strict toilet training, we still find ourselves at a loss to explain how this same Kant became an admirer of Rousseau and the French Revolution and why he defended the cause of a European commonwealth of nations. If, as it seems obvious, the criterion of a father fixation is too limited to explain the philosophic and political ideas of Kant, this objection holds good also when it comes to explain psychologically a collective phenmenon such as the Prussian mentality or the fascist ideology. If a severe father and a strict toilet training are bad things and engender a totalitarian mode of life, then liberal minded psychologists should object to seeing listed among the champions of democracy men like George Washington and Benjamin Franklin, for their devotion to duty was at least equal to that of Kant and other Prussian heroes and might therefore also be explained in terms of a father fixation. If the psychologists would reply to this that there are cases when a father fixation is good, then to explain the bad by a father fixation ceases to be a true explanation.

Untenable also are the premises upon which Erich Fromm develops his escape-from-freedom theory. Viewed from the angle of depth psychology, that is to say of psychology of the unconscious, there can be no such thing as a "feeling of freedom" Schleiermacher believed to exist. Psychoanalitically speaking one cannot wish to escape from freedom and can only wish to escape from a situation in which our freedom is jeopardized. This means that we wish to free ourselves from an unpleasant situation such as imprisonment, obligation or state of anxiety. What we seek is to liberate ourselves from physical, psychological or moral fetters, something entirely different from this alleged escape from freedom. If instead Fromm had put the emphasis on *freedom from anxiety*—the only psychological basis on which the need to escape from freedom can be grounded upon—he would have been obliged to admit that during the critical years following the first World War, the Germans were faced with sufficient economic difficulties to justify the most acute state of anxiety. It is unnecessary therefore to seek to explain psychogenetically an anxiety whose origin is political and economic.

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[2] Henrich Boehmer: *Luther and the Reformation in the Light of Modern Research.*

Equally misleading and unfortunate is the use of the term "failure of nerve" to explain the ideologies of religious minded people. If Sidney Hook had limited himself to saying that Christian authors believe that, without a sense of failure, we cannot properly appraise human undertakings, he would have been correct. It is not because a man believes in the Christian theory of guilt and in the ensuing sense of failure, that he automatically becomes the victim of a failure of nerve. Atheism could theoretically also be explained by a failure of nerve. According to Saint Chrysostom, not to distinguish the divine from the human is a sign of weakness and in one of his famous homilies which modern mystics like to quote, he urges man "to chase away from him all worldly care." No one could claim this to be an easy task but to accuse those who attempt to do it of "failure of nerve" is to fall a victim of an unpardonable confusion.

It is hardly necessary to refute the behavioristic theory according to which our faith in freedom can be conditioned by food. Certainly hunger can be so acute as to paralyze action, but it would be rash indeed to draw from this the conclusion that despots can subjugate populations by controlling their diet. Discontent is not only provoked by famine or inadequate nutrition but also by conditions of work. So far no despot has ever found the secret how to increase production without handling the whip, and flogging stimulates conditioned reflexes which no vegetarian diet will overcome.

### *The Theory of Cultural Patterns*

No one has more vigorously criticized this mania to interpret psychologically social phenomena than has Ruth Benedict. In a paper called *Culture and the Deviant,* she points out that we cannot know what is normal because we do not possess uniform standards of judgment. The normal, she adds, is a variant of the concept of the good, and what is good is determined by the body social's cultural pattern.

While the main error of the psychological social theories is to take it for granted that a certain type of behavior is good, the weak point of cultural relativism is that by declaring that we cannot know what is good, we are deprived of the opportunity of finding our way out of the moral crisis of today. Nor is it helpful to identify the normal with the good. For instance, a given society may consider it good to follow the *Führerprinzip* which does not mean that it would be normal for everyone to aim at becoming a *Führer*. Only an exceptional being could be granted this privilege. From here onward it would be easy for a psychologist to prove that what is exceptional is not normal.

Like all theories which seek to explain functional processes, the theory of cultural patterns cannot account for the disintegration of the pattern and the breakdown of civilizations. Even if we do accept the view that the cultural pattern which developed Nazi ideology was good when envisaged from a particular angle, still we are faced with the necessity of identifying the evil which caused the system to collapse. In a world dominated by the principle of exchange, commerce of goods and ideas, the problems arising from intercommunication between civilizations and cultures take precedence over cultural patterns and make it necessary to adjust these patterns to the dynamics of change.

In spite of its limitations, the theory of cultural patterns is not to be lightly dismissed for it tackles with greater rigor than do the psychological theories the problem of *irrational traits*—a term sociologically less equivocal than the terms evil, abnormal or unconscious. Edward Sapir has shown that the unconscious behavior of peoples is often predetermined by linguistic, religious or artistic cultural patterns. If we want therefore to understand the irrational Nazi behavior we will have first to explain it in terms of a cultural pattern which was responsible for the development of the moral ideas of the Germans. Historically this pattern must be a religious one for it is the functions of religious to provide the community with rules of moral conduct.

## *The German Cultural Pattern*

The most crucial event in the formation of modern Germany's moral character was the Reformation. Out of it sprung the three decisive movements of German political life, liberalism, socialism and national socialism. If it was not for Luther's faith in the individual and his eloquent defense of free will, the most inspired writing on freedom coming from Kant and Hegel, Goethe and Schiller would probably never have seen the light of day. It is not possible to over-emphasize the contribution of outstanding German writers and philosophers to the cause of individual freedom. If it is the work of Luther, the moralist, which is at the source of both German and Protestant liberalism, Luther, the political reformer, must be seen as the father of that spirit of nationalism which was to give birth to a Bismarck. While German nationalism narrowed the meaning of the Reformation, socialism internationalized it. The ideas Karl Marx expressed in his *German Ideology* should be interpreted historically as an atheistic adaptation of Protestant humanism.

Lastly, for the national socialists, Luther, the mystic, serves as a link between medieval German mysticism and the teachings of the romantic nationalist, Schleiermacher and Wagner.

The study of German culture reveals the existence of three fundamental religious cultural patterns, Catholicism, Lutheranism and Anabaptism. To be properly comprehended the great moral crisis Germany went through in the sixteenth century must be grasped in its totality and as a complex phenomenon. Ideologically it has two poles of attraction, Lutheran reformism and revolutionary Anabaptism. Why Lutheranism triumphed and Anabaptism was crushed, only to be revived later, first in the form of Pietism, next in that of romantic nationalism and finally in the form of national socialism, will have to be analyzed historically as it can not be accounted for in the narrow limits of the field of cultural patterns. For the same reason the failure of democratic Protestantism and revolutionary Marxism to defeat national socialism will have to be analyzed by a method that can explain the rise and fall of cultural patterns, which is the historical method.

## *Conclusion*

If the German nation has not always followed the cultural pattern out of which national socialism was born this implies that the fate of Germany is not inevitably linked to the destiny of national socialism and that therefore the German people do not need foreign educators, therapists and technicians to teach them the use of new cultural patterns by means of which they are to achieve their salvation.

To see the development of a nation as the inevitable consequence of the unrolling of a pre-existing cultural pattern or as the outcome of the predominance of a psychotic or neurotic archetype suffering from schizoid misrepresentations of reality or neurotic complexes, implies that the inhabitants of this culturally condemned nation will have to be treated as if they were sick men and needed to be cured and reeducated. Education, in the last analysis is nothing else but politics applied to children, or to those who are legally assimilated to them. Before deciding to treat the Germans as children we should have to prove that during the twelve years of Nazi rule the German people lost all sense of what is good and that their conquerors, or at least one of them, possesses this wisdom. How avoid seeing that, for any one nation to claim this would be tantamount to identifying herself with a chosen race? Although we do not know what is good, we do know that certain things are bad. Among them we can list fear and concentration camps, slave labor and hunger. No one can furthermore deny that national socialism had made an extensive use of these evil elements. There must, therefore, exist a mthod of reasoning by which we can pass a *political* judgment on deeds whose main characteristic is to be part of a *political* action such as is the Nazi *political* program.

It is *pain* which is the common denominator of hunger and fear. If, as we know hunger and fear are political weapons, this means that pain also can be used as a political weapon. It was employed with an appalling frequence and terrifying refinement by the Inquisition and is again being used prolifically in our century by totalitarian regimes. In contrast to political fanatics, Utopians of all times have dreamed of a world free from pain. Between the two extremes stands the moralizing philosopher who sees in pain a sting to activity. Max Horkheimer, who has studied this problem with deep insight, is correct in saying that in a divided society pain is both the archetype of labor and its organon. "It was always the best teacher to bring men to reason. Pain leads the resistant and wayward, the phantast and Utopian back to himself. It reduces them to their body, to part of their body. Pain levels and equalizes everything, man and man, man and animal. It absorbs the entire life of the being whom it racks, reducing him to a husk of pain. . . . Fascism has reinstated pain on its throne. . . . The contradiction between what is requested of man and what can be offered to him has become so striking, the ideology so thin, the discontents in civilization so great that they must be compensated through annihilation of those who do not conform, political enemies, Jews, asocial persons, the insane. The new order of fascism is reason revealing itself as unreason." [3] The *abuse* of the policy of pain as was to be expected, transformed the lands ruled by Fascism into an inferno. The abuse of any major political weapon, like all abuses is unreasonable. As Horkheimer says, pain by reducing man to the body mutilates the ego. What greater affliction could befall mankind? Thus it came to be that by an *abuse of power* fascist reason revealed itself as unreason.

In the light of this study it is clear that what Germany needs is above all to be freed from unsufferable pain, the pain of hunger and exhaustion, of fear and excessive guilt—"for all have sinned and come short of the glory of God." Instead of this, what do we see? Judges and psychotherapists draw lists of political taboos with that self assurance with which Moses lays down rules for the treatment of lepers and adulterers. The question is not whether the mental lepers should be hanged, thrown in a concentration camp or an insane asylum. All who theorize on this problem on the basis of complexes and patterns are but weaving a tissue of useless folly. The intellectuals who suggest punishments, cures and reeducation as a panacea for the ills of Germany are in their turn guilty of an abuse of power. It is immaterial to know whether the inventors of these remedies are themselves schizoids, who misrepresent reality, or if they suffer from a failure of nerve. What counts is the fact that the intellectual betrays the confidence the public shows in him when he uses his particular tools, words and ideas, for wrong purposes. Politics have been correctly defined as the culture of the masses, as it is through politics that the conscious behavior of the collectivity can be developed. By substituting for the judgment of the people the judgment of a special court, such as the one that functioned in Nuremberg, or by the judgment and reports of psychiatrists and their missions and congresses, is an evidence that in these matters an undemocratic line is now being followed. The idea that the fate of the German people is not to be decided according to the will of the most interested body politic, the people of Germany and the people of Europe, but according to the decrees of a professional elite, has a marked political character. Furthermore, the ably conducted campaign led to convince the public that the eradication of fascism is not a political problem but a technical one for specialists to handle on the basis of subtle psychological criteria, has the most serious political implications and should be vigorously denounced in the name of culture. It is a form of political obscurantism as it leads democracy to abdicate some of her most vital prerogatives for the benefit of an elite. When political, judicial and educational decisions affecting the masses are taken by a handful of specialists, it is a symptom that oligarchy—not to be confused with fascism—has a very good chance of eventually substituting itself for a more democratic form of government.

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[3] Max Horkheimer: "The End of Reason" in *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* 1941.

# INTERNATIONAL PRESS

## *RUSSIA'S INTERNAL CRISIS*

While books and articles on Russia have been pouring from the presses since the war, little new that is of note has appeared about that vast region's internal economic situation. In the London *Economist* (issues of March 15, 22 and 29, 1947) one of that magazine's many special correspondents (who as usual remains anonymous) undertakes to fill that gap. In our opinion, he does it brilliantly and expertly. We have telescoped the three articles into one by some judicious cutting. Otherwise we have not tampered with the original text.

There can be no doubt (states the *Economist* correspondent) that the Soviet Union is in the throes of an economic crisis. The saliant facts have been set out in the Government's statement of March 1st. The reconversion of Soviet industry to peace has "in the main" been completed; but the process has not been carried out efficiently. "The gross output of the entire civilian production was 20 per cent higher in 1946 than in 1945." This has a reassuring ring, but it really means that the first year of the new plan has ended in failure. Since plant and labor diverted to civilian production must have increased by much more than 20 per cent, the increase in gross output by only 20 per cent indicates decline in productivity. The situation is worst in the former occupied areas. Their industrial output increased by 28 per cent, but it "did not even reach half the pre-war production." This is a euphemism—output is probably well below the 50 per cent. In the victorious Soviet Union, the devastation and unsettlement of the war are being overcome at a pace not much quicker—so far—than the rate of economic rehabilitation in Western Germany.

As elsewhere, so in Russia; lack of coal is stated to be the chief problem. "The development of the coal industry, which is experiencing the greatest difficulties as a result of the war, is lagging behind and delaying the progress of the entire national economy." The criticism seems to be addressed to the central planning authorities rather than to the coal industry. The fact is that the 1946 plan for coal output has been fulfilled. The Asiatic coal mines have fallen short of their target by 3 per cent, but the European ones, which must now produce about half of Russia's coal, have produced 5 per cent more than was planned. The rehabilitation of the Donetz Basin in particular, where most of the mines were flooded by the end of the war, has gone ahead, since the middle of last year, with an astonishing speed and vigor. The Donetz mines produced about 47 million tons in 1946 (11 million more than in the preceding year)—70 per cent of their output in 1937. The implication of the statement about the coal crisis is, therefore, that the planners in Moscow have not been bold enough; and that even higher targets should have been set for the extracting industries in order to speed up expansion in manufacturing industries. Even so, it must be doubted whether lack of coal has been the decisive reason for the slow rehabilitation of Ukrainian and South Russian industries, dependent as these are on the now more plentiful Donetz coal; and the fact that the Soviet Government has now thought it possible to forego half of the stipulated coal deliveries from Polish Upper Silesia strengthens that doubt.

### Housing and Morale

It is more probable that stagnation in the former occupied lands is caused by a crisis in the morale of the working population, a crisis due to disastrous housing conditions, to shortages of food and consumers' goods and also to general post-war frustration. The housing plan for 1946 was not fulfilled; the housing space made available amounted to 6,000,000 square metres. Housing difficulties are delaying the creation of permanent cadres of workers and the raising of the productivity of labor. Under the Plan, 72.5 million square metres are to be built in the current five-year period. Thus, only one-twelfth of the scheduled housing space has been made available in the first year. Incidentally, the Five Year target for housing is very modest. Even if the planned building by private persons (12 million square metres) is added to it, the average housing space which the twenty-odd million Soviet citizens made homeless by the war can hope to get by 1950 will at best be not more than 4 square yards per person; and this does not allow for any increase in population. The bottleneck is in the supply of cement, bricks and timber, a bottleneck that may be much more difficult to overcome than the relative shortage of coal. In some respects then the crisis appears to be milder than the wording of the official statements suggest; in others it is certainly even graver. But it should be remembered that the old Ukrainian and Southern Russia centres of industry are no longer as important for the Soviet economy as they used to be; and the situation in the new centres in the east is incomparably better than in the formerly occupied provinces, though the wave of war weariness and apathy, strongly affecting production, has also entered the formerly occupied provinces.

The agricultural situation presents a similar difference between the west, stricken by war and drought, and the east, where life has not been so unsettled. Thus "in western Siberia and Khazakhstan the grain harvest increased by one and a half times compared with 1945." But the overall situation is grim. Restoration of the pre-war grain output is not expected under three years; the figures of the last harvest have not been disclosed. The peasants have failed to deliver their quotas of grain to the government; and so the stocks for feeding the urban population must be low. (Before the war deliveries of grain to the Government amounted to nearly one-third of the total harvest.) The technical standards of farming, none too high even before, have decayed. There have been acute shortages in everything: tractors, draught animals, fertilizers, and skilled agriculturalists. Only half the collective farms practice rotation of crops; shallow ploughing is very common; and wide stretches of land have been left to the weeds. The crop of flax has been only half the normal. The rehabilitation of cotton plantations that have either fallen into disuse or been converted into rice plantations in time of war, is progressing; but it is far from completed. Against this 75 per cent of the pre-war sowing area in the western provinces is again under cultivation; and the farms there have about 50 per cent of their cattle.

### Peasants and Collectives

Yet the social, as distinct from the

economic crisis in the collective farms appears much less serious than might have been expected. Mr. Andreev has stated that nearly 12 million acres of collective land had been unlawfully taken away from the Kholkhozes and have now been returned to them. If so much land—4 per cent of the total sown area—had been misappropriated by peasants, this would have been a symptom of a revival of the peasantry's individualism and of its continued opposition to the collective system. But this has not been the case. Ten out of the 12 million acres were "misappropriated" by factories, offices and organizations. During the war these had been allowed (under the law of April 7, 1942) to run their own "auxiliary farms" on untilled Kholkhoz land for the benefit of their employees and workers. After the war, the factories and offices were reluctant to return the land, preferring to go on running their own auxiliary farms on it. Less than 1½ million acres were "misappropriated" by the peasants themselves. The Government is not prepared to tolerate even this; and Mr. Andreev's Board for Kholkhoz Affairs has resorted to draconic measures in order to restore all the land to the collective farms. If illicit private farming has, in these years of chaos revived on so small a scale—one half per cent of the sown acreage—then the conclusion to be drawn is that the collective system has had time to strike very deep and form roots, and that the peasantry's opposition to it has almost vanished. This is probably true of the whole of the Soviet Union except the Ukraine, where the situation is not yet clear. (Mr. Andreev's report covered 90 per cent of the total number of collective farms; it is a safe guess that the remaining 10 per cent are Ukrainian collective farms.) The Ukrainian peasantry has had a much stronger tradition of individual farming than the Russian peasantry; and it has up to a point been affected by Nazi propaganda against the collective system. It is primarily for this reason that the drive in the Ukraine has been initiated, and that Mr. Kaganovich has been sent there.

### Drive For Efficiency

The current Five-Year Plan is based on a system of priorities in which the renewal and the expansion of industry's capital equipment is ruthlessly promoted to be the first and foremost objective of the national economy. Even though in 1946 the Plan was not fulfilled in many branches, the progress made in re-equipping industry was by far more rapid and energetic than the overall increase in the output of consumers' goods. The disappointingly slow increase in the gross output of civilian goods—20 per cent—is contrasted with a 50 per cent increase in machine building. In the long run the principle is certainly sound; and it is sure to pay handsome economic and political dividends. But it may be argued that in sacrificing the immediate interests of consumers to the long term objectives of its economic policy the Soviet Government has been overplaying its hand; that the half-famished consumer is a poor workman; that the chronic, and in recent years aggravated, shortage of consumers' goods results in low productivity of labor; and that a more liberal treatment of consumers' needs would in the end benefit the producers' industries as well, because it would lead to higher overall efficiency.

But the argument is not new; it apparently carries no more conviction now with the Soviet planners than it did in the course of the first Five-

Year Plan. The relentless drive to restore and increase the nation's capital assets is on; and no real "respite" for the mass of consumers is contemplated. In spite of all appearances to the contrary, this policy has been empirical to the last degree. Soviet planners prefer to have as many machines as possible produced now, even at a lower rate of efficiency, than to rely on the hypothetical higher efficiency that could be expected in the future from a better-fed, better-clad and better-housed working class. What one might call the anti-consumer outlook of Soviet planners has evidently been enhanced by the experiences of the war. "What would have been Russia's position now—it is often argued—if in the 'thirties we had given in to the pressure of consumers' interests; if we had not sacrificed our light industries to our heavy industries? Soviet Russia would have been crushed by the Third Reich."

By what means then does the Soviet Government intend to overcome the present crisis? The means recently adopted are not new—they have been used and tested in previous Five-Year Plans; but they have now been carried a few long steps further. The shortage of manpower is being overcome by what looks like a real *tour de force.* The number of workers in industry was increased by three million people last year; for the current year the Plan provides for total employment amounting to 31.6 million people. This is 1.2 million more than the total employment in 1940, Russia's last year of peace. It had been planned that the average annual intake of labor in industry would be at the rate of one and a quarter million throughout the Five-Year period. The intake in the first year was thus much more than double that rate. The intake for 1946 and 1947 will amount at least to about 5,000,000. Where does this new labor come from? In the main, from the armed forces; but even the most drastic demobilization would hardly have allowed Russia to keep her employment level so much higher than that of before the war, since Russia's manpower has been reduced by millions of casualties. Apparently most of the female and juvenile labor drafted into industry during the war will be staying on.

In addition, a drastic regrouping of the available labor resources is taking place which aims at transferring great masses of people from less to more productive jobs. Thus the establishment of the economic civil service has now been cut by 730,000 posts—the personnel thus released is to be employed in actual production. (Incidentally, a few months ago the journal of the Planning Commission had suggested a reduction in the economic civil service by 20 per cent. If the figure of 730,000 corresponded to that percentage one would get some idea of the vastness of the administrative machinery in Soviet economy.) A similar redistribution of workers, especially of the skilled ones, is taking place in agriculture. The administrative staff of the collective farms had also become inflated. As Mr. Andreev has stated, half of the number of agronomists and experts employed in them is redundant and will be directed to actual production. This striking swelling of bureaucracy had been stimulated by the privileged position of the administrative staffs. "The closer to production they are the less pay they get," said Mr. Andreev, referring to the salaries of agriculturists. On Mr. Stalin's initiative, the salaries of agriculturists employed on administrative jobs will from now on be

25 per cent less than those of "agronomers" working in the field. The whole set of measures designed to deflate economic bureaucracy is very characteristic. For many years the regime has had a vested interest in inflating the administrative cadres since politically they have been its most reliable prop. But now that vested political interest has very obviously clashed with the demands of national efficiency, the regime has had to sacrifice a section of that social group whose privileged position it has hitherto carefully sheltered.

### Strict Watch On Bonuses

However, the most important emergency measures have been taken in wages policy. Payment by results, rewards for skill and efficiency, progressive piece rates have been the guiding principles ever since the inception of Stakhanovism in 1935. The policy is now being pushed to new extremes in both its positive and negative aspects. Output above the standard norms is to be even better rewarded than hitherto; the standard norms are to be raised; and often output below the standard norms is to be penalized through decreasing scales of payment. The new collective agreements that are to be signed between the industrial trusts and the trade unions in April will embody these principles. Last year the structure of wages was still planned in connection with the then contemplated abolition of rationing. In practice, this would have amounted to abolition of the national minimum wage that had been guaranteed to the worker during the war. Meantime the drought has compelled the Government to keep rationing in being, but the national minimum wage has been virtually abolished by a fairly steep increase in the price of rationed goods. The process is now to be completed by the raising of the standard norms of productivity. The worker will have to produce much more than hitherto, not only in order to get bonuses and special rewards, but also in order to earn his previous minimum. At the same time control over the payment of bonuses is to be tightened up. Output above the standard norm will from now on not be specially rewarded if costs of production rise together with output. Indeed, in some industries lowering of costs is to be made the condition for the payment of bonuses. Technical and administrative personnel responsible for the building of new enterprises will not be paid any bonuses at all until plants or mines are actually ready for production and taken over by the producers.

But the most sweeping and thoroughgoing change—one that affects two-thirds of the Soviet population—is being made in the structure of agricultural wages. Until now the system of payment in the collective farms was a combination of time and piece rates. The time rate was the pay for the so-called working day. The working day and its pay was equal for all; and all collective farmers were obliged to do an equal number of "working days" during the year. From now on the uniform payment per working day is abolished, and all agricultural wages are to be calculated on the basis of efficiency—that is, in relation to harvests.

The strong bias in favor of incentive wages has in the past undoubtedly stimulated the growth of an elite of skilled workers in Russia; and to this extent it has been justified by the results. But an over-emphasis on incentive wages may also lead to undesirable consequences. The lower-paid worker becomes disgruntled and unwilling to produce. The enterprising individuals grow even more enterprising, while the "unenterprising" mass grows rather apathetic. What develops is a too deep cleavage between a well-trained, efficient and privileged labor elite and a dull, inefficient and disgruntled mass of workers, a cleavage that must seem rather unnatural under a "proletarian dictatorship." At the early stages of Stakhanovism the first symptoms of the cleavage had already led to social tension. However, the Soviet Government is now apparently determined to take the risk. They are confident that, in the short run, no social tensions can cause trouble and lead to any political opposition.

### Planning Finance

In the conversion of Soviet economy from war to peace, costs of production and prices have acquired a very great importance, certainly to the surprise of those who believed that they were of no significance in a planned economy. In the course of the recent budget debate in the Supreme Soviet, the financial aspects of the Five-Year Plan were thrashed out almost as much as were the problems of manpower, higher productivity of labor, etc. Indeed, the need to bring the financial issues to the fore has been so pressing, precisely because in previous years Soviet planners could—under the compulsion of circumstances—afford to neglect them. During the war, finance was simply disregarded. The quantities of tanks, planes, guns, ammunition and provisions alone mattered. "Control by the ruble," that is, national accountancy in terms of money, was hardly possible. In the later years of the war, the Government itself worked on the basis of budget estimates, but most of the industry was still unable to resume financial book-keeping. This did not prevent industry from functioning as effectively as it could; and to this extent it was true that under the planned economy financial problems were largely irrelevant. Yet, the enforced neglect of finance did prevent industry from controlling its own technical efficiency and the productivity of labor. Such control has now become essential in the conversion from war to peace; and much attention is paid to planning costs and prices.

How great has been the legacy of wartime financial disorder can be seen from the fact that by the beginning of last year 42 per cent of newly-built plants and factories, the construction of which was financed by the Promyshlennyi Bank (Industrial Bank), were not able to produce estimates of the cost of their constructions. By the beginning of 1945, as many as 51 per cent of such enterprises had worked without financial estimates. The financial disorder is now being rectified. In 1946 the accounts of 211,400 enterprises were audited by the Ministry of Finance and the Gosbank, compared with only 153,200 in 1945.

This auditing has disclosed a general rise in the costs of production. The average rise in the cost of building materials was about 25 per cent by the end of the war; and it has become much steeper since. Last year the Ministry of Aviation, for instance, put the average rise in the costs of its building materials at 43 per cent; the rise in the cost of timber at 67, of bricks at 47, and of cement at 39 per cent. The variations probably reflect the varying degrees of scarcity of materials.

However, the most striking illustration of inflationary trend has been provided by the magnitude of the national bill of wages and salaries planned for this year. It amounts to 280 billion rubles. The last pre-war bill, that of 1940, was only 162 billion rubles. The sum total of wages and salaries has risen by 50 per cent, compared with a rise in employment by only 4 per cent. What is most striking is that this year's bill of wages and salaries is to be higher by nearly 30 billion rubles than that planned for 1950, the end of the Five-Year Plan, when employment is to be several millions higher then at present. This suggests that already after the publication last year of the new Five-Year Plan wages must have unexpectedly risen to such an extent that by the end of the year the Planning Commission had to scrap that part of the plan that dealt with wages and draw up a new one. The plan for this year incorporates a rise in wages by about 20 per cent. In part, this has been caused by deliberate governmental action, such as the flat increase in rates by 50 per cent for workers in essential industries east of the Urals, designed to attract labor to Soviet Asia. To a great extent, however, wages have soared because industrial concerns have been competing for scarce labor and paying rates higher than those fixed in trade union tariffs. This is an interesting phenomenon — it shows the upsetting effect that spontaneous economic processes have had upon planning.

How does the purchasing power in the hands of Soviet workers and employees compare with the mass of available consumers' goods? This year's plan provides for a total turnover in retail trade, in state-owned magazines and co-operative shops, amounting to 325 billion rubles, a sum only 45 billion higher than the national fund of wages and salaries. The 45 billion rubles represent the margin of consumers' goods available for the farming population. In reality, the margin will be somewhat wider, because the purchasing power of industrial workers and employees will be reduced through taxation. One-sixth or at the most one-fifth of the available mass of consumers' goods will be diverted to the countryside—the rest will go to the towns. One might point to this very uneven distribution of goods as to proof of an extraordinary exploitation of farmers, had it not been for the fact that food, which the countryside does not buy, forms the bulk of the retail turnover. Yet, the purchasing power of the peasantry, too, has grown enormously in recent years; and so in Russia, as elsewhere, superabundant money has been chasing scarce goods.

Industrial concerns engaged in building new plants and factories have been ordered to effect a flat reduction in the estimates of their costs by 15 per cent. Since the estimates had been made in 1945 prices, the reduction ordered ought in effect to be much higher than 15 per cent. Part of the economy is to be achieved through giving up unessential building, but another part through real cuts in costs. It would perhaps be inaccurate to say that the wages policy, too, bears a definitely deflationary character. But it is certainly an elastic, double-edged policy; and at least one of its edges is sharply deflationary. The whole system of wages is now based on payment by results and piece rates; and in the new collective agreements, now negotiated, the standard forms of output are being raised by as much as 20-25 per cent. Should the desired increase in productivity per man not be obtained, then the result is bound to be a fairly steep and absolute reduction in wages. On the other hand, a real rise in productivity would result in better supply of consumers' goods. If this materializes, the effect of the policy will not be deflationary. The most drastic operation in "mopping up" purchasing power has been the steep increase in all State-controlled prices of consumers' goods, including rationed goods. In other words, indirect taxation (the turnover tax) has been greatly increased—and this after and not during the war.

## *ART NOTES FROM MOSCOW*

Russian magazines arrive in this country irregularly and often very late. As this is written, for instance, the January issue of the Russian monthly *October* is the only one available with a 1947 date. This contains an article entitled "Some Characteristics of Soviet Literature" which is of special interest because of the vividness with which it reflects the new "line" on literature prescribed last August by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and first enunciated in the now famous speech by Zhdanov.

The central theme of the article is that after the Bolshevik revolution the "positive hero" came to the fore in Russian literature. The article states that for Dostoevski to depict a positive hero was "the most difficult thing in the world," but for a Soviet writer this is easy and natural. "What manner of man is this—this hero of Soviet literature?" asks the author of the article, M. Charnyi, rhetorically. In common with the best traditions of old Russian literature, he has tremendous moral power, idealism, and a high sense of self-sacrifice. But, continues M. Charnyi, he also has what heroes of Russian literature in the past could not have: activity of will, inexhaustible nerve. This results from the clarity with which he perceives the goal, from confidence in his way of life, and from the uncompromising force of his struggle for socialism.

M. Charnyi quotes Rosamond Lehmann as asking where in modern literature one can find a hero "to fall in love with." Soviet writers don't complain about scarcity of men to fall in love with, M. Charnyi hastens to add. There are plenty of captivating men in Soviet life, distinguished by the charm of their powerful, original and noble character. In a capitalist society people only talk about "development of the human personality" while actually personality — vulgarized by pressure of commercial interests—becomes as standardized as straw hats and is spiritually annihilated. In socialist Soviet society, on the contrary, the human personality has the maximum possibility for development because the interests of the individual are in harmony with the interests of the collectivity. This, M. Charnyi concludes, is the dialectic of history.

There is nothing really new, of course, in this "line" of official optimism coming from Russia. During the war, however, it was found useful to relax state-controls in the realm of literature. Now observers report a return to "normalcy." This "normal" condition again, as in the past, creates some difficulties. All heroes in world literature are not "positive." So the question arises as to what to do with heroes tortured by doubts and contradictions.

An interesting example of such a problem is to be found in the Soviet *Theatre Almanac for 1946*. A noted Soviet critic, M. Usovsky, here discusses the problem of interpreting Hamlet to Soviet audiences.

Hamlet's doubts and hesitations (writes Usovsky), his disillusionment and pessimism, his passivity and inertness are considered completely foreign to "the men of our times," to Soviet man. Therefore to portray Hamlet as presented by Shakespeare would embitter Soviet playgoers. The new playgoer is entitled to see a new Hamlet. It has even been said that all former interpretations completely distorted the idea of the great tragedy. The crux of the play is Hamlet's struggle for the throne against the usurper Claudius and his stooges.

M. Usovsky then relates how Hamlet was presented as a "positive hero" to Leningrad audiences. It was considered unsuitable for him to say:

"The time is out of joint; O cursed spite,
That ever I was born to set it right!"

So in Leningrad production, Hamlet, striking a "heroic" pose with clenched fist and sword aloft, was made to exclaim instead:

"The time is out of joint.
I was born to set it right."

M. Usovsky denies the necessity of such distortions. He declares that of course Hamlet's tragedy could not occur in the Soviet Union where such conflicts between man and society do not exist. But such conflicts did exist in the past and still exist in other countries. "The struggle for our ideal is not yet finished. This ideal is essentially the same as Hamlet's ideal of dignified human life, and we can be stimulated by Hamlet in our struggle."

The thesis that there are no more conflicts in Soviet society is repeated again and again in Soviet writings. In *Soviet Music* (5 Symposium 1946) this thesis is applied to music and art generally. There must be, it is stated, a "united popular front of art." In the same vein, M. Utkievich, a Soviet motion picture producer who had visited France, contributes an article entitled "Encounters in France" to the December 1946 issue of *Novyi Mir.* He reports that in France he found "the most outstanding and progressive" representatives of cultural activities united around the Communist Party: the poets Aragon and Eluard, painters Picasso and Marquet, etc.

M. Utkievich reports an interview with Henri Matisse. He informs us that Matisse votes for the Communist Party and goes to see only Soviet films. He quotes the great French painter as follows:

"Tell me about Soviet artists... Happy people, the state takes care of them... they can work without worries... And me? I for my whole life have had to do with merchants... We all depend on merchants... I thank you for your invitation but I am too old to go to Russia... I can see Russia only on the screen... Show us more of your people, of your landscapes."

M. Utkievich obviously failed to inform Matisse that the excellent collection of his pictures in Moscow is no longer on view for the Soviet public. Impressionists are now banned as "a product of capitalist decomposition." The *New Statesman and Nation* (February 8, 1947) publishes the following note:

"A visitor was recently talking to M. Gerasimov, the most fashionable Soviet painter, who is the leader of the back-to-photographic realism school. The visitor offered his congratulations on the reopening of some of the Russian art galleries and then added that he was looking forward to seeing the famous collection of French impressionists again. 'When would that be open?' 'Never!' said M. Gerasimov, and launched into a diatribe against the bourgeois degeneracy of Impressionism. . . (He) gave the assurance that they (these pictures) would be kept hidden in the cellars in order to prevent anyone from being corrupted by their influence."

It is to this basement collection that Matisse's canvases are consigned!

# BOOKS

## *TIMELESS HISTORY*

### *Paul Kecskemeti*

We may distinguish two types of answer to the question: "What happens in History?"

According to the one, the essential content of history is its temporality. We cannot judge it in terms of any supra-temporal principle. For the historian, there is no way of undoing the work of time; all he can do is to observe a ceaseless process of change, not subject to any unchanging law, and not conveying any meaning except the radical otherness of each stage in the temporal succession. For this school of thought, the separation between Past and Present is radical and irremediable. Each historical period is unique and incommensurable with any other. What we can, and must, learn from History is, in the first place, that past ages had patterns of reaction different from ours. This outlook upon History may be termed "historicism."

The other type of answer to our question holds that the essential content of History is supra-temporal. There are many varieties of this "anti-historicist" view. We may, for instance, think of a conception which subjects historical change to analysis in terms of scientific laws: a psychological or sociological theory of history, for example. Religious or metaphysical interpretations of history also may exemplify the anti-historicist approach (although a historicist metaphysics too is conceivable.)

Theoretically, the scientific bent of our age should favor anti-historicism, for science strives to reduce processes of change to an underlying law which itself is not subject to change. One may, however, accept this as an ultimate goal, and yet argue that the relevant laws of sociology and psychology are not yet sufficiently known for us to apply them to the concrete incidents of history. If we adopt this view we are left with a purely descriptive conception of history which is practically undistinguishable from historicism.

Now the most striking thing about Toynbee's *Study of History* [1] is that it combines emphasis upon the concrete, descriptive detail of history with an attitude that is essentially anti-historicistic. For the historicist, if there is a creative agency at work in history, it cannot be anything but Time itself. For Toynbee, however, this creative agency is not Time; it is Man or rather More-than-Man, Man at his best, Man doing God's work. "What happens in History," according to Toynbee, is that Man in his creative moments produces his masterpiece, civilization, which he betrays when the creative spark grows dim in him. History has its ups and downs: thrusts of creativeness, succeeded by breakdowns and periods of disintegration. All these processes un-fold in time, but their temporal aspect is secondary. Toynbee distinguishes 29 attempts at creating civilization in the course of history (21 full-fledged civilizations, 3 "abortive" and 5 "arrested" civilizations); all these civilizations, he says, are "philosophically contemporaneous and philosophically equivalent" (p. 43). This means that all civilizations, no matter when and where they have come into being, exemplify the same creative principle; their growth, their breakdown and their disintegration are due to the same reasons which we can discern in the case of extinct civilizations (such as Egypt) as well as of civilizations still alive (such as our own Western civilization, or the Far Eastern one).

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[1] Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*. Abridgement of Volumes I-VI by D. C. Somerwell. New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1947. $5.00.

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Toynbee's survey of civilizations is often compared with the "morphology of cultures" which Oswald Spengler outlined in his *Decline of the West.* In reality, however, Toynbee's approach sharply contrasts with that of Spengler, for the latter is an out-and-out historicist. Spengler thinks in time patterns and temporal categories. He is fascinated with the "otherness" of past epochs of history. The germ of the idea from which Spengler's system grew is his infatuation with his modernity, with the uniqueness of contemporary "Faustian" man, with the gulf that separates him from ancient, "Apollinian" or "magic" types. For Spengler, the main lesson of history is its "irreversibility": you cannot go back but must follow to the bitter end the route for which you are fated. The supreme principle dominating history is Fate—and Fate in fact is identical with Time. Spengler says:

> "The irreversibility of world processes . . . is, in contrast to the physical symbol, the expression of genuine, *historical* Time that is experienced from within and is identical with Fate." [2]

History is basically predictable: it always repeats the same temporal pattern from "culture" to "civilization," from integration to disintegration, from religion to intellectualism, from rural to urban society, and so on. This fateful cycle has already run its full course in several cases; our own Western civilization has just entered upon its last phase. Within this rigid pattern, Spengler leaves no room for real creativeness. Toynbee, on the other hand, sees an "unpredictable factor" (p. 67) in the genesis of any civilization. His anti-historicism is not of the "scientific" type I have mentioned above, for although for him every civilization exemplifies the same principle, each one does it in its own individual and unpredictable way. In order to understand history, Toynbee says, we must abandon the postulate of the Uniformity of Nature (ibid.).

Toynbee, like Spengler, distinguishes various typical stages in the development of civilizations. But whereas, in Spengler, these stages are primarily defined by their position in a time sequence, they have no time signature in Toynbee's *Study.* The stages in the development of a civilization, according to Toynbee, are "challenges" to which a group has to "respond." This challenge-response pattern cannot be understood and explained in mechanical terms. There is nothing automatic about it; every challenge confronts Man with a genuine alternative. And once a challenge has been presented, everything depends on whether the response is "creative" — that is, for Toynbee, whether it is mystical, co-operative, and non-violent, — or the opposite. Toynbee has no use for doctrines of creative violence; for him, the two terms are mutually exclusive.

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[2] Oswald Spengler, *Untergang des Abendlandes,* 15. - 22. ed., Munich, 1920, vol. I, p. 603. Spengler's italics.

Since creativeness implies mystical, co-operative and non-violent attitudes, religions as the purest examples of such attitudes are the fundamental elements in each civilization. The event which in Toynbee's interpretation of history overshadows everything else is not the genesis of the State but the genesis of a religion. The downfall of a civilization with its "universal empire," therefore, need not mean a net loss in the balance-sheet of human creativity; while a "universal state" breaks down, its "proletariat," the outcasts living within it, may evolve a new religion which will, then, become the nucleus of a new civilization. Thus the Roman Empire, which was the "universal state" of "Hellenic" civilization, broke down, but its "proletariat" simultaneously evolved the Christian religion and thereby initiated two new civilizations which are "affiliated" to the Hellenic one. These "affiliated" civilizations, the Western and the Orthodox Christian ones, are still extant today.

Such sequences of "affiliation" represent the closest analogy to the idea of "progress" there is in Toynbee's system. Obviously, for Toynbee there can be no linear, automatic progress, since all deterministic mechanisms are excluded. Man, Toynbee says, does not advance in a straight, predetermined line, but he does advance at times; when this happens, we see a sudden change in the direction of human affairs, a dramatic "reversal of roles" or "peripeteia" (p. 308). Such is the case when an "affiliated" society is born: the "dominant minority" of an established civilization, grown sterile and uncreative, is then forced to relinquish its leadership to former outsiders: the "internal" or "external" proletariat of the declining civilization. This is how Toynbee explains the passing away of Roman civilization and the genesis of modern Europe which succeeded it.

In this respect, Toynbee's *Study* may be considered as a protest against Gibbon's *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.* Where Gibbon sees "decline," "the triumph of barbarism and religion," Toynbee sees a new manifestation of creativity. The reversal of value emphasis is complete: the "universal empire" itself, object of admiration for Gibbon and, incidentally, most other philosophers of history, represents for Toynbee a symptom of disintegration in the life of a civilization.

We see that Toynbee's interpretation of history is shot through with religious and ethical elements. He does not hesitate to use ethical categories in explaining historical calamities. Thus, the breakdown and disintegration of societies is "nemesis" (p. 307) attendant upon the betrayal of a partly or wholly ethical principle. Behind disasters overtaking a civilization, one can always discern some radical aberration.

This emphasis upon ethical modes of explanation fits in well with Toynbee's anti-historicism. Historicism, in fact, stresses the *distance* between historic events and the spectator of history, a distance which excludes ethical judgments. One of the main corollaries of historicism is that there are no ethical standards applicable to every civilization; or, as Spengler put it, there are as many moral codes as there are civilizations. For an ethical attitude, as Kierkegaard well saw, "contemporaneity" is essential. Toynbee's scheme of "philosophically contemporaneous" civilizations is a necessary basis for his ethical interpretation of history.

But what does this ethical interpretation really amount to? Does Toynbee hold with Hegel that "the Real is the Reasonable?" Does he assume that whatever cause is victorious is morally justified, that virtue is always rewarded, sin always punished? Certainly not. Toynbee does not say that the judgments of history wholly coincide with the judgments of ethics. He grants that man may come to grief through no fault of his own, simply because he is confronted with too severe a challenge (pp. 140ff.). What he means is only that, once a civilization has triumphed over all initial difficulties and established itself in a secure or even dominant position, it may yet break down,—not by any inherent necessity, but due to a kind of perverse blindness which makes its members fall into dead routine, or, worse, indulge in destructive conflicts. Each of the now extinct civilizations, Toynbee thinks, could have been saved if the men composing it had had broader minds and greater souls.

Is this a "scientific" diagnosis? Is it permissible to introduce so much ethics into scientific explanation? Can the historian look at Man as if he were free, and motivated at times by "higher" considerations, instead of being simply driven by Instinct and Necessity?

This question is, in fact, double-edged. It is directed not only against Toynbee who is under obligation to prove that his method corresponds to the canons of Science, but also against Science which has to declare whether it is committed to acknowledge only Instinct and Necessity as determining factors in human affairs. We know that it is naive to explain history in ethical instead of economic or sociological terms,—but the most urgent thing today is to see whether our science really obliges us to explain every historical event as the necessary product of causal factors in face of which Man is impotent. If the answer to this question is yes, it is entirely futile to make any effort to avert a conflict which may threaten to devastate our civilization. We can hope for success in any such undertaking only if we admit that Insight as well as Instinct and Necessity has a role in shaping human destinies.

This being the situation, it would be rash, I think, to commit science to an uncompromising determinism. Instead of adopting any preconceived metaphysics, whether deterministic or otherwise, we should do well to judge the "scientific" character of theories uniquely on empirical, heuristic and pragmatic grounds. If a theory accounts for certain phenomena, and is not invalidated by others, it is scientifically valid. That it may run counter to certain habitual modes of thinking is quite immaterial.

The real test of Toynbee's theory, then, is heuristic and empirical. Does his concept of "civilization" as an "intelligible field of historical study" (p. 5) account for facts which are left unexplained by other theories? Does his theory of "challenge and response" clarify phenomena which would otherwise be incomprehensible? Does anything in empirical reality correspond to his terms "creativity," "nemesis," "growth," "disintegration," and so on?

To me, the answer does not seem doubtful. All these words correspond to large classes and types of phenomena which cannot be overlooked, but which we cannot analyze very well for the time being. What their ultimate metaphysical status is we do not know. At present, we have to content ourselves with the more or less intuitive knowledge we have of them. It is possible that we shall have greater success later in analyzing these concepts, in breaking them down into elements and in evolving methods of dealing with them which will render us less dependent upon intuition. But as long as the situation remains as it is, we have to tackle these phenomena with the tools which are at our disposal, crude and naive as they may be. We can admit the superiority, in this field, of more sophisticated, more formalized, less intuitive methods only if they succeed better in accounting for the phenomena in question.

All this applies to those phases in the life of societies which come under the large category of "creativity," the key concept in Toynbee's system. We cannot deny that something empirically real corresponds to this term. Man *is* creative; he creates works of art, legal and social systems, large, meaningful structures which we have to understand "from within," from the point of view of their intended meaning, rather than "from without," i.e. in purely causal terms. We do not know whether formalized, analytical science will ever catch up with these products of creativity; I would doubt it, because the idea involves something which almost looks like a logical absurdity: a science which can anticipate its own further development. But this question may well be left open for the moment. The main thing is that, for the time being, we can deal with "creativity" only in intuitive terms.

The same is true of certain related concepts and problems which concern voluntary social integration, peaceful control, spontaneous cooperation, — briefly, the things which are usually discussed under the heading of "ethics." There is no formalized and analytical knowledge of these things at the present time. We know that there is such a thing as a well-integrated, cooperative society and that the contrary also exists, but we do not know exactly how this kind of integration can be analyzed into more primitive terms and controlled by means of a scientific technology. Whether the time will ever come when all this is achieved, we again do not know; but as long as these things have a largely "ethical" connotation for us, we have to deal with them in ethical terms; we cannot afford to ignore them simply because this approach hurts our scientific sensibility.

It seems to me, then, that Toynbee is perfectly justified in exploring the workings and vicissitudes of human creativity and human morality in history. It is, however, a different question whether his categoreal apparatus is sufficient to embrace all the relevant factors of human history. Despite the tremendous wealth of his illustrative material and the breath-taking virtuosity with which he uses it, it seems to me that he has rather too few basic concepts, and that the fitting of facts into the conceptual mold, therefore, does not always come off without strain. For instance, Toynbee tends to reduce class phenomena to just one polarity—the one between "dominant minorities" and "proletariat." This leaves out all intermediary strata which belong neither to the one nor to the other. In the discussion of religious phenomena, secularization hardly plays any role. Many similar examples could be cited.

In general, Toynbee's emphasis upon creativity and morality leads to a certain under-estimation of the "brute" factors of history: Instinct, Necessity, Power. We have to recognize, I think, that man is a dual being; when we have a science of human behavior, it will speak, I believe, of a *dual* determination of human action. Toynbee seems to me to pay too little attention to the dark side of this duality. His picture of human culture—of the "contemporaneous" civilizations in which men struggle to meet the same challenge by a creative response—is a grand vision painted in too "ethereal" colors. But this *partial* vision fills a need, since almost all philosophy of history thus far has over-emphasized the other side. What Toynbee is looking for in history is the essential humanity of man—something we are in danger of losing sight of. The importance of this "timeless history" for our time, therefore, can hardly be over-estimated.

The abridgement prepared by D. C. Somervell presents the essential content of Toynbee's great work in accurate and economical form. The quintessence of the original is really contained in the condensation. Obviously, it does not give as great an enjoyment to the reader as the original with its wealth of detail and its leisurely development of every insight of the author. It is also more "difficult" reading, although some baroque turns of phrase have been omitted, because constant attention is needed if the reader does not want to miss any of the key concepts. But all this is unavoidable; and the main thing is that Toynbee's fundamental concepts have been made accessible to a very large reading public. This is a very considerable service indeed.

## *SYMPOSIUM ON FULL EMPLOYMENT*

***Franco Modigliani***

This symposium,[1] which presents the opinions of eleven economists of varied interests and background, grows out of a conference called by the American Labor Conference on International Affairs in the summer of 1944 to discuss the question of how to achieve peacetime full employment in the United States. It offers convincing proof that the war years, which had no full employment problem because of the war economy, were not wasted by the economists. Economic theory of how to eliminate large-scale unemployment, the most serious and most challenging potential danger to our economy, has progressed far beyond the stage it had reached before the start of the second World War. At that time the notion that the government could and should act to solve this problem was considered a radical theory entertained by a minority of economists. Public works were almost the only suggested tool of policy.

The volume as a whole, as is shown by Albert Halasi's opening survey of the main conclusions reached by the various contributors, proves that among qualified economists the consensus today is much larger than certain opponents of full employment policies would have us believe. Moreover, one finds that public works are no longer considered the only, nor even, in general, the best, tool of policy.

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[1] *Planning and Paying for Full Employment.* Edited by Abba P. Lerner and Frank D. Graham. Princeton University Press. 1946. 220 pp. $3.00.

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This point is most clearly formulated in the essay by Abba P. Lerner, an essay which, though perhaps not so well organized as his best writings, is permeated with his usual unyielding logic. A necessary condition for maintaining full employment is that the aggregate rate of expenditure on consumption and (voluntary) investments by the public and the government be kept equal to the aggregate value of commodities and services that can be produced at full employment, at the current price level. A lower rate of spending spells unemployment because employers will not be able to sell at a profit the output of all the people who want to work; a greater rate of spending spells inflation. It is always possible, in principle, for the government to control the aggregate rate of spending by means of three general devices. Expenditure can be raised (1) by direct government buying (of which public works is but one form), (2) by giving to the public more money to spend through decreased taxation (keeping government expenditure constant) or through direct subsidies to individual consumers, and (3) by government lending. Aggregate expenditure can be decreased by government selling (which absorbs excessive purchasing power), by increasing taxation or decreasing subsidies, and by government borrowing. In addition, each of these devices can also be used to encourage or discourage indirectly the expenditure of the public.

Once this fundamental point is agreed upon, the question that remains, and which is dealt with by the various contributors, is to decide which of these devices, or which combination of them is to be preferred in general or in specific instances. Among the plans proposed in this volume, especially interesting is the one put forward by Frank D. Graham. This represents an ingenious extension to the "reservoir plan" first formulated by Benjamin Graham for standard storable raw materials. Under the original plan the government would fix the price of a representative "basket" of raw materials and would stand ready to buy and sell such baskets (in the form of warehouse receipts) at this fixed price. This would stabilize the price level of raw materials (at least in a downward direction), while leaving the price of individual commodities free to fluctuate. Frank Graham, besides supporting this scheme, proposes to extend a similar reservoir plan to standard storable manufactured commodities. According to his suggestion, the government should encourage enterprises to continue production in spite of a sagging market demand, by offering to take over any unsold present or accruing inventories at a price just sufficient to cover out-of-pocket expenses. The government would not make any outright purchases but would only acquire (with newly issued money) a lien on these inventories which would remain the exclusive property of the individual firms. The latter would have the privilege of repossessing the commodities by paying back the government whenever a revised demand market should, in their judgment, justify such action.

The great advantage of a reservoir plan, such as this, is that it represents, in principle, an automatically self-reversible mechanism. If there is an initial fall in demand it would keep up production and, to a large extent also, income, cutting short the process of cumulative contraction (multiplier effect) that would otherwise tend to ensue. On the other hand, if, at any time, demand should tend to exceed the value of goods and services that can currently be produced, the excess of demand would be met by commodities released from the reservoir. This would greatly reduce the pressure on prices; furthermore, the contraction in the quantity of money, which would occur as firms pay back the government and the money received is retired from circulation, would tend to reduce aggregate demand to the right size. In the absence of a reservoir plan an excessive aggregate demand would have to be curbed by such measures as reduced government expenditure, increased taxation, or forced loans. But these measures would require delicate *ad hoc* decisions, and would be almost sure to meet with stiff opposition.

There are many aspects of the Frank Graham plan that must be carefully worked out in greater detail, especially with reference to the problem of offering sufficient inducements to the enterprises to make use of the plan and that of protecting the plan from manipulations, abuses, and other such dangers. It would seem, for instance, that firms making use of the plan should commit themselves not to raise prices as long as they have not entirely repurchased their inventories under lien and actually liquidated them. If these matters can be adequately provided for, and this should not prove too difficult a task, the plan has much to recommend it. For one thing, it is likely to meet with less opposition than most of the far-reaching plans advanced by other contributors. It should not, of course, be considered a "cure-all." Obviously, if there is a chronic tendency for aggregate demand to fall short of productive capacity, the plan would lead to an indefinite accumulation of inventories. A certain accumulation is useful for meeting the threat of inflationary situations, but beyond this point, accumulation of inventories, though preferable to unemployment, becomes a wasteful way of employing our resources. Mr. Graham is the first to recognize this possibility, and suggests the adoption, in this event, of supplementary measures designed to stimulate consumption — namely, reduction of taxes and/or increased government (deficit) expenditure on useful social services. By means of such measures it would be possible to stop the flow of commodities into the reservoir or even, if desired, to reverse the tide.

At this point one finds substantial agreement between Graham and Lerner. While Lerner favors, in principle, the direct adoption of the second type of measures, he is ready to support the Graham plan, especially because with this plan in operation, these measures would be likely to encounter less resistance. In his own words, "a growth of stocks in the reservoirs would provide the clearest possible evidence of the necessity of increasing the total rate of spending while a decline of stocks would show clearly the necessity of measures for reducing the total rate of spending" (p. 204).

Although the control of aggregate expenditure is prerequisite to the maintenance of full employment, it, alone, is not a sufficient condition unless we can count on a steady price level. If, while we are concentrating on increasing expenditure to the level required by the initial price level, prices should start to rise significantly, we would either fail to bring about full employment or be forced to raise expenditure still further, with the probable result of even higher prices, and thus eventually a process of cumulative inflation. This raises some extremely serious problems.

In the first place, there are those problems of an essentially political nature which are dealt with most fully in Alfred Braunthal's essay. With a high level of employment the bargaining position of labor will become very strong, and may conceivably be used to enforce unreasonably high wage demands. At the same time, enterprises faced with a heavy demand for their products will be less inclined to resist wage demands, since they can pass on the increased costs through higher prices; indeed, they may even tend to raise prices independently of higher wage demands and thus eventually bring about such demands.

It is important to realize that this situation may arise whenever there is a high level of employment, regardless of whether this occurs as a result of spontaneous market forces or as a result of an active government policy; in other words, it is a problem connected with full employment and not with a full employment program. This consideration is of great importance because, though we have never had full employment programs in the past, we have had periods of high levels of employment without inflation or even with a declining price level. It must be recognized that since the last period of peacetime high employment in the twenties, far-reaching institutional changes have occurred, the most important of which is the great increase in the power of organized labor. It is, however, by no means clear that this will necessarily have an unfavorable effect. Responsible trade unions seem to have come to understand that wage increases will not help labor if they are accompanied by rising prices. Moreover, labor, as a whole, will greatly benefit from the assurance of full employment and should therefore be interested in making such a program successful. There are, therefore, as Braunthal points out, many reasons to expect that organized labor will tend to use restraint in wage demands—more restraint, we might add, if there is, than if there is not, a full employment policy. These considerations encourage optimism. In any event, the contention that an active government full employment policy must lead to inflation is far from proved and cannot be used against the adoption of such a program. Only experimentation can finally settle the argument, and if the experiment should fail, we would still have time to decide whether to give up the goal of full employment or resort to policies that will necessarily curtail the freedom of management and labor.

On the whole, the papers we have noted here, as well as the others which cannot be considered in this brief review, represent a significant contribution toward the solution of the problem of large-scale unemployment. Though the concrete policies advocated by different authors emphasize different aspects of the problem, it would be very easy to reconcile and merge various proposals, such as those of Graham, Neisser, Lerner, and Simons, among others. The main thing now is to make a start in translating these plans into reality so that they will be available if and when the need should arise. The basic instruments of policy have been forged. If we fail to take action and are again faced with large-scale unemployment, no part of the blame can be placed on the economist.

# LETTERS

## *REPLY TO LEON BLUM*

***Peter Meyer***

Sir:

I read with great interest Leon Blum's introduction to, and criticism of, Burnham's "Managerial Revolution." [1] This controversy deals, directly or indirectly, with some of the most important problems of our time: what kind of society do we have in Russia today; are there other alternatives to capitalism than socialism; is the victory of socialism after the fall of capitalism inevitable; is it possible, and if so, what is necessary to achieve it and what should be the socialist evaluation of the bureaucratic regimes? You promise that you will present other views in subsequent issues, so I would like to make some remarks.

Blum reproduces Burnham's thesis with remarkable clarity and consciousness of its broad impplications. As is proper for a socialist leader and theoretician, Blum tries to meet Burnham on the level of the general theory of social formations of our time.

Now Burnham's theory consists of two main assertions. The first says that, after the fall of capitalism, a new class society emerged and won in some countries and that there are tendencies to a similar development in the whole world; the second maintains that this development is *inevitable,* or probable to such a degree that we have to accept it as inevitable.

For the sake of clarity, let me state that I don't believe that Burnham proved the second assertion. He was not able to prove it; neither in the *Managerial Revolution,* where he analyzes the present trends of history, nor in the *Machiavellians,* where he tried to back it by a general law of *circulation des élites.* This inevitably is, in my opinion, a superstition, the same kind of superstition, only in reverse, as the belief that socialism must come to power by a process of automatic succession, "much as a living King of France always immediately succeeded the dead King." Burnham only replaced the optimistic fatalism of many Marxists by a pessimistic fatalism.

Let us stay on the level of empirically verifiable generalizations. Is it true or not, that somewhere in the world capitalism was destroyed, but instead of socialism a new class society emerged? Is it true or not that there are at least tendencies to similar developments in many other countries? And here, Blum's objections to Burnham are not in the least convincing.

Granting Burnham's analysis to a certain degree, Blum comes to the conclusion that *"it is possible to destroy capitalist property relations without destroying capitalism."*

That looks queer, because what is capitalism minus capitalist property relations? Property relations are, ac-

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[1] See "Socialist or Manegerial Revolution" by Leon Blum. *Modern Review,* April 1947. pp. 118-126.

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PETER MEYER has become well known among people who follow Russian developments closely for his expert analyses, appearing in *Politics* and elsewhere, of what goes on behind the so-called iron curtain.

cording to Marx, only the juridical expression of production relations. Capital—this is the core of Marxian analysis—is not a "thing," but a social relation between the owner of the means of production and the worker who owns nothing but his labor power, the proletarian. This proletarian is free in the Marxian double sense: being personally free, he owns his labor power and therefore he is *able* to sell it to any capital owner; he is also "free" from any other property, therefore he *has* to sell his labor power to some capitalist. Thus in a society whose wealth consists of commodities, things produced for and sold in the market, labor power also becomes a commodity and is sold for a price, corresponding, in final analysis, to its value which is equal to its costs of reproduction. As the labor power can produce more goods than needed for its reproduction, there is a surplus product, appropriated by the capitalists in the form of surplus value.

This remains true when individual capitalists are replaced by groups of capital owners, corporations, etc., *provided that there is still competition between these groups, and the laws of the market prevail.*

The evolution of capitalism tends—by the laws of competition themselves—to the creation of monopolies, and finally to the creation of an absolute monopoly, an omnipotent trust. This goal is, however, never achieved by pure economic evolution; in a certain stage, the state intervenes with its political power. When the state becomes the monopolist owner of all important means of production, you can call such a stage "state capitalism"; but the trouble is, that this "perfect, accomplished" capitalism is not capitalism any more.[2]

Why? Because without competition the law of value does not operate. Products are not sold for prices, dependent on their value. The distribution of means of production—and labor—between the branches of economy is not regulated by profit. Whole industries can be maintained without any profit. The regulation of production by elementary economic laws, operating automatically, is replaced by conscious regulation. Instead of an "anarchy in production," we have a plan.

On the first glance it seems that this transformation affects only the relations between individual members of the ruling class. Instead of being more or less independent competitors whose power is proportional to the portion of capital they own, they become now members of a well-organized hierarchy, absolutely dependent of, and subservient to, the bosses of the centralized machine.

But how about the workers? Did their relation to other classes change in kind? Yes, it did, and radically. With the abolition of the general market, the labor market disappeared too. There is no competition of labor-power buyers and no bargaining. There is only one user of the labor and the labor power belongs to him. The labor power ceased to be a commodity, it belongs to the state. The worker ceased to be free also in the limited Marxian sense, he becomes a slave of the collective owner of the means of production, of the state. The relation between the fundamental classes of society, the rulers of the means of production and the producers, has qualitatively changed. It is still—as in all class societies—an exploitation, but an exploitation of another kind.

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[2] In Russia, the only country where the bureaucratic regime is fully developed, the evolution did not go this way. There capitalism was first overthrown by a proletarian revolution, and bureaucracy developed afterwards by social differentiation of the victorious group. But we want to prove that, even if developed in a more "organic" way from the bourgeois society, "state capitalism" ceases to be capitalism at a certain point.

Of course, the workers have to be fed and sheltered in some way, at least to the degree that the toiling class does not die out. But so were the antique slaves and the feudal serfs. Different class societies always differ in the *specific way* in which the ruling class forces the producers to yield their surplus product. The specific way of *capitalist* exploitation is the *sale of labor power* by a free worker for its value; the specific way of the new class society is the *enslavement* of the workers by the state. That explains, by the way, why the transformation from competitive capitalism to totalitarian *Planwirtschaft* cannot be achieved by the mere operation of economic laws, why the state has to intervene. As relations between fundamental classes change, as free proletarians have to be enslaved, the state power has to crush all independent labor organizations.

Blum says that in regimes such as in Russia "capitalism is not completely eliminated" because the suppression of private ownership "permits the continued existence of the economic and social relations as a whole that capitalism has engendered. . . "

First we heard that capitalist property relations were destroyed without destroying capitalism. Now it seems that capitalism was destroyed without destroying capitalist economic and social relations.

But in reality the relations Blum cites are not specifically *capitalist* relations. They are relations, *common* to *all* forms of class exploitations, and therefore they cannot disappear if you substitute one form of exploitation for another. In all class societies, we find authoritarian forms of management, basic inequities in distribution, and appropriation of income independent of work. (The word "profit" in Blum's quotation is misplaced: it smuggles in a capitalist category, the existence of which in the given society is not proved. Why call the income of a Red Director "profit"?)

Blum continues: "Such a regime is not capitalist in the ordinary sense of the word, but it is also evidently not socialist in the usual sense of the word either. It is socialist in the sense that there are no longer individual capitalists; it is capitalist in the sense that a residue of capitalism still remains."

The second part of the last sentence is a mistake. What Blum calls a "residue of capitalism" is, as I have tried to prove, features common to all class societies. And the first part of the sentence is simply meaningless. If the mere absence of individual capitalists is a proof of the existence of some kind of socialism, then the empire of Genghis-Khan was also capitalist—in an unusual sense, of course.

The simple truth is that the totalitarian bureaucratic society is neither capitalist nor socialist in any sensible sense. And it is not a transition from one to another either, because it can be proved that it develops away from both. Our old belief that only capitalism or socialism is possible in our time, that *tertium non datur* was wrong.

Blum proceeds to ask: what is necessary to transform such a society into a socialist society? Nothing else, he says, than to recruit the managerial elite without favoritism, nepotism, or exclusiveness; to remove privileges which accrue as attributes of power; to abolish differentiations in remuneration which harm the working masses or impinge in any important way upon a general equality in working conditions, living standards and mores; to substitute voluntary discipline for hierarchical obedience.

Now let me ask: what is necessary to transform a *capitalist* society into socialism? If I put it in the same vague way, evidently nothing else than to recruit the administrators of social wealth without relation to their capital; to remove privileges of wealth; to abolish differences in income which harm the working masses; to introduce a general equality in working conditions and living standards; to substitute voluntary discipline and cooperation for the capitalist command in production. . . .

If this program means more than pious wishes, it implies the abolition of the social power of the capitalist class, from which all its privileges are derived. And the same is true for the totalitarian bureaucratic society.

Bureaucracy cannot maintain itself in power without "favoritism, nepotism, and exclusiveness." That's why it has reintroduced inheritance, school fees, and special education for young bureaucrats. The very differences in income, not smaller than under capitalism, tend to assure the monopoly of higher education for the children of the ruling class. And these differences, as always in the history of class societies, are derived from the commanding position in production and state.

Says Blum: "In order to turn Burnham's managerial regime into a socialist regime, it is necessary only to introduce democracy."

Exactly. But this means only—social revolution.

Capitalism could afford a relatively great amount of political democracy, because the political sphere was, to a large degree, separated from the economic relations, and the economic power of the bourgeoisie was maintained and increased by the automatic play of economic laws. Even under political democracy, the capitalists remained the masters of economy, and the power of their wealth allowed them to control political life in an indirect, although normally very efficient way.

But in a society where the means of production are "nationalized," the political power *is* economic power. The economy belongs to the state, the state belongs to the bureaucratic ruling class. Commanding position in production is identical with the dictatorship in the realm of politics. Here, democracy cannot remain only political; it has to be a social, "industrial" democracy. This means the expropriation of the ruling class, its removal from power and wealth, its abolition. In such a society, a merely "political" revolution in contradistinction to social revolution is meaningless.

Therefore the hopes that Stalin will "grant freedom" someday are futile and stupid. People who believed they had discovered democratic tendencies in Russia—first in the Stalinist constitution, second in the abolition of Communist Army Commissars, third in the reintroduction of these Commissars—were always bitterly deceived. Blum is too honest to present such fake "proofs" for democratization. He only hopes that the transformation to democracy in Russia "has already begun *without our noticing it.*"

Well, I don't think that we can accept this *credo quia absurdum.* As much I sympathize with Blum's honest endeavor to find a new foundation for our common belief in the possibility of democratic socialism in our time, I still don't think that we can afford to replace scientific analysis by wishful thinking.

# COMMENT

## The NAM Takes Its Revenge

As we go to press it is not yet known whether President Truman will veto the Taft-Hartley anti-labor bill. Present feeling seems to be that the bill will be vetoed and that the veto will be overriden by a Congressional majority determined to weaken the American labor movement. If the law as now written is allowed to stand it will basically change the whole structure of American labor law developed on the basis of the Wagner Act. The new slave law represents, in fact, the revenge of the NAM against the system of laws which it had been forced to accept in the first New Deal period.

The law erases many of the protections that the American labor movement had won after long struggle. Nearly six million workers will be deprived of the protection of the closed shop; and government injunctions will again be legalized. The government will also have a number of new means at its disposal to intervene in the affairs of the unions.

The Wagner Act, the Norris-La Guardia Act and the National Labor Relations Act, which employers were forced to accept during Roosevelt's first and second terms when labor showed militancy and fighting spirit, will be entirely recast. The NAM is finally cashing in on the trend toward the right in America—a general tendency that has been clearly manifest for some time.

It is vain to speculate on the impact passage of the law will have on the future behavior of the American union movement. But it can be safely predicted that the Congressional majority which voted this law, and the NAM spokesmen who helped to write it, may get more than they have bargained for. American labor in recent years has perhaps placed too much reliance on its secure position within the status quo. Only too often maneuvers in Washington's anti-chambers replaced militant action in the shops. The trend toward a closer and closer integration of the government and union apparatus may now have come to an end.

The reliance on the benevolence of administration and party leaders has been badly shaken. The passage of the Taft-Hartley law might be the prologue to a political realignment and awakening of the labor movement which will have consequences other than those for which the NAM bargained.

## March Of Moscow Time

Senator Vandenberg found a strong and exceedingly appropriate expression to characterize the Soviet sponsored *coup d'état* in Hungary; he calls it a "treacherous conquest." This insight, however, did not prevent the Senator from indulging in a very strange illusion when he argued for the ratification of the peace treaty with Hungary. He declared: "If we do not ratify . . . the Soviet control continues without interruption."

The Senator may rest assured. Ratification or no ratification, Soviet control will continue without interruption, and not only in Hungary, but also in Rumania and Bulgaria, peace treaties with which were also ratified by the U.S. Senate.

Of course all these treaties provide for withdrawal of occupation armies within 90 days after ratification by the Big Four. If Senator Vandenberg expects the Soviet Government to abide by this provision, he is right; Soviet occupation armies *will* be withdrawn. But Soviet control will continue nevertheless through the media of absolutely subservient governments and parties and with sufficient Russian armed forces remaining in every country "to train and equip" its own native army.

The above-mentioned provision was an obvious reason for the operation which was started in Hungary and then had to be followed by similar operations in Rumania and Bulgaria. Before withdrawing its occupation armies, the Soviet Government seeks to consolidate its grip in the now occupied countries in such a fashion that Soviet control can become absolute after the formal end of occupation. To accomplish this purpose, it is necessary to see to it that before the armies are withdrawn all occupied countries fall under the domination of completely Communist-controlled governments. All opposition has to be smashed and the necessary number of Soviet agents, including military trainers and advisers, must be installed. It is then, and only then, that Soviet Russia will ratify treaties and demonstrate how "faithfully" she is prepared to carry out her obligations. Thus she will withdraw her occupation armies but will not sacrifice one iota of her unlimited control over countries which, for all practical purposes, are already incorporated in her totalitarian empire.

On May 31 the Hungarian Communist leader Rakosi carried out Soviet orders in Budapest. The same day in Belgrade, Tito told Bulgarian journalists that "unification of free Balkan peoples into a strong monolithic entity is indispensable." Eight days later, Bulgarian Premier Georgi Dimitrov moved very close to this goal—at least so far as his country was concerned. He did not need to reorganize his sufficiently subservient government; he merely ordered the arrest of Nikola Petkov, leader of the oppositionist Agrarian National Union Party. Before being jailed, Petkov managed to tell reporters that his arrest was "nothing but a prolongation of what has been happening in Hungary right along." Mr. Topencharov, head of the Government Press Bureau, tried to soften Petkov's declaration and stated that "there is only a political but not an organizational link between the Hungarian and Bulgarian conspiracies." He referred, of course, not to the conspiracies of Rakosi and Dimitrov but to those which were charged to Hungarian Premier Nagy and Nikola Petkov.

Various "conspiracies" were discovered and thousands of persons arrested also in Rumania. In the whole of this part of Europe, the "monolithic entity" of the Soviet empire is nearing its completion.

As this is written, it is not yet known what type of action is being planned by the Soviet Government in Austria where the Red Army is not the only occupational armed force. Austrian Communist leaders have already declared that Soviet Russia will never sign a peace treaty with the existing Austrian Government. But in Austria the Soviet authorities cannot directly dictate a "democratization" of the government and the Austrian Communists are too weak to undertake direct action. Here we must expect a more complicated system of pressure and blackmail.

In Austria, however, there are possibilities of internal resistance which did not exist in countries under straight Soviet occupation. Yet also in Austria, as in most other European countries which have not yet succumbed to Communist domination, the forces of internal resistance are hampered and are being constantly undermined by the horrible conditions under which the people are living. As long as these conditions prevail, there is not much hope that the "treacherous conquest" that is carried out systematically by Soviet imperialism can be stopped.

This tragic situation cannot be relieved unless there is a clear and consistent international policy aimed at restoration of the economic vitality of Europe and at consolidation of progressive and truly democratic forces in every country menaced by Soviet conquest.

## Law Without Justice

Indignation over the acquittal on all 96 counts of the 28 defendants in South Carolina's mass trial died down quickly. Many people evidently agreed with those editors who suggested that the fact that the trial had occurred at all denoted "progress."

In a sense it is quite true that to succeed not only in bringing to trial in South Carolina a white mob for murdering a Negro but also to conduct that trial in a manner that kept it from degenerating into a completely gruesome farce was an achievement. Major credit for this last would seem to be due the young presiding justice, Judge J. Robert Martin, Jr., who was reported to have turned his back on the jury and stalked off without a word when the disgraceful verdict was announced.

After all the "bright" aspects are fully explored, however, a terrifyingly dark residue remains. Here was a clear-cut case if there ever was one. The mob dragged Willie Earle, the Negro charged with stabbing a white taxi driver, from jail, mutilated him and then shot him dead. Twenty-six of the 28 finally tried had actually confessed officially to the FBI their part in the murder after having bragged about it all over Greenville Country. The confessions were in the record. Even the man who pulled the trigger of the murder-gun had confessed. And this time the preponderance of the forces of "law and order" seemed to be on the side of justice rather than ranged against it as is usually the case in such affairs.

Nevertheless the jury found the defendants not guilty on all counts. It was an all-white jury, it is true, which casts suspicion over the entire proceedings no matter how carefully the trial may have been conducted after the jury was selected. But still the fact that faced with incontrovertible evidence ably presented in a courtroom from which all hysteria had been as rigorously excluded as possible, and charged most eloquently by the judge ("You as jurors in a court of justice have no friends to reward nor any enemies to punish. Your purpose and my purpose here today is to see that a verdict is rendered in this case that speaks the truth") the jury was still able to render a complete whitewash, must come as a shock to any

If this shocks us, however, what are we to say of the obscene celebration that broke out in the courtroom immediately following the verdict with both lynchers and jurors apparently imagining themselves to be the heroes of the hour—as they seem indeed to have become in the eyes of the vast majority of the local white community? This incident should make it quite clear that a social battle had been fought in the South Carolina courtroom, a battle having greater dimension than the fate of a single individual—and one complete with victor and vanquished.

And what are we to say about the defense attorney who was played up only recently by the *New Republic* as one of the white hopes of Southern liberalism who gave the most rabid race-hating speech of the trial and now tries to square himself with this kind of an apology: "In retrospect I now realize that probably the same result would have been attained without the type of appeal I made to the jury . . . a thousand regrets . . ."? And what are we to say of Defendant Hendrix Rector who, on hearing the verdict, boasted: "I'm going to stay drunk for a month and then run for sheriff"—and who is now reported to be booked on a fresh charge of shooting up a car occupied by four Negroes?

These little items should give pause at least to those Americans who may be inclined to flirt with the idea that we are the master race, summoned by Destiny to rule the world.

They should give pause, too, to those who think that putting an end to lynching is largely a matter of legal action. This is not to reflect upon the efforts, which we hope may soon take on renewed vigor, to pass the Federal anti-lynching bill. But we must understand that the matter cannot be allowed to rest there. The Greenville episode seems to demonstrate most graphically that the crying need is for action on the community level which must reach into the very heart of the Deep South itself. For this was not a breakdown in the courts, in legal procedure, or anything of that sort. The whole machinery we have established to grind out justice clicked perfectly. Yet lynch law prevailed just as surely as if this machinery did not exist. One can argue perhaps that new laws might improve the chances for eventually securing justice in the higher courts. Yet this would seem to be one occasion on which the traditionally simple American answer reserved for most social problems—"there ought to be a law"—has little bearing.

## Free But Divided

Last month's momentous announcement that agreement had been reached between the main Indian parties and the British cabinet, that the British would leave India this summer, that a plan for partition had been accepted by the Congress and the Moslem League and that dominion status has been offered to Pakistan and Hindustan is among the most important historical events of recent times.

Despite Arnold Toynbee, we Americans are still prone to consider Western history as practically synonymous with human history, so the impact of the Indian decision is not yet fully realized on this side of the Atlantic. Britain's withdrawal from India, which she has held in bondage for centuries, is likely to become a most important date and children in the future may have to memorize: Warren Hastings assumed office as Governor-General in 1774; Lord Mountbatten left in 1947.

But the India that is to be "free" will not be a united India. Instead, there are to be three Indias: Hindustan with approximately 200 million inhabitants, Pakistan with about 60 million and the Princely States with around 94 million.

It is too early to evaluate fully the impact of this division, but it is already clear that communal sentiment, which has been so eagerly whipped up during the last 30 years (and not without some complacent aid from the British Raj) has won a signal victory over rational economic and social considerations. Pakistan is to consist of two entirely unconnected regions separated from each other by 700 miles. Partition will cut off industrial regions from their agricultural hinterland, break up the communication system and channels of trade, make any kind of economic planning—so desperately needed—almost impossible. Sandwiched between regions dominated by the two Indian states will be the sovereign principalities and kingdoms. Thus India will be a hodge-podge of conflicting political alignments, economic policies and social conditions. A united India would have immediately become a most important factor in world politics; a partitioned India will be condemned to relative impotence and powerlessness.

The fact that Winston Churchill, the most unregenerate defender of the British Empire, has enthusiastically endorsed the settlement arrived at by the British Labor Government should give us pause. It is not merely the fact that Indian statesmen have agreed to accept dominion status—at least for the period immediately following the evacuation—that gives Mr. Churchill cause for rejoicing. It is above all his conviction that the partition scheme agreed upon will allow continuation of British preponderance over a house divided against itself.

India's problems will not end with the withdrawal of the British. On the contrary, they are only just beginning. The social issues which have been so long obscured because of the common dedication to the struggle for national liberation will now come to the fore. India's problems will not be solved by the present settlement; they can only be posed by it. Desperate poverty, an archaic landholding system, agricultural over-population, retarded industrialization, illiteracy and malnutrition—these now become the real issues. (A promising indication that such basic questions will be tackled was provided by the recent outlawing of untouchability.)

The Congress Party stood united as long as its chief aim was to throw out the British. Now a cleavage on future policies will necessarily develop between the various classes and layers that have heretofore supported the Congress. The same holds true for the Moslem League in Pakistan.

It seems likely that the continuation of national antagonisms, consecrated by the official split between the component parts of the country, will continue to drain much of the energies which could otherwise be spent in grappling with the central issues. Yet, one can hope that in both parts of the country new social forces will slowly come to the fore, shoving aside religious and communal quarrels.

# BRITAIN'S CRISIS AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

### Keith Hutchison

In their articles on Britain's economic crisis, published in the April number of this review, Messrs. Brailsford and Seers both laid particular stress on the problem of foreign trade. That is undoubtedly the heart of the crisis and, until a solution is found, the condition of the crowded island will remain precarious. For no other country of its size is so dependent on foreign trade for its very existence. Literally, as well as figuratively, it procures its bread and butter from overseas. More than 50 per cent of its food supplies and a large part of its raw materials must be obtained from other countries. Britain's volume of imports, therefore, is the most vital index of its standard of living.

At the present time, that standard is being subjected to a two-way squeeze, because in the long run a country's imports must be paid for and Britain's means of payment, in the form of exported goods and services, are inadequate for its needs. In order to husband foreign exchange resources and eke out the American and Canadian loans, imports are being restricted to not much more than 75 per cent of their prewar volume. This is being done by rationing, by the imposition of consumption taxes, such as the recent staggering increase in tobacco duties, and by the refusal of import licenses for non-essential goods. At the same time, the British public is not being allowed to buy articles of home production with any freedom. Every manufacturer producing goods saleable abroad is directed to set aside a large proportion of his output for export. So British men and women, with money in their pockets, must go threadbare while fine fabrics from Lancashire and Yorkshire are shipped to New York and Buenos Aires.

While a few thoughtless or partisan Britons blame the degradation of living standards on the Labor Government, most people seem

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to realize that it is an unpleasant necessity. The war wrecked Britain's balance of payments and the first duty of the government in power is to restore it. Before 1939, Britain's large annual surplus of imports over exports was compensated by income from a century's accumulation of foreign investments and by other "invisible exports" such as payments for shipping, banking, and insurance services. But in order to finance imports of war materials, Britain was forced to sell a good half of its foreign investments and, in addition, to contract debts to foreign nations totalling some $12 billion. Consequently the country that was once the world's foremost creditor now has international liabilities far exceeding its assets. Moreover, war losses have cut heavily into shipping income. Thus, to finance a volume of imports equal to its prewar average—in other words to maintain its standard of living —Britain must vastly increase foreign receipts from the sale of actual goods and so make up for its lost "invisible exports."

In 1946, the first year of peace, the export trade, which during the war had been shrunk to barely 30 per cent of normal, rose once again to the prewar level. The target set for the end of the present year is 140 per cent of the 1938 volume and, by the time the American loan is exhausted, it is hoped that a further rise to 175 per cent will be achieved. This, it is estimated, is the minimum necessary to restore the prewar standard of living. It means, according to the official *Economic Survey for 1947,* that 25 per cent of Britain's manufacturing capacity must be devoted to production for exports. To dispose successfully of so large a quantity of goods is obviously not going to be easy when world markets become more competitive than they are at present. But Britain's success in this enterprise is of first-class importance to the world at large since its ability to buy the surplus products of the many countries dependent on its market is inevitably geared to its ability to sell.

The high priority which Britain must henceforth give to exports means, among other things, the diversion of workers to the export industries. But now that the pool of unemployed—a permanent feature of the prewar economic landscape—has dried up, the only remaining reservoirs of manpower are the armed services which, despite rapid demobilization, are still much larger than in 1938. Consequently there is a tug-of-war between the needs of defense and the needs of industry, between military strength and economic strength. In the present unsettled state of the world the Foreign Office and the service chiefs can make out a good case for a larger army, navy, and airforce than before the war. On the other hand, the ministers responsible for trade and industry can argue with equal cogency that their requirements are even more urgent since without a sound economic base military power is a delusion.

At just what point a balance will be struck between these conflicting claims remains to be seen. But it is clear that Britain has begun to cut its imperial commitments according to its manpower. Economic necessity has strongly reinforced nationalist pressures in India and Burma. The independence of these states is assured and the garrisons that have held them so long for the British crown are coming home. The Empire, if still a long way from complete liquidation, is shrinking and its life-lines are being shortened. This is one of the consequences of Britain's economic crisis which, as Americans have suddenly become aware, has tremendous implications for the United States. When the British government announced recently that it could no longer afford to extend military protection and economic aid to Greece and Turkey, President Truman proposed immediately that this country should take over. His policy has been generally, if uneasily, indorsed by the American people. They have agreed that the dangerous Mediterranean beat must be patrolled; if the British bobby was withdrawn, then the American cop must carry on.

## II

Damning the British Empire has long been a popular American pastime but, now that that empire is in retreat, some of the most enthusiastic participants in the game are more than a little dismayed. They fear it will mean the creation of numerous political and economic vacuums which the United States must somehow contrive to fill lest Soviet power rush in. Belatedly, even on the shores of Lake Michigan, there is growing recognition of the fact that America's comfortable isolation in the nineteenth century owed not a little to the loosely organized world order based on the British Navy and the pound sterling. That order was, of course, maintained primarily in British interests and had many far from admirable aspects. But looking back to it from the depths of our present troubles, it seems also to have had some good points. British leadership was a stabilizing influence in the world; if it did not provide a century of peace, it at least helped to localize wars and limit their duration. And if British capitalism in its aggressive drive for markets and materials was often a ruthless force, it was also a constructive one. The stream of capital and "know-how" that flowed steadily from London to all parts of the world was a major factor in the rapid economic expansion that characterized the nineteenth century.

The British world order came to an end in 1914. The wounds Britain suffered in World War I were deep—deeper than was at first realized—and it no longer had the strength to finance and police the world. Its abdication created a vacancy which the United States in 1918 could have filled with almost universal consent. The opportunity was fumbled. Repudiation of Wilson, whose reception in Europe proved how ardently the world was hoping for American leadership, and the decision to remain outside the League of Nations, showed that the United States was not yet ready to accept responsibilities matching its power and prestige. In the economic field, the failure was not so quickly apparent. New York announced that it was replacing London as the center of international finance and, during the twenties, it did make an important contribution to the capital needs of the world. Many of its loans, however, were ill-considered with poor risks accepted for the sake of big profits. Moreover, foreign investment was regarded as marginal and, when bad times came, international credit lines were cut abruptly. Worst of all, Washington worked at cross-purposes with Wall Street by raising tariff barriers against the goods of the debtor countries and so helping to force many of them into default.

Having lost one chance to assert world leadership, the United States now finds that the pressure of events is forcing it to take on the job under much less favorable auspices. For today there is another contender for the position, a contender which commands great military forces and makes a strong ideological appeal to millions outside its own borders. Russia's one great weakness is the relatively backward state of its economy. It has vast potential resources but, for a long time to come, it must devote all of them to rebuilding and expanding its own industry and agriculture. It has, therefore, little or nothing to contribute to the countries within its immediate sphere of interest, not to mention those to which it would like to extend its influence. On the contrary, the bareness of its cupboard compels it to take from its neighbors so that its foreign economic policies tend to work against its political plans.

By contrast, the United States can, if it chooses to do so, harness its political and economic interests in one team. The Truman Doctrine declares in effect that it is American policy to protect "free peoples" whose security and independence are threatened either by external aggression or by revolution fomented from outside. I do not propose to discuss the wisdom of this policy which, as these words are being written, is receiving the approval of a large bipartisan majority of Congress. For good or ill, the United States is committed to a rather special responsibility for maintaining global order and, as a logical consequence, to a rather special responsibility for promoting and maintaining world prosperity. Obviously, a country like Greece would not be exposed to its present perils if its people were busy and reasonably well fed.

## III

The United States seems certain, during the next two decades, to be called upon to contribute importantly both to the reconstruction of Europe and to the development of backward nations whose poverty is dangerous to the peace of the world. Fortunately, it can undertake this task not only without sacrificing its own well-being but with positive benefit to its economy. There is, in fact, a rather close analogy between the position of this country today and that of Britain in 1815. In the long struggle against Napoleon, Britain was the organizer and financier of victory and the industrial base of the Grand Alliance. After Waterloo, it stood head and shoulders above the rest of the world in economic development. Under the stimulus of a prolonged war, its industrial revolution had been accelerated and expanded factories were equipped to serve less advanced countries which were hungry for goods and anxious to learn for themselves the new techniques. The United States today has attained a similar preeminence. Its enormously enlarged productive apparatus represents more than half the industrial capacity of the world. But American pride in this achievement is tinged with anxiety. Memories of the early thirties when the output of a much smaller plant appeared to represent overproduction prompt the question: how is the vast machine to be kept running smoothly when pent-up domestic demands have been satisfied?

Before attempting to answer this question, it may be worth while to examine British experience in the early nineteenth century. Soon after Waterloo, British industry and agriculture were both overtaken by depression. The war orders which had sustained high prices and fat profits had ended and, for the time being, there seemed no alternative market. Yet corresponding to British capacity to produce there was a large potential demand in both Europe and the New World. The London banking houses, which had accumulated funds and experience in financing the war, undertook to bring buyers and sellers together. As an economic historian has written:

> The way to an expansion of England's foreign markets, like the road to her political security, seemed to lie through the stabilizing of conditions in Europe and the development of the New World. The activities of the representative merchant of the post-Napoleonic period, Alexander Baring, reflect some realization of these relations. Scarcely had the postwar slump spent its initial force, when in 1817 the firm of Baring Brothers was lending gold to the Second Bank of the United States and had plunged into the intricacies of the financial reconstruction of Europe.[1].

Let no one think that I am referring to early British experiments in foreign investment as models to be followed. Many of the bond issues in the first two decades after Waterloo constituted swindles of the investors or borrowers or both and were put out by unscrupulous financial middlemen and shady contractors into whose pockets most of the proceeds disappeared. But the British investing public slowly learned from its mistakes and a market was built up for more productive investments. The invention of steam locomotion opened a great new field for British capital, equipment, and know-how. All round the world British engineers supervised the construction of railroads, harbor works, and public utilities which had been financed wholly or partly in London. At the same time, venture capital in increasing amounts was being found for foreign industries, mines, and plantations.

At the beginning of this era, Britain's commercial policy still followed mercantilist traditions. Tariffs were steep and complicated; the Navigation Laws continued to impede shipping; both the export of machinery and the emigration of skilled workers were prohibited in an attempt to preserve industrial monopolies. But the economic facts pounded irresistibly against such outworn barriers. The "hungry forties" finally demonstrated that the rapidly multiplying population of Britain could no longer be denied access to foreign food supplies and, by the turn of the century, all impediments to free trade were expunged from Britain's statute books.

## IV

Historical analogies, illuminating as they can be, must never be pressed too far. The fact that America today is facing economic problems somewhat similar to those confronting Britain in 1815 does not mean that similar solutions are applicable. Nineteenth century Britons pursued policies that conformed to the laissez-faire philosophy of their time: their plan was planlessness. Whatever the defects of these policies—and no student of history can minimize them—they had, at least, the virtue of consistency.

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[1] Leland Hamilton Jenks: *The Migration of British Capital to 1875.* Page 31.

Present American economic policy, on the other hand, shows marked symptoms of schizophrenia. Since 1933 the Administration has been seeking to secure a universal lowering of trade barriers by means of an interlocking series of reciprocal trade agreements. More particularly, since 1939 it has been preaching to the world about the wickedness of discriminatory trade practices, quantitative restriction of imports, the use of currency manipulation as a protective device and so forth. But simultaneously, during the past fourteen years, the United States Government itself has resorted to many new restrictionist practices. It has developed a nationalist agricultural policy which employs the whole protectionist bag of tricks; it has sought to shield its merchant marine from international competition by means of increasingly large subsidies; it has promoted an export credit program which flagrantly violates the State Department's cherished principle of multilateralism.[2]

This conflict of policy within the American government has added greatly to the difficulty of selling the program of freer trade to other nations. During preliminary discussions with a British delegation of a draft charter for an International Trade Organization, State Department representatives were frequently embarrassed when their colleagues from the Department of Agriculture and other agencies objected to various clauses on the ground that they would interfere with existing safeguards for farm and other interests. Thus exceptions and escape clauses were introduced which set precedents for other nations when the draft charter was submitted to an international committee last fall. It is doubtful, therefore, whether the International Trade Organization, when it is finally launched, will be in a position to bring about a substantial reduction in trade barriers. The best that can be hoped is that it will keep them from multiplying and will provide safeguards against arbitrary unilateral changes in national commercial policies.

Before the I.T.O. can get very far with its task of promoting world trade and employment, the United States must take steps to adjust its trade policies to its status as the world's great creditor. Foreign debts can only be paid in goods and, unless those goods are permitted to enter this country, foreign debtors will be compelled either to default or to limit their dollar purchases. Even now, as we have already noted, Britain is cutting its consumption of American tobacco and other countries are taking similar steps. Nevertheless, the surplus of American exports over American imports remains huge: in 1947 it may well exceed $9 billion. The gap is being filled largely by American gifts and loans but each loan, unless it is destined to become a gift in fact, increases the prospective volume of goods coming into the United States. So that, unless the United States is prepared to invest steadily increasing amounts abroad, it must either accept more imports or see its exports drastically reduced. One way or another a country's balance of payments must reach equilibrium. Prosperity depends largely on whether that equilibrium is achieved at a high trade total or a low.

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[2] For particulars of these and other examples of inconsistency, see *Foreign Trade Policy of the United States* by Harold H. Hutcheson. (Foreign Policy Association Reports. Vol. XXIII, No. 1.)

Some of those who believe that high tariffs are essential to American salvation have proposed to cut this gordian knot with the sword of autarchy. Let us, they say, limit our exports to an amount just sufficient to pay for those commodities—coffee, bananas, cocoa, tin, and so forth—which we cannot produce in this country. Then it will not be necessary either to open our ports to competitive foreign goods or to become entangled in this dangerous business of foreign investment. Strange as it may seem, some advocates of this plan are also staunch defenders of free enterprise. Yet obviously, its realization would involve the most drastic interference with business freedom. The government would have to decide what goods could be exported and allot maximum quotas to the businesses that produced them. The typical American export industries include automobiles, electrical machinery, machine tools, chemicals, household equipment. They are, by and large, the most efficient and profitable industries and thus tend to attract increasing amounts of capital and labor and to expand their requirements beyond the capacity of the home market. Limitation of exports therefore would force the Government to plan for the diversion of resources from more efficient to less efficient uses—a curious way of assuring prosperity.

## V

It is inconceivable that America's most powerful enterprises would consent to any move in the direction of autarchy; in fact, there are many indications that they are preparing to put their whole weight behind a drive to reverse traditional commercial policies. Big industry, looking ahead, sees that it will soon have to sell an increasing proportion of its output abroad if that output is to be maintained at a profitable level. It will not be possible to achieve this aim unless prospective foreign customers are given more opportunities to acquire dollars. Big industry is also concerned about the effects of tariffs on raw material supplies. Domestic resources of the most important non-ferrous metals and a growing number of other commodities are no longer adequate for domestic needs. Protective duties do not, of course, bar the entry of such materials but they do tend to force American prices above world prices and so handicap industry. The situation has recently been illustrated by a revolt of copper consumers against the continuation of an import duty of four cents a pound in the face of an acute shortage of the metal. Despite strong protests from the owners of marginal copper mines—a politically powerful group—Congress has voted for a two-year suspension of this duty. This is a significant straw in the wind.

But that wind will not begin to blow strongly until the domestic postwar restocking boom slows down. Since V-J Day, the United States has been exporting far more goods than in prewar times but this business has not been altogether welcome. Demand has been so insistent at home that foreign sales have added to scarcities and helped, in some instances, to raise prices to dangerous heights. The spectacular rise in wheat during the past winter, when the government was raking in every bushel to ship to hungry Europe, is a case in point.

This situation will not last indefinitely: indeed, there are already signs of slackening in domestic consumption and inventories are beginning to cause anxiety in some industries. Soon the search for new markets will be pressed in earnest and the development of export business will receive increasing attention. The condition of many potential American customers, however, is immediately very unpromising. Most Latin American countries have accumulated reserves of gold and dollars which they are ready to spend on machinery and other capital goods. But in the long run, Latin America's ability to buy from this country depends very much on its ability to sell to Europe, including Britain. This was also, before the war, the largest market for U.S. goods.

Economically and socially, Europe remains in an extremely precarious state. The crisis in Britain, discussed in the first section of this article, is repeated with variations in more than a dozen countries and all these crises are intimately connected. The slow pace of recovery in one country slackens the rate of recuperation in all. It is difficult for Americans to appreciate how badly the fabric of Europe has been damaged by the war or how exhausted, physically and spiritually, its people are. American relief and loans have helped to keep them alive, but this assistance has mostly been swallowed up in meeting actual subsistence needs. Even Britain has been able to allot but a fraction of its American loan for the purchase of badly needed machinery. In all the war-torn countries reconstruction is proceeding slowly and productivity remains dangerously low.

In the race between recovery and chaos, it is not yet possible to predict with any assurance that chaos will be the loser. The decision may depend largely on how far the United States is prepared to go in backing recovery. If the Truman Doctrine represents more than a makeshift, it will have to be implemented by much wider measures than aid to Greece and Turkey. The eastern Mediterranean is a strategic sore spot; but the gravest threat to the life of democracy lies in the internal bleeding of western and central Europe. Until that region is restored to more robust economic health, its ability to resist Russian infections can hardly be guaranteed.

It would appear, therefore, that the foreign policy which President Truman has launched and the Congress indorsed must logically be backed by an active foreign economic program. It implies a deliberate and steady effort to fortify European democracy by assisting its return to a modicum of prosperity. It will require large-scale loans of American funds—really of American goods and technical skills. And, if the program is not to be permanently on a charity basis, it will be necessary, as the assisted countries regain their productivity, for the United States to accept their goods in ever-larger quantities.

There will be many who will say that this country cannot possibly afford any such program, that if it attempts to underwrite European prosperity, it will end by bankrupting itself. It is my belief that the obstacles are mental rather than physical and that the question which Americans must ask themselves is: Can we afford to leave so vital a part of western civilization to sink or swim? As I have attempted to show, internal economic pressures and external political pressures are both pushing the United States in the same direction. If it misses this opportunity to lead the world toward security and stability, history is not likely to offer it a third chance.

# CAN CAPITALISM SURVIVE IN ONE COUNTRY?

**Henry Jacoby**

In his memoirs, Herman von Eckardstein, a German diplomat, records an interesting conversation he had with Theodore Roosevelt in 1911. He quotes TR as follows:

"As long as England succeeds in keeping up the 'balance of power' in Europe, not only on principle, but in reality, well and good; should she however for some reason or other fail in doing so, the U.S. would be obliged to step in at least temporarily, in order to re-establish the balance of power—never mind against which country or group of countries our efforts may have to be directed. In fact we ourselves are becoming, owing to our strength and geographical situation, more and more the balance of power of the whole globe." [1]

Theodore Roosevelt thus clearly defined the principle behind the foreign policy that President Truman announced when he asked Congress to approve loans for Greece and Turkey. The validity of TR's statement today shows clearly that U.S. foreign policy is determined by this country's position as a world power and not by ideological issues that are used to popularize this policy.

But what are the conditions under which the U.S. has actually become one of the two power balances of the globe? Are the auspices under which the "American Century" begins comparable with those of the days when Britain emerged as a great world power?

Britain rose to power with the rise of capitalism. In the time of mercantilism and absolute monarchy, France was the leading world power. As the capitalistic pattern of production and trade developed, international relations changed. France was unable to adapt herself quickly enough to the conditions of free trade and the expanding world market, and Britain's hour had come.

When the world market ceased functioning between the two

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[1] *Die Welt der Diplomaten.* By Herman Freiherr von Eckardstein. Leipzig, 1937.

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world wars, however, Britain's strength was spent. And now we come to one of the great ironies of world history: at the very moment when capitalism as a world system is in full retreat, the United States—the only country in which capitalism is not merely an economic system but a faith—takes over Britain's world power!

## I

From its beginning capitalism everywhere was dependent upon an expanding world market. Capitalism cannot exist without an increasing production for which it needs new markets. When, with the depression of the nineteen thirties, the world market rapidly disintegrated, a new pattern of economic and political behavior emerged. Economic or political ideas had little to do with it. America's traditional philosophy of peace through trade did not prevent her from erecting a powerful tariff wall which cut off the stream of free trade.

When the free flow of trade began to be impeded, foreign exchange in European hands dwindled and a tendency developed to produce as much at home as possible. The sense of political insecurity strengthened this trend toward self-sufficiency. Import quotas, licenses, barter and clearing arrangements were employed as new economic devices to enable governments to restrict imports and to encourage domestic production regardless of economic costs. The international division of labor disintegrated together with the world market. Domestic prices were no longer related to world market prices. The flow of international capital also was reduced to a minimum. (From 1934 to 1940 over two billion dollars of American capital alone was recalled.) American lending activities were taken over for the most part by the Federal Export and Import Bank.

During the nineteen thirties, multilateral world trade was increasingly superseded by a system of commodity exchange known as "economic regionalism." The Ottawa Agreement (1932) is regarded as the classic expression of this regionalism, although the trend toward closer economic collaboration between England and the Dominions had begun before 1932. The British Empire's share in England's imports increased 40 percent from 1925 to 1936. Whereas, so long as the world market functioned, everyone bought where he could buy the cheapest without any further interest in the country of the seller, regional trade pacts stimulated mutual adaptation of production and economic integration between the countries involved. Nazi Germany turned toward the Danubian countries for food and raw materials. In this relationship, the stronger country dictated the conditions of "mutual adaptation" and finally attempted to "integrate" by force a large area which it considered its *lebensraum.*

## II

The present situation can be understood only if we bear in mind the main features of the pre-war development outlined above. The predominant trend in pre-war world economic relationships continues to develop. Governmental control over production and trade has increased almost everywhere outside the U.S. The end of the war has brought no relaxation. War losses, devastation, and the wear and tear on the means of production have made for new and ever tighter measure of economic control. The greater the economic difficulties of a country, the less it can afford to permit the profit motive to determine production and trade. It must try to concentrate on the most vital activities. And the new political insecurity supports this trend. Again and again we are told that no country can be expected to orient itself toward an efficient international division of labor without guarantees of military security. A recent international economic survey conducted by the New York *Times* came to the conclusion, therefore, that the United States and Canada are the only capitalistic countries left in the world. Since Canadian industry is not much more than a branch of U.S. industry, the latter is actually the only significant capitalist nation remaining.

Interested in providing its large productive apparatus with a market, the U.S. has entered upon a crusade for free multilateral competitive international trade. The question, therefore, is: Can America, with all its power, restore free trade, and, if not, can it remain capitalistic?

The fervor with which the "free enterprise" system is being praised in the United States does not prove this system's vitality. Geoffroy Crowther, editor of the London *Economist,* even thinks that the vehemence and frequency with which Americans say that they believe in "free enterprise" suggests the existence of a doubt, since it was not deemed necessary to make such professions of faith in 1919.

Nowhere in the world do we see the slightest indication of a turn away from government control of trade. On the contrary, the increasing number of control measures and regulations are being utilized constantly as the justification for new and more all-embracing controls. Britain, the most important importing country, has discovered that restriction of foreign exchange is not enough. State purchasing of the most important raw materials is being organized; a single buying agency for raw cotton set up; the Colonial Office has taken over the dealings of the Rubber Growers' Association, etc. These agencies can shift purchases at will and in accordance with political aims or governmental commercial policy. In order to save dollars, the British Board of Trade has stopped British buying of American cotton. Since the war only 525 out of 85,750 bales imported came from the U.S. France has just announced the intention of restoring her system of imperial preferences, and other countries are following the same general pattern. The dwindling of foreign exchange reserves is forcing countries in the direction of bilateral trade agreements, and where state monopolies have been established, bilateral trade has become the prevailing practice.

In Europe a network of financial and trade agreements on a bilateral basis already exists, and new agreements are announced almost daily. Given free competition, the U.S., with her enormous capacity for delivering the goods, would emerge strongest; but countries interested in finding a partner for commodity exchange do not give the U.S. a chance. Indeed, the fact that the U.S. has become such a powerful producer that no one can compete with her is one more reason why there is no longer interest in international competition. Countries which control their imports because of shortage of foreign exchange and that have entered bilateral agreements are forced also to control their exports as a means of allocating available surpluses in accordance with their commodity exchange agreements. Barter clauses are important in most of such bilateral agreements. Polish coal is exchanged for French hydro-electric equipment, Swiss watches for Danish cattle, etc. Commodity exchange is not confined to Europe. Argentina, which has reserved for official agencies the sole right to market or license export of many staple products, restricts the sale of grains and meats to inter-governmental exchange arrangements. Such agreements exist with Switzerland, Spain, Britain, Brazil and other countries.

The shortage of all goods, foodstuffs, raw materials and manufactured products, has led some countries to open their doors wider for American commodities than is good for them in view of their dollar deposits. When they find themselves in the disadvantageous position of not being able to gain new dollars through trade, they are taking to slamming their doors abruptly. Brazil, for instance, has recently imposed import licenses on many manufactured goods from the U.S. Belgium and the Netherlands have announced that they must cut their imports to help adjust their adverse balance of trade. The Netherlands' total imports and expenditures abroad amounted to 4.6 billion guilders in 1946, while their exports and revenues from abroad yielded 2.3 billion. By far the greatest supplier of Dutch imports was the U.S. France has increased her import duties on the eve of the ITO Conference in Geneva. French imports totaled 57.3 billion francs in 1946; exports—29.6 billion. The United States furnished 33 percent of French imports while 0.6 percent of French exports came to the U.S. Sudden restrictions of imports by Sweden has aroused great indignation in the U.S., because no allowance was made for goods which were already contracted for here. Denmark has embarked upon a vast import-saving program and has established import quotas for the most vital goods. In many countries quotas have replaced or superseded tariffs. Under tariff restrictions, even under so-called prohibitive tariffs, private buyers and sellers can still do business if they can produce cheaply enough or sell dear, but under the quota system the volume of trade is fixed by governmental decision.

A country which lacks foreign exchange for its purchases may also decide to consume its own production which was formerly exported. In many Latin-American countries license controls have been widely extended over the export field in a move to prevent undue flow out of the country of products needed for domestic consumption.

Lack of foreign exchange means, for all practical purposes, lack of dollars, since there is no other important world currency left. This is the end product of a development which began when the international gold standard was abandoned. This factor tightens the network of bilateral pacts. England, for example, despite all the austerity she may practice, needs large imports. In order to pay for them, she must export. But at the same time she is forced to request good customers, such as Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands to buy less British goods, for these countries cannot deliver sufficient vital commodities to England and therefore have over-drawn their accounts. It has become necessary for England and other countries to bring about a close bilateral balance of trade in each case.

This necessity to balance bilateral trade reinforces the trend toward economic integration. If country A wishes to sell to country B, but B lacks the exchange commodities A desires, then A may try to induce B to produce the wanted product. B, however, may be reluctant to change its pattern of production, either because vested interests in the country are opposed to the change, because B will become too dependent on A, or for any other reason. Thus the economic integration may proceed only if A is politically strong enough to push B. Argentina, for example, after developing a state-directed economy at home, tries to integrate her neighbors into her economic system. She has withheld vital fodstuffs from those countries which are reluctant to comply with her wishes. Argentina's pact with Chile is typical. It provides for official Argentine investment in Chilean enterprises in order to increase output of certain commodities for which Agentina is to have a preferential right of purchase. Brazil was forced to abandon her wheat import restrictions and to produce certain goods that Argentina wanted in exchange for Argentine wheat.

Russian policy in this respect is much more in the limelight. Secret trade treaties, combined with political control, have paved the way for economic integration of Eastern Europe into the Russian economy. A Russian-Polish barter agreement (the details of which are not all known) provides not only for large-scale exchange of manufactured goods and raw materials but also includes such arrangements as the delivery of Russian cotton to Poland and the shipping back of textile goods. (The same arrangement appears in Russian pacts with Czechoslovakia and Hungary.) Moreover, Polish coal is given in exchange for Russian political assistance. Under the weight of Russian power which is in dire need of all kinds of goods, Sweden, one of the few countries whose productive capacity has not decreased as a result of the war, has granted Russia a credit of one billion crowns with repayments to begin after ten years. There is no doubt that this credit imposes considerable strain on the economy of a small country such as Sweden and is one of the reasons for the sudden curtailment of Swedish imports. Yet delivery of high grade iron ore to Germany saved Sweden from Nazi invasion, and a similar economic appeasement in relation to Russia seems to be prudent policy.

There is more behind the Swedish credit policy, however, than these political considerations. Russia can be a market for a long time to come, whereas in trade with the U.S., Sweden's imports have increased five-fold while her exports to the U.S. have declined 25 per cent. Sweden is being drawn gently into Russia's economic orbit. In order to facilitate production of those Swedish goods that Russia wants, the latter has promised to deliver lignite to Sweden from the Russian zone of occupation in Germany and has also sponsored a three-year Swedish-Polish commodity exchange agreement. Germany formerly organized the trade of her junior partners in a similar fashion.

If the chances for unfettered trade with the old importing countries are being buried under a mass of bilateral or regional agreements on commodity exchange, cannot American capitalism hope for free trade with countries in Asia? Cannot American capitalism mold Asia according to its own image? But Asia is no virgin land and has not remained untouched by world developments. True, it has an insatiable need for goods, but also it has even less purchasing power than Europe and the new nationalistic governments in Asia plan to develop their own industries. We have learned from history that infant industries seek government protection against more powerful and developed competitors, and hence do not favor free trade. Elaborate export controls exist in India even now, favoring domestic raw material processing industries. The jute industry is a case in point. Large-scale industrial development in Asia, of course, would create an urgent demand for imported capital goods.

But will there be free export of capital to Asia? Can private investment in Asia play the role for American capitalism that it once played for British capitalism? No nationalist government in Asia will permit uncontrolled investments; all will demand that national and foreign capital serve their national policy. Whether much foreign capital will flow in under these conditions, and under the threat of full nationalization, is questionable. The Chinese government, for instance, as early as 1944 adopted regulations which give the government the right to decide what enterprises are needed and also predicting that all important industries will be operated eventually by the government itself. So long as governments, in China as well as elsewhere in Asia, because of civil war and political unrest, lack the strength to carry out any far-reaching economic policy along this line, they will probably not be considered sufficiently stable to encourage private investments. That the trend toward state control in Asia is not merely a whim of the present government in China or India, but a general and unavoidable tendency in all economically backward countries striving for industrialization, was indicated in April of this year when A. K. Gani, Minister of Economics in the new Indonesian Republic, announced a ten-year plan for shifting Java, Sumatra and the smaller islands of the Republic from a colonial to an independent economy. Mr. Gani stressed the necessity for a State monopoly of all export and import trade and a State credit system. Enterprises built with foreign loans are to be run jointly by workers and the State.

## III

We come now to the paradoxical situation that exists throughout the world today. Never before was the need and desire as great for American goods (both consumer and producer goods). Yet all nations seek to limit imports, or at least are willing to take them only on credit. Almost no government, however, is willing to leave the utilization of credits to the discretion of private business. Nowhere are conditions favorable for business-to-business loans or for private investments. The great need of many countries for American goods and investments can scarcely be satisfied except through U.S. Government loans. Government-to-government loans are based primarily on political considerations. The desire to develop an American market abroad goes hand-in-hand certainly with these considerations, but government-to-government loans cannot be viewed merely from the point of view of profitableness; they may serve their purpose even if they cannot be repaid.

With the question of U.S. Government loans we come to the crux of the problem of international economic relations. After World War I, private credit resumed its old role and paved the way for some years of increasing trade. This credit pursued purely business aims. Today, however, since international credit is almost entirely government credit (mainly U.S. Government credit), we face a different situation. True, it is not quite the same as in 1945 when lend-lease shipments accounted for 75 percent of American exports. In 1946, out of a commodity export of 9.8 billion dollars, private commercial exports amounted to 7 billion dollars.[2] Imports, however, covered only 50 percent of the exports for that year. Actually the difference between the exported and imported value was even greater than indicated by these figures. Taking goods and services together, the U.S. exported 15 billion. (This figure includes UNRRA, private gifts, and the sale of surplus property abroad.) Goods and services received by the U.S. totalled 7 billion. Besides lend-lease grants and UNRRA aid, U.S. Government-to-government loans were primarily responsible for the ability of foreign customers to pay for American goods.

Some leading American export executives have declared publicly that the outlook for their industry is bright because U.S. loans will close the gap between exports and imports. This may be correct, but it certainly does not fit into the pattern of capitalistic trade and will not further revival of capitalism in the world. Government loans, even if their purpose is not preponderantly political, do not play the same role as business credit; they pursue a national economic policy and are not much different in their effect from bilateral and preferential agreements. U.S. Government loan agreements carry clauses regarding tariffs and foreign exchange regulations that may alter the traditional ways of trade no less than do regional pacts. The immediate advantage for

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[2] See *Survey of Current Business,* March 1947.

American export industries may be the same if loans have an outspoken political purpose as in the case with those for Greece and Turkey. Indeed, such loans may keep American production on a high level for some time to come, but this is not their most important feature. The more political the purpose of these loans may be, the less the U.S. Government can afford to be indifferent to the kind of goods the borrowing nations receive. When President Truman requested in his message to Congress (March 19, 1947) that the Government's authority be extended for a period of one year, he declared: "We have granted loans and other monetary aid to nations whose existence must be preserved. These loans will accomplish their purpose only if recipient nations are able to obtain critically needed supplies from this country. Export control is an important instrument in carrying out the purpose of these loan programs."

In view of the fact that export managers of American industries have repeatedly stated that the prosperity of their business and future trade depends on the foreign loan program of the Government, it is clear that this future is not going to be shaped by the action of free enterprise and will not again follow the familiar capitalist pattern.

The American loan policy has a number of implications worth examining.

(1) In the pursuit of the political and economic objectives of its loans, the U.S. Government will have to interfere in foreign countries to a much greater extent than was necessary in the days of old-style "dollar diplomacy." It cannot rest content with mere stabilization of friendly regimes in such countries, but will have to see to it that their general economic development goes in accordance with U.S. interests. Governments of countries which receive U.S. loans will therefore be induced by the U.S. Government to increase control over production and trade.

(2) Extension of large amounts of credit to other nations will force expansion of the U.S. Government's activities in the economic sphere.

(3) The U.S. seeks to sell, but not to buy. Therefore, however large U.S. loans may be, most countries will run out of dollars very soon, even before rehabilitation of their economy has been completed. This means not merely that the chances are dim that the loans can ever be repaid, but also that they will not permit the debtor countries to relax trade and exchange controls. Despite the loans, clearing arrangements and barter trade will grow, and unless new loans are going to follow, the flow of American supplies will be cut off increasingly.

During the next few years a number of vital imports can come only from the U.S. and all available dollars will be used to obtain these vital goods. In the long run, however, every country will seek a partnership for commodity exchange and develop alternative sources of supply. Russia, with Eastern Europe integrated in her economy, will look for further complementary countries and will attract a number of them.

(4) Loans granted to countries such as Greece and Turkey and utilized in part to build up the armies of these countries may open the doors for American trade, but will these loans keep them open and prevent these countries from being pushed into the Russian economic sphere? When the new "Truman Doctrine" was announced, Drew Pearson pointed out in a broadcast that it means that at least history does not necessarily repeat itself, because this time the U.S. does not intend to remain aloof from the European scene and is determined to safeguard her interests there.

We must not be too certain of this, however. In certain respects it looks as if the history of the 1920's might be repeated—only this time the U.S. in some measures will play the role France then played in relation to the Balkans. Certainly France was economically weak and the U.S. is economically the most powerful country in the world. Yet their situation has many points of resemblance. France, fancying herself in the role of Europe's banker after World War I, financed by generous loans the armament of eastern and southeastern countries, in order to build up a security belt around Germany. These loans, however, did not inspire gratitude but rather resentment, and—most important—they did not by themselves integrate the economies of the debtor nations with that of France. The capacity to grant or withhold a market needed for a country's produce gives a nation which has this power a position of steady influence and pressure which no mere creditor can match. When financially poor Germany offered markets and barter trade to the Danubian countries, the powerful French financiers lost the game. This is history which may repeat itself. Even the trade relations between the Danubian countries and Germany may be restored—only this time Russia, with command over the Danube area, may be able to dictate the conditions of exchange and at the price of a minimum of cheap foodstuffs turn all or part of Germany into her workshop.

## IV

The crusade for multilateral and competitive trade on a world scale will not get far. Organized action by the U.S. aiming at international restoration of capitalism might, indeed, effect the reverse, since all governmentally organized economic action leads away from the capitalist pattern of economic behavior and toward a regimented economy.

The strong desire of Americans to restore the world market should deceive no one. American business is not willing to implement this strongly expressed intention and enter the world market as a big buyer. The International Trade Organization may formulate some inspiring principles, but the American escape clause by which any tariff reduction can be cancelled if it harms any American producer will prove more effective than principles.[3] With the U.S. production index 88 percent above the prewar figure, this country is more reluctant than ever before to take in other nation's products. On the other hand, because of her high level of production, the U.S. is more in need of exporting than ever before. Even though exports may not amount to more than 6 or 7 percent of total production, they are vital in terms of specific products. Unless the U.S. finds markets for some basic agricultural commodities, production will be reduced, and this in turn will reduce the demand by the farmers for industrial products. We know well how a small disturbance of the market can set off a chain reaction wphich results in depression.

Loans can sustain export, but for how long? If the loans cannot be repaid, can this method of financing exports be continued? Of course, an armament boom based on the threat of war could avert the crisis. But this would bring production back under government control—probably to a greater degree than during the last war. The coming of a new crisis would also provoke government interference in economic life on a greater scale than formerly, since American citizens will no longer accept large-scale unemployment.

The United States today is in a new and historically unique situation. We seem to live on the eve of an "American Century"—not because there are opportunities for American capitalism, but because the U.S. is the largest industrially well-developed and integrated economic area in the world at a time when the capitalist mode of international commodity circulation and division of labor will no longer function, and also at a time when all smaller nations are suffering from the way in which their political frontiers hamper their economic life. Yet the U.S. seems incapable of giving to this "American Century" that way of life so cherished in America. With the U.S. the only really powerful capitalist country left in the world, it seems unlikely that it can remain capitalist in the long run. Capitalism demands expansion; it requires free circulation of capital and goods throughout the world. If all outlets are sealed to it, capitalism will suffocate even in the vast expanses of America and the world-wide trend toward regimented economy will break through the last and strongest bulwark of Free Enterprise—the United States.

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[3] The developments described above have led to the establishment of the "World Bank" and the International Monetary Fund as a means of stepping up international trade. Discussion of their chances would exceed the space limits of this article. At best they represent another way to spread U.S. loans. The Bank, with much too little capital, is supposed to issue private bonds, but there seems to be marked reluctance on the part of private investors to go into this business without the U.S. Government's guarantee.

# TRADE UNIONS IN POSTWAR RUSSIA

## Solomon M. Schwarz

By the time the USSR joined the war, the steadily declining Soviet trade unions seemed to have almost withered away. They no longer constituted an independent element in the social and economic life of the nation, and were no longer considered representatives of labor's interests in relation to management. For over a decade there have been no collective agreements in the USSR, and the trade unions have exercised no influence in fixing wages; what is more, they have resigned themselves to the principle that the rates of output and of wages for piece work should be determined by management without even consulting the unions. For more than ten years, the Soviet trade unions have also forfeited all their rights in the second basic domain of union activity, that of supervision over the hiring and firing of wage earners.[1]

In the 1930's the Soviet trade unions were animated by "the struggle for the increase of the productivity of labor." Though this objective estranged the unions from the workers, it breathed new life into the union machinery. But in the early 1940's even this objective faded. At that time the transformation of the Communist Party, its infiltration into all the pores of the body economic, its taking over "direct control" instead of "general guidance" in all economic problems, and its assumption of leadership in "the struggle for the higher productivity of labor"—all these tended to make the Party largely responsible for "the politico-economic education" of the workers, thus relegating the unions to the background even in this field. Once more, as happened ten years earlier, the question arose as to whether they served any useful purpose at all. They were actually saved by the outbreak of war.

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[1] See "Trade Unions in Russian Industrial Life," by Solomon M. Schwarz, *International Postwar Problems*, July, 1945, pp. 322-328.

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### *New Objectives Arise In Wartime*

Under the conditions of war Soviet workers were settled with many new burdens. Food, housing, the shifting to production of women in charge of their families, care for the soldiers' dependents, orphans and partially disabled veterans returning to work—these and many other problems had to be solved. In the towns, the basic units for this purpose were the single enterprises, with the trade unions availing themselves of their experience in these matters[2] and displaying considerable energy. Thus the unions came back into life, and ready ground was provided for their postwar development.

The Party leadership very soon became aware of the postwar possibilities implied in this reorientation of the trade unions. It accordingly took steps to strengthen both their organization and ideology.

The union organization was consolidated first of all by a reshuffling of the leadership. In March 1944, the All Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), which had held no Plenary Session since the beginning of the war, was convened for its 12th session (i.e., the 12th since the last Congress in the spring of 1932). It elected a new Presidium of the AUCCTU consisting of younger men, who won prominence at the time when the Party had already tightened its grip on all the social and political affairs, and when the worship of Stalin became the main feature of Soviet public life.

More important was the ideological rearmament of the trade unions. A new line of policy was enunciated by the 13th and 14th Plenary Sessions of the AUCCTU in March and December 1945. This new line was not at variance with the former "production" line. The subordination of all the union activity to the interests of production remained the supreme tenet of the trade unions. "The satisfaction of material and cultural needs of the workers and employees" must be unreservedly subordinated to production tasks, and is desirable mainly because it promotes industry. Nor is the activity of the unions to be confined to the satisfaction of these needs; beyond that, raising of the level of output remains their major duty. But the evaluation of duties incumbent on the unions was conspicuously shifted in the program.

The very wording of this program is characteristic: the unions are seen basically as *caretakers of the needs* of workers and employes, and not as *defenders of their interests.* The Soviet trade unions repudiate what they disparagingly call "trade unionism," i.e., the defense of the interests of hired labor. They "take care" of wage and salary earners as consumers and citizens, and are primarily concerned with tying them to their working place, and inspiring in them attachment to the particular enterprise. Thus the Soviet unions fundamentally digress from the western independent unions. Despite the verbiage they use, they are rather reminiscent of the company unions in America and of managerial activities for the workers' welfare as they were practiced in many plants in prewar Europe.

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[2] Ibid., pp. 337-339.

By the time the 13th Plenary Session of the AUCCTU was convened, it was felt that the war was approaching its end, and that the unions had to brace themselves for the tasks arising under the postwar conditions. The war took a terrible toll in victims, and put a tremendous strain on the populace, which bore it staunchly for the sake of averting the danger threatening the nation. But government circles realized that while privations would run rampant for a long time after the war, the people would no longer be willing to resign themselves to hardships as they had done during the war. Moreover, it would be expected that after a victory paid for at so high a price, the populace would press for the betterment of both living and social conditions. To cope with these anticipated difficulties the Party resolved to increase the union efforts for the promotion of material welfare and cultural needs of the workers.

The main report delivered to the 13th Plenary Session was studiously kept within these limits, thus emphasizing that the problem under discussion was confined to *living conditions,* while *working conditions* were left out of consideration. Yet the main resolution adopted by the session jumped these bounds, and touched upon some more vital questions. The range of this program is too wide to be analyzed here. But it is worthwhile to list the duties which it imposed upon the unions with a view to meeting the workers' and employes' needs. The unions are directed:

> "jointly with the management and local Soviets to take all possible measure; to increase the floor space and to bring into good repair the existing space; to take active part in the commissions taking over newly-built houses and in the distribution of floor space; to foster the workers' private building projects";
>
> "to supervise regularly the conditions in workers' hostels, and see to it that they are adequately supplied with fuel, furniture, bedding, etc.";
>
> "to assure the smooth functioning of public baths, laundries, sani-

> tary and disinfection centers, showers and other sanitary accommodations in the enterprises," and to "achieve an improvement in the work of health officers and enforce the prosecution of violators of the sanitary regime in workers' hostels, settlements and municipal utility undertakings";
>
> "to institute a daily checking on the timely supply of workers with footwear, soap, special work clothes and food for those entitled to it";
>
> "to expand the network of shoe repairing, tailoring, knitting, metal-repairing and other shops working to satisfy the daily needs of workers and employes" and "make industrial plants manufacture household wares from waste materials, such as spoons, forks, knives, dishes, tea-pots, pans, irons, locks, pails";
>
> "to increase the supervision over eating places, retail stores and ancillary farms operated by the plant management," "help improve and expand public feeding of workers and employees" and "farming projetc. of industrial establishments," "to give every assistance to workers and employes for the development of individual and collective vegetable gardening, and for the acquisition of livestock and poultry";
>
> "to provide for further improvement of medical help," "to take care of speedy rehabilitation of destroyed resthomes and sanatoriums . . . and of the extension of diet kitchens and the setting up of institutions for the diagnosis and prevention of chronic diseases";
>
> "to improve the operation of day nurseries, kindergartens, playgrounds, child clinics and milk kitchens," "to increase the number of resthomes for pregnant women and nursing mothers" and "to assure the timely selling of layettes, children's apparel and shoes, children's beds, baby carriages and toys";
>
> "to develop the network of pioneer [i.e. members of the Communist children organization] camps and children's sanatoriums, and to take daily care of the welfare and education of the children of workers and employees who lost their lives in the struggle with German-Fascist aggressors";
>
> "to provide for the material and cultural needs of soldiers' dependents," "to increase the solicitude for the welfare of and medical assistance to the disabled veterans" and "to check on the proper application of laws guaranteeing them preferences and privileges," etc.

The program adopted by the 13th Session, while also mentioning "the improvement of working conditions" as one aspect of trade union activity, actually confines this activity to very narrow limits. It "directs management and union organizations to make full use of funds appropriated for labor protection, especially to restore the existing and to construct new ventilation; to expand or provide new shower rooms, lockers, washrooms, drying appliances for work clothes, drinking water and lighting installations"; it further instructs the unions "to keep a close watch on the application of law concerning the protection of pregnant women and nursing mothers," as well as "of laws for the protection of juvenile workers." But the program leaves the basic question, that of wages, entirely out of consideration. This question, however, was too burning to be sidetracked. At the 14th Plenary Session, the Chairman of the AUCCTU, Vasili V. Kuznetsov, said in his report on union tasks: "The trade union organization must work toward the elimination of whatever hampers the increase of the productivity of labor, and *consequently* of wages" (*Trud,* Dec. 7, 1945). Kuznetsov reiterated this vpiew at the 15th Plenary Session in April 1946: "All organizing activities of the trade unions must be geared to create for the workers conditions of steady increase of productivity, and *consequently* of wage raises" (*Trud,* April 13, 1946). The resolution adopted by the 15th Session also stresses this view: "The central, regional and factory committees of the trade unions have . . . to eliminate causes preventing the workers from increasing their output, and *by the same token* from obtaining higher wages" (*Trud,* May 5, 1946). This idea has grown into a tenet of Soviet trade union doctrine. The Soviet unions know of no other way to raise the standard of wages.

These statements served to clear the ground for the resumption of union activity aimed at the increase of output and not of wages. Press reports about low productivity, often lagging far behind the prewar level, became ever more frequent. The unions were once more entrusted with the task of remedying the situation. Thus it was the objective of bolstering up production and not wages, that prompted the resumption of collective bargaining by the trade unions.

### *Collective Agreements Once Again*

On February 19, 1947 the Soviet press reported that "The Council of Ministers of the USSR has approved, as in former years, the proposal of the Central Council of Trade Unions concerning the conclusion of collective agreements between management of the enterprises and the factory councils of the unions." The allusion to "former years" is of course a fig-leaf. In reality, collective agreements in the Soviet Union faded out of existence in the early 1930's, soon after the idea of "special duties" entrusted to the unions as labor "defense" organs—an idea that had been prevalent among Communist union leaders—had been declared "trade unionist" and criminal. The textbook of labor law (for juridical institutions) issued last year by the People's Commissariat of Justice states:

"With the strengthening of planning and the development of Soviet economy, a transition took place from the regulation of wages by agreements to their regulation by the state. . . The need for the conclusion of collective agreements gradually vanished, and from 1934 in most production branches no collective agreements were concluded."

The assertion that after 1934 collective agreements were nonexistent "in most branches" is also varnish. In reality, such agreements were concluded in 1935, in conformity with special government decrees, only for water transport, commercial organizations, lumbering and lumber floating, but even in these branches the agreements of 1935 were the last ones. Apart from them, not a single collective agreement was concluded in the Soviet Union after 1934.

The digesting of this development took time. In the spring of 1937 after an interval of almost two and a half years the AUCCTU was convened in its 6th Plenary Session to discuss "the trade union crisis" and ways to solve it. In the discussion, the abolishment of collective agreements was set forth as a striking manifestation of the union's decline, and upon Shvernik's report the Session unanimously decided "to renew the practice of concluding collective agreements between trade unions and Soviet economic organs." But the 6th Session of the AUCCTU was the last attempt to restore the Soviet unions to their former role, and the energy it gathered very soon petered out. At the next, the 7th Plenary Session in the autumn of 1938, Shvernik reported that the Economic Council at the Council of People's Commissars had just "approved" the draft of the first collective agreement (for the Stalin automobile plant in Moscow) to the effect that "after the final confirmation of the draft of the collective agreement by the Economic Council the conclusion of similar agreements ca nbe brought under way for other branches of the national economy." Why the draft should have been "approved" by the Economic Council, and why a "final confirmation" by the same Economic Council was needed in addition to the "approval" was shrouded in mystery. However, the whole matter was dropped very soon, and the press never reported either the "final confirmation" of the automobile plant agreement or the conclusion "on its basis" of other collective agreements. In the two-hour report which Shvernik made to the 8th Plenary Session in the spring of 1939, he did not even mention collective agreements. And a year later that same Shvernik wrote in the organ of the AUCCTU:

"Collective agreements once played an important politico-economic role, especially in the first years of peaceful expansion of the economy," but "at present" the *collective agreement "is outdated."*

The Communist press abroad continued to trumpet the importance of collective bargaining in the Soviet Union. It was praised in pamphlets issued during the war by the American Council on Soviet Relations and the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, as well as in the reports published by British and American trade union delegations on their postwar trips to the Soviet Union. The leading Soviet circles were plainly reluctant to admit that collective agreements had vanished in the USSR, and the above mentioned textbook of Soviet labor law (1946), after stating that "the conclusion of collective agreements has actually ceased," makes the surprising remark that "in principle the practice of collective bargaining may be renewed."

This renewal is now under way, though the present collective agreements differ widely from the old ones. What is now being introduced under the name of collective agreements is a far cry from agreements concluded abroad, or even in the first decade after the revolution. According to the Labor Code which formally is still in force, though practically put on ice, the collective agreement "establishes working and hiring conditions in the single enterprises, offices and economies, and in groups thereof." It would seem that the purpose of the collective agreements is patent enough: instead of the single worker's bargaining with the employer, that is to say submitting to his demands, the working and hiring conditions, especially the wages, are established by an agreement concluded between a labor union and the employer or employers. This safeguarding of the workers' interests constitutes the essential function of collective agreements.

After this "safeguarding theory" of the trade union movement was discarded on the eve of the '30's, several attempts were made to construe a new conception of collective agreements. But since the recollection of the old agreement was still vivid, these attempts proved unavailing, and collective bargaining was given up altogether. When the revival of collective agreements was envisaged in 1937, they were regarded—despite all the subterfuges—as the agreements of the old type which safeguarded the workers' interests. No wonder that this idea, clashing with the firmly established line of Communist policy, was very soon dropped, and was not revived in the course of a decade.

### *New Role of Agreement*

The new Soviet collective agreements aim at a very different goal. In the Soviet Union there is supposed to be no need of protecting the workers. "With us the Socialist state itself stands guard over the interests of the toiling people," stated *Trud* editorially on February 19, commenting on collective bargaining. Therefore the purpose of collective agreements consists not in the protection of labor, but *"in guaranteeing the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the state production plan for the given establishment."* Hence *"the main stipulation of the contracted obligations must be an increased demand from every worker.* Without strengthening labor discipline and without ruthless struggle against the violators of state and labor discipline—grabbers and loafers—there can be no real fulfillment of obligations laid down in the collective agreement."

And what about wages, which once were the core of collective agreements? In an article published in *Pravda* (February 21, 1947) the Chairman of the Trade Union Council, V. Kuznetsov, declared:

"Any change in the system of labor pay can take place only upon a decision of the government. This rule remains valid even when collective agreements are concluded. This does not mean, however, that management and labor are not concerned with wage problems. Their duty consists in creating conditions for the increase of labor productivity, and *as a consequence,* for a rise of wages."

The rise of wages as "a consequence" of an increased output is the guiding principle of the wage policy as it is reflected in the new campaign for the conclusion of collective agreements. This amounts to the repudiation of the workers' right to claim higher wages, and of what is disparagingly styled in official Soviet parlance, the "mechanical" increase of wage rates. What is more, the conclusion of collective agreements in many industries is coupled with the increase of the norms of output, consequently with the decrease of the piece rates since, to quote Kuznetsov's article once again, "the government decided in March that in several economic ministries the norms of output are to be raised." Leaving no doubt that the reintroduction of collective agreements implied the rise of the norms of output pressing down the wage rates, *Izvestia* states on March 6:

"Alongside the conclusion of collective agreements, a revision of norms will take place as well as a regulation of the method of fixing them. This will require special attention on the part of management and trade unions, since our plans must be based *not on* *average-arithmetic norms* already reached in production, but on *average-progressive norms,* which must be *leveled up to the achievement of the best workers."*

This "leveling up" amounts to a deliberate attempt to introduce such norms of output as can be reached by the average worker only under the greatest strain, or can not be reached at all. The campaign for collective agreements becomes an instrument of pressure upon the workers for the purpose of increasing their output.

### *Trade Union Elections*

The introduction of collective agreements has been followed by an overhauling of trade union machinery. Coincidentally with the announcement of the revalidation of collective agreements, there was launched a campaign for reelection to the union organs. On February 11 last, *Trud* reported that the Presidium of the AUCCTU had issued instructions for the reelection of union officials.

These instructions are spiced with numerous details patently designed to ward off any election "surprises." Two examples may illustrate the procedure. The elections are held in electoral meetings only; there is no question of permitting the workers to cast their votes by using the ballot-boxes throughout election day. The existing method is designed to facilitate control over the elections. In enterprises where general meetings of workers and employees cannot be called because of changing shifts, the balloting proceeds in single shifts, yet the same list of candidates is presented to all. As regards the question of who is empowered to draw up this list, and who is to be included in it, the instructions are rather vague: "The list of candidates for the secret ballot includes such persons as are recommended by more than half of the union members working in the enterprises." Since the candidates for the whole enterprise are nominated in several preliminary meetings of the single shifts, this stratagem delivers the elections into the hands of "the machine."

The 6th Plenum of the AUCCTU prescribed secret voting, but, in addition, granted to every member of election meetings the right "to object" to any candidate, even without stating his reason. The question whether the candidate "objected to" remains on the list which is to be submitted to the *secret* ballot, is decided by *open* vote. At present this electoral trick has been further perfected. The open vote now decides "for the objection" or "against the objection," and not for or against keeping the candidate on the list. This is a shrewd psychological manipulation, since it is more difficult to vote "against the objection" than "for keeping the candidate on the list," especially when the objection is raised by an "influential" person.

At variance with the general principle of secret ballot, the instructions introduce open balloting in certain cases, without giving any justification for this exception. The most important of these cases is the election of so-called union group organizers. Union groups are small primary cells in the enterprises, and election of union group organizers is the first link in union elections; this is where the series of elections actually start. A secret vote in these cells would provide some general guarantee of free elections, and is therefore of special importance. But precisely on this level the secret vote is now prohibited. The idea of introducing open balloting at the election of union group organizers was set forth and approved at the 7th Plenary Session of the AUCCTU, in September of 1938. With the principle of a secret ballot formally prevailing, this exception was a thorn in the flesh, and aroused considerable dissatisfaction, and during the war the election of union group organizers was in fact carried out by secret vote. But at present there is no need for constraint, and in view of the approaching campaign for collective agreements wavering may become a hazard; therefore, election of union group organizers by open vote is now the strict rule.

This primary election marks the beginning of the general election campaign. It culminates in the conferences of single unions (the "branch" conferences mentioned earlier) and in the election of their Central Committees. There is no question yet of a general Trade Union Congress and of the reelection of the AUCCTU. The last, 9th General Congress, was held in April and May of 1932. A new Congress was to be convened two years later, but has not met for almost 15 years. When an attempt was made at the 6th Plenum in 1937 to overcome "the trade union crisis," and the Plenum resolved—just as it has done now—to carry out the reelection of union organs, this campaign was to result in the convention of a general Trade Union Congress. The decision was explicit: it stated that the 10th Congress was "to be held on October 20, 1937," yet so far none has been held. The reluctance of the Soviet union leaders to convoke the Congress shows how little credence they give to their own perorations about the workers' boundless devotion to the Communist Party and the Communist trade union leadership, and how they fear the latent disaffection of the workers.

# IS WAR WITH RUSSIA INEVITABLE?

## An Examination of Burnham's New Thesis

### Boris Sapir

> **"Nothing is more shortsighted than a precipitate determinism, which in advance interprets events to come as uncontrollable denouements of the predetermined world catastrophe."**
> **J. HUIZINGA in "The Outraged World"**

As a result of the Soviet Government's foreign policy, the following viewpoint is steadily gaining ground:

Russian dictatorship is striving for world domination. It is bracing itself for war, and if the "war of nerves" now being waged does not yield the desired results, the Soviet Government will unleash an armed conflict as soon as it attains military superiority. Left to themselves, the Russian people are unable to cope with the terroristic regime.

From this concept the logical inference would be that preventive war against the Soviet Union is urgently needed. If that diagnosis is correct, time works against the future victims of Bolshevik aggression. Before long, the atom-bomb secret will become known, and Stalin will avail himself of the first opportunity guaranteeing him the advantages of an offensive.

And yet, in reality there is no question of repeating the Hiroshima experiment on the territory of the former ally. The futility of any attempt to push the United States into war is beyond doubt. For various reasons, some moral, this country cannot possibly start an aggression against the Eastern member of the Big Three, who is fully aware of this fact. Only simpletons and dishonest propagandists can claim the contrary. Democratic nations, by their very nature, shun the initiative of war, and arousing warlike spirit among them is a hard task. Public opinion, which must be heeded by the American Congress, the British Parliament, and the French Chamber, will support a declaration of war in exceptional cases only—in the case of provocation from the outside for instance. Such was the course of events in both 1914 and 1939, and there is no reason to

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number of single ideas, of which some are right and others wrong.

This conception is brought into clear relief in a recently published book, *The Struggle For The World,* by James Burnham. The author is a young American scholar, once a Socialist and later a Trotskyite. He has been studying contemporary problems for several years, and has centered his attention on the social forms which take shape in the period of latter-day capitalism and seem destined to replace it. With his keen mind and deliberate efforts to remain independent of traditional views, Burnham tries to create a comprehensive doctrine providing solutions for all the basic problems of our time. Here lies the effectiveness and significance of his work. In his first book, *The Managerial Revolution,* published in 1941, he describes the formation of a new social order which is neither Capitalism nor Socialism, and is headed by a class of managers. It is not possible to dwell here on Burnham's hypothesis which throws light upon one of the main trends of the interim period between the two World Wars, though it ignores other trends, and therefore is open to the charge of oversimplification. In *The Struggle For The World,* Burnham makes combatting Bolshevism a world problem. Proceeding from the theories of the British historian Toynbee, he deduces the present clashes among the former allies from the idea of competition between civilizations, while the conditions of world development in the age of the atom and of the jet-propelled aircraft lead him to the assumption of the inevitability of the emergence of a universal empire, which will be either American or Soviet, depending on which will win in the war between the two nations. This conflict, according to Burnham, started in 1944 when Greek sailors revolted against the British command under which they fought in the Mediterranean against the Axis powers.

Disillusioned with Marxism, which he obviously adopted in its Nechaev-Blanqui interpretation, Burnham came under the influence of sociologists who devoted their main attention to the study of the mechanics of power in state and society, and who were bent on lending the precision of natural science to the doctrines of political power. By basing his views on their works (Machiavelli, Michels, Pareto, and others), Burnham was better equipped than many others to analyze the nature of Bolshevik conspiracies, and to understand the relative weakness of their antagonists. But by applying methods borrowed from his masters, Burnham comes to abstract, though sometimes brilliant, ideas which strike the reader as a blaze of paradoxes. His algebraic constructions stimulate thinking, but "what we need is ascetism of thought for the sake of wordly wisdom," to use the words of the renowned Dutch historian, J. Huizinga, in his posthumously published book, *The Outraged World,* from which the quotation at the beginning of this article was taken.

It is doubtful whether competition among the various civilizations is the primary source of international conflicts. The very juxtaposition of the Western and Eastern cultures is open to challenge. As a matter of fact, Bolshevism germinated from west-European seeds. Even the most rabid anti-Socialist cannot deny the existence of close ties between Marxism and Western civilization. The idea of universality inherent in Russian Communism must be traced to the premises of human culture which so brilliantly blossomed in the West.

On the other hand, National Socialism and Fascism, disowned by every protagonist of Western civilization, were born in nations which obviously belong to the West. Why should a nation which produced Lenin and Stalin, but also Tolstoi and Dostoevsky, be classified under another heading than a nation which bred Hitler and Goebbels, but also Goethe and Kant? To be sure, the historic development of Russia differs from that of the European West. Connection with the Byzantine culture, absence of the medieval towns, serfdom which lingered until the middle of the last century, and retarded development of capitalism—all these predetermined the shaping in Eastern Europe of social forms different from those in the West. Yet if civilization is considered in its deeper aspect, i.e., as the source from which flows the vivifying stream which determines the nature of social institutions, than it appears that the so-called Eastern and Western civilizations have been based on the common Judeo-Christian principles. Rifts between nations are rooted not in the divergent complexion of their culture, but in the sphere where power interests clash. More important still, international controversies build so-to-speak vertical lines which are crossed by horizontal lines indicating the social struggle within the bounds of the separate national sectors into which mankind is divided. Burnham devotes much attention to this struggle. In *The Managerial Revolution* he stresses the similarity in the advent to power of the new class of "managers" in such dissimilar countries as Russia, Germany and the United States. Whether his characterization of this group actually playing a prominent role in contemporary politics is correct, and whether there is any analogy between the New

Deal bureaucracy and the ruling Communist cabal is irrelevant for our purpose. What matters here is to show the relative value of the distinction between Western and Eastern civilizations, or rather the political ineffectiveness of the distinction existing between them.

Burnham's contraposition of civilizations is linked to the fact that as a result of the Second World War, Eastern civilization has been organized into a powerful state headed by a totalitarian Communist Party striving for world domination. Incidentally, Burnham, because he has not completely shaken off his Communist past, identifies Marxism with Bolshevism, and attributes to the former the origin of the idea of an international plot for seizing control of the whole world. A historian and politician may consider the Communism of Stalin, Lenin and Trotsky as one phenomenon, but he should distinguish the various stages of its evolution. The conspiratorial and equalitarian trend of Lenin's epoch rested on the Marxism of the 1850's, and the Bolshevik terrorism until 1928 could possibly invoke the Marx of the period of the Union of Communists. Yet the totalitarianism and despotism of Stalin's bureaucracy, which discarded equality as so much rubbish, is the original creation of the "Beloved Leader," and has nothing in common either with young Marx or the mature author of *Capital.* Burnham rightly emphasizes the difference between the Russian people and the Soviet regime. He shows that this regime enslaves its own people, and aims at the enslavement of other peoples within its sphere of influence. He thinks that the regime has "put the screws on" the nation with such vigor that there is no way of overthrowing it. Only war could deal a death blow to the Bolshevik dictatorship.

Under the impact of the fact that the Soviet regime has survived for thirty years, and emerged victorious from many a desperate predicament, most of our contemporaries, reared in the sociological doctrines of the nineteenth century, are prone to consider as utopian the possibility of the downfall of that regime. Political prognostications usually operate with the notions of class, interest, feasibility, etc. The totalitarian state has obliterated all these notions, therefore in this case the accustomed cogency of the prognostications seems lacking. Hence the assertion that without military defeat the Soviet Government will last quasi-eternally. And yet, the overthrow of Fascism in Italy, the plots against Hitler which were disclosed after the war, and the failure of National Socialism to win the hearts of the people in occupied countries, pose the question of the limitations of totalitarian regimes. Despite the fifth column in Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, France, etc., these nations, as well as German occupied nations in Eastern Europe, appeared to be proof against Nazism. The last word has not yet been spoken either in Poland, or Bulgaria, or Rumania, or even in the outskirts of the Soviet Union, including the Ukraine. There are disgruntled people in each of these lands. In this connection it would be correct for Burnham to apply his doctrine of antagonism existing among the national sectors which, as mentioned above, serve him as the basis of his idea of an imminent new world war. In spite of the advantages which Bolshevism possesses over National Socialism—the absence of the master-race theory, more freedom of maneuvering in revolutionizing social relations—national resistance within the sphere of Soviet influence may grow into a barrier against world domination.

The psychology of the pessimism which sees no chance of the dictatorship being overthrown by domestic opposition can readily be understood. Yet it ignores certain important facts. Along with difficulties emanating from the aspiration to national independence which is strong in the territories under Russian domination, there are other troubles that threaten to shatter the edifice erected by Stalin. First, there is the contradiction between the plans hatched by the Kremlin Government, and the historic tendency inherent in the Russian foreign policy. Contrary to Burnham's opinion, it was neither Marx, nor the First International, but Russian Bolshevism that engendered the plot for world domination. Unlike Germany which, impelled by certain circumstances in her history in the nineteenth century, aspired to world hegemony, Russia has not nourished this ambition. In the Soviet Union many realize the dangers implicit in such plans. If even in Hitler's Reich, as we learned after the war, there appeared men who tried to overthrow the Nazis in order to save their country, then there can be little doubt that in Russia, too, patriots will arise (they may even now be active behind the iron curtain, unseen by the outer world) who will stake everything to save their nation from the horror of defeat in a war which it does not desire.

Stalin's personal regime paves the way for plots and palace revolts. There are plenty of people in Russia who occupy prominent posts, and whose well-being, even life itself, depends on the dictator's whim. Not idealistic motives, but the instinct of personal security must compel them to seek safeguards against the never subsiding danger of disgrace and everything that follows in its wake.

Another threat to the very foundations of the regime is provided by the almost insoluble problem of succession to the ruling group. To find a substitute for the aging dictator, and to cast upon him the nimbus of undisputed authority requires much time and effort. Of all the authoritarian social organizations in modern history, only the Catholic Church has managed to continue unimpaired the selection of its leading cadres. But the Church is built on the transcendental idea of God, and cannot be compared with Bolshevism. Thus the shocks against the dictatorship, coming as they do from various directions, expand like ripples on the surface of water, and draw within their orbit diverse persons capable, for different reasons, of launching considerable activity. These persons do not live in a vacuum, but in a Russia which has just met Europe, has learned things of which she previously had no idea—a hungry Russia, harassed by wartime privations, disgruntled and avid for thoroughgoing reforms.

All the information about the Soviet Union obtained from new refugees and foreigners who visited Moscow, from Red Army soldiers who confided in the Russians they met abroad, and from the Soviet literature, points to a spiritual crisis prevaling in the nation. This crisis has now been complicated by an economic disaster caused by a poor harvest and the system of forcible collectivization. The Soviet Union is by no means secure from political upheavals, though it would be vain to try to set time limits. And a serious upheaval, even if not deliberately aimed at far-reaching goals, cannot but bring disorder to the top party levels. Unlike democracy, the totalitarian system is strong only so long as its leading group can carry on with unabated firmness. But when cracks appear in the system, its doom is sealed.

The danger of Burnham's conception consists in the fact that it shifts attention from the positive program for overcoming postwar chaos to organizational measures barring Soviet expansion. He is right in stressing the need for such measures, and he is also right in urging close collaboration between the U.S.A., Britain and France, and in criticizing the shortsightedness of those who approach the question of loans from the viewpoint of mere commercial advantage. But he does not pay sufficient attention to the problem of the urgently needed social and economic transformation of Europe. Yet the creation of a European federation, advocated by Burnham, presupposes the solution of this problem. The federation is not feasible without the support of large masses which cannot be mobilized under the slogans of freedom and Western civilization if the people are not assured of a sweeping change in their way of life. Moreover, under the existing circumstances, a planned economy is necessary to provide them with adequate food and housing—otherwise even the most generous help from the U.S. will be in vain. Europeans fear Bolshevik expansion. But they fear no less that an economic crisis will break out in America. The certitude that Hoover's period will not be revived in the U.S. would give wings to democrats and Socialists in Europe, and would greatly enhance the chances of an anti-Bolshevik struggle in Russia. If the Western powers manifest their inability to cope with the postwar problems, the disaffected elements in Russia will lose heart, and Bolshevism will probably prolong and consolidate its existence.

Burnham has travelled a long way from his past socialist beliefs. Yet to a certain degree he has maintained the Marxian method which, however, leads to queer results if devoid of Marx's deeply felt antagonism to the exploitation of man by man, and his longing for social justice. Without these aspirations, the Marxian analysis of capitalist society remains suspended in mid-air. This analysis, even if recognized as correct, does not in itself postulate the struggle for Socialism. The latter flows from *Capital* which combines objective analysis with a subjective social ideal. Burnham's ideal of an American Empire, conceived in conformity with Marxian principles, and buttressed by an objective analysis of the so-called material basis, is also suspended in mid-air. The acts of individuals and masses result from efforts of the will, and the will presupposes decisions. But decisions do not flow from naked objective analysis. Let us assume that Burnham's analysis is correct. But the reader of the book will want to know whether the idea of an American Empire is good or bad. He will look in vain for an answer, and will therefore remain unresponsive to the author's exhortations. In politics only ideas which sway the masses are a real force.

# THE MIDDLE EAST— WORLD STORM CENTER

**Karim Korine**

The central fact about the Middle East today is Britain's complete control over everything and anything. Nothing happens without her consent, direct or indirect. This is especially true, first in Palestine, then—one after another according to the degree of British influence and control internally and externally—in Transjordan, Iraq, Persia (here American influence is predominating), Turkey (Truman's statement about aid to Greece and Turkey marked the "evacuation" by Britain of these two countries for the USA), Syria, Egypt, Lebanon (here French influence predominates).

The Middle East was the ancient cradle of civilization: Babylon in Iraq, the Pyramids in Egypt, Moses in Palestine. In the Middle Ages—while Europe was sinking deeper and deeper into the blackness of ignorance, civil wars, feudalism—Baghdad, under Arab Abbasid's rule, was the capital of the greatest civilization known until then, the last Arab Empire which extended at that time to its farthest limits: west to the Loire River in France and to Casablanca on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, east to Western China, north to Constantinople, south to Ethiopia. Its commerce, its knowledge flooded the whole of Europe, Asia and Africa. Then Mongol and Tartar invasions from Central Asia destroyed the Abbasid Dynasty, Baghdad, the Arab Empire and Arab civilization, as they destroyed Rome and the Roman Empire in ancient times. Ottoman Caliphate misrule and misconduct brought the Middle East to the lowest, darkest, rowdiest period in its history. Warring Bedouin tribes dominated the scene. Only in the cities were the Ottomans able to retain a semblance of authority. But, even there, people did not dare to leave their houses at night! This was a heyday for thieves, cut-

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KARIM KORINE is an Iraqian journalist, novelist and political analyst who lives in Baghdad. He writes: "I have noticed that American news agencies, newspapers and magazines in general show slight interest in Middle Eastern affairs. You care just about your superficial interests—oil, airfields, Palestine—without due regard to the internal situation." This point is well-taken and we are pleased to present Mr. Korine's informative article.

throats, highwaymen. Irrigation systems, so essential to this desert region, were ruined; disease became widespread—90% of the people, especially the children, contracted trachoma, the terrible eye-disease—illiteracy was complete, contacts with the outside world became rare. This last is scarcely surprising for 99% of this area is desert land which overlaps the valleys and the river-bank itself, and the only means of travel then existing was by camel for long distances, by donkey or horse for short trips. Journeys took days and months to complete.

Arab awakening began with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt at the turn of the 18th century. Napoleon brought with him not only an army whose conquests included Egypt as well as South Syria, but also several cultural missions which planted the first seeds of Western civilization in Egypt and Syria. Then French missionaries, arriving on the scene in the 19th century, helped to extend further European influence. Thus it is that the western half of the Middle East, having had first contact with the West, now enjoys far greater progress—cultural, social, economic—and hence has far greater weight politically than the eastern half, both in relation to Middle East and Arab League itself as well as in international councils.

The real *coup majeur* which awakened the Middle East from its long slumber, however, was World War I. Also there were those few rich Arabs and Persians who studied in European universities and then returned to their respective countries with new revolutionary ideas regarding freedom and independence. These formed secret societies to liberate their countries from Ottoman misrule, and then—in most cases—became premiers and ministers in their independent states. Finally, World War II changed the whole scene, shaking the old order to its very foundations and destroying long-established traditions. The impact of the rival Nazi—now Soviet—and Allied propaganda for Arab consumption, the long years spent by millions of Allied soldiers in the Middle East during the late war, the great strategic importance of the Middle East during this war and its present-day importance strategically and otherwise, the struggle between the USSR on the one hand and the USA and United Kingdom on the other for securing the upper hand in this vital region and controlling its fabulous riches and mineral wealth —especially oil and potassium—all these and many other factors have jarred the Middle East out of its age-long quietude and plunged it, suddenly and violently, into the inferno of modern western power-politics and the struggle for survival of the fittest.

The only concern of Americans in the Middle East nowadays is where their immediate interests lie—Palestine, oil, airfields, etc. —which is, of course, quite natural. They are not concerned with—nor do most of them know anything about—the internal situation.

I hope I will not shock the average American when I say quite frankly and clearly that the seeds of World War III lie precisely in this internal situation which is almost entirely unknown to him. The rest of this article is an attempt to analyze the situation in each of the countries of the Middle East both from the internal and external points of view.

## *Egypt*

Egypt is the most progressive and the most densely populated (about 20 million inhabitants) of the Middle Eastern countries. Some indication of the degree of her advance relative to her Arab sisters is provided by the fact that Arab films, which have become almost exclusively an Egyptian monopoly, were first produced in Cairo and are now changing drastically and speedily the whole social life and outlook of the Arabs. Egyptian papers, magazines, literature—even Egyptian teachers, architects and technicians—are now flooding the Middle East. Egypt is highly esteemed by all Arabs and exerts the greatest influence on their minds, sympathies and emotions.

But despite all this, it must not be forgotten that the majority of Egyptians are still illiterate and very poor. Malaria and bilharzia take a terrific toll each year. The sudden postwar upsurge—political and cultural—which Egypt has made is due to the fact that, first, she was for many years the center of actual fighting; second, the hub of world communications (the Suez Canal passes through her territory); third, money amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars was brought in by the war and the expenditure of Allied troops. The majority of Egyptians are still farmers and peasants and her economy depends primarily on agriculture and the Nile land.

Egypt, after many struggles with the British, gained her nominal independence in 1936 by a treaty with Britain which imposed many vital restrictions. Egyptian public opinion was then powerful, but not so powerful as today with new millions of educated Egyptians and a modern press. (*Akhbar al-Yom,* one of the principle weeklies, has a circulation of about 200,000.) Aroused public opinion was the main reason for rejection of the British treaty revision proposals. The British wanted to impose the following three conditions in order to guarantee their secret control of Egypt: 1) a Joint Defense Council; 2) three years for completing the evacuation of British forces (instead of one as the Egyptians demanded); 3) joint British-Egyptian rule in the Sudan.

At the present time Egypt, of all the Middle East countries, enjoys the greatest degree of internal democracy. She has a number of parties, the biggest and most powerful being the Wafd—a leftist party with youth, students, and labor support under the leadership of Nahas Pasha. King Farouk is a public-spirited man and is held in almost the same esteem as George VI enjoys in England. One important factor in Egypt today is the powerful rivalry between Nahas Pasha and King Farouk for popularity. The latter will never forget nor forgive the former for what happened in 1942 at the time of Alemein when the then British Ambassador in Egypt, Sir Miles Lampson, ordered British tanks and troops to invade the Royal Palace and forced Farouk to appoint Nahas as Premier with dictatorial powers. Nevertheless, Farouk was ready to accede to the three aforementioned British conditions for treaty revisions provided they gave him the Sudan crown. Britain refused this for fear that Egypt might become strong enough to dominate the whole Middle East. So negotiations broke down and Egypt decided to submit her case to UN. Britain tried to avoid this move by pressing Syria and Lebanon to mediate, but the offer of mediation failed. Now Britain is still endeavoring to avoid the issue being submitted to UN, because she knows Russia will exploit the situation for her own benefit, just as Hitler exploited the Palestine conflict to win the Arabs to his side and alienate them from Britain. Hitler succeeded to a considerable degree and Russia is now succeeding even more due to her powerful propaganda, to the strong leftist anti-British parties that exist in the Arab countries today, and, most important, due to Arab dissatisfaction with their internal conditions. The Arabs blame the British for the wide-spread illiteracy and failure to control disease. They say the British want the Arabs to remain backward and poor in order that the British may have an excuse to stay in Egypt. Their charges are no doubt exaggerated but there is a grain of truth in them. Egypt is still insisting on going to UN and refusing all negotiations. There are reports, however, that President Truman may intervene to end Anglo-Egyptian differences, although the UN may first counsel resumption of negotiations.

### *Syria and Lebanon*

Despite French evacuation, France still has some influence in the Levant, especially in Lebanon. The British hoped that when the French got out, they could move in. How? Not directly, but indirectly by means of the Greater Syria Project which King Abdullah is most anxious to realize with Britain's and Turkey's support. Abdullah hopes to unite his Transjordan—nominally independent, but in reality under complete British control—with Syria which, naturally, looks askance at such a move because it would end her newly gained independence. That Syria and Lebanon have some degree of real independence is not difficult to determine for they alone, of all countries of the Middle East—in which the British and the Arab governments loyal to them are carrying on a widespread campaign against Communism—have Communist parties whose literature is filtering through the whole Middle East. These two countries contain the only Communist sore in the heart of the Middle East, but a sore right at Turkey's backdoor. No wonder Britain and Turkey are enthusiastic about the Greater Syrian Project.

No official parties exist in the Levant, although there are some beginnings and general elections are going to be held shortly in the two states. There is a strong movement—by labor and students—for revising the Election's Bill which provides for two-degree elections. It is remarkable how two-degree elections are still the order of the day in all Arab states on the grounds of the people's backwardness. Of course, wherever there are two-degree elections, there is no real democracy. It is quite easy for the reigning government to influence the secondary voters so that the government's nominees always win.

### *Iraq and Transjordan*

Iraq and Transjordan are ruled by the same Hashimite Dynasty: boy-King Faisal II in Iraq, under the regency of his relative—who is also the Crown Prince of Iraq—Abdul Ilah, and King Abdullah in Transjordan. In these two countries, British control is more complete than in other sister states—especially so in Transjordan. Perhaps the British feel it impossible to relax their grip to any degree because of the nearness of Russia. Russian Azerbaijan is less than 100 miles from Iraq's northeastern tip.

A year ago Iraq concluded an alliance with Turkey. Transjordan followed this example a few months ago. Iraq also concluded an agreement for union with Transjordan. Neither agreement has yet been ratified by the Iraq parliament. Britain desired to give these agreements inspired by her a semblance of legality and popularity—so some Iraqi circles say. For this reason, General Nuri, said to be Britain's most trusted friend in Iraq and the Middle East and her right-hand man in Arab politics, was made Premier. He dissolved parliament; two-degree elections were ordered so that the new parliament is made up almost exclusively of official government nominees. Only four candidates from the National Democratic Party were selected. This kind of set-up, of course, is expected to ratify the agreements without quibbling. The five Iraqi parties deny the legality of the new parliament, claim elections were not free.

Now Turkey, assisted by Britain, is spreading her tentacles throughout the Middle East, beginning with Iraq and Transjordan. Her aim is to form an Eastern bloc with herself as the leader and the Arab League's seven member-states as followers. The Eastern bloc—modeled on the Western bloc in Europe—aims at showing Russia that Turkey is strong and that a united Middle East is prepared to stop Soviet expansion and penetration. Iraq and Transjordan have thus far succumbed to Turkey's wiles and the position is now pregnant with possibilities. Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt have refused as yet to join the bloc.

Nuri resigned after the Iraq General Elections, and Salih Jabr, who played a chief role in concluding the Iraq-Transjordan union agreement, formed the new cabinet specifically in order to achieve that union and ratify the Turkey-Iraq alliance.

As for elections in Transjordan, they are scheduled to be held shortly.

### *Turkey and Persia*

Turkey and Persia (Iran) are the two windows open to Russia for an attack upon the Middle East. Which will she choose? My own prediction is Persia because she has hundreds of thousands of Tudeh-Communist Party followers—labor youth, student—throughout Persia. I predict Russia will not strike directly at Turkey and the Dardanelle fortifications but will invade Persia and Greece. Greece too has strong Communist elements. If Russia penetrates the Middle East through Persia and thus succeeds in surrounding Turkey from the north, east and south, she will automatically succeed in paralyzing the Straits.

Under Premier Oavam, with his exceedingly prudent policy, Persia has succeeded in forcing the withdrawal of all foreign troops from her soil, has kept Azerbaijan from becoming a Communist dictatorship and has now completed the General Elections—elections said to be free, though boycotted by Tudeh. Oavam certainly did everything possible to insure success in the elections for his Democratic Party followers. His zeal has caused a rift between him and his King, the Shah of Persia, who charges him with trying to set up a dictatorship of the type of Franco's in Spain and Salazer's in Portugal.

As for Turkey with her million-strong army constantly mobi-ized against the possibility of Russian attack, she would have suffered a complete financial collapse were it not for Truman's eleventh-hour loan.

There seems little doubt there will be a third World War with the Middle East as the actual center. The Russian Colossus is already too near the extremely vital Persian, Iraqi, Saudi-Arabian oilfields, and the peoples of the Middle East are backward and weak —a combination that throughout all history has proved an irresistible temptation for aggressors. It is therefore most important to review British policy in the Middle East. Is it accomplishing what would seem to be its required purpose: fortifying the Middle East against Russia? Emphatically not. Britain is achieving its purpose with the Middle Eastern governments, which are all composed of the rich, feudalistic few and therefore are strongly anti-Communist and friendly to Britain and America. But the internal situation in each of the Middle Eastern countries is completely unsatisfactory, and the peoples of these countries—who naturally, because they know Britain controls everything, blame her for all their troubles, and would seem, from their limited viewpoint, to be quite right in throwing themselves into the arms of Russia, Britain's enemy, who is constantly promising them complete independence and a happy life. The peoples of the Middle East see themselves as still backward and poor (which is true despite the fact they are much better off now than they were before the war), uneducated, disease-ridden, their voice unheard, their governments an instrument in British hands. They conclude that all this internal backwardness is due to the British who do not want them to progress and become strong and really independent—this so that the British can continue to rule the Middle East and flood it with their goods.

Before the war, national prestige in the Middle East was much higher and these countries were in fact more independent. But the emergence and nearness of the Russian Colossus has forced Britain to change her policy and interfere more and more in Middle Eastern internal affairs.

Now, I should like to whisper a few friendly words in Mr. Bevin's ear. The ignorance, disease, poverty, backwardness of the Middle East are very fertile grounds for Russian Communism. Soviet infiltration is made easy by the fact that Russia can play upon the people's sympathies. The uneducated people do not really understand what Communism is, just as they did not understand what Nazism was. They threw themselves into the arms of Germany during World War II, and even more surely they now seem destined to throw themselves into the arms of Russia during World War III, simply because of Britain's stupid policy in the Middle East. On the other hand, if Britain does all in her power to spread education, if she strengthens the Middle East economically and industrially, answers the peoples' wishes and demands, and grants them their independence, Russian propaganda and influence will have nothing on which to work. Then, and only then, the people of the Middle East, like the British and American peoples, will come to understand what Communism really means and will have nothing more to do with it.

It is up to Britain—and better sooner than later—to strengthen the weak points in her Middle Eastern policy which are at the same time the strong points of Russia. And it is up to the United States to press her to do it.

# REPORTS

## LETTER FROM JAPAN

### Harry Roskolenko

One of the curious currencies of our time—unrelated to systems of money—is the method of barter following in the wake of the war. In Japan, where the *yen* has reached atmospheric proportions of Ceiling Zero, barter as a form of trade is the overall handmaiden of the black market. For without the Black M, only the legal aspects of inflation—the withering ugliness of hunger—would be the accepted token for a large section of the population. When troops occupy they also regulate, as exchange, the nature of an economy, as well as the moral disproportions of time, war and man.

If General MacArthur is the unconscious Emperor-Elect of Japan, then every GI over the rank of 2nd Lt. is a Prince. Military careers interrupted by the war's end are now being pursued with exacting variations on the theme of "legitimate looting"—and in a vulgar rush. The soldiers, only mere Barons and Dukes, are nevertheless very rich in the possession of more than the elementary stuffs of life. But the most venal practice is not the innocent exchanges the troops indulge in to get cameras, affection, or small-fry possessions, but what the top rung of the brass-hats initiate. It is more than rumor to say that every polished iron head carries a private American Corporation in his wallet, and that he works at it with the same innocence his less polished brethren in the ranks work for a camera. While the edifice of Hirohito has but a moat and an honor-guard to protect it, the true economy walks the side-streets and the polished offices with a "know-how" saluting a very safe future.

For purpose of illustration I can cite the following ratios of exchange. A 70 pound sack of sugar sells for 8000 *yen*; 8000 *yen* can buy a diamond ring, a Rolliflex camera, or a few strings of cultured pearls. A carton of cigarettes selling at the PX for 60 cents, brings 600 *yen* on the Ginza (which is more than a month's wage for a laborer) and in turn buys some ivory-carvings. A bar of candy, worth a nickel, has a 40 *yen* value. A hatful of bars helps to loot an assortment of objects, which every Japanese home willingly surrenders to the new surrealistic economy, for food, etc. In this fashion the country has been drained, democratically, of its art, furnishings and folk-craft—and what was not flattened by bombs, goes back on every ship leaving Yokohama.

Within this curious comedy, with SCAP as the chief comedian, is the official rate of 50 *yen* to the dollar, though the *yen* in New York is quoted at a much higher figure. The unofficial rate, however, is 100 to the dollar; and anyone who touches his paybook is indeed backward.

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HARRY ROSKOLENKO has been touring the Far East as roving correspondent for Australian newspapers and for the *New Leader*.

The official currency is the new *script* dollar, operating the many-handed operations necessary for buying, exchanging and promoting a deal. While script is forbidden to the Japanese, and the *yen* is the only token he may receive, he chiefly works in goods received, services rendered, and the splendid bit of phrasing known as "presento." Shortages, of course, make bankers out of the occupation personnel. They have unlimited credit, but it also increases the amount of pilfering, high-jacking and court-martials.

In the BRITCOM (British Commonwealth Occupation Force) area of Kure, ship cargoes disappear up alleys with not even the signature of a port officer to show that a ship docked. Trucks carrying supplies are constantly high-jacked. In turn, the high-jackers suffer the same fate, in true Hollywood and New York style. But if it took the antics of Col. Murray and his diamonds to highlight the frantic methods employed to "democratize Japan," what has not been exposed (and it would be difficult to do) is the super-salesman living at semi-swank Dai Iti and the Imperial hotels. What is fact, and every rumor has a fact in Japan, makes most correspondents here pretty grim. Likely the anxiety complex will get a DSC for services rendered to the human psyche. No one will talk. And since the best basis to qualify a perfectly good rumor is silence, then silence is germain to the question of What, Whom, How?

The British have complained that they are not getting a break in future business arrangements. For six months Australia has been dickering to sell wool to Japan. The very men sent to negotiate the deal fear to speak out. But the man in the slick American uniform or the gray tweed suit, ostensibly working for Uncle Sam, does not wait upon legal delicacies or the outcome of the future Peace Treaty before embarking upon his business deals. Not only is SCAP staffed with businessmen, but members of the Reparations Committee are top-notch executives. From the following is a choice selection of pure sales-aggrandizement working under a fictional relationship.

If we are not hogging the works, then our methods must have a prettier metaphor. Of the 88,627 bales of raw silk produced since the end of the war and of the 30,251 bales allowed for sale, we took 26,369, leaving less than 4000 for the rest of the silk-starved world. Under the SCAP set-up, there is only one foreign bank in operation, the National City Bank; and neither the pound nor any other currency but the dollar, can be exchanged. There is a 40 cent monthly charge on savings accounts and a 25 cent fee for cashing checks—all considered as dubious returns by the civil service personnel. Obviously the dollar cannot help but control even a transitional economy under such a relationship.

Transitional exports are arranged through the Export Section of SCAP and it provides a juicy plum. There can only be an exchange of goods—not money. And since Japan needs almost everything, the best preliminary pickings can be had by the gentlemen who spell "Know-How" with caps.

A certain executive from Detroit, officially representing SCAP, managed to tie up the future Japanese automobile industry six months after he landed. Others have compiled index systems on "Who's Who in Japan" and are awaiting the next SCAP directive before launching their onslaught. The textile section of SCAP's United States Company, the buying agency for Japan, has one expert who openly states that Japan will make him. Of course, by some type of analysis, it is legitimate business—but it all depends on the analyzer. We are, after all, coming to teach democracy, but we are bearing gifts instead.

Under Lee Myers, SCAP's motion picture man, the Japanese cinema is being flooded with Hollywood's brand of celluloidal glitter and gloss. Shortly a distributing company will be officially launched, and though SCAP says that nothing can be done until a company representing all producers is organized, the fact is that the flood is at high tide now. All imports work ostensibly on the prewar quota; yet the relationship is quite similar to preferential treatment, Empire preference, about which we still have a deep flush of red.

In the publishing trade it is just as bad. The *Reader's Digest* has a Japanese language audience to the tune of 300,000. *Time, Newsweek,* etc., have Pacific editions based on their own imported paper. An attempt by the British to launch the "British Digest" was rebuffed on the ground that it can only be published if they supply their own paper. And with a world shortage, it should be obvious who is getting the short end of the stick.

When the situation gets dirty, it is time to roll up the sidewalks. One representative of an American philanthropic organization has managed to take over half of a large estate by the simple medium of feeding the other half of the estate with pilfered edibles. It is pointless suggesting that Jeffersonian democracy cannot work as the conqueror, with a bag of entrepreneur's tricks. We are incorporating in the New Japan a medium we abhor back home. Are we wielding the big-stick, or using the typewriter as a cash register? Another angle, and this stems from desperate Japanese businessmen, is the almost universal offer to use their capital; an arrangement that cannot help but pry open doors currently shut to them.

Even if one is not sentimental—and the nation is in ruins—we offer them no more than the extension of baseball, our overt systems, our splendid "presentos." As an exercise in democracy, we use directives which demand and take.

One often wonders whether Washington or MacArthur is running the show? If MacArthur was not the spiritual sponsor of the useless Yoshida Government, the word "sponsor" should then take on another meaning. Newspapermen write one thing when they write in praise of the General, but over a drink they mean something else.

# HOLLAND'S NEW LABOR PARTY

### Koos Vorrink

On February 9, 1946 a new party, the Dutch Labor Party, was formed in Holland through fusion of three prewar parties: the Social-Democrat Labor Party, the Liberal Democratic Union and the Christian-Democratic Union. A few political groups that had been formed during and shortly after the war joined the fusion. These groups consisted of Catholics and Protestant Christians, as well as left radicals from the Dutch resistance movement. The new party announced that its goal was a new socialist society based on democracy.

Prior to the Second World War, political life in Holland reached a dead-end. The rigid and almost unmovable dividing-line between the religious and non-religious groups prevented the forming of parties on a clear basis of political and social-economic principles. This became very clear subsequent to the 1929 crisis when Holland too was afflicted with mass unemployment. In the elections of 1937, the Socialists advanced most vigorously their ideas on the need for a planned economy, ideas which had formally been presented in their "Labor Plan."

The result of the elections, in which the Socialists fought with all their force and enthusiasm in close cooperation with the trade unions, was that they gained one seat in Parliament, emerging with 23 seats instead of 22. The Communists dropped from 4 to 3 seats. However the three religious coalition parties rose from 52 to 56 seats. Once again religious and ecclesiastical sectarianism had succeeded in preventing a meaningful political pronouncement of the voters on the basic questions facing Dutch society.

On the eve of World War II, however, this "escapism" died an inglorious death. In August 1939, Socialists for the first time entered the Dutch cabinet. A period of successful, but one-sided opposition was at an end.

In the years between the two world wars, the Christian parties systematically excluded the Socialists from participation in the government. The uneasiness over this fact increased in the ranks of the religious parties, however, especially as the will and ability of the Socialists to achieve reforms became more and more evident.

The years of German occupation greatly increased dissatisfaction with the strait-jacketed politics of the prewar era. Especially among those who took an active part in the resistance movement was a new spirit discernible. For a time it looked as if the nation, freed from the Nazi yoke, would emerge freed from the sterile sectarianism of the religious political parties also.

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KOOS VORRINK is the president of the Dutch Labor Party and a member of the Dutch Parliament. As a leader of the Dutch resistance movement he was arrested by the Nazis and spent several years in German concentration camps until liberated by American troops.

These high expectations did not materialize. For a moment after liberation it seemed as if the Movement of the Dutch People (*Nederlandse Volksbeweging*), a new party formation which had sprung up, would be able to secure a grip on the will of the nation and give it a new *élan*. But it soon became apparent that five years of war and occupation had not altered the natural conservatism of the Dutch masses. Nearly all the pre-war political parties were re-established. Yet there was fairly wide recognition of the need for a new orientation, a different spiritual structure and organization of political life.

The result of a great many discussions in a great variety of circles was the founding of the new Labor Party.

One must understand that great sections of the population, Catholic and Protestant Christian, among which are hundreds of thousands of laborers and small trademen, were inaccessible, even unapproachable, for the ideas of democratic socialism. The importance of any breach in these circles, however small, can scarcely be overestimated. If one is aware, moreover, of the paralyzing influence of years of propaganda—stemming from the Christian political parties—to the effect that Socialism and Christianity are incompatible, one can then well imagine the feelings of those who on February 9, 1946 witnessed Catholics, Protestants, and non-religious elements talking from the same platform and making a frank appeal for unity in a new democratic socialist party.

A year has passed since that moment. The experiences of this year have been manifold.

When we look at the results of the 1947 elections for the Second Chamber of Parliament (*Tweede Kamer,* equivalent to the British House of Commons) there is little reason for optimism. Contrary to the general expectations that the Labor Party would win about 35 seats (out of 100), they emerged with 29. The Catholic Party with 32 became the largest fraction in Parliament. Socialist Professor Schermerhorn was forced to resign as Prime Minister to be replaced by a Catholic Party member, Dr. Beel.

The principal reason for this disappointing result was the fact that a number of voters of the former Social-Democratic Labor Party threw their support to the Communists. The latter rose from 3 to 10 seats. Distrust of some elements of the socialist character of the new Labor Party, undoubtedly also contributed to the poor showing.

The Communist Party had not been involved in the discussions which led to the formation of the new party. It was excluded on the grounds of its ideological fixation on the doctrine of dialetical materialism. Of a more serious nature, however, is the Communists' advocacy of proletarian dictatorship, their close connections with Russian policy and their tactics of personal slander and coarse demagogy directed against the socialist movement and its representatives which in no way can be reconciled with the democratic character of the Labor Party.

After the elections the Catholic Party and the Labor Party decided to form a coalition government. The fact that such a decision was possible marks a fundamental change in the structure of political life in Holland. A program of cooperation is now being executed. Central in this program is the policy for peaceful negotiations with Indonesia.

The Labor Party places its seal on this policy under the leadership of Minister Jonkman and Professor Schermerhorn, as chairman of the Committee General. The Linggadjati Agreement can be the starting point for successful and lasting cooperation between Holland and Indonesia.

A radical fiscal policy, moreover, will be inaugurated by Minister Lieftinck, while Minister Drees introduces much needed reforms in the care of aged people in Holland. Structural changes in the agrarian field are being planned by Minister Mansholt. Nationalization of the Dutch Bank is expected to take place soon. This will no doubt be followed by nationalization of the coal mines. No other coalition could secure a mandate to embark upon such a radical program.

Within the Labor Party there has developed a strong sense of unity. As with any democratic party, it has its more radical and more moderate currents. But these lines cut across those of the old parties and groups which came together to form the new party.

The party provides a variegated propaganda. The Catholic, Protestant and humanistic Work Committees encourage reflection and study in their own circles as well as carry on propaganda among their co-religionists or like-minded elements generally. Each group has its own publications.

The party has organized a series of conferences on Indonesian, municipal, cultural and agrarian policies. A specially nominated Program Committee in which practically every group and tendency in the new party is represented as drafted a new statement of principles on which there came to be unanimous agreement. The program leaves no doubt of the democratic, as well as socialist, character of the new party.

That agreement was reached so soon may have been because the former Social-Democratic Labor Party was never a dogmatic Marxist party, even though it numbered among its members some outstanding Marxists.

Two conclusions can now be drawn in relation to the new party. Its founding has broken the old frustrating patterns and delivered Dutch political life from its barren rigidity. This development has created a new possibility for the advance and eventual victory of democratic socialism.

# INTERNATIONAL PRESS

## *INDIAN PLAN FOR SOCIALISM*

Jayaprakash Narayan, recognized leader of the Indian Socialist Party, attempts to give a general outline of the program and perspectives of the Indian Socialist movement in two articles in the Indian Socialist magazine *Janata* (issues of November 1946 and January 1947). In view of the fact that British occupation of India will soon cease and because it is most likely that discussion of social problems, so far obscured because of the emphasis on the struggle of national liberation, will now come to the fore, we believe it is particularly important that we acquaint our readers with the main points of Mr. Narayan's argument.

The creation of a socialist society, he writes, involves two stages: the stage of the transition, and the stage when socialism has been established. It is obvious that the form of the transitional period will be determined by present conditions and final objectives, that is, the final picture of socialism in view.

The objectives of socialism are: elimination of exploitation and poverty; provision of equal opportunities to all for self-development; full development; full development of the material and moral resources of society and utilization of these resources in accordance with the needs and wishes of society as a whole rather than in accordance with the dictates of profit; equitable apportionment of national wealth and social, educational and other services between all who labor and serve society.

A system of social organization that serves these ends is a socialist society. Anything that does not is not socialism. No preconceived theories, no matter by whom propounded, need detain or confuse us if they do not subserve these ends in practice.

I believe that these ends can be achieved only if certain vital changes are made in existing society and the economic and political organization of the future society is based on the foundations described below.

First of all, India must become an independent nation. There can be no socialism under British rule.

Second, there should be no privileged economic or political class, as at present, i.e., a self-perpetuating class wielding economic and political power. In other words, the "ruling" Princes and the *zamindars* (not the peasant farmers of the Punjab but the landholders of U.P., Bihar and some other provinces) and the capitalists must be made to surrender their economic and political power and privilege.

After the removal of the British power, the abolition of Princes and of the *zamindari* and capitalist systems should be a comparatively simple problem. If the Indian people proved strong enough to destroy the British Raj in India, nothing could stop them from destroying feudalism and capitalism if they desired to do so. The only limiting factor would be the stage of development of the political consciousness of the masses.

Abolition of Princedom hardly raises any technical problem for socialism to solve. Bourgeois society has the solution ready at hand and we could draw upon the history of bourgeois revolutions. The Princes will only have to be reduced to the status of the ordinary citizen and their States made part of regions scientifically determined with due regard to geography, economic resources and cultural affinities.

Abolition of the *zamindari* system is only the first step in a socialist reorganization of our agrarian economy which indeed involves rather difficult questions of theory and practice. By merely saying that there will be no *zamindars* in socialist India, we say practically nothing as to the real form of socialist agriculture we wish to develop in this country.

Abolition of capitalism is undoubtedly a great step forward towards socialism, but by itself it can hardly be called socialism. It is merely a negative half of which the positive half has yet to be created. In what manner capitalism will be abolished and what will take its place will determine to a large extent the kind of socialism that we are going to have.

## II

The land systems in this country are complicated beyond description, but they all agree more or less in exploiting the tiller of the soil in the interest of a small landed and moneyed class. All these systems have to be scrapped completely and a new system created in their place. In building up socialist agriculture, we will have to pass through two stages — the co-operative and collective stage.

After the abolition of *zamindari*, there will be a redistribution of land with a view to breaking up big holdings and making the smaller holdings economic. No peasant would have more than a certain maximum acreage of land, let us say 30 acres, and not less than five. No one shall be allowed to own land who does not reside in the village, and actually till his land. The unit of agricultural economy would be the village. The legal ownership would have the power, according to laws made by the State, to settle its lands with individual peasants. Thus the peasants will have a sort of proprietary right over the land settled with them. Present proprietary rights will be respected except where found necessary to alter them in order to bring about a fairer redistribution of land and remove gross inequalities at both ends. But the proprietary rights would be restricted merely to the right of the peasant to receive from the produce of the village lands his share in accordance with the size of his holding. No peasant will be allowed to sell land to anyone except to the *gram panchayat*. Peasants will not be allowed to carry on cultivation and other farming operations separately. Each *gram panchayat*, among other things, will also function as a farmers' co-operative. The co-operative will conduct all farming operations including buying, selling and borrowing. All who labor in the fields will receive wages in kind or money according to the wage laws of the State and the produce will be distributed after deducting costs according to the size of holdings.

This is the co-operative stage of socialist farming. The next stage is the collective stage in which no individual proprietary rights in agricultural lands are recognized and all lands pertaining to a village, or farming unit, are owned and run by village collectives. In Russia collectivization was pushed through at great human cost and under a ruthless dictatorship. Estimates run up to as high a figure as twenty millions of those who had to be "liquidated" in order to make collectivization a success. I do not favor such a colossal repression of the toiling peasant masses, nor does socialist theory permit it. Abolition of landlordism, re-distribution of land and breaking-up of big holdings would require State coercion to be used against perhaps fifteen to twenty percent of the agricultural population. But collectivization might require sixty to seventy percent of that population to be repressed. I do not find any justification for any political party, speaking and acting in the name of the toiling masses, to indulge in such wholesale repression. Twenty percent may be coerced in the interest of the remaining eighty percent but there is no justification for repressing seventy percent of the peasants, even "for their own good." Co-operative farming itself would require a good measure of coercion. But, in that case a wise mixture of coercion and persuasion, as also concession of certain economic advantages might be, and I am sure will be, found to be sufficient. Collectivization on the other hand would require a degree of wholesale repression that is repugnant to socialism which, above all, is the expression of the will of the toiling masses. Therefore, collectivization will follow as the second stage and its pace would be necessarily slower and adjusted to the results of propaganda and demonstration. I need not, however, emphasize that new agricultural colonies and settlements need not pass from the co-operative to the collective stage. They can and will be put on a collective basis from the start.

## III

I visualize two types of industries in a socialist India, large scale and small scale. It goes without saying that both large and small industries together with agriculture will form parts of a balanced national economy, democratically managed and controlled.

All large industries would be owned and managed by the Federal or Provincial Governments. Representatives of trade unions would have appropriate voice in the management from the lowest to the highest levels.

I visualize all small industries to be organized into Producers' Co-operatives, who would own and manage their industries. Apart from passing legislation for the regulation of these co-operatives, the State will not interfere with their work. These industries will include subsidiary agricultural industries as well as existing and new handicrafts and other small industries.

I visualize and advocate another type of industrial ownership apart from State ownership and Producers' Co-operatives; that is, municipal or community ownership. A township or a city may own and manage, if not large, middling and small industries. The representatives of the workers in these community-owned industries would naturally have adequate voice in their management.

I advocate development of these co-operatives and community-owned industries, firstly because I do not believe it is possible to find employment for many years to come for our surplus population, which would swell further at least by twenty percent, by the Revolution in agriculture and large industry alone; secondly, because I desire to prevent the State from acquiring the sole monopoly in industry and employment. The State under socialism threatens, as in Russia, far from withering away, to become an all powerful tyrant, maintaining a strangle-hold over the entire life of the citizen. This leads to totalitarianism of the type we witness in Russia to-day. By dispersing the ownership and management of industry and by developing the village into a democratic village republic, we break this strangle-hold to a very large extent and attenuate the danger of totalitarianism.

In the field of trade I have the following picture in mind. Foreign trade will be entirely in the hands of the State.

Internal trade will be shared between the State, the local community, and the co-operatives.

All banking will be in the hands of the State.

### IV

The State in socialist India must be a full democratic State. There can be no socialism without democracy. It is a common mistake these days to think that there must be dictatorship of the proletariat in a socialist State. The dictatorship of the proletariat has a place only in the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. And in this period, too, it is not inevitable in every case. Marx visualized a capitalist State, such as England, where political democracy was in full vogue and there was no large standing army, where democratic processes could be used to bring about socialism. But apart from such rare cases, dictatorship of the proletariat has been considered in Marxian thought as essential for the transitional period. It is, however, the very essence of Marxism, that once the transition is over, the State must become a fully democratic institution. When the old ruling classes have been destroyed and society has been converted entirely into a society of workers, it is idiotic to talk of a dictatorship of the proletariat because the proletariat cannot dictate to itself.

Whether our transition in India from present society to socialism takes the democratic or dictatorial form—I personally think it would take the democratic form—it should be remembered that dictatorship of the proletariat in Marxist theory does not mean the dictatorship of a single party, such as the Communist Party in Russia. It means the dictatorship of a class, or in Russia, of a combination of the toiling classes, such as the workers, and peasants and the lower middle-class. These classes may have one or more political parties, and these parties must all be united in the dictatorship or have freedom to function freely under the dictatorship. The dictatorship of the proletariat never meant that parties of the working class or other toilers would be suppressed; it meant only the suppression of the ruling classes and their political and economic institutions.

First of all, democracy under socialism should mean that there will be no one party rule and that there might be more than one political party of the working people and that the workers, the industrial and peasant co-operatives, the trade-unions, etc., might form different political parties and that these parties should function freely. It should mean that there should be full freedom for expression of opinion and to form voluntary organizations for political purposes. The trade unions, the local communities, the co-operatives and other such corporate bodies of the working people might have their own newspapers and broadcasting systems and conduct their own schools and educational institutions.

Democracy under socialism should further mean that the trade unions should not be limbs of the State and subservient to it, but independent bodies supporting the State, and also exercising a check over the government of the day. In Russia the trade unions have no independence whatever and have been subjected to the will of the State on the theory that the State, being a workers' State, must have all workers' organizations subject to it. Here the State and Government have been confused. A particular State may be a workers' State, but the government of the day might be making mistakes and wilfully or unwilfully acting contrary to the workers' interests. In that cases there must be independent organs of the working class, such as trade unions—and in a socialist society the trade unions will be second in importance only to the Government itself—in a position to check or correct or change the government in power.

## V

The problem of transition to Socialism has two parts at the present juncture. The first part is concerned with the achievement of a free Indian democracy and the second with the transformation of that democracy into a socialist democracy.

Let us assume that a full democratic State has been established in India. In such a democracy, if we go by historical parallels and the prognostications of Marx and Lenin, the bourgeois class would come to the top. How could the working class and the city and rural poor displace the bourgeoisie and establish Socialism? Through the democratic process or a violent revolution?

Speaking for myself, I would choose the democratic method. Remember the goal I have laid down is that of democratic Socialism. It is an axiom of Marxism, not as Mao Tse Tung says that Socialism cannot be achieved except through democracy, but that Socialism cannot exist except together with democracy. The method of the violent revolution and dictatorship might conceivably lead to a socialist democracy; but in the only country where it has been tried, it has led to something very different, i.e., to a bureaucratic State, in which democracy does not exist. I should like to take a lesson from history. If the socialist movement in India had no freedom to use the democratic method, there could be only one way of destroying bourgeois society and bourgeois rule, that is to say, the way of violent revolution and dictatorship. But I have assumed that a full democratic State has come into being.

Marx, as early as 1872, when political democracy had not yet risen to its full height, visualized a peaceful transition to Socialism. If we take into consideration, as it is our duty to do as Marxists, all the social changes that have taken place since then we shall be strengthened in Marx's view. Political democracy has become far more democratic to-day than in Marx's time and the economic, political and ideological forces of Capitalism have been completely shattered on the European continent and become much weaker in Great Britain.

In our own country, the capitalist class, even when sitting at the top in a democratic State, will not have the strength of the British or American capitalist classes. It will be far weaker. Furthermore, it would be impossible to solve the economic problems of the country within the framework of Capitalism. This will strengthen the forces working for Socialism. There will be yet another factor working in the same direction. The forces gathered today in the fold of the national movement represent various sectors of the people, but overwhelmingly they represent the peasant masses and the urban middle class.

When I assumed the capitalist class to have come to the top, I assumed too that it could do so only by riding the wave of Nationalism. Apart from the fact whether this would be possible or not, such a leadership or success in so exploiting the national forces would invest that class with certain responsibilities which it could not discharge consistently with its interests. The resulting disillusionment could only further strengthen the forces of Socialism. Capitalism when it was a growing force in the world found it possible to assume the role of national leadership. The decadent Capitalism of today cannot play this part any more.

The conclusion to which all this leads me is that in a fully democratic India the transition to Socialism can be and should be a peaceful democratic process.

## VI

Let me turn now to the problem of creating a fully democratic India. The fight for democracy, which has been waged these many years under the leadership of the Congress, is very near success today. But the Imperial Power—together with its main supports, namely the Moslem League and the Princely Order—stands even now pretty solidly in our way.[1]

British rule is undemocratic, Princely rule is undemocratic, communalism is undemocratic. All these three are ranged against us today. They make a powerful combination. How can we conquer these forces of reaction? Surely not by giving in to them, surely not by making concessions. Our nationalist leadership believes today that by making a few compromises with these forces it would be possible to acquire so much political power as to be able later to destroy the enemies of democracy. But it is forgotten that the political power so acquired will not be held exclusively by the forces of Nationalism and democracy but also jointly by the forces of reaction. Having got into power these forces will be strengthened rather than weakened. Recent history shows that every concession hitherto made to communalism has only made it stronger till it has become the present Frankenstein. The danger is that concessions made with regard to the basic principles of our national life would result in such a sickly and diseased India that life for her would hardly be worth living.

In other words, I clearly see a major revolution intervening on our road to Socialism. I see further that the success of that revolution depends as much on its political as its social ends. In fact, I do not see that revolution succeeding if only "quit India" were inscribed on its banners. Other objectives, too, its banners must proclaim: "Land to him who tills it"; "Wealth to those who produce it"; "*Praja Raj* in the States"; and others. The revolution must mobilize fully the peasants, the workers in the factories, the students, the city poor and middle classes. Such a revolution will not only lead to the establishment of a full democracy in India but also take us a considerable way on the road to Socialism. Such a revolution will place at the top not the capitalist class as I had assumed above, but the toiling and the middle classes. While such a revolution will not destroy Capitalism in one stroke, it would put it on the defensive and start it on a losing race.

## VII

Does the present situation justify a faith in such a revolution? I believe it does. India is clearly passing through revolutionary times. There is discontent among the people, among the peasants, among the workers, among the States' people. The youth of the country is restive. There is universal anger and distrust with the machinations of the British. The people are fed up with riots and mutual murder. Only there is no requisite effort to gather and organize these forces of revolution.

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[1] This article was written before the British Government's decision to "quit" India.

The success of the coming revolution depends upon the extent to which the economic and social urges of the masses find in it their expression. Therefore, it is the task of socialist Congressmen, particularly of the Congress Socialist Party, to ensure that in the preparatory work every care is taken to develop and intensify the social consciousness of the masses and strengthen the class organizations and struggles through which alone that consciousness is best expressed and developed.

The Congress which has been and remains the spearhead of the national revolution has been slowly taking note of the economic urges of the people. The resolution on social objectives adopted by the Meerut session of the Congress goes a very long way towards Socialism. The difficulty, however, seems to be that to the dominant section of the Congress, which seems at bottom to be guided by capitalistic ideas, but which exploits the name of Mahatma Gandhi, these declarations of social policy are merely tactical moves to placate the masses in order not to lose their support. If we review the work of the Congress Governments in the provinces and at the Centre, we shall find apart from words and resolutions no concrete proof that the social policy laid down in Congress manifestos and resolutions has any binding or compelling force behind it. Therefore, the course of the transition to Socialism would depend to a very large extent on the success of the socialist movement in influencing, not only in words but also in deeds, the national movement.

Thus we see that the transition to Socialism is not a straight path, but a tangle of conflicting paths. Therefore it is not possible to be doctrinaire about the policies of this period. I have reaffirmed my faith in democratic Socialism, which is the only true Socialism. I have stated clearly that in a full and untrammelled democracy I shall adopt democratic means to achieve Socialism. But faced as we are with undemocratic forces which have to be defeated and destroyed before Socialism can be ushered in, I conceive a period of trouble and turmoil, a revolutionary phase of the transition, a phase in which not only the democratic revolution should be completed but also considerable progress made towards Socialism. A state and society emerging from such a revolution should then be able to pass in a democratic manner into full Socialism.

But there may be all manner of upsets in this scheme of development. The coming revolution as visualized may not come at all, and the country may be saddled with an undemocratic rule. Democratic methods would be of no avail then, and a different sort of revolution might take place, a revolution based on a different alignment of classes and led mainly by the socialist forces in the country which should then be organized independently as the Socialist Party of India. Or again, taking advantage of the turmoiled times ahead, the capitalist, feudal and communal elements might make a bid in alliance with the Right wing of the national movement to establish their dictatorial rule. Democratic means would again be of no avail and the only alternative would be to counter the reactionary move by establishing a dictatorship of the toiling masses, a dictatorship not of any party or the working class alone, but of the workers, the peasants and the city poor. Other developments would require other tactics, other solutions.

What I wrote at the outset was in the context of certain ideal assumptions. It was necessary to do so to put my views clearly. But we cannot experiment with Socialism under controlled conditions as in a laboratory. Therefore, keeping our objectives in view and not departing from basic principles, we must be ready to adopt whatever methods and tactics a changing situation might demand.

Whatever form the transition to Socialism might take, I should make it clear in conclusion that the overall requirement for the achievement of Socialism is the existence of a well organized, powerful socialist party, supported mainly by workers' and peasants' organizations and organizations of the youth (volunteer, student, etc.), and the city poor.

## *COST OF BRITISH RECONSTRUCTION*

The conservative London *Bankers' Magazine* for March 1947 prints an interesting article entitled "Compulsory Saving?" that highlights the enormous difficulties which Britain faces in seeking to maintain her role as a world power. Current discussion of Britain's position has centered too much, perhaps, on the short range prospects of Britain's crisis, to the neglect of some of the more basic problems involved. The following article stresses the formidable long range obstacles which Britain, shorn of a great part of her empire, will have to face.

How (asks the *Bankers' Magazine*) is the country going to finance the enormous real capital needs of the postwar era? There is popular agreement that we must make up six years' deferred maintenance, carry through a large-scale modernization of industrial equipment and at the same time execute a vast new housing program. It is now becoming recognized that this can only be achieved by use of current effort which necessarily involves a corresponding abstention from consumption. Past savings are of no avail and contemporary capital creation must be financed by contemporary saving. Is the community prepared to supply a sufficient volume of genuine savings?

The article then cites F. W. Paish who, writing for the *London and Cambridge Economic Service,* makes an estimate of the magnitude of saving effort required and indicates the channels through which it may be financed. Mr. Paish assumes that in the ten-year period from the end of 1945, (1) wartime losses will be made good, (2) three million houses will be built, (3) industry will devote all its undistributed profits to new capital reconstruction. Further provision should also be made for war damage grants to the colonial territories, and also for repayments on the United States and Canadian loans since these are due to begin in the period covered. Budget deficits will also have to be financed out of savings and in this respect can be classed as capital requirements.

Mr. Paish gives two estimates of total capital requirements over the ten-year period, one of which he regards as a minimum (£11,050 million) and the other as likely (£14,020 million).

From what sources will this finance be forthcoming, bearing in mind that it must be *new* finance representing sacrifice of current income? Mr. Paish lists funds that should automatically accrue and then estimates a figure of Normal Personal Savings based on the prewar percentage (3 percent) of the national income which emerged as such savings. It will be seen that a large gap results which must be filled in by extra savings if the capital program is to be carried through. Two estimates are given, one representing a maximum and the other a likely total.[1]

Is there the slightest hope, asks the *Bankers' Magazine,* that these extra savings will be furnished voluntarily? Will the citizen, anxious to restore his former standard of living and to restock his household, even supply his prewar quota? With inordinately high taxation the rich are no longer a prolific source of capital accumulation and the fanatical cheap money policy is not only deterring saving but encouraging capital consumption.

The harsh conclusion of Mr. Paish is that there must be some sort of compulsory saving unless the capital reconstruction program is to be drastically curtailed. It is probably too ambitious in any case. The solution suggested by Mr. Paish is a continuing budget surplus ranging, as the table above shows, from £300 millions to £700 millions a year.

That this in itself would provide a solution follows from the statistics. The question is whether the level of taxation required would not produce a popular revolt, manifesting itself in a grave loss of incentive. Something might be done by restoring the principle and practice of the deferred credit, but this time the withheld sums should carry interest. What is really required is a drastic curtailment of State expenditure so that a budget surplus could emerge at tolerable levels of taxation. The White Paper recently published postulates for 1947 the devotion of 16 percent of the national effort to capital equipment and maintenance. At current levels of productivity this is quite inadequate to set against the ambitious program of postwar reconstruction and development.

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[1] SOURCES OF CAPITAL FOR FINANCE OF RECONSTRUCTION 1946-55

(In millions of pounds)

| | *Maximum* | *Likely* |
|---|---|---|
| Public authorities— | | |
| Surplus war stocks | 500 | 350 |
| U.S. loan and credit | 1,100 | 1,100 |
| Canadian credit | 300 | 300 |
| Extra budgetary funds | 1,200 | 400 |
| Business savings— | | |
| Undistributed profits | 2,200 | 2,200 |
| Normal personal savings | 2,600 | 2,600 |
| | 7,900 | 6,950 |
| Extra savings needed | 3,150 | 7,070 |
| Total | 11,050 | 14,020 |

## *A GERMAN RE-EVALUATES MARXISM*

*Das Sozialistische Jahrhundert,* theoretical organ of the Berlin Social Democratic Party, presents an interesting article by Erich Winkler in its December 1946 issue. Winkler evaluates the Marxist heritage and tries to answer the question whether or not Marxism today can still provide the theoretical framework for a reborn German labor movement. He writes:

The "uprooting of Marxism" was proclaimed as a task of first importance by the Hitler government and that this task was undertaken seriously is attested by the number of those who died on the scaffold. So long as all independent expression of opinion was banned, criticism rendered impossible, free investigation considered dangerous to the state, and revolutionists cynically liquidated, all falsifications of historic truths remained unanswered and found ready ears. This is why it is necessary to repeat today things which have been said before.

It is not possible to ignore the Marxist scholasticism and apologetics that once handicapped us and that are reappearing today. Those who are unable to question their own presuppositions, who subordinate so-called scientific theses to the political-tactical demands of the hour, can only provide new arguments to those enemies of Marxism who proclaim again and again that it has degenerated into a fixed dogma.

The old struggle between various tendencies in the socialist movement had fruitful results in the theoretical sphere, yet it also led to splits which rendered the labor movement incapable of implementing its political demands. It would be disastrous if this fight should have to be fought all over again with all the old arguments and slogans. Too much energy that could be employed constructively would be wasted. Furthermore, the historic process has decided many questions that were debated in the past.

What has given world-wide significance to Marxism is that it provided a historic consciousness to a whole era. Because Marx's unique conception served to lay bare not only the structure of capitalist society but also revealed its laws of motion, because Marx analyzed not only its static concept but also the dynamics of its course, he made it possible to discover the links that exist between all aspects of bourgeois society.

The nature of this society is determined by the fetish character of all social life—its so-called reification—and by domination through state and society, which corresponds to class divisions. The reification results from the rational splitting up into parts that can be calculated—a process of division which has spread from the individual enterprise over the whole of social and cultural life. It attempts to discover the "laws" of separate happenings by rational means and makes the total process ever more impenetrable to the individual. Man becomes an object of the apparently impersonal development of things and of anonymous laws. Things dominate man. This development is unthinkable without the action of the machine. The machine has liberated a technique which for the last 150 years has held the whole of humanity in its spell, threatening first the existence of the worker and finally that of the whole of society.

Ownership of the means of production establishes domination. The dependence of the worker on the means of production creates the proletariat. The proletariat constitutes itself a class. The concept of class is the structurally central concept of bourgeois society and at the same time its counter-pole. The theory of the creation of a working class that frees itself and has as its mission the placing of the whole of society on a new basis in the process of its own liberation has become the point of crystallization of a political movement that embraces all countries of the capitalist world.

The working class assigns itself an historic task. It assumes theoretically in advance what it hopes to accomplish through action in the political, spiritual and cultural sphere. This process is impossible without autonomy and without power.

That which is possible and realizable can be accomplished—not that which is merely desirable from the utopian standpoint. Freedom has to be fought for. The fight requires preparation for the responsibilities that go with direction and organization of social formations. The goal is a classless society, free from any kind of domination.

Such is the great general concept of historic materialism. It is this concept that validates the demand for dominance of scientific socialism. The demand holds valid even in a leaderless country in which capitalist turbulence has brought about breakdown and destruction of the old forces.

It is thus the aim of the proletariat to end proletarianism. The groups that support socialism must by no means be limited to the proletariat. Many forces that are as yet opposed to socialism will march with it, once they recognize the supra-personal values, the higher morality that animates its adherents. In all socialist ideas, be they Utopian, Christian or Marxian, there is rooted the desire to break from the fetters of oppression and domination, the longing for a state in which justice governs the relations between men.

The great ethical principle of Marxist socialism is the idea of social justice in its concrete historical form. Thus it is not only the power of analysis that drives men forward to dedicate themselves to a higher social form; they are also driven by the image of a new type of man. Man must again live purposely, must be able to develop his forces freely and spontaneously. He must liberate himself from the abstract vegetative life of the present in which he is the object of material forces and of domination.

# BOOKS

## *INSTITUTIONS OF WORK AND SOCIETY*

### *Julien Steinberg*

> **"How to organize human life in a machine society is a question that confronts us anew. Behind the fading fabric of competitive capitalism there looms the portent of an industrial civilization, with its paralyzing division of labor, standardization of life, supremacy of mechanism over organism, and organization over spontaneity. Science itself is haunted by insanity. This is the abiding concern."**
>
> **Karl Polanyi**

In an age of catastrophe that is holistic, our social research continues, for the most part, to be atomistically designed. We gallup-poll social situations but infrequently seek their dynamics. We remain content to classify statically and to categorize. In terms of method the time calls for Galileo and we continue to invoke Aristotle.

In the preface to the second of the notable *Middletown* studies, Robert S. Lynd indicated the proper direction for current social research. "The investigator (Lynd) is critical of the type of research that throws its net too broadly, as does the general 'survey.' By and large, social research seems to him to make larger gains by digging vertically rather than by raking the top-soil horizontally, and a disproportionate amount of energy in current social research appears to him to be going into the latter sort of work. . . . The point made . . . is not that social science needs to put on blinders or narrow its range of vision. Quite the contrary. The most hopeful tendency in contemporary research in the social sciences is the viewing of sharply defined problems against the entire institutional world in which they operate. But this type of research looks at the broad field *with a single problem as its focus.* This is quite different from approaching a broad field with a number of very general hypotheses and seeking to get a 'general picture.' "

Most current views of dramatic social phenomena continue in the *luftmensch* tradition. The number of industrial strikes are totalled: wage and price rises are computed; but practically never is the attempt made to relate these phenomena to the social matrices in which they occur. The popular "solution" for labor-management disputes is on the level of the incantation for those involved to "try to understand one another better." The difficulties are recognized on surface levels, but purely as existing and in these terms. Their understructures are less frequently examined. In fact, strictures exist against inquiry into power relationships, economic conflict which is basic, etc. To point out the banality that the businessman is in business to make money, or that the best businessman, purely in terms of business dictates, is the one who makes the most money is taken as an insult by the business community. The allied banality that workers work for wages, and are most successful with this aim economically when they compel the employer through collective bargaining, strikes, etc., to pay them more, is taken as an assault on labor. Both

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groupings take this description as an imputation of "base" aims. In this light, how can industry-labor difficulties which arise from the fabric of the economic structures encompassing them be managed when the participants are not even willing to recognize the real terms in which they exist? Increasing concern is felt regarding the "human problems" of industry—and barring some recent, somewhat more encouraging academic research—solutions are invariably in terms of plant music, industrial ball teams, and the like. It is foolish to be scornful of all such ameliorative innovations, but it is tragic in consequence to cease investigation at these points.

The basic alienation of industrial workers must be studied from at least three major foci: a) the level of description (for a particularly sensitive expression of the problem from this angle, the reader is referred to Simone Weil's essay on "Factory Work"[1]—*Politics,* December 1946); b) the relation of the institutions of work to the institutions of society; c) the present and probable future concomitants of the total industrial and societal constellation.

Because of their relevance, sound investigatory tools, enlightened disciplines, the Yankee City series has been of extreme importance and encouragement in this general regard. The most recent published report in this over-all analytical examination of a New England town is "concerned with the study of the social organization of the modern factory" and its relation to the larger community.[2] As such, its findings are not without significance for the whole of our industrial society.

The immediate problem, from which the rest of the study flows, was this: In the worst year of the depression all the workers in the principle industry of Yankee City went on strike. They struck with little warning and with sufficient force to close the doors of all the factories. The employers previously had said that their employees were too "sensible" to strike. Union men outside the city also had stated that Yankee City would not strike because it wasn't organized and couldn't be. Many of the workers concurred in that belief. Yet, in spite of such unanimity, the strike did occur, and management was "soundly beaten." In addition, the workers organized themselves, entered the ranks of an industrial union, and became steadfast members. Why?

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[1] "In a factory," reports the author, in part, "... thought is obliged to remain in constant readiness not only to follow the monotonous progress of movements indefinitely repeated, but to find within itself resources to cope with the unexpected. Such an obligation is contradictory, impossible and exhausting. Body may often be exhausted evenings upon leaving the factory, but mind is more so and invariably so. Whoever has experienced this exhaustion—and remembers it—may read it in the eyes of nearly all the workingmen filing out of a plant. How one would like, along with his time-card to check in his soul upon entering the plant, and then check it out intact at quitting time! But the reverse takes place. One takes it into the plant where it undergoes its ordeal; evenings, drained by exhaustion, it can do nothing with hours of leisure."

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[2] *The Social System of the Modern Factory, The Strike: A Social Analysis,* by W. Lloyd Warner and J. O. Low. Yale University Press, 244 pages, $3.00. The preceding volumes in the series are: *The Social Life of a Modern Community,* by Warner and Paul S. Lunt; *The Status System of a Modern Community,* by Warner and Lunt; *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups,* by Warner and Leo Srole. Forthcoming volumes will be: *American Symbol Systems* and the *Data Book For The Yankee City Series.*

The intriguing study which ensues established its investigatory roots deep in the history of Yankee City, the development of its industries ("from clippers to textiles to shoes"), its industrial ownership patterns, its status and prestige systems inside and outside of the factory, etc. The first suppositions prove inconclusive. Did the depression cause the strike? Was it the low wages? These were the ready explanations of the townspeople. "Each of these speakers, however, forgot that there had been serious depressions before and that there had been no strike in Yankee City. . . . There had been low wages before and that there had been no unions. . . . There had been strikes when wages were high and times were said to be good. Although these economic arguments supplied important and necessary reasons for the strike and unionization of the workers, they were insufficient to explain the strike and why unionization occurred."

The core of the economic argument that the workers gave for the strike was their "conviction that the factory owners were making money and had jockeyed the operatives into a position that threatened starvation." This argument furnished adequate grounds for action, but told only a part of the story, and failed to explain why the crisis was caused. Its personalistic guilt-finding, while justified in a number of instances, could not explain why throughout the U.S. thousands of factories were closing. Bankruptcy is hardly a basis for sustained industrial profits. In short, these surface explanations failed to relate the desperate plight they symptomized to the status of the industrial system, and the economic life of the country. The plight of these workers was in large part the tragedy of the national labor force as a whole. They partly voiced the legitimate grievances that Simone Weil, for example, described. They did not, and could not be expected to, grasp the totality of their crisis with the national crisis. It is this area that the study surveys in some detail.

Vital in any explanation of the strike is an understanding of the break in the skill hierarchy in Yankee City. The investigators at the start expected to "find a recognizable hierarchy of jobs based on the degree of skill demanded in their performance. Our assumption was that we would find, in the technological jobs as in the managerial ones, a hierarchy of statuses correlated in some way with the complexity of the task. We expected, too, that the evaluations of technological jobs, both by management and by labor, as expressed in their attitude toward different jobs, would correlate, in general, with an observable hierarchy of skill. In the course of our investigation we found that this hypothesis was quite untenable."

What they did find was that an enormous division of labor and mechanization existed in Yankee City's major industry, shoe manufacturing. They discovered that "there were no high-skilled technological jobs and few medium-skilled." Most of the jobs could be described only as "low-skilled." Furthermore, "comparative wage rates do not even correlate with what little skill differential is left." In an earlier day, youthful workers in the factories served their apprenticeship in an "age-grade" system. The more skilled they became the higher their rise in the hierarchy. They looked with respect on the older men with more skilled jobs above them. Initiative came from the desire to learn more and to advance accordingly. The worker learned, in addition, that he had a craft and he was aware of his status in the factory. As such he had *identity.* From this recognition of status and role, he sustained self-respect. The hierarchy with the resultant social mobility it made possible made a community of the factory with communally-shared recognition of status values. As the worker grew older, he, in turn, instructed those who were younger and who were respectful of the status he had attained. We are not discussing here the earlier system valuatively but structurally, and in these terms, social mobility, self-respect, status, job and skill prestige, were all available. But "slowly this way of life degenerated and the machine took the virtue and respect from the worker, at the same time breaking the skill hierarchy which dominated his occupation . . . the 'ladder to the stars' was gone and with it much of the structure of the 'American Dream.' " The symbolism of success, we might add, which in an earlier day was associated with an Horatio Alger or Henry Ford, or the way to fame and fortune as an industrious if not ingenious businessman, has been converted in our time into the *deus ex machina* image of Superman as the representative of the miraculous powers which are latterly more appropriate to the contemporary basic anxieties and closed aspirational tunnels.

The low-skilled worker lacks security because he is easily replaceable; he lacks possibilities for advancement because his job, and his anonymous status in relation to his nominal "co-workers" and to the rest of the factory system, provide little opportunity to achieve skills; those jobs that call for skills are filled by others (designers, research chemists, etc.) who are recruited from universities and elsewhere outside of the factory. His job is nearly rote and his capacities are unsatisfactorily tapped. If the worker is unambitious, he is unsatisfied; if he is ambitious, his fate is frustration. Management looks on these consequences as being those of the industrial system and seeks to sustain them. Pointing out that educated persons are most likely to be discontented in this industrial milieu, the authors report: "Management is aware of this and attempts to overcome the difficulty by discriminating against educated persons who seek technological jobs . . . Management wants workers who will do simple unskilled jobs without questioning the authority of superiors." .

Simone Weil in her essay discusses the personal relationship between the worker and the factory. She tells of having seen workers linger in a driving rain rather than enter the alien factory before the whistle blew. "No intimacy binds working men to the place and objects amidst which their lives are used up. Wage and other social demands had less to do with the sit-down strikes of '36 than the need to feel at home in the factories at least once in their lives." This feeling of alienation from factory and machine, and the make-believe sense of ownership it calls for, is well illustrated by a comment of a Yankee City foreman concerning a girl who worked a machine she had been away from for some time because of illness. "Of course, I put another girl on the machine she used. She came back and said, 'Where is my machine?' I said, 'Your machine? Did you buy it? Maybe you would like to. Maybe you could buy the factory, too. What did you mean, your machine? You were out sick, weren't you? You take the machine I give you.' "

In its totality, the break in the skill hierarchy, the authors find, "contributed importantly to the outbreak of the strike, to the courses it took, and in particular, to the coming of the union." Important factors also were the consequent negation of social mobility, the changing relationship between management and the workers, the change in relations between worker and worker, the complications induced by absentee ownership, the removal of the roots of economic problems from the sole confines of Yankee City, the loss of worker status in the community, economic deprivations, etc.

What is the relevance of Yankee City to the national economy as a whole? The ramifications of the technological changes which the authors report are, for example, hardly unique for Yankee City. And "these problems frequently can be met only by changes in social organization, sometimes minute, sometimes almost cataclysmic." In addition, vertical extensions of industry create their own problems of "greater social distance between the higher executives, on the one hand, and the technological workers and factory community generally, on the other. To social distance is often added spatial distance. Both tend to accentuate the split in interests between the superordinate to the subordinate groups in the business enterprise. They also impair the community's control over the local factory and its policies." The horizontal extension of industry further lessens the independence of the local community. Human considerations in industry are frequently submerged under the technological impact because "under modern competitive conditions" management must act "strictly in accordance with business logic." The authors state: "This is a problem (technological advances) whose ramifications extend far beyond the confines of any one factory or of any individual community. It affects the economy and social organization of the whole country and should be examined on a nation-wide basis. Individual communities like Yankee City are powerless to solve, by independent action, the problems arising from this source."

In the chapter, "Blue Prints of Tomorrow," devoted to summary conclusions and projection of the data into the future, the authors state that two basic findings illustrate a "phenomenon which is to be found throughout industrial America." The first, in uneven stages, is the break in the skill hierarchy and the decreasing hopes of workers for skill advancement. The second is that "social mobility is no longer present, and the American worker realizes it." The authors relate the growth of unions in part to these factors. "The unions act as agents to express the common hopes—and bitterness—of the workers. . . .They have become social institutions with a great variety of activities. . . . They play an active role in national and local politics." At this point, the authors would seem one or two steps ahead of the facts. Social mobility is ceasing, but the 'American Dream' has not yet lost its tenacious hold on the American imagination. And while labor is on the fringe of structured political activity, not even the barest outlines of a national labor party—as the expression of that grouping—is visible. The authors, in addition, tend to overvaluate the role of education as a means of aiding social mobility. "As long as this route remains open to the children of workers and other members of the lower class, their frustrations will not be sufficient to be explosive." The fallacy here lies in a failure to relate education to the general economy at a given time. In times of economic constriction, of depression, industrial dead-ends that are apparent enough in periods of technological "normality" extend to this area, making the securing of employment, let alone advancement, a herculean task. And without national "considerations" of these problems as regards the legislative and governmental arms of the nation in an over-all policy, these trouble-brewing vats seem likely to erupt with disastrous political concomitants—which may lead to managerial dictation and the doom of political democracy. The authors themselves, elsewhere in the volume, refer to studies which indicate that "social mobility through the schools is also slowing up." They state their belief that "despite all of these and other significant modifications of our economic power, our basic hierarchical social order will remain. . . . No complex society can escape such ranking and get its work done." A fear that would seem appropriate at this point is of the political dangers of the new restratification. The loose-ends of our economy may lead to power restructurizations dooming any possibility of democratic control from below. The checks on such prospects: a mass liberal-labor third party, a politically active and enlightened electorate, and other similar forces exist at present only in the realm of political wishfulness. In fine, the authors conclude: "It is impossible to predict what the new social order which is evolving will be. Once the society is formed it is doubtful if such labels as 'fascist,' 'communist,' or 'capitalist' could be realistically applied to it."

The hope of mankind is the faith that it is within the realm of human manipulation and control to interiorize in the new society the elements of spontaneity in place of alienation, democratic control instead of what seems to be emerging as authoritarian hierarchy, and the authors of this study are to be thanked for making available some of the raw materials from which the urgent, new postulations must be drawn.

## *STALINGRAD — AS SEEN FROM THE KREMLIN*

***Heinz Paechter***

Theodor Plievier was one of the pioneers of the political reportage novel in Europe between the two wars. His version of the 1918 revolution and his indictment of Weimaranian society are known to American progressives under the titles *The Kaiser's Coolies* and *The Kaiser Goes, The Generals Remain.* His German readers were mostly the kind that think Upton Sinclair is the modern Zola; but his power of characterization is far superior, his mass demonstrations are as true as any reporter ever described, and he has a consummate skill in making his persons appear as representatives of types. In his last novel, *Stalingrad,*[1] he gives new proof of his talents: there is significant reporting, enlightning allegory and impressive shaping of mass movements.

However, the very perfection of this method reveals its limitations. The mass experience has replaced the

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[1] Theodore Plievier: *Stalingrad,* Aufbau Verlag, Berlin W8, 1946. 384 pages. One chapter is available in English translation in the English language edition of the Moscow review *Literature and Revolution.*

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experience of individuals so completely, the type symbols (in fact they are mere allegories) have suppressed characters and temperaments so effectively that a fascist writer was able to hail this novel as the glorification of the unnamed German soldier who has taken up the burden of his collective Fate in heroic silence. Or—should we suspect that there is a reason for this rapprochement of styles between Nazis and Communists? We shall see.

*Stalingrad* is the novel of the German Army. It was written in Moscow on the basis of German and Russian archives, of letters found on German prisoners and dead soldiers, of interviews with hundred of prisoners. First of all it is a gigantic research job. Of 383 tightly packed pages, one third probably concerns troup movements, geographic detail, appreciation of the military situation (and we are hardly spared any regimental numbers), official Nazi documents. Future historians may decide whether all this evidence has been correctly evaluated; the present reader can hardly help admiring the craftmanship which assigned each of these pieces its proper place for the best effect, and integrated them into the pageant of a big historical event.

This, unfortunately, is the effect sought. Bigness of the Nazi disaster, enormousness of their crime, gigantic dimensions of the void that opens before the victims, overwhelming power of horror, despair, confusion, disgust. In the author's version, the Nazi Army was crushed by the sheer quantity of its suffering, from the wide spread of disease and the low fall of the thermometer. If in Zola's *Debacle* all the cruelty of neglected wounds is condensed in one scene and all the repugnance of helpless limbs unforgettably sallies forth in one paragraph, Plievier has to spill fountains of pus, heap mountains of dismembered cadavers, command trainloads of frozen bones, and repeat these scenes over and over again, in equal monotony of quality and increasing only in quantity. The Nazy Army suffocated in the sheer enormity of its pus.

This may be a way of writing history, and it may be well in line with the *genre* paintings that fill square yards of Russian walls. It certainly does not make a novel. The gigantic dimensions of suffering and disaster are meant to overwhelm the dramatis personae, but too much is done in that direction. Bigness here is only a clumsy way of representing "types" instead of real people. The story is all figured out, as on a checkerboard, by the hidden mastermind of the Russian staff; it is not carried by the characters.

True, all German soldiers are victims of the blunders made higher up; but again, a study of various degrees and kinds of inaction, or of the automatism of conditioned reflexes is unconvincing. The reader may be interested in the course of the battle; his interest is not aroused for a cause or for any of the hundred individuals who time and again drag their bones or are carried limblessly over the stage when new waves of Russian armor tighten the iron net around their sector.

The Russians, on their part, do not appear individually at all. They are summarized in the gigantic steamroller or their presence is noticed when iron hail pours down on the luckless Germans; but so great is the tact of this German Communist writer, or maybe of his political commissar, that no individual or collective deed of heroism is mentioned. The whole story moves on the German side, and all the Germans know of the Russians is their mighty might, their better equipment, their wiser planning. Not even the Russian slaves who were used as draught animals are characterized as human beings; we hear of no act of fraternization or of any other spontaneous manifestation of human relations between enemies. Even honest reporting is squashed by this method of recording only that which is collectively true. Should Plievier have noticed any spontaneous acts of mortal hostility, the Russian censor must have struck them out; the correct and humane treatment of Germans who surrendered is a statement of policy rather than reportage; not even a Russian whore, barely mentioned to point to the Nazi officers' corruption, evokes any human interest through her accidental death. In fact, this reader was able to dig through the 383 pages of pus only thanks to his deep interest in the sociology of fascism and of Stalinist literature.

Even in the one place where we should expect a strong emotional appeal, Plievier lets us down. There is in the ranks of the German Army no Communist, no Social Democrat, no Catholic, not even a Republican, in fact no member of the opposition, no man just reasonable enough to see through the Nazi swindle from the outset and with whom the reader might identify himself. Plievier's research actually unearthed the punitive battalion which, we know, was filled up with former inmates of concentration camps, but this apparently was not the "line" at the time of writing. Nothing and nobody is there to distract Plievier's attention from the collective downfall of the Nazi Army, the collective demoralization of the German nation, the drab sagging of all mental and moral powers. Nothing protects the reader from the overwhelming impact of the Russian steamroller, the gigantic scale of dying and ailing.

The soldiers who thus are exclusively on the receiving end of history's blows, shrink to the size of marionettes. Their characters are sketchily drawn, of necessity, because they are meant to represent types. There is the stubborn, haughty SS officer, whose pride drives him into self-destruction; the Nazi careerist, who orders stalwart resistance even when it is madness, but surrenders as soon as the danger comes close to his own bunker; the reactionary Prussian officer clique who do not see any way out but suicide; the fat superintendent of provisions who looks at his job as a place to enrich himself; the irresponsible commanders who knavishly fulfill the Fuehrer's order against their better knowledge and insight, none of them being plagued by attacks of bad conscience; finally, there are two types with whom Plievier apparently sympathizes: the common soldier who is led to his disaster like a sheep to the slaughterhouse, and the honest doughboys' father, the officer from the trenches of World War I whom we know from Remarque, Renn, Montherlant, Juenger—the old storm troop leader who has now become a Panzer colonel (though again we are not told about his relations to the Nazis between the wars.)

It is this latter type (we can hardly see him as a person though Plievier asserts that he was an exception among his colleagues) who on the very last three pages seems to catch a glimpse behind the curtain of blood, pus and excrement, and says that the German people had been mistaken. He goes as far as to say the leaders were guilty not of losing out but of starting the war, and stretches his hand out to the other type, the former S.A. trooper who had been disciplined for misbehavior, to build a new nation. It is hard for us to believe in this reform, for we know little about the private life of this officer; he does not seem to have much of a private life anyway since he spent all his life in the Ministry of War. But then, none of these soldiers has much of a private life. We read the letters they receive from home, but they are pruned down to clippings about suffering; occasionally we hear of a soldier who dreams of repairing a fence back home, or of a bank deposit to be withdrawn; but this is all counterfolio to the vainglorious nonsense of prolongated suffering on the front—it is pitchdark, heavily loaded "Symbolism" as understood in Russia. The "types" fill their jobs of "representing" ideas, and so even the reporter's job is badly done. We don't understand the colonel's conversion, though we understand the SA trooper's despair. It is all the more significant, therefore, that the colonel, and not the civilian, the professional leader and not the meek man from the people has the last word which is supposed to open up a new future. This is the book of the German generals who joined the Moscow "Committee for German Freedom"; it is not the book of the German people, but a symbolized and loosely epicized editorial for their benefit.

# COMMENT

## The Desire for Chaos

After having decided to attend the Paris Conference, the government of independent and sovereign Czechoslovakia received the order from Moscow not to attend. The order was executed. In the most modern and progressive sense of the words, "independence" means not to depend on one's own will, and "sovereignty" means—also in the most modern and progressive sense—to be subservient to the will of the mighty neighbor. This is the real situation of the eight countries who were forced to refuse the offer to participate in the Paris Conference. Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania—these eight countries are not independent states any more but parts (or provinces) of the tremendous Soviet Russian *empire* (and the same is true for the Russian-occupied part of Germany).

We say *empire* and we mean *empire* and not "sphere of influence" or anything similar; the general policy of these countries is not influenced but is dictated by Moscow. In the classical sense, an empire is a dominating power with its dependencies ("country or province controlled by another," according to the Oxford Dictionary). Until now the attempt has been made, with much hypocrisy—and not without some success,— to camouflage the real extent of the Soviet empire in Europe. Of course, this effort will be continued, but hardly with any success: the present frontiers of the Soviet Empire are clearly designated by the fact of the non-participation of countries in the Paris Conference. But the Soviet government does not intend to consider these frontiers as final. Its policy is really imperialist, precisely because it is aiming at the *expansion* of its empire. And the "Marshall Plan" has been considered dangerous by Moscow because, if implemented, it probably would put limits to this expansion — at least as far as it had to be accomplished by relatively peaceful means. Moscow did not succeed in hindering the Western powers from starting the affair, but it forbade entry into its own empire.

The consolidation of the European part of the Soviet empire has not yet been completed, and today we see how the Soviet government is pressed to complete it. The necessary counterpart of this task is for Moscow to obstruct the consolidation and rehabilitation of the rest of Europe. This is no less important a reason for its animosity toward the Marshall Plan. There should not be any economic and political consolidation where — and as long as — there is no Communist, that is Soviet, domination. The alternatives should be: either a Soviet-controlled order, or chaos. And while struggling against the program inaugurated by Secretary Marshall's action, Soviet Russia is struggling for the chaos that should open the way to the expansion of her empire.

The violence of the Soviet reaction was perhaps the most convincing indication of what could be expected from the realization of the Marshall Plan. The Russian rules began to see the terrifying spectre of a Europe beginning to create the necessary conditions for its rehabilitation. It was too obvious, indeed, that European cooperation was the only way to alleviate the disastrous situation of the European peoples, to stop the deterioration of the economic, political and moral conditions of their existence. It was one of the most startling absurdities of Allied policy that the action now suggested by Marshall was not started two years ago, at the latest. But there are no reasons to doubt that the work begun in Paris should bring some useful results. Something can be accomplished even without American help which, however, will be absolutely indispensable in initiating any really substantial progress. On the other side, it would be perilous to indulge in wishful optimism and thus overlook the potential strength of Moscow-directed sabotage.

For example, the Soviet empire embraces practically all of the important agrarian regions of Europe. Of course, these countries will not simply refuse all commercial exchange with the countries which attended the Paris Conference. But their nonparticipation will restrict the possibilities of inter-European economic planning, and will leave many weak spots in the system of European cooperation, which could — and undoubtedly will — be used by the Soviets to undermine the efficiency of the whole undertaking. Also, there are the Communist parties in the participating countries which undoubtedly are already charged with the task of doing their utmost to hamper the realization of the new plan and then to annihilate its results. The Paris Conference is not in itself a decisive victory over chaos. The Soviet struggle for chaos is continuing. And this war waged by technically "peaceful" means cannot be won by the

Western countries unless they are able to realize the highest measure of solidarity, and unless this country is prepared to overcome the anachronistic prejudices of its economic ideology (including the idea that it can sell without buying) and to offer sufficient means for the regeneration of the European economy.

## John L. Outflanks the Bureaucrats

The UMW has won the best contract in its history just a few days after the passage of the Taft-Hartley bill. It has delivered a resounding defeat to all those reactionary elements in American society which sought to bury the American labor movement under a welter of restrictive clauses, paragraphs and law cases. John Llewellyn Lewis did not choose to avail himself of the procedure so generously outlined for labor disputes by the new act. The UMW did not behave like good children: they failed to petition the NLRB for a decision as to whether or not the whole coal industry is an appropriate bargaining unit; they didn't file reports with the Secretary of Labor on the compensation of all officers of the union and their manner of election, on all dues and fees required, the procedures of its constitution and by-laws, its assets, liabilities, receipts and disbursements for the last year; they have not as yet given the NLRB an affidavit by each officer of the union swearing that he is not a Communist; they by-passed complaining to the NLRB, appealing to the Circuit Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court; they held no NLRB-supervised elections on whether the miners wanted to be represented by the UMW, nor did they conduct another election to find out whether a majority of miners desired a union shop — all these and many other steps would have been necessary if they had followed the procedures outlined by the Taft-Hartley bill. But no, John L. Lewis chose a simpler way: *he went out and got a contract!* Here is the story in his own words: "Why did the coal operators give you such a favorable contract?" asked a reporter. "I didn't ask for a contract," retorted Lewis. "We told them our people were out of work, that the Government had discharged us and we were looking for employment. . . . We said they could send over to Europe for 400,000 displaced persons if they wished. They didn't seem to want to."

John L. Lewis won his case by a procedure so simple that it has been almost forgotten since the American labor movement entangled itself in Boards, Offices, Paragraphs, and Arbitration Courts: he used the crucial economic power of the members of his union. Like the simple man in the tale of Andersen who looked at the supposedly beautifully dressed Emperor, he was the only one to see that the Emperor really was not wearing any clothes at all.

One might quarrel with many of John L. Lewis's procedures — one might think, for instance, that his method will no longer be adequate in the coming age of politicized labor relations — yet it remains true, nonetheless, that he won perhaps the greatest labor victory in recent years. Let's look at the record. Here are some figures on the average wages of soft-coal miners since the Depression:

| *Year* | *Average Weekly Wage* | *Year* | *Average Weekly Wage* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1933 | $14.47 | 1943 | $41.62 |
| 1936 | 22.71 | 1945 | 52.25 |
| 1939 | 23.18 | 1946 | 58.03 |
| 1941 | 30.86 | 1947 | 65.25 |

The new contract provides for a rise from $11.85 for a *nine*-hour day to $13.05 for an *eight*-hour day, a doubling of the employer's contribution to the miner's welfare fund, plus a number of other advantages such as longer lunch periods. Furthermore, a clause that makes the contract valid only "during such time as such persons [the miners] are *willing* and *able* to work," frees the union from civil suits for damages under the Taft-Hartley act.

Not an unworthy outcome of the strategy of a man whom the philistines of the Right but also of sections of the radical Left accused of "having lost all sense of reality" and of being actuated only by a neurotic lust for power and publicity. John L.'s sense of reality remains in good working order — much better, indeed, than that of many of his critics.

And for those who still ask why the miners should be paid higher rates than other industrial workers — just a little notice we saw this morning in the papers: Nashville, Ill., July 8 (AP) — "The Centralia Coal Company was fined $1000 today on charges of 'willful neglect' in the March 25 explosion-deaths of 111 miners. The fine was the maximum provided by statute."

## "Women Talk Too Much"

Andrei Vishinsky, the Russian confession expert who was elevated a few years ago to the position of first spear-carrier to Commissar Molotov, believes that "women talk too much." Now this is a crucial question that has slipped unsolved down the long corridor of history, and it must certainly be of great advantage to have an opinion on it from a person who has shown such infinite skill in getting well-known speakers to keep quiet and to talk, and to say just the right things, and at just the right moments.

Vishinsky revealed his opinions on the matter some time ago to a Mr. George Okulitch, who was serving as a Canadian military attaché in Russia. Mr. Okulitch had married a Russian woman, and when he sought permission for her to return to Canada with him, and was refused, he requested an explanation from the Deputy Foreign Minister. Vishinsky replied — a bit flatly and petulantly — that it was "the duty of a Russian woman . . . to produce Soviet children — not children for the Canadian Government." After relieving himself of this kernel of "Marxist" knowledge, Vishinsky went on to denounce the whole category of Russian women who would marry foreigners, describing them as "the wrong type to be examples of Russian womanhood. They try to exchange the hardships of building Russia for the ease of other countries. *Women talk too much and thus they give the wrong impression of the Soviet Union."* (Our italics.)

On the face of it, this statement looks like a *non sequitur* — but this is only appearance. Actually it conceals but thinly the staunch Communist principle of the equality of the sexes. That is, *any Russian* who talks too much — man or woman — is apt to give "the wrong impression of the Soviet Union." If this seems to contradict the pronouncement that "the duty of a Russian woman is to produce Soviet children," it is only because of ones lack of dialectical understanding.

And now at last we have the answer to our ancient question concerning female vocal chords. Yes, women talk too much — *when they get loose!* The thing to do then, obviously, is to keep them at home. But certainly Comrade Vishinsky wants nothing so reactionary as *Kirche, Küche, Kinder.*

Socialist metropolitans, *red* borsht and little Bolsheviks — ah, that is, dialectically speaking, another and a quite different matter.

## The Law and Order of Nonsense

The Dutch province of Limburg has a large surplus of vegetables. Netherland sources state that 200,000 tons of vegetables will be available for export between the beginning of July and February of next year. A substantial amount of this produce is ready for immediate shipment and will spoil if it isn't disposed of soon.

Germany lacks vitamins; the cities of the Ruhr valley haven't received fresh vegetables for many months; the miners' children show signs of scurvy and other vitamin deficiencies. The German food ration is down to around 800 calories, well below the theoretical level of starvation.

Dutch Limburg borders on Germany; transportation between the land where the vegetables are in danger of rotting and the land of scurvy and vitamin deficiency could be easily arranged — freight trains could cover the distance to the cities of the Ruhr in a few hours. Between the wasteland and the land of plenty there are no high mountains, no natural obstacles whatsoever — but there is one huge obstruction: the Great Wall of Bureaucracy.

Holland wants payment in German industrial products but the Anglo-American occupation authorities in Germany want all German trade to be transacted in dollars. The Dutch must pay in dollars if they want to get German industrial products; and the Germans also must pay in dollars — which they don't have or which the occupation authorities do not allow them to spend. So the hungry cannot get to the food and the food cannot get to the hungry: between them stands the whim of a few experts and the sign of the dollar — a sign dominating men, a sign condemning men to die, a symbol that has become an all powerful *thing,* a thing that kills men, a Thing let loose.

On the left bank of the Rhine the vegetables are rotting and on its right bank men are rotting. A few hundred thousand tons of vegetables and the lives of a few million people are involved: but what is epitomized here is the state of our world. Only a sign, a regulation, a decree stands between the men and the source that could still their thirst. Is one really to believe that regulations, decrees and bureaucracy will forever keep people from taking what their bodies require?

# GUEST EDITORIAL by Leon Blum

## Whose Fault?

All the warnings have been in vain, mine as well as other people's. It has happened. The Paris Conference has broken up. It will be a hard blow for the millions of men and women on both sides of the Atlantic who had expected a decisive step toward the reconstruction of Europe, towards the restoration of international solidarity and towards peace.

Why did Molotov reject so categorically George Bidault's last proposals without himself formulating a positive suggestion? Why did he come to Paris at all, if he had decided to take this attitude? Did he really think that through this strategic maneuver he would be able to place the responsibility for the failure on someone other than himself? The facts are so plain, so pertinent and so obvious that they cannot delude anyone.

What was Molotov's justification? He hammered away continually on one single idea, the same that already had constituted the underlying theme of the historic Tass communiqué. According to Molotov the Anglo-French plan as formulated by M. Bidault would have meant an interference in the economic policies and sovereignty of the small nations, especially the small nations in the eastern orbit. Interference on whose part? The United States? In calling upon Europe to deal with them as a unit the United States went out of her way to dissipate suspicions of wanting to exercise political pressure — through discrimination, a trick, or preferential choice — on one or the other power. Interference on the part of France or Great Britain? Certainly not, for the preparatory work, the presentation of the eventual plans for distribution of American aid would not have been submitted to Great Britain and France alone, but to a collective European organization.

If a request for the integration of a nation's needs and resources with those of the entire European continent, which is in its own interest, is called interference in a state's political life and sovereignty — I agree. But if this is what Molotov means, we might as well scrap once and for all every effort for a collective organization; for then, economic and political nationalism, with all its defects, all its large and antiquated blemishes, and all its risks will again become the law.

Only, don't accuse Great Britain and France of splitting Europe into two antagonistic blocks! On the contrary, it is precisely the Anglo-French proposal which would have induced and obliged Europe to unite in solidarity. Undoubtedly it would have been only a partial, precarious and fragile union, but at least a point of departure, furnishing the basis for a larger and tighter organization. Molotov's theses have ruined this possibility of a union; he prefers to uphold Europe's division into different states separated by the iron barriers of national sovereignty.

The states in the eastern orbit will be even more closely tied to Russia, while the western nations will be forced to continue to regulate their relations with the United States without them. Public opinion in France and Great Britain was quite ready to say: "We will decline American aid, if it is unilateral and refused to Russia." But it is not so certain that it will say: "We will deprive ourselves of American aid at any time that it pleases Russia to reject this aid for no particular reasons." In vain international Communist propaganda will repeat: "You see — Europe has been split into two antagonistic blocs! You see—the western trap!" Who has done the splitting? Who has set the trap with their own hands? And we will be obliged to give international Communist propagandists the same answer we gave our Communist comrades in France, when they threw the halting of the "Blum Experiment" and their absence from the government into our faces: "This is your work! . . . Whose fault is it then?!"

# FROM THE MINER'S POINT OF VIEW

**George Saxon**

Paralyzing coal strikes have become a standard fixture of American life. Coal is the very life blood of our economy, yet there has hardly been a time in the last four years when the industry has not been either recovering from a strike or preparing for another one. But this is only a fraction of the picture. The specter of overproduction is haunting the coal fields and mass unemployment looms just ahead. No one can forget the destitution, the squalor, poverty and hunger which blanketed the coal areas in the days of the "sick industry." Yet it is expected that the rehabilitation of the Ruhr and other mining areas will eventually curtail the export market. Already there have been cutbacks in many industries, and it is only a question of time until there will again be a serious problem of overproduction.

The specific quality of the problem of coal — as industry and as life — can be judged, however, only by the effect which it has on the individual miner and the society in which he lives. The wretched sties which make up a coal camp, and the blighted half million who inhabit them, are the true problem of coal — which is a *social* problem of the greatest possible scope, not at all a problem of the mechanics of production. Any proposed solution to the problem of coal which does not begin with the primacy of the miner himself is doomed to failure.

### *The Community of Coal — Conditions of Labor*

The uniform culture of the society within the coal areas represents, essentially, a community within the community. The coal community assumes the character of a semi-colony and exhibits the characteristics of colonial oppression. The basis for the semi-colonial nature of the coal community is to be found in the high degree of

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exploitation of labor — a great deal of which is implicit in the isolation of the coal camps. From this situation there flows a whole series of social and cultural traits which serve to particularize the area and set it off from the remainder of the economy.

Labor underground is hard, dangerous and dull. The pickmen themselves laughingly say that all that is necessary to become a miner is to "have a strong back and a weak mind." The rate of fatigue in the mines is probably higher than in any other industry of comparable size and importance. The mere experience of staying underground for a few hours is usually enough to temporarily impair the muscular and nervous systems of visitors to the mines.

The mechanization which has taken place in all of the important mines during the last two decades has altered the nature of the labor process to a very serious extent. Since the introduction of cutting machines, loading machines, motors, and so on, the tempo of activity has been set by these machines themselves, and the labor of the men has had to be integrated into their pattern. The result, however, has been to diminish the quantum of labor but little, while compressing it into a mechanical form. "You can't take time out to catch your breath anymore." Most old miners say that they preferred working in the mines before they were mechanized, even though it was harder work in some respects. What little individual creativity once existed in mining has been erased by machine production.

But the hard and dangerous monotony of the labor process is supposedly compensated for by a relatively high wage scale. Unfortunately, the problem only begins where the exchange of labor for money ends. When the miner leaves the pit he steps into a gray, empty culture. The coal camps offer no media of self-development, no possibilities for creative activity; they are merely a collection of desolate shacks on desolate hillsides where men exist until it is time to return to the pits.

It is claimed by the miners, and justly, of course, that their high wages are only a fantasy; that they are lucky to clear $2000 a year. The abominable check-off accounts for a good portion of the miner's income. Strikes, shutdowns, shipping conditions, and so on, lower the annual income tremendously. But the essence of the problem lies in the relation of the individual to his hostile environment. In the coal camps, no wage, however high, could purchase a normal existence.

The eternal battle to establish decent living conditions — which always ends in failure — syphons money off at an incredible rate. In the company stores money simply disappears before the miner's eyes: the prices are uniformly high — and uniformly without regard to the quality of products. The food bill alone not infrequently runs to $40.00 a week for a family of three; manual laborers must eat a great deal of food: Moreover, higher wages mean higher prices, not only for food but for everything that the miner buys. And the houses are usually owned by the mining company, which seldom deducts from the rent for improvements added by the miner. The company seldom exhibits great concern over any of the conditions in the camp.

### *The Kind of People They Are*

The ideas and social customs of the people in the coal camps give further evidence of the independent nature of the coal community. Most important is the conception that the miners have of men who live in the same territory, perhaps even in the same camp, but who do not work in the mines. The miners consider them as "outsiders," scorn them, or, if they are friends, deprecate them. Reporters who penetrate the coal fields during strikes never fail to marvel at the low esteem placed on "public opinion" and the rest of the nation. This was particularly obvious during the war, when the miners struck time and again disregarding completely the appeals of their collective idol, President Roosevelt, as well as threats of force.

Perhaps 50 percent of the miners read some newspaper other than the famous *UMWA Journal.* But it is doubtful if even one percent of them give any credence at all to the editorials or news items which even seem to cast aspersions on the UMWA. Bitter experience has taught the miner that the press is his arch enemy.

One of the strong bonds which holds the larger coal community together in isolation from others, is transient labor, or the "floaters." Single men in particular, but sometimes whole families, drift from camp to camp and state to state looking for better working conditions, better bosses, a better climate, or just for the sake of moving. News and information fly from camp to camp with unbelievable rapidity; news of disasters travels 60 to 80 miles overnight by relayed word of mouth.

The average miner knows the characteristics of all major mines within 20 miles of him. But many miners, particularly those of

European extraction, regard anything more than three miles away from the Monongahela River (for instance) as something akin to Indian territory, and seldom venture into it except for legal or medical reasons (jail or hospital).

Numerous nationalities are represented in the areas where coal is mined. There are three large groups: Negroes, native whites, and southeastern Europeans. The English and the Welsh, who were America's first miners, are to be found but seldom anymore. Within the camps, relations between the three groups are very fine even though differences are recognized. This must be contrasted to the clear distinction between Negro and foreign miners, on the one hand, and the predominantly native-white stock which inhabits the small farms around the coal fields, on the other.

National groups among the miners are usually well organized; frequently this takes the form of lodges, many of which publish national language newspapers. Some of them even sponsor colleges to which miners' sons can go for very little tuition. These lodges and societies are another factor serving to unify the coal area, since their members are drawn from widely separated sections.

The similarities in living conditions and problems of life must take precedence, however, among the factors which have created the monolithic character of the coal culture. A coal camp, whether it is to be found in Colorado or eastern Alabama or Central Pennsylvania, cannot possibly be mistaken for anything else yet devised by man. To construct a mining town it is necessary to erect several dozen low-grade chicken coops in rows on a hillside, pour tons of coal dust over them, eradicate most of the vegetation, and place gaunt men at strategic intervals. After 20 years, piles of refuse will accumulate, a stench will arise, the chicken coops will fall into identical states of disrepair: and the camp will represent the communities in which half a million men exist.

Some of the company towns have a violent history which is still recalled by the older miners. Before the First World War, the competition between the larger coal companies forced them to import cheap labor from eastern Europe. They sent agents to the Balkans and Italy to induce poor peasant to migrate to the great western land of opportunity. Upon arrival the peasants were herded into company towns behind barbed-wire barricades which enclosed the pit-mouth as well. This enabled the men to work unguarded; but it was imposible for them to leave the barricaded area without passes signed by company officials. Armed guards enforced this rule, and also saw to it that no reporters or union organizers entered. This period left many of the immigrants somewhat suspicious of American democracy and American freedom. Those who remember the barbed-wire enclosures, and the sons who have heard their fathers' stories, understand the necessity for self-reliant, militant action, and believe that it would be suicide to place their confidence in any man who is not a miner.

### *The Miners' Own UMWA*

The history of the rise of the union is no less instructive to the miner. Most miners today can recall pre-union days; most of them remember when they entered the pits before sun up and returned to the surface at dusk. Wages were incredibly low — years went by with no dollar balance to their credit. Sometimes they were paid in scrip that could be redeemed only at the company store; and not so infrequently the miner was in debt after rent and the store bill were checked off. Bloody battles were fought in those days. The famous March on Logan ended in a pitched battle between hundreds of union men from around Charleston, W. Va. and the National Guard. It is claimed that the bones of the dead still bleach on the mountain tops somewhere in southern West Virginia.

The UMWA grew out of the objective necessity for a united and centralized industrial union which could channelize the forces of thousands of small mining camps and focus it against the solid phalanx representing the small group of important operators. Organization has always been an industry-wide problem. As long as mere districts were organized, the union seemingly could never exercise a commanding force in negotiations.

Incessant industrial warfare plagued the coal fields literally for generations. It was not until the early 1930's, under Roosevelt's New Deal, that the UMWA was able to gain a real toehold throughout the country. The preceding period had, in fact, seen the union bankrupt itself and dwindle to a few thousand members. The operators had used all known devices to destroy the union, including injunctions, thugs, and the corruption of leaders. The union fought harrowing battles which depleted the treasury but gained nothing. Wage differentials in Southern Districts and non-union areas effectively prevented the UMWA from achieving very much of consequence.

But the great wave of radicalism which followed the initial bewilderment of the depression carried the UMWA to a position of influence never equaled in American industrial history prior to that time. John L. Lewis gathered a group of wily lieutenants who directed aggresive twentieth century organizational campaigns which seemed to the operators and workers alike to be as slick as a slate roof. Lewis sent sound trucks throughout the area broadcasting to the miners the somewhat exaggerated announcement that Roosevelt wanted all men to join the UMWA. Publicity experts and a small army of statisticians joined the campaign. Altogether it was audaciously planned, and as carefully organized and adroitly executed as could have been imagined. Although no one knew it then, the CIO was being born in that drive.

But the real credit for the superb resurrection of the UMWA cannot go to Lewis, brilliant tactician though he was and is. Lewis himself only expressed supremely the objective needs of the moment and the desires of the mining masses. Without their tremendous sacrifices and creative energy the organizational drive would have been nothing. As walking delegates, rank-and-file miners followed the railroad tracks between lonely camps for weeks on end to organize whole areas. These men received nothing for their labor and ate only what they were given by sympathetic miners. Other miners traveled with the paid organizers to add their voices in the plea for organization, or to play a guitar or yodel. Ministers prayed for the union, teachers taught the blessings of organization in the schools. It was a mass movement of tremendous power.

Tumultuous and bizarre years followed the initial organization of the UMWA on a mass scale. Lewis split the old craft-organized AFL, and in a short time coal-trained organizers poured over American heavy industry drawing millions of unskilled workers into the CIO. The UMWA itself struck time and again, even in the heart of the war and generally won its demands. The basic wage rate rose from $1.50 a day (in many sections of the country) to $13.05 in the space of 15 years .Some of the life-and-death control which the operators had held over the miner was wrested away by the union and industry-wide bargaining was established.

The miners displayed unparalleled militancy and pugnacity in all of their strikes. "No contract — no work" became a by-word throughout the entire country. In recent years picket lines have been abolished as there is no question but that strikes will be observed. The miners made great sacrifices, fought great battles, won great victories. But these selfsame victories are becoming, in the final analysis, meaningless.

The lesson which must be learned from these years of struggle is that the community of coal presents a social problem which must be solved on a community scale through social planning. Until that is recognized, nothing of lasting significance can be accomplished.

### *The Social Problem of Coal*

The whole complex of life in a coal camp is unutterably repressive for the human organism. Throughout his life the inhabitant of a mining community contends with two constant factors, dirt and boredom, and two variables, fatigue and privation. And within the coal camp there is almost no escape. The young man who expects to remain in the area where coal is mined assumes as a matter of course that he will work in the mines. There are no other jobs to be had. The young woman expects to marry a miner; there are no other men to be had.

The communities provide no recreation except for a dance and beer hall and, occasionally, a dilapidated theater. There are few opportunities for education, and almost no outlets for cultural activities. Only the gardens provide a medium for individual expression and they are usually a marvel to see. In many cases the railroad tracks work through the center of the camps with locomotives breaking up ball games and conversations, and throwing cinders down all of the necks in a quarter-mile radius. Sometimes slate dumps burn up to the very doors of the houses. (The lack of transportation forces the miners to live in company houses near the pits.)

It is not surprising that there has been a mass exodus of the young people from the mines. The emigration began during the war when thousands of young miners enlisted voluntarily, though they could have had deferments, in order to escape the mines. Many of them returned several years later, took one look, and re-enlisted. "The army is better than the mines," they said. Of those who did not enlist in the army, many went to metropolitan centers and participated in war work. They refuse to return. No one can pass through a coal camp without being impressed by the general absence of young people, men and women alike. The average age of the men in the pits has gone up to the mid-thirties, an unprecedented figure. During the depression it was customary to lay men off at forty.

But for the older miners escape is impossible. After devoting half a lifetime to the mines it is difficult to find employment elsewhere, difficult to make the personal adjustment, and difficult to forget the smell of coal. This is particularly true of the foreign-born and the Negroes. They have no plot of ground to retire to somewhere in the hills and they have no other skills. In the vicinity of the coal camps there is no other industry to absorb them, and to move a family a great distance into an alien culture is a great adventure which is not especially enticing.

And the psychology of the coal community is a barrier of no mean importance. A man who leaves the pits must have a very legitimate excuse not to incur the scorn of his friends. Even to retire requires something of an apology; the men instinctively consider those who leave the pits as some sort of deserters. There is a certain amount of romance in coal mining. The older miners warn young men to stay out of the mines but themselves regard mining as a way of life which must be defended even though they hate it. As one miner expressed it:

> "It gets you. You don't often quit minin' for good. It gets you where you live, the smell of coal or something. It's the hardest work there is, but it gets in your blood and you ain't satisfied with nothin' else. You ain't satisfied with minin' either, and there you are."

This expresses perfectly the conflicting attraction and repulsion between the miner and the mine. On the one hand the miner takes pride in his work — he considers it a distinction to be a miner. On the other he is repulsed by the abominable living conditions he endures: he is physically and mentally destroyed by his working conditions, and rebuffed by the employer-employee relations.

It is the entire culture of the mining community which destroys the individual and which is responsible for the world-wide hatred of mining. No particular aspect can be assigned the blame: it is the revolting conditions of life which occasion the revolts of the miners.

### *The Miners Sense Their Problem*

The miners themselves, slowly and empirically, but surely, are realizing the quantity and quality of their problem. The inevitable rise in prices which followed each successful strike during the war, and the decline in the quality of goods, taught them the national implications of the struggle for better living conditions in their own industry. The struggles with the government that occurred recently indicated the relationship between the nation as a whole and the coal community, and welded the smaller community more closely together.

The miners, and in particular, their wives, bitterly understand that little has been changed regarding living conditions in the last decade and a half. They remember the hectic war days when it was not uncommon for men to work 18 hours for many days in succession, and when it seemed for a time that it would be possible to save some money and still buy a few long-needed commonplaces. They also remember the Army and Navy "E" flags, the patriotic speeches, the promises about postwar America, and their hopes — but nothing is changed. They know that their houses have not been repaired, that they still have no washing machines, that they still live in coal dust and perpetual smoke, and that there is no likelihood that things will get better. They know that they are getting no younger and that a depression is coming. These are the things which confront the average miner. These cause revolt.

To the basic problem of the miner — the place of the individual in society — the UMWA has no answer. As a massive, brutal, fighting force the purpose of which was to wage implacable war on the operators, the UMWA and its perfect expression, Lewis, were unparalleled. That is unquestionable. But the very victories of the UMWA only moved along the spiral of history to a higher stage and posed problems which the union, an outmoded social form, cannot deal with in any adequate fashion. For the miners understand quite well that a continued succession of strictly economic strikes will avail them but little. This is heard on every side. And it explains the lack of enthusiasm for Lewis' safety strike in April of this year.

But the miners understand equally well that *something* must be done. They are rebelling against their living and working conditions and are beginning to see their problems in a generalized form, in relation to the entire economy and to the state itself. The problem is only now being posed; the coming depression will bring it into a much sharper focus. Whatever action the miners take to solve their problems, it is safe to say that it will come as spontaneously and be as powerful as the rise of the UMWA — and will be considerably more vindictive.

Today the bureaucracy that Lewis has created — which at one time was progressive inasmuch as it centralized the strength of the widely separated mining camps — has become a dead weight on the backs of the miners. It no longer offers the requisite leadership for the struggle; it does not represent the demands of the rank and file. The leaders have fallen behind the men on every front. For example, to the problem of living conditions the union offers absolutely nothing beyond an anemic health and welfare fund which contributes $1000 to the family of a dead miner. Nothing is done about medical service, about housing, about recreation, about race relations. The bureaucrats, isolated from the life of the rank and file for many years, do not even comprehend these problems, much less offer a solution for them.

History is passing beyond the UMWA as it is now constituted. The men look beyond the question of dollars and cents and grasp the essence of their problem, the problem of a stunted individual in a blighted society. They demand new goals, new ideals to lead them into struggle. They retain great confidence in the person of Lewis but in his concrete programs, such as they are, they find but little inspiration. And not only do new perspectives fail to develop, but even the old achievements are threatened as old tactics collapse. Facing the intervention of the government, the UMWA can only maneuver hopelessly, caught in a blind contradiction, unable to oppose the government yet unable to avoid conflict.

As yet no social form or ideology has arisen to channelize the social frustration and potential revolt of the miner. The Communist Party has met with singular failure in its endeavors to corral the miners. Between the defunct and inglorious National Miners Union of a decade and a half ago and the strike-breaking attempts which were a consequence of the Browder line during the war, the Communist goose has been well cooked. However, the Communists, who are not stupid people, altogether, sense the direction events are taking. But the *sine qua non* of Communist penetration on any great scale is the collapse of the Lewis regime. Once Lewis falls, the Communists, who have patriotically hated him in every issue of their every publication for five years, will attempt a belated sally into the coal fields by raising the hoary cry of "we told you so."

It is safe to assume that the Communists will not be alone. Lewis has not made room in his bureaucracy for any lieutenants of note, and his fall, which is impending (though not immediately so), will signalize the opening rounds of a battle royal among hundreds of combatants. The winner of this contest cannot be foreseen but it can be said with all assurance that the outcome will find that individual or organization in control which presents the most adequate program for solving the social problem of the miner.

### *Elements of the Solution*

In its broad outline, the necessary program for the coal community can already be seen. There are three essential phases: (1) the coal industry must be integrated into the national economy; (2) a complete reorganization of the physical aspects of the community according to a social plan; and (3) the integration of the miner and the culture of the mining community into the major flow of national culture.

The first element, the integration of the industry into the national economy, is essential, but in itself meaningless. It is not so much the industry which demands organization as it is the men themselves. It is not even correct to say that the nationalization of coal is a prerequisite of the organization of human welfare and the necessary revolution in living and working conditions which will take place. While it is certainly true that the production of coal must be planned and that fluctuations in employment must be overcome through nationalization of production, it does not at all follow that nationalization will solve any problems in and of itself. All facts point to the contrary. In America today coal production is at an all-time peak, yet the miner is hardly satisfied. In Britain the nationalization of coal means only greater restrictions on the miner. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the Russian miners are not especially entranced by their particular form of state control. *Nationization without social planning means only greater exploitation.*

The rationalization of the production of coal and its integration into the production pattern of the nation must come as a concommitant of the rationalization of the communities and of the physical aspects of culture within the coal area. For instance, present-day coal camps are separated from each other, are small and placed at pit-mouths. They are strictly temporary ventures erected at the least possible expense and designed to be written off as losses when the mine is worked out. An amalgamation of these camps must take place. Dozens of them must be removed from the face of the earth and the families given homes in new brick cities specially erected. (There are many districts underlaid with coal which will see production for half a century or more.) There is every reason to believe that, with modern construction methods, the cost of such a center would be surprisingly low. And the low utility rates for electricity, water and sewage would constitute great savings over the cost of an atempt to provide similar conveniences at present.

Also, the savings which would follow the removal of the camps from the smoke and dirt of the pit, coke and slate dump-area would be tremendous. The depreciation on all things from automobiles to toothbrushes is very rapid when they are subjected to the corrosive fumes and gases always found near mines. The rate of death occasioned by lung diseases would drop rapidly in a better environment. At present it is almost 50 percent higher than for industry as a whole. Sanitation, purified water, and better medical service would lower the disease-rate considerably. Playgrounds for the children and recreational opportunities for the adults would not only diminish the mass disgust with the living conditions which now exist, but would actually pay off in increased productivity within the mines.

### *A New Relationship to Work*

But the basic problem transcends both the planning of production and the erection of model communities, however essential these may be: *it will be vitally necessary to place the miner in a new relationship to his work.* The integration of production and the reorganization of the physical aspects of the community are no more than corollaries of the problem of individual participation in productive planning, and cannot be considered as independent.

The revolt of the miner is the revolt against the atomization of the individual in production. The human organism demands the opportunity for individual expression and purposeful creativity in its activity. The cash nexus as the only nexus between the miner and the mine degrades the individual, breeds discontent, and lowers productivity. Thorough mechanization completed the process of depersonalization of production and reduced the miner to the status of a dependent machine cog which labors in a dark hole. The miner sees himself in this light and stands amazed at the image of what was once a man.

Social frustration, an acute sense of degradation, and revolt at his status is characteristic of almost every miner. The men hate their occupation, hate their communities and hate every aspect of their own lives. The wives and young people are no less impressed by the futility of existence. Yet hatred, among the older miners at least, is not directed at the profession of mining; rather, it is directed at the situation to which the miner and his community have been reduced and at the unknown forces which are to blame. "Things can't go on like this; the working men won't stand for it"— is heard very often among the miners.

With the coming of the depression, the miners will demand a complete reorganization of the coal industry which can provide them with what are regarded as the necessities of civilization. And they will be implacable in their demand to participate as sapient individuals in the process of production. The Lewis bureaucracy will prove to be incapable of offering to the mining masses the kind of advanced, creative leadership that will prove to be necessary. And that bureaucracy will fall. A new, democratic organization capable of expressing the courage and desperation of an oppressed people will supersede it.

Today the coal industry is well advanced into a continuous social crisis. The industry which has been sick for two decades has produced an infinitely more malignant sore — a sick society. Until that society is integrated into the broader culture, and until the individual miners achieve their place as masters of production and of their own lives — until then there will be misery and revolt, but no peace, in the coal fields.

# PROBLEMS OF GERMAN RE-EDUCATION

### Clara Menck

There is no word that is used more and hated more in Germany than the word *re-education.* There is no general feeling of hatred against the occupation as such: it is taken as the natural consequence of defeat, and in the beginning many even took it to be a salvation from a state of affairs that had become unbearable. The question then arose as to what would be the attitude toward the occupation powers that would develop on this basis. And in this respect, the idea of proclaiming re-education as the program of the occupation authorities has not been welcomed. The psychological reaction is very natural: educative measures have a more lasting effect to the degree that they are not declared and felt to be such. The factual discussion is made more difficult because of the claim to superiority which is inherent in every attempt to educate. The Germans — who during their administration of Czechoslovakia and Poland were the first to treat a white people with the attitude of superiority that heretofore had been directed only against the colored races — now felt that they themselves, as the intended objects of a general education, had not only been beaten and deprived of relation to the important political factors, but were now to be treated, in their turn, as backward beings subject to moral insanity.

This alone can explain why the French occupation, despite its economically much more oppressive aspects, is often taken to be more palatable than the American. The preference for the French is not due to any success of the very adroit French cultural propaganda (which is too clearly contradicated by the rigorous measures of de-industrialization and confiscation to have any widespread effect). Rather is is due to the fact that the slogan which governs French occupation policy, *Sécurité,* has a clear and hard factualness with which the individual can come to terms without losing his self-esteem. The French Undersecretary Schneiter explicated this slogan quite clearly some time ago when he stated that the neces-

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sity for the political security of his country would determine both the nature and the length of the occupation. The idea of world security is much less clearly present in the American re-education program, and all of the American measures are therefore clothed in a sort of abstract-ideological garment which naturally invites unfavorable reactions.

It has often been said that the unpopularity of the Germans in foreign countries was due not so much to what they did as to the way in which they did it — with the claim to absolute righteousness of the system that stood behind them. It has now become apparent in Germany that such odium adheres not only to actions inspired by wrong ideologies, but to all political actions that claim to be inspired by morality. The result of this has been that the German now has a criterion given him by the American authorities, which he can use to measure everything they do. The unavoidable harshness of military occupation and of widespread bureaucracy are not experienced with indignation or with a shrug of the shoulders, but excite the smile of an unruly child who has discovered a human frailty in his teacher. Now it is true that Germany is the only country in which the ridiculous is not deadly — otherwise neither Wilhelm II nor Hitler would have been feared — but it does have a clear perception of the deeds of any individual whose actions can be linked easily to a program to which they correspond. Actions that merely infuriate the German when they are done by a Frenchman or an Englishman, are in the case of the American placed in the debit column of a moral ledger, as well. It is not meant to say anything here against the necessity of re-education. For it results from the fact that the Germans, those "metaphysical termites of Europe," are political mischief-makers for much more deeply rooted spiritual causes than, for example, the Japanese, whose imperialism and militarism were impressed on the people in a much more artificial and brutal manner.

The more removed an occupying power is from the country that it occupies, the less capable it is of directly transposing its concrete ways of life and government. The American program exhibits great wisdom when it renounces (at least in theory) the imposition of "Americanism" on vanquished central Europe. I intend to show that great difficulties appear when the attempt is made to depart from this general orientation in concrete instances. Modern democracy is not a definite and obvious molding power as was the Romanity of old; it is, rather, a chance, a potentiality — that is why its content must differ in every country.

### *Initial Difficulties of Re-education*

The re-education program was worked out before the German defeat, and was predicated on two unspoken assumptions: the creation of a *tabula rasa* in Germany through the elimination of the Nazis from all positions of power; and an overcoming of the tensions between East and West. No one was then able to imagine the gigantic repercussions of the existence of the Curzon line, and of the minority policies of the smaller eastern powers — the new mass migrations of people that have affected the structure of Germany as deeply or even more deeply than the war destruction. Nor probably did anyone imagine that it would be impossible to effectuate a more or less satisfactory de-nazification once a certain delay had elapsed after the armistice — otherwise the need for revenge on the part of the German anti-fascist minority would not have been blocked in such a vigorous manner. One wanted to prevent bloody acts of passion, but only such acts would have allowed for a first rough purification. Such acts would have involved innocent victims and would necessarily have had many shortcomings; but their effect would have been far more thoroughgoing than the "cold revolution" via administrative measures which it is attempted to bring about today (through the de-nazification procedures) and which everywhere bogs down halfway. It seems that not only innocently spilled blood asserts a vengeance in history, but also the blood that has not been spilled and that continues to infect the body politic. The German "revolution" of 1918 can serve as a good example.

The number of small fry who pass through the holes in the net of de-nazification laws, the necessity to insure the continued functioning of the German economy, the mass of politically "unknowable" refugees from the East, now make it impossible to implement re-education as a purely spiritual program, as intellectual influence alone. Re-education today must become the all-pervasive, dominant idea of all political activity in Germany, or it will remain completely unsuccessful and will even have opposite results.

But it is precisely here that the greatest difficulties are to be found. Political, military and economic demands of the day continually interfere with plans that have been made with more distant goals in sight. The German, insofar as he is willing to accept a superior guidance, witnesses with astonishment and dismay how those who are supposed to guide instead fail to keep all the strings that they originally held in hand, and how the desired development is continually interfered with by more powerful interests. Many measures taken by the Americans attempt to strengthen the initiative of the Germans, yet this initiative is made impossible because of zonal boundaries and through economic and fiscal measures passed by the Control Council. In the Germany of today an intellectual worker can hardly earn more than 500 marks a month; he is worse fed than a tramway conductor. The idea of justice can not be made to impress people's minds as long as criminal elements among Displaced Persons are not treated with the same rigor as all other criminals. In short, nothing is more unfavorable to education than the image of a well-meaning but inconsistent educator.

### *"The Time of History . . ."*

Once political and economic tensions have lessened, such difficulties may disappear: but it is to be feared that the decisive psychological moment will then already have passed. Waldemar Gurian once made the observation that "the time of history is not the time of men." The huge plans of American policy which reckoned with developments over a period of years — the kind of plans that attined such great success in the military field just because they were taken in good time — failed, in this case, to consider the rate of change of human sensibility. No time was to be lost in Germany after the defeat . . . but the most precious time has been lost. The readiness to welcome and to accept, which existed immediately after the great shock of war and defeat, no longer exists. Immediately after the armistice, huge posters with photos from the concentration camps and the slogan "This is your fault" appeared in the American and French zones. These posters made a strong impression, but — they remained much too long. Their stirring impact was lost in the course of a few weeks, and they then induced a certain stubborness on the part of the population. The KZ film *The Mills of Death* reached the public much too late; it is easy to see by the statistics how the number of spectators diminished progressively in the different cities in which the film was subsequently passed. The impossibility of preparing enough copies of the film in time, caused the failure of one of the strongest educational means.

In general one felt the lack of a detailed plan concerning the use of propagandistic media. Radio stations oscillated between the simple use of typical American programs such as hot music— which didn't go over with the German public — and the continuation of popular songs and ditties from the Nazi days. A part of the German public waited with great expectation for the first American films, which, since they had been popular before, held out the possibility of great positive influence. But the films which finally arrived were not chosen according to political or pedagogical criteria; commercial and private interests were solely determining. There were some good and appropriate films but also the worst kind of war films — and the public found in them more of a resemblance to similar German products than a difference in ideology. Even in September 1946 German motion picture houses were still showing a film that glorified the war effort of the American people — one that could hardly be distinguished from equivalent German products. The situation today is such that old German films draw large crowds; long queues can be seen before the box offices of the theaters that show them. The situation in the theater is very different. The caliber of the American theater was a great surprise to the German public. Many American plays are now produced in German theaters, and they have an excellent influence; but the theater caters only to a small layer of people. Furthermore, the choice of plays to be produced has often not been too happy, witness — *Awake and Sing* or *Arsenic and Old Lace.*

Plans concerning immediate political education were evidently much more integrated than those regarding the cultural sphere. But these plans presupposed a much greater progress in de-nazification than it has been possible to achieve up till now. The German authorities that have been installed in power have shown remarkable skill in building up an autocratic regime behind closed doors. It was thought sufficient to give general directions, and it was forgotten that the complicated net of German planned economy — which has become even more involved through the splitting up into different zones — made it possible to change basic directives through administrative orders. The appeal "to play democracy" which was made to parties, youth organizations, etc. looks somewhat incongruous in front of these facts. The influence of public discussion on domestic happenings is in fact very small; the whole apparatus is so complicated that there always exists the possibility of shoving responsibility, finally, onto the military government and thus disarming criticism. The danger therefore exists that discussion and parliamentarism will again, as in 1918, be accused of consisting only of vain talk. The early introduction of the parliamentary game has led, furthermore, to a strong influx of reactionary elements into the bourgeois parties — especially in Bavaria and northwestern Germany.

### *The Youth*

The attempt is made especially to draw the youth — and in Germany this means people between 20 and 35 — into discussions; but every attempt in this direction shows again that the necessary preconditions for such experiments are still lacking. Attempting to give a personal feeling of self-confidence to young people who lack this feeling because of their education in the Hitler Youth, only too easily serves to draw them together in a new collective in which the "front spirit" provides the determining link.

The support given the old style German youth movement is also not without danger. The frightening alienation from reality that is prevalent here is indeed only a special case of the group egoism that characterizes the whole of German life. It is typical that hardly anything has been done on the German side concerning the urgent problem of delinquent youth, but that there openly arises a claim among the youth themselves that just those who had believed and fought for National Socialism were the real idealists and that they are to be the new leaders — after a dubious conversion. This youth is already too much catered to from the American and the German side, and this very fact hinders it in passing over the shadowline that divides it from adulthood.

The situation concerning the woman question is similar. It is necessary to draw German women away from their indifference and disinclination toward all that is politics. That is why women's organizations patterned after the American models are favored. But it is forgotten that the situation in Germany is very different, that there are quite special reasons which draw German women back from politics as from all practical occupation: a pervasive myth of the special depth of female sensitivity — a myth that has been created by a whole German cultural trend. This myth is catered to as much in the new women's associations as in the old Nazi organizations, and it hinders the fruition of what is precisely the most urgent today: a sober factualness in thinking and feeling. A change in the type of woman would be much more lastingly achieved — though a longer span of time would be required — if the German administration were forced to give to women practical and not only theoretical equality with men in all occupations and professions. This development cannot be stopped anyhow since there now exists a very strong numerical preponderance of women (there are 100 men to 170 women). But such a policy would force German public opinion to rethink and revise the whole German population policy; up till now there has not even been a departure from the Nazi policy of encouraging high birthrates.

### *Democratic Ideology and the Real Situation*

Here, as well as in many other questions, such as that of the eastern refugees — which is too easily "repressed" from German consciousness — there is to be found a most important and positive, if disagreeable, task of re-education, namely, to point to the almost unbearable harshness of the factual situation, which the administration and public opinion somehow still try to hide. It might be correctly argued that such knowledge, given the hunger and lack of even the most ordinary necessities, might drive people into desperation; but one should not forget on the other hand that if one hides the bitter truth one will only recreate new illusions — especially among the youth, which has a special propensity for accepting illusions. The inclination to paint a much prettier picture than the facts warrant very often leads, furthermore, to a situation in which the extremists of both camps, i.e., the Communists and the Nazis, may draw a profit — since they are then the only ones to talk openly of facts which are kept hidden. Just one example: the municipality of Stuttgart neglected during the summer of 1946 to have enough wood cut to insure the heating of households during the winter — they relied naively on the help of the Military Government (this reliance is typical of German mentality). The Communists were the only ones to raise the question in a decided manner, and they thus gained the reputation of being provident city fathers. Here again one sees clearly the great danger in playing with democratic forms when the feeling of true responsibility is lacking.

This danger inherent in the granting of democratic forms while an anti-democratic spirit permeates large layers of the population, is well known from the history of the Weimar Republic. This is especially apparent in regard to German justice, which confounds democracy with a psychologizing interpretation of the law and is unable to render firm judgement. The case of a certain first lieutenant who, in early May 1945 (that is, after Hitler's death) took deserters who had crashed in their plane from their hospital beds and shot them to death, is typical. (Regulations would only have forced him to deliver them to the next highest in command.) He was sentenced to two years in prison; the judgement stressed the youth of the accused, who was 30 years at the time of the deed, and took into consideration the fact that, given the education the accused had received, he must have been convinced that he was doing his duty. Another officer whose pistol had not functioned at the execution was acquitted. Similar cases — and there are many of them — also show where abstract-democratic or pseudo-democratic thinking may lead.

The attitude one must take toward such developments has been expressed well by Dolf Sternberger, editor of the important Heidelberg review, *Die Wandlung:* "No democracy for the enemies of democracy, no freedom for the enemies of freedom." Sternberger touches upon one of the most contradictory phenomena of current German life—a phenomenon that is almost incomprehensible to the outsider—namely that formal democracy is often most strongly defended by those who are its enemies while radical democrats have today to stand for force. This explains why some of the best elements in Germany remain aloof from the too-early play of party life, and why they retain their skepticism concerning the hurried transfer of functions from American to German administration. In addition, there is also the general fact that the transformation from dictatorship to democracy takes place under condition of general need and destitution and is thereby made more difficult. One might ask, more generally, whether democracy and liberalism do not require a certain high level of material life. The healthy play of the various egoisms on which both democracy and liberalism are based presupposes that this egoism will not present itself in too coarse a fashion, and that it will be counterbalanced by a sort of spirit of fair play that is silently taken for granted.

When a German prosecutor stated recently that "morality ends with a daily ration of 1000 calories," he is not to be taken as cynical — nor does his statement apply only to criminal deeds. It also has its implications in political life. The profound decomposition caused by destitution and need lasting for many years cannot really be tested by well-meaning occupation officers who from time to time undergo hunger experiments with German rations. An economy so deeply regimented as the German economy is today, converts democratic forms into a more or less pretty arabesque of public life. These forms wil become meaningful only after the devolution of the regimented economy. Both German and American organizations like to arrange discussions as "forums of democracy"; parties, clubs, radio stations are also active in this regard. Young people especially are invited to discuss the most general and abstract questions that preoccupy them; but it is to be feared that, despite all good will, this only fosters an evil German trend: the propensity for irresponsibility — which cannot be compensated for by dialectical skillfulness. It would make more sense, for example, to get parents and teachers of a school to discuss concrete daily questions and difficulties that arise in school life. And in general, it would be better to center all discussion on everyday problems — as did the mayor of a small town last summer who organized a talk with the women of the town on the shortcomings of food distribution. In such cases, where talking and acting are not divorced from each other, it is really possible to talk of education for democracy in Germany.

### *Idealism and Egoism*

The last great difficulty to be discussed arises from the fact that re-education is naturally an unrewarding task for Americans. The functionary in a colony — in the British Commonwealth, for example — knows that his work will in the long run profit both his country and himself; that is why idealism and egoism can never fall too far apart. But the situation is different in Germany, where it is the intention of the American administration to make itself unnecessary. American authorities therefore work mostly on short range projects, and business interests and political necessities stand in sharp contrast. The man who only wants to do business, or who is solely concerned with power, is not in the right place here; but a great administrative apparatus cannot hope to attract idealists only. The unthoughtful act of one person can destroy more than can be repaired by a hundred well-thought-out decisions. A few examples: if military authorities requisition the swimming pool in Oberammergau for the white American military, allow German girls up to 21 years to use the pool after a previous medical examination for venereal disease, but force the colored American soldiers to bathe in the village pool together with the rest of the population — then all education concerning race questions is turned into nonsense. If the inhabitants of requisitioned houses in cities like Frankfurt and Stuttgart are forced to sell their furniture "because they can buy themselves new ones," and if this furniture then turns up on the black market, the consequence is that all radio programs of the "Voice of America" remain without effect. The individual who takes such action is no longer an individual in the eyes of the Germans — he is an integer of the policy of re-education.

# GERMAN CARTELS TODAY

### George Lobbenberg

American discussions of German cartel problems usually include the Ruhr coal cartels; the steel producer's syndicate with its various sub-branches such as the rolled steel and tube cartels; and finally the great German chemical and heavy industrial trusts, including I.G. Farbenindustrie, Vereinigte Stahlwerke (United Steelworks), Mannesmann, Krupp's, Kloeckner, Hoesch, etc.

Yet, unfortunately, American observers of the European economic scene tend to ignore, or at least minimize, the important fact that trusts are *not* synonymous with cartels—even though certain of their subsidiaries might have been dominating one or the other cartel.

This confusion in terms has recently been worsened by the promulgation of a so-called "Decartelization Law" in the U.S. and British zones of Germany. It states that companies with more than 10,000 employees are to be eliminated or broken up "unless such companies prove that they are not excessive concentrations of economic power." In addition, the law forbids German participation in international and domestic cartel arrangements, as well as prohibiting "combinations in restraint of trade."

## *Cartel vs. Trust*

Simply expressed, cartels are combinations of producers of a given industry whose purpose is to allocate production quotas, limit distribution area, as well as set up price schedules. Such rulings are enforced by means of a more or less rigid supervision of the activities of the group's member firms through a central clearinghouse. The latter can fine violators, depending upon the extent of their excess production or distribution in various areas.

A trust, on the other hand, is an industrial combine either of the vertical, horizontal or "circular" type, whose operations are integrated under a central management which controls all production, marketing, distribution and financing policies. Trusts may operate

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in the form of holding companies, or they may emerge as the result of a series of mergers or consolidations. As we mentioned already: the various units of a given combine may, at the same time, be members of cartels—and, due to their financial and productive capacity, may even dominate the activities of such cartels. This, however, does not make every trust the automatic equivalent of a cartel.

### *German Cartels During World War II*

In reviewing the role of cartels in the over-organized Nazi war machine, we shall not attempt to account for each of the hundreds of small trade associations and cartels whose fate, since 1942, has been a very dubious one. In that year the Speer organization (Reich Ministry of War Production) took all powers of allocation and distribution away from these groups, which had already been united under the Reichsgruppe Industrie, headed by Mannesmann's chief, Wilhelm Zangen.

Productive controls were turned over to the so-called "Rings," industry-wide super-cartels which were to operate under the immeiadte supervision of Speer's ministry. Rings were supposedly able to obtain priorities and allocations for both labor and raw materials directly from the highest authority. But since Reichsgruppe Industrie, with its hundreds of branches and divisions, was not dissolved simultaneously, the twilight existence of its member-groups continued up to the allied occupation of Germany.

Today, Germany's political and economic picture shifts with every move made by the Big Four in Washington, London, Paris or Moscow. Nevertheless, since each of the four zones is gradually being organized in patterns reflecting the basic interests, policies and traditions of their respective occupying powers, the growth of certain specific trends can be observed and reported. Thus we shall now examine the present situation of German cartels within the postwar economy, zone by zone.

### *The Russian Zone*

American observers in Berlin agree with reports of allied correspondents that the Russians have succeeded in establishing a huge, Soviet-controlled super-cartel, named the Sovietische Industrie A.G. (Soviet Industrial Corporation). This organization is reported to be in control of more than 50 percent of the industries of the Russian zone, including the vital coal and chemical industries of Saxony, parts of the textile industries of that region, as well as a number of automotive, machinery and other manufacturing plants.

The Soviet Industrial Corporation is organized on lines not unlike those of the former Speer ministry, except that S.I.C. controls only those industries which Russian occupation authorities consider of interest for their purposes. These are primarily the producers of consumer's goods destined for the Russian market, together with certain important armament and optical firms. The latter group, however, did not remain under their former German managers, as most of the civilian industries did. German war plants thus operate under immediate Russian supervision, with Soviet managers and controllers in all divisions.

Many industrial groups falling under the domination of the S.I.C. have kept their former organizational patterns for purposes of administration. Thus the old cartel, renamed Mitteldeutsche Kohlenverkaufs-Gesellschaft, remains as a sub-unit of the Soviet cartel.

The few positions open to Germans within the Russian economic organizations in Germany are, of course, usually reserved for leading members of pro-Soviet parties. Only a few specialists with well-known Nazi records have remained in their old jobs.

A good summary of Russia's economic policy in Germany was given by Joel Carmichael in his report on the Soviet zone (*The Nation,* January 4, 1947): "An insatiable demand for goods of all kinds . . . has enabled the Russians to turn their zone into a convenient and entirely subordinate addition to their own system of production."

### *The French Zone*

The Saar province is, with the exception of the wine-growing Rhine and Moselle regions, the sole area of economic importance within the French zone of Germany. In this small, but highly industrialized province the French have been applying a rigorous program of economic "degermanization" (not to be confounded with denazification!) Economic ties between the Saar and metropolitan Germany were severed with dispatch and thoroughness, and while most of the representatives of the former Saar managerial class were left undisturbed, their industries are rapidly being integrated into the French economic structure.

The Saar mining industry was sequestered by the French military government in December 1945, and is now working under French management. The region's steel and iron foundries are also operating under French supervision, although no sequestration orders were issued to date. Yet the old Saar cartels have already been taken under the wings of French *comités*—trade associations in charge of French production and distribution schemes.

Custom belts and other equally effective methods aid in speeding up the complete assimilation of the Saar into France's industrial orbit. The region now boasts one of Germany's most modern electrical accessories plants, according to French authorities "transferred by request of the company's management" from Stuttgart to the Saar. This plant, belonging to the Robert Bosch A.G., is now turning out considerable quantities of electrical goods for the benefit of French consumers.

A significant sidelight on the basic French attitude was given by France's representative to the North German Coal Control Commission, General Perrin-Pelletier, as quoted by *Fortune* (December 1946):

"We Frenchmen understand the psychology of the Germans—they want to be given orders without possibility of discussion. We agreed that the miners need more food, housing and consumer's goods. The difference is that we would stand behind him with a whip. Then everybody would have coal. We French take the attitude that every German is or was a Nazi, and if you don't want to kill off all the Germans you have to work with Nazis. In the Saar we did not make the idiotic mistake of denazification. The British are prepossessed by some funny sort of humane feeling. They should concentrate on coal."

### *The American Zone*

After months of preparation, debate and negotiations in Washington, London and Berlin the Decartelization Law was finally promulgated officially on February 11, 1947 in both the U.S. and British zones of Germany. As we already noted above, this law not only contains a number of patent semantic contradictions, but it becomes even more of a theoretical instrument once one examines the numerous exceptions provided for: There are special regulations for the break-up of I. G. Farben. There are others exempting certain subsidiaries of Ruhr industrial combines; and all public utilities, mail and rail services are, of course, excluded from the law's provisions. The same holds true for those commodity distributing organizations to be organized in the future under regional or international auspices. To date these include coal (distributed by a cooperatively owned cartel in the American zone) as well as lumber. Likely additions to the list are wheat, corn, nitrates and other agricultural essentials.

The first five firms to come under the law's terms are, according to the Decartelization Branch of the U. S. Office of Military Government in Berlin:

1. Opel, the General Motors-owned automobile plant at Rüsselsheim near Frankfurt. General Motors, on the other hand, just announced that Opel would begin a $500,000 production program to export Opel parts, with the help of G.M. credits. It is therefore most unlikely that the law will actually be invoked against this company in the near future.
2. Robert Bosch A. G., Stuttgart, important manufacturer of electrical instruments and automotive accessories. One of Bosch's best plants has already been "saved" by removal to the French-occupied Saar province, without either the official knowledge or consent of OMGUS.
3. Metallgesellschaft, and Scheideanstalt, producers of fine high-alloy metals and metal products.
4. Gutehoffnungshütte of Nuremberg, iron and steel mills.
5. M.A.N., affiliate of Gutehoffnungshütte, truck and Diesel engine builders, with plants at Augsburg and Nuremberg.

While it is doubtful whether any of these firms are at present working with more than 10,000 employees, and while it is just as uncertain whether their production will soon attain the 30-percent-of-total-production figure earmarking them as "concentrations of economic power" under the Decartelization Law, these five firms do represent important segments of German industrial capacity.

I. G. Farben firms located in the U. S. zone are being placed under the supervision of 47 German "Trustees," whose duty it will be to run these units as separate corporations, competing with each other in the (supposedly existing) open market. While the German Laender governments have already voted to nationalize all I. G. plants of the zone, this vote has, to date, not obtained the approval of OMGUS.

### *The British Zone*

The Decartelization Law, whose American origin and sponsorship we have already mentioned, was simultaneously adopted by

British "Mil Gov" authorities on February 11, 1947. This fact, together with the widely hailed economic unification of the U.S. and British zones of Germany, should not lead us to the assumption that the British attitude towards the terms of the law, and particularly towards the entire economic theory underlying its structure, is related in any way to that of its American authors.

London realized long ago that it would be politically expedient to "play ball" with those Americans who insisted on the fundamental importance of introducing a law similar to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to the German economic scene. But "Mil Gov" never intended to apply the law's terms to any serious extent—thus again following a traditional Anglo-American pattern. Therefore the simultaneous proclamation was, from the British point of view, more of a face-saving action than a fundamental change of policy.

In a statement to Parliament in November 1946, Bevin definitely committed the British government to the nationalization of Germany's heavy industries. By now most of the key firms in these industries operate under British controllers. These, in turn, come under the jurisdiction of two over-all organizations of the British Control Council: the North German Coal Control Commission at Essen, located in Krupp's palatial Villa Hügel mansion; and the North German Iron & Steel Control Commission in Düsseldorf.

Several significant steps taken by these two commissions prove that, Decartelization Law or not, Bevin's policy is gradually being implemented. With the United Steel Works under British control, the subsidiaries of this and several other steel trusts have already been reorganized into operating companies, with a nominal capital of 100,000 marks: Vereinigte's sprawling Dortmund works are now Hüttenwerk Hoerde A.G.

At Oberhausen the huge Gutehoffnungshütte plant is now working as Hüttenwerke Oberhausen A.G.

Otto Wolff's Bochum mills are now Eisen & Stahlwerke Bochum A.G., and Klöckner's Haspe plant is now Hüttenwerk Haspe A.G.

These plants do not fall under the Decartelization Law, and can therefore operate at their maximum capacity, inasmuch as labor, fuel and raw material restrictions permit this. Other firms likely to be reorganized in a similar form include the Mannesmann Tube combine, Hoesch A.G., Krupp's, the latter already under British control.

Possible "victims" of the law include the Henkel soap combine, with headquarters in Düsseldorf, I.G.'s sprawling Leverkusen plant, and the I.G. affiliate, Dynamit A.G. at Troisdorf.

At the same time the old, established Ruhr cartels which used to dominate the economic scene of western Germany continue to function, even if under partly changed names. British economic policy-makers, realizing that cartels provide the perfect transitional form of administration in changing from a private to a state-owned economy, have made no serious moves to abolish or bandon the Ruhr's cartels. Thus it can be seen that few of the basic industries of the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial region will be seriously affected by the decartelization "program" of the British Control Council.

### *Nationalizing German Industry*

Should press reports of a coming political consolidation of the U.S. and British zones be confirmed, it will be interesting to observe how officials of the two zones will adjust their policies towards each other. In view of the present German economic situation, the British position would seem to be a more logical one. A planned economy is actually the only practicable method which Germany can use to work itself out of its catastrophic economic situation.

Thus rigid governmental supervision will be required for a long period of time, and a new group of German managers will have to be trained and put in office by the Allies—since the former managerial class of Germany's heavy industries have proved to be utterly unreliable from a political point of view. Therefore, because of the personnel question, as well as the more important basic problem of preventing a new accumulation of economic power in the hands of a few industrial combines, the nationalization of the Ruhr's heavy industries appears as the only possible solution under the present circumstances.

But while certain American spokesmen, among them Walter Lippmann and the Alsop brothers, have recognized the need for a clear U.S. policy of nationalization of German industry, and in spite of the open vote of German Laender governments in favor of such a program, U.S. administrators in Berlin have insisted on continuing their dual economic policy: the combination of a decartelization program with the stimulation of an artificial and theoretical free-enterprise system in Germany. Only the future can tell whether this legalistic and unrealistic approach to an urgent economic problem will be able to satisfy the very real and concrete productive needs of Germany and its European neighbors.

# TRENDS IN FRENCH UNIONISM

### Pierre Monatte

Arthur Koestler, reporting in the Sunday magazine section of the New York *Times* on his recent visit to France, announced discovering in the French market place a famous horse—the Trojan horse of Russian totalitarianism with its forces ensconced within the French state and ready to seize power.

Koestler reports correctly that the French Trade Union Federation (CGT) is to be found within this horse and that it constitutes the Russian Czar's (1947 version) most important battalion of French Cossacks.

Yet in relation to the whole picture, Koestler is half—perhaps even more than half—wrong. He failed to see all that he should have seen. Had he looked closer, he would have discovered not merely one Trojan horse but two. They have kept a watchful eye on one another during the last three years. They eat their oats side by side; when one moves, the other does also. It is almost as if they were not only stable-mates but also accustomed to working together in harness.

Furthermore, if Koestler had put his ear to the flanks of the horse that he did see—the one containing the CGT—he would surely have been intrigued by the strange rumblings to be heard from its belly. There is great agitation there. The CGT does not have a peaceful conscience in relation to the course it has taken of late almost against its better judgment.

The individual unions and federations which comprise the CGT ask themselves where it is all going to lead.

Since the days of the "liberation," the French working class has been caught between a double menace of a *coup de force*: the Stalinists on one side and the de Gaullists on the other. Both these forces will doubtlessly continue to exist and threaten for some time to come.

Both these bodies of storm troops, of course, mask their prepara-

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tions and conceal their true objectives. When M. Depreux, Minister of the Interior, finds his personal telephone wire tapped, he does not know immediately whether it is the Stalinists or the de Gaullists who have been at work.

The French Stalinists (one must call them that instead of "Communists" for they trample daily on the basic principles of Communism, the class struggle and internationalism) have apparently renounced at this juncture any thought of a *coup de force*. They are attempting to clear for themselves a road to power by legal means. It is to be noted in passing that Hitler too rejected the *putsch* and turned to the ballot-box later to force old Hindenburg's hand.

Regardless of how the Stalinists hope to achieve their ends, however, will the CGT subordinate its own aims and work "for the King of Prussia" as we used to say, or—to phrase it more appropriately for our time—"for the Czar of Russia"? This is the problem which needs to be discussed.

### *Tradition of Union Independence*

Koestler is probably too much an aristocrat of the press to believe that workers, unions and union members, have thoughts distinct from (and sometimes sharply opposed to) those of political parties. Such, however, was the situation in France for 50 years and I believe it remains the case even today.

It was due neither to chance nor to the youth and inexperience of the French union movement that it proclaimed its independence of parties and governments. On the contrary, this decision was taken after the experience of a century of struggle. It was a lesson derived from the experience of the whole history of our movement.

Is this tradition dead today? I do not believe so. We are merely passing through an eclipse. This is not the first phenomenon of that sort we have witnessed. It will pass, just as it did on previous occasions.

One cannot deny that the Stalinists have taken over in brilliant fashion the key positions in the CGT. They are now in process of integrating themselves, discarding the principles and methods of the past, and applying their own principles and methods. At the moment they are extremely careful not to create the impression that the independence of the union movement is at an end. They do not preach their creed which is unified direction of the unions by the party. But they practice it and that's what counts. Still the very fact that they do not dare say what they think, or confess what they do, proves that they are not yet sure of their power. They realize that they would crush the spirit of the great majority of workers who follow them if they were to speak out openly.

### *Distrust of Politics*

Many trade union leaders abroad—and a number in France also—think that the old revolutionary French syndicalism is outmoded. It seems to me that they are very much mistaken. French syndicalism represents a phase that has not yet been attained in other countries. The French working class has had the sorry privilege to have made a number of political revolutions from which it has benefited very little. It fought courageously in 1793, 1830, 1848, and again in 1871 but it was first the *grande* and then the *petite* bourgeoisie that took the raisins out of the cake. If the French workers are to fight again, they want to fight for their own emancipation.

This explains the French workers' instinctive distrust of politics and their belief in an economic revolution which would transform their daily lives. The CGT has often been attacked in the past for its "anti-parliamentarianism." The accusation was unjustified, but it is true that unionists had lost their faith in politicians and believed that they could manage without them.

One of the main characteristics of the CGT today—this CGT which has become a fief of the so-called Communist Party—is that the politicians have returned. This comeback by the politicos is still in part an aftermath of the Russian Revolution. Viewed from afar, this revolution still exerts some of the glamour of its early years which redounds to the benefit of those who speak in its name. In part, also, the influence of Communist politicians in the CGT is because of the impact of a party which chooses its deputies from the ranks of the working class. But above all it is due to human laziness. How good it would be if pigeons, already roasted, would fall into our mouths! How convenient if men of good will, a generous state, a party of hail-fellows-well-met could bring us emancipation without any effort on our part. Or perhaps there can be a kind of labor organization which will function in our behalf in somewhat the same fashion as the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals operates in its field!

The Comrade Deputies and Comrade Ministers, however, can do very little to change the condition of the working class. One even discovers that a "Communist" Minister of Labor, who only yesterday was Secretary of the Federation of Metal Workers, suddenly emerges as an expert in sabotaging and breaking strikes. The famous strike of the printers last year is now known as "the Croizat strike" after the Communist minister who broke it.

The French workers are now learning very rapidly that one can rely as little on the generosity of the state and on the good will of parties as on the "big hearts" of the bosses; that one is always best served by oneself; that one should never count on anything except organization of the working class. This was the meaning behind the slogan, "Independence of the Union Movement!" "Independence" in this connection meant independence of the working class from the boss, from the state and from political parties. The union movement grew by the maximum effort of all its members for daily defense of working class interests and for ultimate liberation from the proletarian status.

The CGT will ultimately be forced to go back to its 1906 constitution. Even in the days when it did not act in accord with this document, it was forced to pay lip-service to it. Nor have the Stalinists dared to strike from the statutes of the CGT the clauses pertaining to union independence.

The union movement of today needs independence as much as did the union movement of 1906—a little more so in fact. This is scarcely the moment for conformity and compromise.

### *The Historical Background*

In developing its orientation, French revolutionary syndicalism owes considerable, perhaps, to the divisions that existed within the socialist movement. For a long period there were at least four or five socialist parties: Guesdists, Allemanists, Jauresists, Blanquists —not to mention Anarchists. If a union tied itself to one of these parties, it was politically labeled and lost—its power of attraction certain to be expended in internal quarrels. That is why the first attempt to create a federation of unions, the *Fédération Nationale des Syndicats,* influenced by the Guesdists, did not succeed in imposing its will on the whole union movement. But later the Federation of Labor Exchanges *(Fédération des Bourses du Travail),* originally also influenced by a socialist trend but rapidly becoming independent, gained a remarkable ascendancy—especially under leadership of Fernand Pelloutier (1895-1901). The CGT was in existence in 1895 but it did not gain any considerable influence until 1902. It was then that the French government undertook to tame the unions—an effort in reaction to which the CGT and Federation of Labor Exchanges united their forces. The CGT was reborn in this period and the basic organizational structure developed at that time has been maintained ever since.

The united union movement of the early 1900's engaged in historic battles for the 8-hour day, for the right of a weekly day of rest, against private employment agencies, etc. Revolutionary syndicalists fought against the reformist trend in the unions but proved in action that they knew very well how to fight for reforms. (Reforms and reformism are two distinct things.)

The year 1906 marked the high tide of labor activity of that period. These were the days of the great propaganda campaigns for direct action, for the general strike, and against militarism and war. In 1906 at the Amiens convention the CGT declared that while syndicalism stands for the coordination of workers' efforts and for immediate demands, it also struggles for full emancipation which can be attained only through the expropriation of the capitalist class by means of the general strike. To the unions, which at present are primarily defense organizations, the convention assigned the task of ultimately becoming the organism of production and distribution for the new society, the basis of social reorganization for the future world.

The Amiens convention marked the victory of the revolutionary current over reformist trends within the CGT. Even such strongholds of reformist tradition as the printers' union voted for the Amiens constitution, although with some reservations concerning the general strike. Independence of the union movement from both political parties and governments was endorsed practically unanimously.

In the previous year (1905) the French socialist movement had become unified. Now two powerful united forces, the union and socialist movements, faced each other. Jaures, however, did not choose to continue indefinitely a fight against revolutionary syndicalism. He accepted the political independence of the unions as a *fait accompli.* Certain militants of the CGT were invited to write for *L'Humanité,* Socialist Party organ. There was a notable improvement in relations facilitated by the conciliatory attitude of Jaures and especially of Vaillant, who defended the CGT against the last assaults of Guesde's lieutenants. Jaures, always animated by a spirit of conciliation, calmed the waters in the Socialist Party, and the CGT, which had just passed through an internal crisis, was also inclined to a conciliatory attitude. The Amiens decisions remained in force but the atmosphere in which they were applied had changed considerably.

### *Debacle of 1914*

With the coming of World War I, the CGT was subjected to its great test. It was a period of trial for all labor organizations—economic as well as political. They did not succeed in blocking the road to war. This constituted a defeat and testified to their powerlessness.

The French CGT could claim with justice that all its earlier efforts to have the Trade Union International consider the war problem had been blocked by the other union federations—particularly by the German trade union federation—but this provided little consolation. The German trade unions had taken the position that all questions of this kind were to be decided by the party. When the German Social Democracy and the Socialist International had gone bankrupt in the face of war that bankruptcy also implicated the Trade Union International.

Could the CGT alone have thrown the monkey-wrench of the general strike into the machinery of war as its earlier resolutions had enjoined it to do in such a crisis? Clearly there was no possibility of this since such measures would have had to be taken simultaneously on both sides of the border by union federations having confidence in each other and by workers inspired by a common feeling of brotherhood.

Thus it became necessary to salvage out of this defeat what could be saved and to maintain in some fashion the spirit of working class internationalism. It was this sentiment which led the CGT minority, rallying around Merrheim and Bourderon, to send representatives to the international socialist and anti-war conference at Zimmerwald. The CGT majority, on the other hand, ranged itself at the side of the government.

### *Splits and Splitters*

The differences between the minority and majority finally culminated in the split of 1922. This split was precipitated almost automatically by events rather than by the conscious action of those who participated in it. It is true nevertheless that most of the tendencies which were then fighting each other in the union movement really wanted it. Only the revolutionary syndicalist tendency—to which I belonged—considered it criminal to split the unions. Those most impatient for a complete break were, on the one hand, the partisans of collaboration with governmental bodies such as the International Labor Office and, on the other, the Anarchists and the then-new Communist tendency grouped around Frossard. (It was this same Frossard who in later years broke with the Communist Party and became a Minister himself.)

At the time of the split the two resulting trade union federations were about equal in strength. Fifteen years later the CGT had regained nearly its old strength whereas the Communist-dominated CGTU had lost about two-thirds of its initial membership. These losses were occasioned by internal divergencies which existed from the very beginning, but above all by the rigid control of the new organization by the Communist Party. Whoever failed to accept the dictates of the CP was forced to leave the CGTU. The latter was dying a slow death when the attempted fascist coup d'état in February 1934 caused the two federations to reunite. This unity was shattered again in September 1939 when the Communist union leaders accepted the Russo-German pact and were eliminated from the CGT.

After World War II unity was again re-established. Under cover of this unity, the Stalinists have succeeded in capturing control of the central bodies of the CGT, its main industrial and most regional federations. Thus the CGT is at the moment the main mass army of the Stalinists. It is this CGT that moves within the Trojan horse which Koestler saw on the market place in France.

## *What Next for the C.G.T.?*

Will the CGT continue for long to serve as the mass base for the French National-Communist Party? French unionists can be fooled some of the time, but not for long. They can be told that their fault is excessive individualism and they will prove immediately that they can be disciplined—even too disciplined. But to order them to march like blind men, to march militarily, to follow-the-leader like a flock of sheep as was done in the celebration of July 14th last is going too far. The French unionists know that the policies that led France to the abyss of 1939 and 1940 were fundamentally wrong—and they ask for something different—radically so. They are ready to supply the necessary effort that will be required of them in this respect. But they do not know what this "something different" could be nor what kind of effort is necessary to bring it about. What is being proposed to them?

General de Gaulle proposes a policy of *grandeur* which means nothing but a return to the past: military *grandeur*, the frog that wants to be as big as a cow, the Strong State after an old and well-known model. General de Gaulle may be able to assemble quite a crowd around him but he will not be able to rally the workers. He will win only those classes which profited from the system of the past. His Trojan horse may create a stir but it will not go far.

Frachon and Thorez propose that the CGT model itself after the Russian state—not, to be sure, the state Lenin outlines in *State and Revolution,* but the concrete Russian state of 1947 with its police tyranny, forced labor, absence of all liberty, and totalitarianism which exceeds even that of Nazi Germany.

Even as early as 1945 a Communist union leader dared to say, "The strike is an arm of the trusts." Another CP union leader declared in December 1944: "Patience, patience, when Germany is sovietized, *then* will be the moment to act. *Then* we can sovietize everything and the Anglo-Americans will be thrown out of Europe."

All in all this amounts to an effort to recreate in France the institutions of 1947 Russia—including Russian imperialism. But naitonalization conceived in such a spirit can only incorporate the union bureaucracy with the state bureaucracy and both will be a heavy burden on the backs of the workers.

So it is that this other Trojan horse cannot fool the people too long either. It can operate only while it is dark and neither Frachon, Thorez, nor their master, Stalin, can prevent the day from breaking and light from spreading across the sky.

Present indications are that the French unionists will soon begin to stir violently. There are today two currents that oppose the Stalinists in the unions. There is the former CGT majority grouped around Jouhaux and Bothereau who may seek to bring about a situation similar to that of September 1939 when French nationalism discovered it had been betrayed by Russian nationalism. Jouhaux and his aides have put quite some water into the red wine of the CGT constitution of 1906. They still talk of the independence of the union movement but they have in fact linked themselves to the government and to the Socialist Party through their policies of collaboration with governmental bodies.

There is another current, its representatives eliminated from top posts by the leaders of both the old CGT and the CGTU, but still by no means dead among the rank and file in unions and factories. This current is the legitimate heir of revolutionary syndicalism, still faithful to the class struggle and to internationalism. This tendency is still dispersed in a number of uncoordinated groups and nuclei. If this current succeeds in regrouping itself within the CGT, the fate of the Trojan horse that Koestler discovered will soon be settled.

# RUSSIAN COLONIZATION II

**Walter Kolarz**

### *Strategic Colonization*

Had Russia applied to the new territories she obtained through the Second World War the initial principles of the highly theoretical "policy on nationalities" proclaimed in the years immediately following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the organization of these provinces would have been roughly as follows: the Soviet portion of East Prussia would have been transformed into a small German Soviet Republic; the southern portion of Sakhalin, inhabited by nearly 400,000 Japanese, would have been similarly converted into an embryo Japanese Soviet Republic from which to carry Communist propaganda into the Japanese Empire; the Karelian Isthmus containing the third largest Finnish town, Viborg, would have been included in the Karelian-Finnish Soviet Republic; an autonomous Magyar District would have been formed in the Karpatho-Ukraine, which was ceded by Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union in July 1945.

Nothing that has actually been done in the solution of the new territorial problems accords with the earlier principles. The demand has simply been that the Russian people must be compensated for their gigantic losses in the war and rewarded for their efforts in bringing about the final victory over Germany and Japan. Yet this too is theory to some extent, for the truth is that the strategic outposts in the extreme west and extreme east of the Soviet Union have to be manned by the most reliable people. And who, from the point of view of the central State authorities, can be more reliable, more loyal to Russia than the Russians? A widespread campaign has been started to popularize the new territories as settlement areas; pamphlets are distributed which describe the riches particularly of Southern Sakhalin; and the advantages of settling in the new Soviet districts are eagerly discussed on the collective farms — on the initiative of the Communist cells. Official propaganda speaks of the spontaneous desire of Russians to go to the new lands,

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of the "genuine patriotism" which leads them almost to urge the government to grant traveling facilities. Though it is usual in the Soviet state to present everything that has to be done for reasons of state as originating on the people's initiative, the Russian peasants in fact seem to have preserved their "wanderlust" and their inborn ability to adapt themselves to different geographical surroundings and diverse climatic conditions. Thus no special measures of coercion should be necessary to induce them to settle in the new outlying territories. We may believe, therefore, that the collective farms — just as formerly the old Russian village communities — are sending out their *khodoki,* their special trusted men, to explore the new settlement areas. There is, however, the difference that the Soviet *khodoki* do not go to the settlement areas themselves but obtain their information in Moscow from the Central Settlements Board now attached to the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR instead of to the USSR as previously.

The recruitment of settlers may be the easier in that Russian colonists are not forced to go to any areas where they would have to do pioneer work as so often in the past. In East Prussia, for instance, though they found a war-ravaged country, it contained many farmsteads more or less intact, and cottages of better quality than those in the Russian villages they had left. According to official Soviet sources, collective farmers from at least 12 districts have been involved in the westward move to the agrarian hinterland of the new Soviet port of Koenigsberg. Thousands came from the nearby Byelorussian districts of Minsk, Mogilev, Bobruisk, land of the new Soviet port of Koenigsberg. Thousands came from Bryansk, Orel and the Moscow region — all areas which have suffered in the war. But there are also colonists from the regions of Kostroma, Kirov and Yaroslavl which have not been affected by military operations.

The peasant settlers are greatly assisted by state subsidies in the form of special allocations of cattle, poultry, seeds and agricultural implements. A big tax relief has been granted to everyone going to East Prussia and it may be presumed that the Collective Farm Statute will be less strictly applied there, and in all other areas to be colonized, than in the crowded central Russian districts. There is likely to be a more liberal margin for individual peasant property in land and cattle at the periphery of the *kolkhoz* in East Prussia than in Russia proper. By April 1947, 12,317 families of Russian collective farmers had already settled in East Prussia.

The colonization is not confined to the peasant element. Many workers from Central Russia have gone to the Soviet portion of East Prussia to staff the power stations, the local industries, the harbor installations, the big wagon factory at Koenigsberg, and the Machine Tractor Stations springing up all over the district. Representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia, too, doctors and teachers in particular, follow in the wake of the peasants and workers.

The aim is to transform Soviet East Prussia into a "genuine Russian land" where nothing will recall the German past. The area is now called "Kaliningrad Region," with its center, Kaliningrad, subdivided into districts bearing the names of "Red Flag," the "Guards," and of General Bagration, who fought against Napoleon. The big railway junction of Insterburg has been given the name of "Cherniakhovsk," commemorating General Cherniakovsky who fell in the early stages of the Red Army offensive against the then Nazi bulwark, East Prussia. Friedland, the scene of a Russian military defeat in the war against Napoleon, has become "Pravdinsky"; and the name of Tilsit, where Czar Alexander I concluded a humiliating peace with Napoleon, is likewise erased from the map — and replaced by "Sovietsk."

The colonization of the Kaliningrad Region differs from other Russian colonization drives because it is coordinated with a general westward move of the Slavs carried out under the auspices of Russia, and on Russia's initiative. The settlement of a few hundred thousand Russians is only a small part of an operation in which the bulk of the human material invested consists of Poles and Czechs, who have contributed five and two million people respectively. Russian treatment of the remnants of the German population in East Prussia, however, compares favorably with the completely negative attitude adopted by both Poles and Czechs toward the German problem. Thus at the beginning of 1947 there were 30 German schools in East Prussia as against 149 Russian ones, which shows both the survival of a German minority and the granting of cultural minority rights by the Soviet authorities. So Russia, despite the very marked nationalist revival and the abandonment of any really generous policy on nationalities, at least does not exhibit the same degree of chauvinism as the minor Slavs.

### *Russia in the Northwest Pacific*

Russian's annexation of Southern Sakhalin (Karafuto) and the Kurile Islands is politically and historically far more important than her annexation of Bessarabia, Eastern Poland or even of the Baltic States. In all the latter cases the vanquished were small nations; the conquest of these areas means a local, strategic strengthening of the Soviet borders enabling the Russians to exercize greater control over seas of secondary importance in world politics — the Baltic and the Black Sea. The annexation of Karafuto and the Kuriles, on the other hand, coupled with the re-establishment of Russian rights in Port Arthur and Port Dairen, points to the resumption of an active Russian policy in the Northern Pacific where Russia has been in continuous retreat for over 100 years. The former Russian "North Pacific Empire," more a name on the map than a reality, was created by a few Russian pioneers and fell to pieces when Russia sold Alaska and the Aleutian Islands to the United States in 1867. The collapse became complete when Russia abandoned the Kurile Islands to Japan in 1875, and then lost the southern half of Sakhalin by the Peace of Portsmouth in 1905.

The importance of the reconquest, particularly of Southern Sakhalin in 1945, can only be fully realized by taking into account the grave danger of Japanese attack that threatened Northern Sakhalin in the inter-war period. For five years, 1920 to 1925, the Japanese were actually in military occupation of Sakhalin. Even after the withdrawal of the Japanese troops, Northern Sakhalin was still to some extent part of the Japanese "co-prosperity sphere," for the Soviet government was not strong enough to refuse the coal and oil concessions that were granted to Japan for a 45-year period. These concessions survived the general liquidation of Russia's foreign concessions during the period of the second Five-Year Plan. At the beginning of this period Japan controlled a third of Northern Sakhalin's coal production. Only the precarious situation in which Japan was placed in 1944 through the increasing breakdown of her European allies, and the growing military pressure exerted by the Americans, compelled the Japanese government to relinquish the Northern Sakhalin concessions.

As long as the expanding imperialism of Japan was not checked, the Soviet Union remained constantly apprehensive lest Northern Sakhalin might one day fall to the Japanese. Russian colonization, successful as it may be in the land of the Yakuts, Bashkirs and Kazakhs, was no match for Japanese colonization in Sakhalin. Both Russia and Japan invested human material in their respective parts of Sakhalin. It was a race for supremacy in the Northwest Pacific, in which the Japanese had the advantage. Karafuto is the natural continuation of the Japanese main islands, close to the overpopulated Japanese territories from which settlers could come. But Soviet Sakhalin is thousands of miles away from the big Russian centers. Moreover, from the point of view of climate and harbor facilities, Karafuto was likewise more favorably placed than the northern half of the island. Nevertheless, Russian colonization in Sakhalin worked miracles. Since Czarist times, when the famous writer Chekhov declared that the Island was quite unsuitable for human habitation, the population has increased over tenfold. In 1945 when Russia celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the liberation of Northern Sakhalin, there were 17,500 school children alone —more than the total population before the 1917 Revolution.

Yet the Russian achievement fell far short of the results of Japanese colonization in Karafuto where the population increased from 106,000 in 1920 to almost 400,000 in 1945. Thus Japanese and Russians still remained in a ratio of three to one. At all other decisive points on the Soviet borders the Russians have the advantage of a greater population pressure. Large and prosperous cities are situated near the western and southern borders of the Union and the disadvantage of empty or sparsely populated areas lay with the neighboring countries, such as Finland, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan. The only exception was in the Soviet Far East where Sakhalin in particular was the Achilles' heel of Russian colonization and Russian expansionist policy. The victory over Japan in 1945 was the great turning point in the destiny of the Pacific. For Russia it resulted in the attainment of a security in the Far East which her settlers, by themselves, had been unable to ensure. However, settlers are still a valuable safeguard, and thousands of them are pouring into Sakhalin.

The first Russian fishermen, mining experts and architects came to Karafuto immediately after the Red Army occupation forces. A stream of colonists followed, coming from the most distant parts of the homeland — according to a Soviet reporter in *Pravda*, from Smolensk, Ryazan, Kaluga, Kostroma and the wider outskirts of Moscow itself. The possession of Southern Sakhalin enables the Soviet government to enlarge considerably the Soviet fishing industry, thus wresting from the Japanese a part of the leading role they had played in the world's fisheries. By the end of 1946 there were 18,000 new Russian colonists in Southern Sakhalin employed in the fishing industry. Soviet newspapers have much to say about the victorious entry of Russian culture, the increased number of Russian schools, the opening of a Russian theatre in the town "Yuzhnesakhalinsky," known as Toyohara under Japanese rule. There is even a new song:

*The houses all look new again*
*The grass is thick, green pile.*
*Sakhalin, O Sakhalin,*
*Glorious Russian Isle.*

On one point only is there complete silence: the status and fate of the Japanese population of the island. The Japanese in Karafuto did not form an alien upper class as in Korea, but constituted almost the entire population. In the new Soviet atlas for secondary schools, the ethnographic map of the Union indicates that Southern Sakhalin is a completely Russian land without "minorities." Even if this does not record the exact state of affairs, it does at least illumine the Russian colonization program. The Japanese inhabitants are, in fact, being gradually re-transferred to the overcrowded main islands of Japan.

While Sakhalin is a vital fuel, timber and food supply area for the entire Soviet Far East, the economic value of the Kurile Islands is insignificant; but they have great strategic importance. The 32 Kurile Islands firmly lock up the Okhotsky Sea, making it a Russian lake. From these islands Japan can be kept in check militarily. And they are equally useful as potential stepping-stones to the Aleutians and Alaska. True, their strategic value is to some extent diminished by the fact that they are one of the foggiest places on earth, being covered by impenetrable fog for some 20 days every month. The Japanese, it seems, were not tough enough to endure the hardships of the climate and they rather neglected the Islands. Thus they were unable to make full use of them in the Pacific War. Japanese statistics indicate that not more than 15,000 people lived in the archipelago. The northern islands had no inhabitants at all during the winter months.

Official Soviet sources, referring ironically to Japanese incapacity to colonize the chain of islands, assert that the Russians would do the job properly — and proudly announced that new Russian colonists on the northernmost islands had held out throughout the winter. Only the youngest and most enthusiastic Soviet citizens are considered fit enough to participate in the colonization of the archipelago. This is why an appeal was issued to Komsomol members, confidently relying on their spirit of adventure and their patriotism. Konstantin Badigin, a "Hero of the Soviet Union," after himself visiting the Kurile Islands, told Soviet youth in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*: "Here (in the Islands) a wide field is opening for the constructive, energetic activity of your youth. May our boys and girls remember their distant ancestors, those fearless seafarers, untiring explorers, who centuries ago did such a great deal to make the Kurile Islands ours and may they give their strength to the rebirth of these far-off, genuinely Russian lands."

No doubt Soviet youth will obey the call, will go to the Kurile Islands just as they went to *Komsomolsk-on-Amur* at a time when this far eastern city had but a single street of primitive timber houses, unromantically called "First Provisional Street." To provide for the children of the new settlers a secondary school has already been built in the Russian settlement recently named "Severokurilsk."

### *Liquidated Peoples*

Two types of Russian colonization under the Soviet regime have so far been considered. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the colonization by Russians is simply due to the economic, technical and numerical superiority of Russians and Slavs over the peoples in the territories concerned. In the case of the new Soviet territories annexed through military conquests the triumph of the Russian people has been safeguarded mainly by the flight or compulsory transfer of the previous inhabitants.

A third type of Soviet colonization, finally, refers to areas within the old borders of the Union where the non-Russian population has been forcibly removed, atomized over the whole territory of the Union, and literally expunged from the ethnographic map of the USSR. Thus the new statistics make no mention of a number of peoples who in the 1939 census totaled far more than two million. These were: Germans, 1,423,534; Chechens, 407,690; Crimean Tartars, 202,000 (1936); Kalmucks, 134,327; Ingushi, 92,074; and Balkarians, 42,660.

By taking the most drastic measures against these peoples and abolishing their Autonomous Republics, the Soviet regime has accepted a thesis which the Bolsheviks previously rejected as un-Marxian, namely, the existence of "good" and "bad" peoples. The distinction in itself implies an ideological capitulation to nationalism. After having publicized their "new approach" to the problem of nationalities for over 25 years — and, indeed, after trying very hard to find it — the Soviet regime has come to the conclusion that there are "bad peoples" who must be treated in the same way as, or even worse than they were in Czarist Russia.

The disappearance of such peoples as the Chechens, Crimean Tartars or Kalmucks does not concern students of ethnology only, as if it were an event occurring at the periphery of human civilization and having no effect on world politics. On the contrary, the destiny of the peoples in question is closely intertwined with the destiny of Europe. The recent mass shifting of populations in Europe was made possible just because the transplating of entire peoples to remote places has the approval of the ruling strata in Russia. Without the agreement and advice of the Soviet government, the big reshuffle of populations after the Second World War, affecting Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany, could never have been carried out. The advice was based on a specifically Russian experience. The Soviet government and the Russian people think in terms of "unfinished spaces"— that is, in terms of a developing country where peoples can be reshuffled according to the needs of state economy and defence. They apply this line of thought to Central Europe schematically, notwithstanding the totally different conditions there.

### *Crimean Tartars*

The liquidation of the Crimean Tartars as an ethnic group, and their removal from their Crimean homeland by the Soviet government, is but the last act of a long process which started when the Empress Catherine II established a Russian protectorate over the Crimea in 1774 and annexed it in 1783. The Crimean Tartars were no backward people in need of tutelage. They had built up a militarily vigorous and economically flourishing state. Gardening, the cultivation of vines and tobacco, silkworm cultivation and cattle breeding had reached a high standard. They traded successfully with the Mediterranean world, exporting cotton and silk materials and great quantities of wheat. One hundred years after the Russian conquest of the Crimea a Russian writer remarked sadly that only traces remained of the former wealth of the country. The reason for the decline was the gradual exodus of the Tartars. Their tragedy began immediately after the conquest. The first great trek to Turkey began in 1784. In this first emigration period, between 1784 and 1790, many thousands of Tartars left the peninsula. But it was not only emigration that took them away from their homes on the Crimean coast. They were also victims of a military-political action such as the Russian authorities often applied to newly conquered peoples; they were transferred from the strategically important positions where they lived to other parts where they could be more easily controlled.

Again there were minor emigrations in 1807 and 1811, during the Russo-Turkish wars when the sympathies of the Crimean Tartars were with Turkey. The second large-scale emigration set in after the Crimean War. In the years 1859 to 1863, according to official data, 181,000 Tartars left the peninsula and the adjoining areas that had been part of the historic Crimean state, while another 120,00 joined in an illegal emigration. This new wave of Tartar emigration affected 784 villages, many of which were entirely depopulated. The reason for this second large emigration was the oppresive rule of the Russian authorities during the Crimean War. Right from the outset the Tartars were regarded as enemy agents and many were indiscriminately arrested. The Russian authorities tried to replace the emigrants by bringing in not only Russian and Ukrainian colonists but also Germans, Bulgars, Jews, Czechs and others.

When the Crimea became part of the Soviet Union the Tartar element was less than one-fourth of the population. Nevertheless, the Soviet government for propaganda reasons — possibly to please the million Turkic people of the USSR or perhaps to impress the people of Kemal Ataturk's Turkish Republic — transformed Crimea, on paper, into Crimean Tartaria. However, the Tartar Soviet Republic was still-born, not only because of the numerical weakness of the Tartars but also because the Communist Party gained only a slight influence over them. As late as 1936, the Communist Party in the Crimea had only 13.9 percent Tartar members. The Crimean Tartar Republic would probably have come to a peaceful end sooner or later, just as the other Autonomous Soviet Republics will disappear one day. The Russian-German war, however, precipitated developments.

From official Soviet sources it appears that the loyalty of the Crimean Tartars to Russia in the Second World War was as doubtful as the Czarist authorities considered it to be in the Crimean War. Over 20 years of socialist Soviet education does not seem to have forged any stronger links than did 130 years of Czarist rule. There were Crimean Tartar police formations assisting the Germans, but such groups were set up in all German-occupied countries. Did the

Crimean Tartars betray the Russians to a greater extent than the other non-Russian peoples in the USSR because they were geographically in a more exposed position and consequently more flattered and courted by the Germans? The truth is difficult to discover; nor is it known how the punishment of the Tartars was carried out and where they are today. Only the result is known — that the Crimea is finally a Slav country, officially known as the Crimean Region of the RSFSR. Not only the Tartars but also the equally unreliable German and Greek colonists have disappeared. The Russian-Ukrainian element, which a short time ago had only a narrow majority over the combined non-Slav peoples, now dominates the whole peninsula. Over 170 new collective farms have been founded by Russian and Ukrainian colonists since the end of the war. They are endeavoring to imitate the skill of the Tartars in the cultivation of tobacco and vines.

### *Chechens*

The history of the Chechens runs almost parallel to that of the Crimean Tartars. Before the war the Chechens and the much smaller Ingushi people were combined in the "Chechen Ingush ASSR." The *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* describes the Chechens as "the most active and strongest opponents of the Czarist Government during the conquest of the Caucasus." The Russians suffered indeed the most "extensive and bloody disasters" at the hands of these people who were unequalled masters of forest fighting. To subdue them the Russians had to make greater sacrifices in human material and money than in the struggle with any of the other mountain people of the Eastern Caucasus.

General Yermolov, who in recent years has been popularized in the Soviet Union in connection with the revival of old Russian military glory, clearly recognized the "Chechen danger" and in 1818 built a fortress with the characteristic name of "Grozny," meaning if not "terrible" at least "redoubtable" or "menacing." Countless military expeditions went out from Grozny against the Caucasian mountaineers, particularly the Chechens; but it was not until 1857-59, some 40 years after the fortress was built, that the Chechens were finally brought under Russian control. The Russians knew well that these new subjects of the Czar, after all the trouble they had given, would not easily reconcile themselves to the loss of their freedom — so an attempt was made to settle the "Chechen problem" by a double transfer of population. Immediately after the conquest, the inhabitants of 44 *auls* (villages) were transplanted from the mountains to the plains where they could be more easily controlled. The more rebellious ones were forced to emigrate to Turkey where they were given hospitality on the express demand of the Russian government. Thirty-nine thousand Chechens left Russia in the summer of 1865 — one-fifth of the entire Chechen people at that date. Those who stayed behind did not keep quiet. In 1877 there was another wave of unrest following the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War, and more trouble in 1886. A Russian monograph on the Chechens[1] stated that they could not yet be considered "fully pacified"; they still looked across the border to Turkey, whither many more dreamed of emigrating. The emigration of the 39,000 had not eliminated the "Chechen problem," for the birthrate of these people was particularly high, far above the average in the Russian Empire.

After the October Revolution, the Chechens were regarded as a specially suitable instrument for building up socialism in a primitive society, a natural ally of Bolshevism. They were hailed as a "freedom-loving people, never reconciled to the rule and privileges of individuals and families" (*Great Soviet Encyclopedia*). Soviet propaganda publications printed photos of the picturesque faces of Chechens, for instance that of the 99 year old Mahomed Yevkurov, a prospector said to have assisted geological expeditions in the search for lead, coal and copper deposits in the Chechen mountains. Even a year after the outbreak of the Second World War the Chechens were apparently still regarded as a "good people." Data made available on October 5, 1942 showed that 44 Chechens had been awarded decorations for valor in the field — not a bad record considering that far larger peoples such as the Turkmenians, Tadjiks, Kirghiz and Estonians had not won many more by that date.

The crisis in the relations between Chechens and Russians came only when the German armies reached the Caucasus mountains. Then the old antagonism seems to have reawakened. At the time of Russia's greatest trial the Chechens apparently considered that they owed no loyalty to the country which in their view was still the Russia of the great soldier Yermolov, who started the conquest of Chechenya. Soviet Russia, on the other hand, was not generous enough to forgive betrayal by a tiny people who, after the withdrawal of the Germans, helplessly faced Russian vengeance. By outlawing the Chechens, by ejecting them from the family of the "peoples of the Soviet Union," Stalin's generation terminates a struggle which has lasted over 160 years. Stalin has brought Yermolov's task to a victorious end, at last ensuring Russian domination of the northern slopes of the Eastern Caucasus, not only in a military sense but also ethnographically.

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[1] E. Maksimov and G. Vertepov: *Chechentsy,* Vladikavkaz, 1894.

The Chechens might have been spared if their small country had not the misfortune to be the second most important oil center in the Soviet Union. As guardians of the oil wells of Grozny, a special responsibility rested on the Chechens, and the punishment was bound to be severe when they failed in their task. Oil is a danger to many small peoples. As soon as oil intersts are at stake, notions about national self-determination, independence, autonomy or national rights count for little — whether the oilfields are in Latin America, the Middle East, or the Soviet Union. Grozny, the City of Oil, has turned out to be more disastrous to the Chechens and their national existence than Yermolov's little fortress of a former day.

### *Kalmucks*

The disbandment of the Kalmuck ASSR and the removal of the Kalmucks to Asia may perhaps appear a lesser hardship than the application of such measures to Chechens, Crimean Tartars and Volga Germans, for the Kalmucks had not come to European Russia until the seventeenth century and had only recently abandoned their nomadic way of life.

Nevertheless, the fate of the Kalmucks, even if less pathetic than that of other "bad people," is just as characteristic of the breakdown of the original Soviet policy on nationalities. The Kalmucks had gained for themselves a right to their new home — the Kalmuck steppe southwest of Astrakhan — by gallantly fighting on the Russian side in many wars, from the Seven Years War (1756-63) onwards. Ten Kalmuck cavalry regiments took part in repelling the Napoleonic invasion and two of them even entered Paris in 1814.

Peter the Great granted the Kalmucks far-reaching autonomy but their special status was gradually reduced under his successors. When Catherine II decreed the limitation of Kalmuck autonomy any abolished the Khan title (1771), the majority of this proud people of the steppe left Russia. As far as the remaining Kalmucks were concerned, Russian policy was to press them away from the more fertile areas. At the beginning of the eighteenth century a ukase was issued forbidding Kalmucks to approach Russian settlements nearer than ten verst (over six miles) thus excluding them from the fishing waters of the Volga and the Caspian Sea. In the sixties of the nineteenth century, Kalmucks were ordered to withdraw by ten more verst. This provided increased breathing-space for Russian colonists on the fertile fringes of Kalmuckia. Through these measures the Kalmucks became increasingly poor, and by the end of the century they had lost 80 percent of the cattle they had possessed at its beginning.

During the 1917 Revolution the Kalmucks did not gain distinction in the ranks of the Bolsheviks. Their leaders first declared themselves in favor of moderate, democratic self-government — and later joined the Cossack counter-revolution. Banditry flourished in Kalmuckia long after the end of the Civil War, and its existence was said to be due to the intrigues of the Kalmuck nobility and the division of the Kalmucks into rival clans. In 1929 the Soviet authorities struck a decisive blow at what they called the "Kalmuck upper class." Members of the Kalmuck feudal aristocracy, the *Noyony* and *Zaisangy,* were deported beyond the borders of Kalmuckia and all their property was confiscated. This may have been, formally, an act of class struggle, but the Kalmucks interpreted it as Russian interference with the destinies of the Kalmuck people, carried out with the support of a mere handful of local Communists. The *Noyons* were not only a "feudal aristocracy" but also hereditary heads of Kalmuck local self-government, and thus despite their often tyrannical rule they represented, to the Kalmuck people, legitimacy and historical national tradition. The removal of the *Noyons* from Kalmuckia was certainly a progressive act, viewed in the abstract, but it failed to take into account the pecularities of Kalmuck historical development—and its actual result was to strengthen the Soviet state authorities. The Kalmucks, not thinking within the framework of Marxian dialectics, undoubtedly felt the action taken against the *Noyons* as a blow against their people as a whole. They probably regarded it simply as a continuation of former Czarist measures designed to limit the power of *Noyons* for the purpose of increasing the influence of the Russian state over Kalmuckia.

This is the background against which the Kalmuck "betrayal" in the Second World War and the subsequent punitive measures have to be considered. Soviet reports on Kalmuck unreliability are borne out by the presence of a comparatively large number of Kalmucks in Displaced Persons' Camps. On the other hand, the Red Army was able to boast that 71 Kalmucks were awarded military decorations in the first year of the war. Whether justified or not by their attitude during the war, the punishment inflicted on the Kalmucks is consistent with Russian "Kalmuck policy" since the days of Catherine II. The Soviet regime, however, has been more thorough. Instead of clearing another ten verst zone, it has cleared the entire Kalmuck steppe for new Russian settlers.

### *Volga Germans*

The case of the Volga Germans is somewhat different from that of the other peoples who have been eliminated, if not physically, at least as political units. The transfer of the Volga Germans was not a vindictive act carried out after the victory but a preventive measure taken at the very beginning of the war and thus more justifiable than the treatment accorded to Chechens, Tartars or Kalmucks. It cannot be overlooked that a Volga German Republic might have been a real danger to the Russian rear in the days when Hitler's armies stood at Stalingrad. The Soviet government may be reproached less for the removal of the Volga Germans from their homeland than for failure to provide a new home for them within the boundaries of the gigantic Russian Empire where they could have lived in a coherent group with cultural and administrative autonomy. All Soviet sources preserve an ominous silence about the Volga Germans, as if they had never existed, though there used to be much praise for their great agricultural achievements and their share in the Civil War.

To remove the Volga Germans from their fertile fields near the town of Saratov had been a cherished dream of Russian nationalists in Czarist times and was actually near fulfilment in the First World War. A plan was under way to deport these people in April 1917, but the outbreak of the Revolution in February frustrated this plan. It is an irony of history that the Bolsheviks themselves, 24 years later, have carried out a part of the Russian nationalists' program which but for the Revolution would have been done by Czarist Russia.

### *The "Great Russian Brother"*

The Soviet government by its severe measures against Crimean Tartars, Chechens, Kalmucks, Volga Germans and some minor peoples has not only brought about their annihilation but has also given a stern warning to other peoples of the Soviet Union that they must not live according to their own national traditions, which are anti-Russian, but must accept the thesis of the "great Russian brother" as the foundation of their national ideology. Of course the disbandment of a Republic and dispersal of its people is an exception to the general rule, which is to make the "peoples of the Soviet Union" serve the central state machinery of Russia. The future of the peoples of the Soviet Union largely depends on the benefit which the state and the dominant people in the state, the Russians, can derive from them in the economic reconstruction of the country or for the embarassment of certain neighbors by playing up minority issues with their assistance. Even insofar as they are useful, the "peoples of the Soviet Union" are but a reserve army, without a political will of their own, in the service of the Russian colonizers.

# INTERNATIONAL PRESS

## *THE "NORMAL" CONSUMER*

The newspaper *Der Kurier,* published in the French sector of Berlin, printed in its May 10, 1947 issue the following account of the "normal" consumer — the forgotten man of today's Germany. The whimsical tone hardly conceals the tragic facts that are exposed here:

If the "normal" consumer wants to eat a half-pound of hamburger meat and boiled sausage all at once, he not only must have an iron constitution, but he must also be able to forego three week's meat ration and do without potatoes for months. And it will not hurt him to have some of the virtues of a camel — especially its patience and capacity to store up food and consume it slowly. In fact, he really must have a kind of "pantry-biology" in order to buy, cook, roast, fry — and finally devour hastily — all the meat, fish and potatoes (often half-spoiled) which occasionally are thrown on the markets of our metropolis in one glorious afternoon, and then to stock this meal in his intestines for the coming four lean weeks. Fortunately, his intestines have been trained.

During this waiting period, he receives a certain impulse to continue living from a handful of noodles, and also from a substance that is administratively termed "lentil meal," but which in fact consists of ground chestnuts and scraps of soy beans. He springs from his bed every morning to gather wood in the suburban forests of Berlin (provided he has an official wood-gathering permit), then warms his midday soup and waits for another permit or a street car or the end of the working day or the monthly paycheck — and then buys the newspaper in order to study the progress of democracy. In the evening he digs in his garden, and so loses some more of the albumins which perhaps are still circulating in his lymph system from the third distribution of last month. His linen hangs on the line to bleach — this does wonders for his soap coupon. As to bodily cleanliness, he simply touches as few dirty things as possible.

I thought I had spotted one on the street car the other day: a normal consumer of female sex, about 50 years old. She had white hair, and that unhealthly gray color in her face. When I asked her where she was going, she replied that she wanted to go to the city limits and there try to stop a car which would carry her to some village where she hoped to get some potatoes. So I hadn't found a normal consumer at all, but only another illegal one, another one of those people who with their unlawful actions try to undermine the people's economy — who go with a piece of cloth or a silver spoon into a village to seduce peasants into illegal barter of food. What would happen to the German economy if this sort of thing continued! It is only what they deserve if the police hunt them down, drive some into labor camps and throw others from the platforms and buffers of railroad trains....

It was practically impossible to find a normal consumer — most of them were buried last March during the cold wave. The normal consumer was really a fiction that has been punished by death.

Between this fiction and real life there are many stages — hoarding, compensatory deals, corruption, barter, "business"— thousands of such stages leading up to what is called criminality in the moral code of the occupation, and what is actually only an attempt to remain alive.

I found the whole society to be like a pyramid at the top of which were those who had managed well and at the bottom those layers that had managed less well. So I went out to find the Not-Normal-Consumer. Near the apex of the pyramid, high up on the backs of the people, I found the new aristocracy, *those who produce something*: shoes or rubber lining, radio accessories or egg beaters, buna or carbide or carpenter's glue. All producers automatically belong to a very exclusive company. The members of this set exchange among themselves glue against stockings, buna against egg beaters. They lack nothing.

"Without cement," said one of them," no wall, no roof without a wall, without a roof no place for an engine, and the engine in turn doesn't run without oil. So we 'compensate': for threads and rags we give nails and conveyor belts. We also 'compensate' meat and vegetables so that the worker's cafeteria doesn't remain empty; and for myself there just remain a few hundred pairs of stockings so that I can get a pound of butter from time to time. Distribute . . . no, we *direct* the goods. 'Direction of the flow of commodities'— that's the right expression, and those who are not on the few islands to which we direct the goods simply sink into the sea. There isn't enough for all, anyhow."

Then there are also governmental oligarchs. They have special permits and special coupons, cars, telephones and inter-zonal travel. They get all the nourishment they can from the thin stream of gravy. We all live on blocks of ice that have lost contact during the spring thawing, and those who are able to jump from one to another block have a profitable and nourishing occupation. They jump between the Bavarian egg island and the Solingen razor paradise, between the Magdeburg sugarbeet archipelago and the flint mines (one doesn't quite know where these are located). Flints are to be had in Berlin for 2.50 marks, but in Hamburg and Bremen they cost five marks — but then again, these cities have herrings.

And now we come to the third layer of the pyramid — that large group which the Germans call "Schieber"— and Americans would call "sharp operators." They go around with a rucksack and a suitcase. Most of them have discovered the possibilities that are inherent in this occupation only by accident. After naively buying onions or potatoes for a time, they came to realize that lard can be transported more easily, that cigarettes are a stable monetary unit. They now specialize in certain districts and certain articles. Liquor against fat, thread against oil. "Work," says one of them, a boy of 19, "work — one should do as little of this as possible."

Most of them still have a trade. But the trade only serves as a camouflage — they just bow to the fact that we live in an age in which everybody has to be registered twice. Once according to the old system: carpenter, tailor, bricklayer — one goes around looking like a worker, wearing proletarian cloth (proletarian cloth is very advisable these days). But behind this mask the real man of our age is to be found. The self-help man who can do everything, who runs in the rain between the station and the peasant store-room, the man who can get everything — things to eat and things to keep you warm — never very much, but always just enough. Though this talented individual is not the normal consumer of our times, it may very well be that he is the normal man of our times.

We now come to the next species, not smaller in number but certainly near-tragic in nature: it is this category which still holds the skeleton of the whole together. But not without losses. The 19 year old has a father who is a civil servant, a teacher, a businessman and cannot leave his job. And every lightfooted daughter has a mother who carries on the usual business of life: washing, shopping, queueing — with longer waits and greater effort. There is a whole group of people in Germany who have to act as if things really had not changed at all — as if the pension or the income was still sufficient to cover needs — as if one could make the allocation do— as if the shoes could be resoled — or as if one could simply buy a ticket on the railway and go where one wants to go. This As-If majority would be in a very bad spot if it attempted to act solely according to the As-If hypothesis of yesterday. But of course it doesn't do this. It sells something that dates from yesterday, some table cloth or an extra suit. A young teacher lives in a little hamlet and depends on getting five packages of cigarettes a month to sell at a higher price in order to increase sufficiently his all too small salary. An architect who would like never to leave his drawing table must nevertheless enter into the "compensation" trading: he needs paper and he must provide for his family. The miner receives special ration points with which he can legally buy additional fat, liquor and bread.

These special ration points for those who have exceptional rights really contradict the whole legal structure of the state. It amounts to the announcement that there is now a state of exception within the system of democracy and equality. Everybody strives to attain an exceptional right, because this amounts to the right to continue to exist. Whether it is category I or category II in the Russian zone, points or special allocations for workers, or noonday meals for the attendants of the Military Government — below these exceptions there lurks nothingness, the self-consumption of society, the slow working of deadly losses, the decrease in weight, the selling of clothes, of shoes, the freezing in winter, the state of weakness which sometimes in February ends with a collapse of the heart, and the listless waiting, the tired and glazed eyes. Below the exceptional rights there is that little theoretical heap of 1500 calories which, thrown into the cooking pot, emerges as about 800 calories — nothing more than a medically ascertained and administratively controlled day of grace. This is the day of grace that has been granted the "normal" consumer.

## *GERMANY — A RUBBLE HEAP*

The Frankfort *Oekonomist* recently carried an article by an engineering and building expert which presented a first, rough balance sheet of the degree of destruction that war has brought to Germany, and of the efforts made up till now to rebuild the country and carry away the rubble. The main points of this balance sheet follow:

Germany has now a population of about 65 millions. About 7.8 million apartments are available and an average of 2.7 persons inhabit each room. In theory, the housing program would consist of re-building 4.71 million totally destroyed apartments and 3.41 million heavily damaged apartments which are now unusuable, and the new construction of about 3.5 million additional apartments that are needed to make up for the lack of building during recent years. The whole program would thus involve the building or re-building of 11.35 million apartments.

It is useless to start from calculations on the sum of destruction of valuable property if one wants to establish a first rough account: the "rubble balance" of the Second World War has to be established first. The elimination and utilization of rubble is a most important factor in determining the possibilities of reconstruction. It is estimated that the mass of rubble now accumulated in Germany amounts to about 400 million cubic meters.[1] It would seem to be the easiest solution simply to leave these mountains of rubble where they are and to start building entirely new cities or districts in new locations. This might be difficult, however, not only because the present sights have been determined mostly by geographical factors such as proximity to rivers, etc., as well as to the location of the centers of transport and traffic, but also because the complicated subterranean installations of large cities (canalization, cables, etc.) are largely undamaged and represent tremendous values.

The various Laender governments are now elaborating special construction laws that would be valid throughout the American zone. But the figures of destruction are of a fantastic magnitude.[2] The immensity of the task is illustrated by a single example from the city of Hanover. In this city 9600 houses have been completely destroyed, 3650 others have been heavily damaged, and 15,750 have suffered medium or light damage. Reconstruction would take about 20 years if 2433 bricklayers, 490 carpenters, 198 roofers and 635 woodworkers worked daily during this period. Up till now only 356 bricklayers have been found in the city.

## SOVIETIZATION OF A GERMAN PROVINCE

The information service bulletin of the German Social Democratic Party, published in Hanover, carries in its March 15th issue the following report on conditions in the Russian-occupied area of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern:

The German state and municipal administration depends in all of its decisions on the Russians. The Germans are not allowed to take any important actions before they have secured Russian permission. Every important official has long conferences with the Russians which always last

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[1] One cubic meter is approximately equal to 1.3 cubic yards.

[2] RUBBLE STATISTICS OF A FEW GERMAN CITIES

(*In millions of cubic meters*)

| *City* | *Degree of destruction* | *Rubble* | *Removed so far* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Berlin | 77% | 100.0 | 1.5 |
| Brunswick | 41% | 3.0 | ? |
| Essen | 90% | 10.0 | 0.8 |
| Frankfort | 55% | 12.0 | 0.5 |
| Hamburg | 78% | 43.0 | 1.8 |
| Hanover | 65% | 6.0 | ? |
| Karlsruhe | 50% | 1.5 | 0.3 |
| Köln | 75% | 18.0 | 1.0 |
| Mannheim | 75% | 1.5 | 0.5 |
| Wiesbaden | 38% | 0.6 | 0.25 |

for hours and sometimes take place daily. Objections are of no avail.

The real ruler of the country is a Major Serebrenski, the Soviet political representative for the Land. He determines what is printed in the press and inspects the content of all radio programs, speeches and lectures. He also decides on the line of the so-called "Kulturbund" (cultural association) which is a propaganda instrument serving, among other purposes, the infiltration of CP ideas into the Western zones.

Every German who plays any kind of a role in the economy, be he an industrialist, an expert or an administrative official, is in constant danger of being accused of sabotage if, because of confused orders or circumstances outside of his control, projects with which he is charged do not turn out according to plan. Every businessman, every industrialist, every artisan of any importance gets his orders directly from the Russian economic officer.

The industrial capacity of the country has declined drastically. The traditionally small number of industrial undertakings have been further reduced through dismantling. The few factories which remain work almost exclusively for reparations. The total production of the greatest meat-processing plant of Northern Germany — the Schulze and Söhne firm of Friedrichslust — goes exclusively to Russia; and despite the reduced animal population, the firm is turning out greater quantities of meat products than at any other time in its history. The occupational authorities not only live on the country but also send huge quantities of food, cattle, etc., to Russia. The effects of the agrarian reform, which was implemented hastily and without preparation — and therefore turned out to be a failure — are even more disastrous than the dismantling of factories. Industrial exhibitions featuring empty containers from former days, and samples that cannot be sold, hardly veil the real situation.

The unification of the Socialist and Communist parties was also the work of the Russians. On New Year's Eve 1945-46, Carl Moltmann, the former president of the SPD and now president of the SED (Socialist Unity Party) stated that he was definitely against the merger. A few days later he was called in to see the Soviet administration. After his talk with a Russian general and Major Serebrenski, Moltmann suddently pleaded for unification. A huge propaganda campaign was started and the new unified SED was born in the beginning of April 1946. Major Serebrenski himself was a speaker at the decisive meeting of the SPD.

No members of the other two parties (Christian Democratic Union and Liberal-Democratic Party) are as much persecuted as the men who have remained true to their Social Democratic beliefs. The former second president of the SPD, Jesse, who fought in the underground against Hitler, was arrested a few months ago and we know nothing about his fate.

All elections on the municipal, county or Land level are also strongly influenced by extra-German forces. Election officials have to follow the directions of Major Serebrenski. The elections are "managed" in such a manner that even prominent SED leaders have declared that "one can no longer speak of free elections."

There is pre-censorship for every word that is printed — not only for newspapers and reviews, but also for every official statement, every ad, every family announcement, letter head, and theater or film program. Every public speech, even if it deals with non-political matters, must first be censored.

Every lecture in administrative schools or people's universities has to be censored. *Literally every word is scrutinized.* If there is even the slightest possibility that a word might somehow hide a double meaning, it is removed. All those who have to deal with the censorship office are worn out by interminable discussions and questions: "What do you mean by this? I would say that. . . ." Even a statistical summary that compared the present with the former density of population of the Land was barred by the censor.

The similarity between all totalitarian systems leads to the ironic situation in which a text that is clearly intended to attack the Hitler regime is nevertheless banned by the censor because he fears that it might also be interpreted as an attack on the Russians. An anti-Nazi newspaper article against the "brown hords" had to be taken out because the Russians also wear brown uniforms. Political satiric poems against the Nazis had to be changed or eliminated because they might have been taken as applying to Soviet conditions.

Propaganda flourishes that hides the real facts. And there is an oversupply of material on "true democracy." But it has not been forgotten that Goebbels used exactly the same formulation when he wanted to camouflage the true character of the Nazi regime during its first years.

## *A TRIP INTO GERMANY'S EASTERN ZONE*

The following report on a trip to the Eastern zone appeared in the *Neue Ruhr Zeitung* for April 2, 1947:

The train was supposed to be a direct train and to bring me to Saalfeld in three hours. It actually took eight hours and I had to change twice. The first car of every train is reserved for the Red Army, and is the only one to contain windows. Sometimes Germans are allowed to ride on the Russian car — the crowding is often absolutely unimaginable despite the fact that one can travel with special permits only — but people prefer to ride on the buffers rather than board the Russian car. Most often there are only one or two daily trains, and their usual delay varies between three and five hours. It was worse some time ago; but then the Russians "forbade" delays.

Most of one's "traveling" time is spent in waiting-rooms and on station platforms. Almost all lines now consist of only one track, the others having been dismantled and shipped to Russia. The tracks, trains and stations are terribly dilapidated, the locomotives are old and insufficient in number; and many old-time railroad employees have been dismissed, so that everything is very inefficient.

"We now live in Russia," says a worker sitting next to me. "Only two days after I came back from Russia, where I had been a POW, I had almost no clothes left and yet I was sent to work on the dismantling here. A nice welcome this!"

We pass long trains with huge wooden cases and crates. Dismantled machinery! They have been standing here for a long time already. There are thick steel pipes on which one can still read the election appeals of the SED for the "reconstruction elections."

The hotel where I finally landed was amazingly well furnished and in good condition. It used to house high Nazi officials on visits to Thuringia. I can have a room — but first I must get permission from the police: long interrogation there: who am I? what do I do? coming from where? going where? why? Finally I get the room:

where they used to have the picture of Hitler and Goering they now have Lenin, Stalin and Karl Marx.

I try to get some food by showing my interzonal coupons. Polite refusal: these first have to be exchanged in Jena or Weimar. Every county has its special coupons and travel coupons can be had only by making a special request to the Kommandatura! But coupons are of little use anyhow, since there hasn't been any meat sold here for the last eight weeks, and no fat for the last four. What meat and fat did exist was shipped to Leipzig, apparently. . . .

The city is totally blacked out; the fair that is taking place seems to require all of the electricity. The current is not turned off, but posters tell you that it is *streng verboten* to use any electricity. The police control the meters, and every evening patrols look for sinners. Only doctors and essential industries are allowed electricity. The local textile, leather and printing industries haven't worked for weeks; and only the co-op and the bread factory are allowed to bake bread.

Friends and even totally unknown persons come and want to know about the "West with its golden Freedom." They want at least to send their children there, since schools here are impossible. The director of one of the schools is a former apprentice in a food-processing firm. The "new teachers" make more than 30 mistakes in a simple dictation.

I ask for people I knew formerly. Doctor B. had come back from imprisonment in Russia; then one night he was taken away again. No news. The reasons? Nothing is known. The publisher Sch. has vanished in the same way. A few weeks later a truck came to his house to fetch the furniture. His wife was told simply that he had been condemned. No written notification. Another man, director of a publishing firm, disappeared in the same way. The 15 year old son of the charwoman who works for my friends also disappeared. . . .

Still, things are not the same as in the Nazi days. The terror is now consciously experienced. The SED is a small minority. School classes refuse unanimously to attend SED instruction courses and prefer heavy manual work which is meted out as punishment: "They cannot force us another time," say the boys of the higher classes.

And yet certain things are better in the East than in the West. There is no housing scarcity either in Leipzig or in Saxonia or in Thuringia. Since occupation troops have been reduced considerably they have been rather sparing in their requisitioning of rooms. The bomb damage is not as big as in the West, and the Eastern refugees always tend to proceed further to the West. Certain consumption goods are available — sometimes one even gets liquor; and the paper rations are considerably higher than in the West. But one doesn't always know whether the coupons will be honored now or only after two months. There are few cars to be seen since hardly any gas is given out.

The police are armed and exceedingly unpopular. The insecurity, especially at night, continues to be great despite the display of policemen. There are an increasing number of cases of deserters who attack people in order to get civilian clothes. Bands attack trains and grab all the baggage they can get. That's why I was warned to sit on my suitcases continually.

Political jokes are widespread: Who were the first members of the SED? The Three Wise Men. They saw the Star, ceased work, and ran to the crib. . . .

People used to listen to the Hamburg radio, but since there is now no electricity this source of information is no longer open. It is forbidden to subscribe to papers from the West. My friends formerly got a Munich paper through the mails from time to time; but they were warned by a postal official that he had been ordered to establish a list of all those who receive papers from Berlin or the West. . . .

## *POTATO-HUNT*

*A letter one of our editors recently received from a young lady in Berlin supplements the impressions registered in the above article*:

Today I want to plant ten pounds of potatoes in the garden plot which has been allotted to us in one of the public parks here. If they are not stolen they might bring us about 200 pounds — which means that we will have been spared two "hoarding tours" to the country. You may be interested in an account of our last such tour, from which I returned with 100 pounds — ten of which we now intend to use for planting.

Lisa, a friend of mine who is heavily handicapped physically (her left arm has been amputated and her left leg is stiff), waited from five o'clock in the morning till one p.m. at the station to get tickets for us. She finally got them for my sister-in-law and myself for a ten o'clock train leaving the next day, and a ticket for herself on an early morning train. We all wanted to get on the latter train because you thus have more time to go ferreting out stuff around the villages. After some unsuccessful efforts, we finally succeeded in passing one ticket control where the official didn't pay any attention. But the train was so crammed already that we could only get in through the windows. We finally arrived in the village of Neustadt and successfully exchanged a silken blouse, a little coffee, some cigarettes, a pair of wooden shoes, some wool and a little bit of tea, against potatoes. Then the problem arose how to transport the potatoes — it was about five kilometers to the station. We were happy to find a truck that took us along for a few cigarettes.

Arriving at the station, we went into the restaurant to wait for the train — which was due in about five hours. Suddenly the police arrived at the station. They had already taken all the potatoes from the people who were sitting outside the station. Women wept and wailed: one asked to be allowed to see the county official. She was told that he wasn't at home. But she made such a fuss that she was finally allowed to keep her potatoes. Generally all the timid ones lost their entire hoard, and only the most energetic got away with at least some of it. We were terribly afraid that the police would come into the restaurant and we began to stuff our potatoes into small bags, tuck them away in our clothes, hide them in an oven of the restaurant, in a cupboard, etc. But the police still wanted to comb through two more villages and thus didn't take the time to search the restaurant.

Finally the train arrived. My sister-in-law managed to get in, and I succeeded in handing her my rucksack and my shopping bag — but then a man scrambled in behind her and there seemed absolutely no way for me to push in too. Then we heard rumors that the police would control the train that was to come after this: if I failed to get into this train, I was likely to lose all my potatoes. My sister-in-law tried to return my rucksack to me. But I was still attempting to get in — I was about one-third in the train and two-thirds outside. "*Close all doors!*" shouted the stationmaster. I asked him to try to close the door behind me. The people in the compartment refused to budge (everybody thinks only of his own interest these days). Finally he succeeded in closing the door. I am saved. After I was in, a number of people still managed to jump on the running boards.

At the next station police appeared and attempted to push all these people with their baggage off the running boards. They were not only chased away, but had to pay a fine of three marks in addition. The police continued to ride with the train and went along on the running boards collecting three marks from everyone standing on them. People payed the fine several times and always jumped on the boards again. The police were no longer able to dominate this pandemonium; they continued to collect the fines — after all they need money too — but gave up all attempts to push people from the boards. People hung on the train, in any way they could manage, like huge grapes. The train must have looked rather curious. All along the route people looked at it as if it were a marvel. Well, finally sometime during the night we arrived back in Berlin.

# BOOKS

## *PORTRAIT OF EINSTEIN*

***Jim Cork***

Any serious work on Einstein must be judged foremost by its competence in elucidating the revolution in scientific conceptions connected with Einstein's name. That test Philipp Frank, Einstein's successor at the University of Prague and a leading spirit of the "Vienna Circle" of Logical Positivists, meets with flying colors in his new book,[1] which is an extremely skillful blending of the personal and ideological history of Albert Einstein. The part devoted to the development of Einstein's ideas is a notable fear of compact and concentrated explanation, and tells the story about as successfully as is possible in non-mathematical language. The direct laconic style of Frank, which never obtrudes with problems of its own, is a distinct help.

Newtonian physics, up to and through the 19th century, had succeeded in bringing under its sway in an ordered system a vast array of phenomena, chiefly in the macroscopic world. It had "solved" all mechanical problems, "settled" the basic astronomical problems, begun to penetrate into the mysteries of heat phenomena, investigated the antics of light, and even led to an innerly consistent picture of the structure of matter. Classical physics was dominated by the mechanical viewpoint, all phenomena being explained by the push and pull of unchangeable magnitudes being acted upon by forces from a distance. But by the end of the 19th century the Newtonian synthesis began to meet difficulties — in two fields especially, those of optics and electrical phenomena — which remained impervious to traditional mechanical explanations. The famous Michelson-Morley light experiment decisively disproved the existence of the ether (devised as the last desperate attempt to "save" the mechanical explanation of light phenomena) and further established the — then seemingly astounding—fact that the velocity of light was constant irrespective of whether the ray traveled in or against the direction of the earth's motion. Einstein concluded that a mechanical explanation of the behavior of light was impossible and that the Newtonian mechanics of material particles could not be generally valid. He boldly proposed: 1) dropping the idea of the ether; 2) the establishment of the principle of the constancy of the velocity of light, irrespective of the motion of the receiving or the emitting source; and 3) the denial of absolute motion, in favor of the idea that motion can be described significantly only relative to a given frame of reference. ("Physical laws are the same in all co-ordinate systems moving uniformly, relative to each other.") The special theory of relativity rested upon 2 and 3. The general theory of relativity broadened out to include the basic problems of gravitation within the new generalizations. It stressed, after Maxwell, the importance of the field concept in physics, and uncovered non-Euclidean geometry as *the* geometry for the space-time continuum.

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[1] *Einstein, His Life And Times,* by Philipp Frank. Alfred A. Knopf, 1947. $4.50.

JIM CORK is an American writer who contributed a "Portrait of Nehru" to our April issue. His fields of interest include music, science and philosophy as well as international politics.

Einstein drew all the logical consequences from his new conceptions, which resulted in a series of seemingly paradoxical statements which involved cutting the ground from beneath all the traditional Newtonian absolutes (motion, time, length, mass, space, etc.) which were now shown to rest partially upon arbitrary metaphysical assumptions. Always present in Einstein's conceptions was the basic idea of the relativity of these concepts within a particular frame of reference, and the changeableness of the magnitudes under specific conditions. So timekeepers (clocks) are tied up with velocity and vary with the latter; similarly for yardsticks (measuring "intervals in space") which vary with velocity (a stick would shrink to nothing if its velocity were to reach that of light); also for mass which increases in proportion to the increase of the velocity. Einstein established new conceptions of mutual functional relationships between entities formerly conceived as separate and independent one from the other (so space-time instead of space and time; so space-bodies in space, for space has no absolute significance apart from things and the laws of their mutual relationships; so the equivalence of mass and energy, instead of their formerly-held distinctness, concretized in the famous equation E=mc2 which found its tragic embodiment in the atom bomb).

It is necessary to point out, lest people's common sense be too shocked by these "paradoxical" results, that the deviations from Newtonian classical physics occur only at very great velocities. For our "ordinary" Euclidean world Newton's generalizations still hold basically. The old mechanics is still valid for relatively small velocities and forms the limiting case of the new relativity physics. In this sense Einstein has not "overthrown" Newton but only supplied a necessary refinement, a more all-embracing conception which includes Newton's as a special case, but is able to explain phenomena which Newtonianism couldn't.

Einstein's theory of relativity was no concoction spun out of thin air by purely speculative methods. It was the result rather of an extreme sensitivity to the theoretical synthesis needed by empiric data which had piled up, a synthesis which Newtonian mechanics could no longer furnish. Its proud validation was furnished by the empiric verification contained in diverse astronomical phenomena: 1) the correction of the previously noted discrepancy in the motion of the planet Mercury's orbit around the sun; 2) the bending of light rays as they passed close to the sun; 3) the change in wave length of light emitted by a star. It is important to note that the latter two were predictions on Einstein's part of previously unknown phenomena and were verified subsequent to his predictions. The whole history of science hardly offers a finer example of the prescience of pure theory.

### Present State of Physics

Not all problems in physics have been solved by the theory of relativity (or by Planck's theory of quanta, the other chief cornerstone of modern physics). On the contrary. The seemingly dual nature of light stands as an obstacle to achieved complacency on the part of modern physicists. Does light travel as a succession of particles or as a wave? In phenomena of diffraction and interference it acts as a wave. In photoelectric and chemical phenomena it acts as a stream of particles. Einstein evidently believes that this puzzling duality of light represents a transition stage to a more fundamental and unifying conception. "I shall never believe," he once said in pondering this duality, "that God plays dice with the world." Neither De Broglie's theory[2] of considering and treating corpuscles and waves simultaneously, or Bohr's Theory of Complementarity[3] which insists that we accept the duality as basic but complementary features of the same physical object, and limit ourselves to the description of one or the other aspect, depending on the specific nature of the apparatus used in the concrete experiment, is found satisfactory by Einstein. He still believes that a more all-embracing field theory can be found which will include both particle and wave characteristics of light as special cases and ". . . save the historic conception of a physical reality independent of the devises of observation and measurement." The search for the basic equations underlying this unifying field theory is the work which is now, and for many years has been, occupying Einstein as his chief task.

### Philosophy of Science

When the first fruits of Einstein's researches were published and some knowledge of them began to get around, various people sought sustenance and support from them for preconceived notions and pet beliefs in extra-scientific realms (the Archbishop of Canterbury once asked Einstein what effect relativity would have on religion). In the field of philosophy attempts were made to draw subjectivist, idealistic conclusions from the theory, for relativity *seemed* to place the observer and his frame of reference in a directive and decisive position. However the central *objective* point was missed, viz., that the foundation of the relativity theory lies in the fact that in the four-dimensional space-time manifold there is a measure which for all measuring observers and all reference systems has no absolute value independent of any action, will, or desire of the human observer. As Morris R. Cohen says in his *Reason And Nature*: "Einstein's conception of the essential unity of time and space in existence and the idea that the law of nature must be absolute and invariant in all spatio-temporal transformations is the capital point to keep in mind. This will enable us to dismiss at once the popular impression which, confusing physical relativity with the relativity of knowledge to mind or consciousness, sees in Einstein's work a new support to anti-materialist subjectivism. In none of the phenomena explained by relativity is there any special reference to mind. When we speak of the length of a body depending upon the state of the observer, we do not refer to his consciousness or subjective feeling but to the velocity of the physical system in which he might set up yardsticks and clocks to measure physical processes." Einstein himself is evidently not in agreement with such subjectivist interpretations and has not joined the chorus of those scientists (Eddington, Jeans, Schroedinger, Compton, Bridgman, Alexis Carrel, et al) who have attempted to draw unwarranted anti-determinist and anti-causality conclusions from either his own theories or Heisenberg's so-called theory of indeterminacy. The ideal underlying his research is still the conviction that, "Without the belief that it is possible to grasp the reality with our theoretical constructions, without the belief in the inner harmony of our world, there could be no science."[4] No mad-hatter's world for him!

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[2] See De Broglie's book, *Matter And Light*, pp. 46-47, for his own exposition of the theory. How unsatisfactory it still remains to De Broglie himself is evident from his own words on the next page (p. 48): "Nevertheless, the reason why these two aspects exist, and the manner in which it might be possible to merge them in one superior unity, remain a matter of mystery."

[3] See Bohr's paper, "The Causality Problem In Modern Physics," for his own discussion of his theory and its relation to the logic of Einstein's theory of relativity, in *New Theories In Physics*, International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, Paris, 1939.

### Social Reception of Theories

What a tragic commentary on the perversity of the human mind that Einstein's theories, especially in the early stage of their career, were accorded anything but the objective reception that should have been tended a purely scientific theory. Instead of being judged solely on the basis of scientific principles and evidence the greatest theoretical construction of modern times was submitted to ideologic indignities engendered by the political and social prejudices of countries, races, parties, individuals. And reputable scientists were not the least among the sinners. When, during the First World War, Einstein, as an anti-militarist, refused to sign the famous "Manifesto of the Ninety-two German Intellectuals," which culminated in the assertion, "German culture and German militarism are identical," he was censured by many German scientists and his (!) science proclaimed as non-Germanic. But French and English scientists were not wanting who were equally guilty of subordinating their scientific impartiality to national and racial prejudice, claiming that the relativity theory exhibited that thinly-spun idealism supposedly characteristic of the German mind, and had nothing in common with either the lucid elegance of French science or the solid empiric character of the English tradition. Later the Nazis denounced relativity as the incarnation of Marxist materialism, though the Soviet pundits, hilariously enough had already dialectically damned it as bourgeois idealism ". . . serving exclusively religious and metaphysical tendencies." What a sorry over-all spectacle of multifarious anterior prejudices overriding intelligence. It must have furnished Einstein in those days with some ironic thoughts on the capacity of men for rational enlightenment.

### Individual, Social and Political Man

Einstein is a man who goes his own way. Simply, but quite unpretentiously, he disregards the trivial amenities that have gathered about personal and social intercourse. His political and social thinking cannot be easily fitted into any rigid ideological pattern. He is committed unreservedly to no program, no group, no party—no country, even. His beliefs, his temperament, his scientific ideals, which transcend paltry racial and national prejudices, have fashioned a true citizen of the world. The lonely dedication to his high calling has, paradoxically enough, committed him, a humanist, to a stark individualism which has often withdrawn him from the company of humans to the solitude of his own thoughts. He has, of course, on occasion lent his great moral weight to the support of causes obviously dear to him (Zionism, anti-militarism, etc.) But here, too, he hasn't shown that "consistency" expected of the organized devotee. He has, for instance, shown concern for the situation of the Arabs, and stressed the need for amicable Arab-Jewish relationships, things which have not earned him the thanks of the average representative of political Zionism. As for his well known anti-militarism, history has undoubtedly played him a cruel trick here. For he who has hated war as the chief social evil on earth and who has openly agitated for the cause of the War-Resister's International had the ironic fate to fashion the equation pointing at the energy-potential locked up within the atom, and in the greatest cataclysm to date to have co-operated in the creation of the most awesome weapon of destruction in history. One can only sense the magnitude of the moral dilemma, and the possible individual moral tragedy, involved.

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[4] Einstein and Infeld: *The Evolution Of Physics*, p. 313.

As one who places such central value upon the freedom of the individual, and who, in his own person, has become a symbol of the creative worth of critical free enquiry, Einstein minces no words in showing his abhorrence of dictatorial regimes which place both goods in such stark jeopardy: ". . . For this reason I have always been passionately opposed to such regimes as exist in Russia and Italy (under fascism, that is—J.C.) today."[5]

Gentle soul, free thinker, humanist, democrat, amateur musician, greatest thinker of his age — nature, indeed, has here fashioned one of her immortals!

## *FROM CALIGARI TO HITLER?*

***Hans Sahl***

The methods of modern film criticism are mainly marked by two tendencies: the esthetic and the sociological. One either limits oneself to treating *Film as Art* — Rudolf Arnheim in his basic work — applying the analyses of forms to the technical occurrences on the screen, or one interprets the contents of the film as symptoms of social conditions and modes of behavior. Siegfried Kracauer's new book on the German film[1] adds to these two methods, which often intermingle and complement each other, a third: the method of depth psychology. What has to be said about this form of explaining political and social phenomena has been excellently stated by Nicolas Calas in his article "Are the Germans Paranoiacs?" in the June issue of *Modern Review.* Siegfried Kracauer's book, despite its scholarship and profound power of observa-

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[5] During the May Day celebration in Moscow, *Pravda* listed Einstein, in addition to many well-known fellow-travelers and stooges of Stalinism, as one of their friends in America. It is generally known that Einstein is a member of a number of C.P.-front organizations. One doesn't know whether it was this or Einstein's well-known penchant for refusing public comment on the many questions, claims and criticisms that come his way, that accounted for his refusal to comment *this time.* Assuming that Einstein, who is not a devious personality, joined these organizations out of the best of intentions, without in any way desiring thereby to seem to countenance, even obliquely, the regime in Russia, surely he must realize that no action, however innocently motivated, will remain unused by the Soviet for its own political purposes, as witness the claim in *Pravda.* Therefore a few gentle words of rebuke on Einstein's part would have carried enormous moral weight and given aid to the friends of intellectual freedom everywhere.

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[1] *From Caligari to Hitler*: *A Psychological History of the German Film,* by Siegfried Kracauer. Princeton University Press. $5.

HANS SAHL was one of the leading young film critics in pre-Hitler Germany. The author of two volumes of poetry and one oratorio, he is now at work on a novel and is also New York theater, film and art correspondent for the Swiss *Neue Zuercher Zeitung.*

tion, again proves the dubious nature of a method which, as Calas expressed it, replaces "the fetish of organism and the goddess reason with a new gadget called the unconscious."

Kracauer assumes that the German film between the two World Wars was nothing but the expression of a secret psychopathic "disposition," of a sick "collective mentality" of the German middle classes. It began with *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* in which he already sees a manifestation of the destructive conflict between tyranny and chaos, authoritarian and anti-authoritarian tendencies, which, by many roads and detours, finally led to Hitler — tyranny being represented by Caligari chaos by the fair. (To back his thesis, Kracauer quotes a pamphlet of the seventeenth century which compares the fair to Babylon. Apparently the German soul even then must have had a morbid attraction for ferris wheel, merry-go-rounds, and hot dogs.) Once these "psychological patterns" are established, the history of the German film becomes, for Kracauer, merely a history of incurable regressions. Every gesture on the screen, every gag of the story department, every shifting of the camera is evaluated only with reference to the fundamental thesis to be proved. In this list, even the best products of German movie art, such as Karl Grune's *The Street,* or G. W. Pabst's *Comradeship,* or Leontine Sagan's *Maedchen in Uniform* are only retarding moments, pseudo-democratic pantings in the race of the "collective soul" with the storm troops of the unconscious. For example, Kracauer says about *The Street*: "In exploring the psychological mechanism involved in the would-be rebel's submission, *The Street* corroborates the Fridericus films in full." (Incidentally, isn't the "would-be rebels submission" the standard theme of *every* capitalist production?) A shot in the same film, in which the hero rests his head on the breast of his wife, causes the following remarkable statement: "This gesture — recurrent in many German films — is symptomatic of the desire to return to the maternal womb. . . . It is an attitude which results from the prolonged dependence of the Germans upon a feudal or half-feudal regime." The elimination of subtitles in Lupu Pick's *Scattered,* certainly a considerable artistic enrichment of the silent films of those years, is qualified as "mute chaos." The "New Objectivity" at the end of the twenties, represented by painters like George Grosz and Otto Dix, by poets like Bert Brecht and in the movies by a turn toward realism and the documentary style, is interpreted as "paralysis of the mind," while the *Blue Angel,* produced in Berlin by the American director Joseph von Sternberg, becomes a symptom of "German immaturity."

These few examples are adequate to show where such *over-interpretation* can lead. One might just as well represent Hollywood's Superman films as an "unconscious" pre-realization of the Truman Doctrine, or Mickey Mouse as proof of the "escapist" tendencies of the American white-collar worker. Shock brigades of materialistic interpreters of art have exhausted their readers by statements of this kind. But where does it lead? True, films are produced by an industry which attempts to adjust its commodity, with seismographic exactness, to the needs and moods of the public (although no one has definitely established whether the film fashions society or society fashions the film). But they are also the expression—often corrupted and perverted — of specific literary trends, spiritual traditions and reminiscences. Consequently, one cannot speak of *Caligari* without mentioning the expressionistic art of those days: the paintings of Marc Chagall or Kokoschka; the poetry of the young Werfel; the theater of the "Habima"—or the influence of books like Prinzhorn's *Paintings of the Insane,* William Worringer's re-discovery of the gothic, and many other developments that, directly or indirectly, contributed to the style of that epoch. The esthetic nomenclature of the film, with its inter-relations, influences and inherent laws, exists for Kracauer only as far as it provides him with the desired indicia for his psychological warfare on the German mind. A method of observation more adequate to the problems of artistic creation would have concluded quite differently. Far from being prejudiced by a "Vansittartist" approach to history, it would have defined the drive toward stylization, the excited subjectivism of *Caligari* and its architecture, not as a psychopathic "retreat into the shell," but as a legitimate part of that post-impressionist-cubist revolution of the twenties which occurred simultaneously in almost all European countries. *Caligari* certainly was not proof of the inevitability of what was to come later. The fantastic irrationalism, the rejection of the naturalistic decor are not yet equivalents of gas chambers, book burnings, totalitarian ideologies and Nuremberg party congresses.

*From Caligari to Hitler* is one of those questionable books which, by the very character of their errors, are more stimulating than most of the so-called "authentic" ones. Yet it is by no means what it pretends to be — a history of the German film. No one would deny that Hitler was already in the movies before he came to power. The adoration of the uniform (military comedies); the hymns on blood and soil (*Green Is the Heath*); the falsification of history for political purposes (*The Flute Concert of Sanssouci*), the predeliction for feudal aristocratic interiors (all of the Ufa operettas), the social fairy tales of the good executive who leads his private secretary directly from the typewriter into his fairy castle; not to speak of the newsreels that were indeed skillfull in propagandizing the rearmament of Germany in between shots of milk-drinking baby elephants, airplane crashes and fashion-shows — all this was a pre-announcement of forces waiting behind the screen to take over. But to prove this, one was not bound to delve into the abysses of the German soul. It was as obvious as the seven million unemployed, who testified to the chaotic state of a society which evidently could no longer be organized by means of parliamentary rule. Kracauer's book gives a vivid, though psychologically veiled account of the permanent civil war that shook post-war Germany and of which the film was only *one* expression among others. What it does not mention, however, is the role that the German intelligentsia played in those years, the part taken by that intellectual upper-crust which, torn between capitalist democracy and Russian Communism, either took the side of the latter or remained aloof, engrossed in discussion; or which, questing a "third" solution, finally landed among the brown battalions. Fundamentally, very little has changed since then. Germany continues to be the ideological battlefield between East and West. Except for the fact that in the conflict between chaos and tyranny, the role of Caligari now has been assigned to Ivan the Terrible. A new chapter in the history of the German film is about to begin.

# *JASPERS AND GERMAN GUILT*

### *Josef Maier*

It was in October 1945 that I studied in the Palace of Justice at Nuremberg an early copy of the indictment against the chief Nazi war criminals. I got to know the meaning of genocide and more especially I learned that of the seven million Jews who had been living in Europe before the war, at least five million were exterminated by the Nazis. The total number of Jews everywhere was some sixteen millions. Of what other people can it be said that almost a third of them have been massacred?

While everywhere men were fighting and dying for something, for freedom and democracy, or simply in the defense of their country, the victims of genocide died for nothing. Killed wholesale by scientific methods, their death was robbed of any meaning whatsoever. It is necessary to remind ourselves of just what Germany's victims have endured, and are enduring now, if we are to weigh properly Germany's guilt and obligation.

*Germania delenda* is no solution. An eye for an eye has never solved anything. Blind hatred cannot be an answer to so great an evil. But justice and a change of spirit *is*. It is the answer given in a rare and noble little book by Karl Jaspers,[1] co-founder of existentialism, professor at the University of Heidelberg and one of the greatest living philosophers. In a keen analysis of the German question of guilt, he seeks to summon from one's mind and heart every ounce of understanding and kindness and so, in a measure, to restore the balance.

Let no one say that the question of guilt is of no more than academic interest. In Jaspers' opinion it is of utmost political and moral importance. A considerable section of world public opinion today is condemning the German people as a whole. Because they are guilty and unrepenting, that opinion holds, every calamity which has come and which is yet to descend upon the German people is well deserved. The argument of collective guilt serves to justify a policy aiming at the dismemberment of Germany, the outright destruction of her industrial economy and the wiping out of the economic basis for the existence of millions of human beings. But perhaps of even greater importance are the moral implications of the question of guilt for every German.

Karl Jaspers' book is a dignified and well-thought-out protest against the myth of collective guilt. Of course, he knew about Dachau and Oranienburg and the rest. He shows that, far from proving that all Germans are guilty, such institutions of terror in fact prove the exact opposite. Camps of this sort — sites, that is, other than extermination camps — were used almost exclusively up to 1938, and largely up to 1945, for German opponents of the Hitler régime. Being a Jew, I know very well that time and again the whole Jewish people have been made the scapegoat, sometimes of imaginary crimes and sometimes of crimes committed by individual Jews, as by individuals of every group and people. I

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[1] Karl Jaspers, *Die Schuldfrage* (Lambert Schneider, Heidelberg 1946; Artemis Verlag, Zurich 1946).

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feel we should be, in spite of what the Nazis have done to us, among the first to join in opposition to this blasphemous myth of collective responsibility.

But Jaspers is not primarily concerned with accusations, or the refutation of accusations, from the "outside." Nor does he consider it proper to indulge in the sport of countercharges. He is not a politician, but a philosopher trying to plumb below the surface. To him, the question of guilt is essentially an "internal" problem, a question for the conscience of every individual German. "To be sure, the verdict of the victors, being of political nature, is of the greatest consequence for our existence; but it does not help us in our internal transformation, which is decisive. Here we are dealing entirely with ourselves."

Germany is a mortally sick nation. Millions go hungry and without shelter. Of necessity, their horizon is narrowing. There is not much room for cogitation and soul-searching. In this atmosphere, many have come, after so much misery and suffering, to expect reward and at least consolation, not exhortation and blame. Yet, Jaspers feels the question of guilt to be most urgent, in fact, "it is a question of life and death for the German soul." He did not wait long before bringing it up for discussion. The present book is the outgrowth of a series of lectures he delivered at the University of Heidelberg in the winter semester of 1945-46.

Jaspers' distinction between four different kinds of guilt — criminal, political, moral and metaphysical — is very helpful for a more adequate grasp of the meaning of the problem. It is clear that being criminally guilty, and hence subject to criminal prosecution, can only be a condition of individuals who are proved to have committed acts in violation of unambiguous laws.

It is clear, also, that political responsibility for what was done by the German government in the name and on behalf of the German people must rest with the German citizenry. His government is the citizen's own responsibility, Jaspers insists, a theory which is a commonplace in a democracy but a lesson to be learned by the former subjects of a dictatorship. The degree of the German people's political responsibility is determined by the force and will of the Allies. They have both the might and the right to exact reparations and to insist on *Wiedergutmachung* in the broadest sense. It is the law of *vae victis*. The vanquished have no other course but to obey. But if the victors are wise, they will consider the moral and material consequences of their acts, and seek to be guided by the norms and traditions of natural and international law.

It is different, in Jaspers' opinion, with moral and metaphysical guilt. The authorities that render decisions in cases of criminal and political guilt are the courts and the victors. For omissions, however, and for acts that I have committed as a person; for the fact that a breach is made in the solidarity of men and that wrong and injustice have come upon the world — for these I have none to answer but my own conscience and God. For involuntary and enforced participation in Nazi crimes; for shutting my eyes and ears to the cries of the tortured; for my fear and cowardice and hardness of heart—I am morally guilty. I must stand trial before my own conscience. My death would have changed nothing, it is true. But the fact that I am still alive after all that happened lays inescapably a heavy metaphysical guilt upon me.

Jaspers is thoroughly aware of the

intimate interrelation and interdependence of the several kinds of guilt and their common origin in the human situation. It cannot be denied that political conditions have a decisive influence on the character formation of the individual. Yet is it not equally true that moral aberrations are the fertile ground for the growth of adverse political conditions and the development of a criminal atmosphere? Jaspers' primary concern is with the moral and metaphysical aspects of German guilt. Here we are dealing with fundamentals. Nothing but a complete internal transformation of the German people will do, he feels. To be sure, it is important that the victors leave the Germans with enough air to breathe and bread to eat. But it is still more important that the German people experience a profound catharsis of their entire being.

This is a task that only the Germans themselves can accomplish. Its performance cannot be accelerated by decrees from the outside, by drumming into their heads that they must admit their guilt and publicly beat their breasts. It is of necessity a slow and painful process. But it is an indispensible one, says Jaspers. He holds out no promise of reward in the political realm. Without *"Reinigung der Seele"* there is not even the *possibility* of political freedom for the Germans. Perhaps, he says, they will, in the process of their internalization and proper appreciation of their situation, come to realize the significance for themselves of Hegel's interpretation of the relation between Lordship and Bondage in his "Phenomenology of Mind":

> "The truth of the independent consciousness is . . . the consciousness of the bondsman. This doubtless appears in the first instance outside it, and not as the truth of self-consciousness. But just as lordship showed its essential nature to be the reverse of what it wants to be, so too, bondage will, when completed, pass into the opposite of what it immediately is: being a consciousness repressed within itself, it will enter into itself, and change round into real and true independence."

I am inclined to agree. The need for regeneration cannot be denied. From my own experience as an American official in post-war Germany I know that there are still sizeable sections among the German population who like the game of playing off the East and the West, expecting to reap the harvest of a war between the two. But I can also testify to the fact that much moral self-reckoning is taking place, even though it is not done, and cannot be done, in public demonstrations.

There is no shortcut to moral regeneration and outside prodding will certainly not help. Moreover, are the standards by which we judge the Germans of a universal character, applicable and applied in like manner to victor as well as to the vanquished? Are there no aggressors among the victors, no keepers of concentration camps, no oppressors of minorities? Is the problem of guilt an exclusively German question? Are we not trying to escape if we isolate and localize a disease with which our entire civilization is afflicted?

The unceasing deterioration of human relations in Germany bears witness to our own moral improbity. There is today no outside power that could teach or guide the Germans, no ideology with which they could in good conscience identify themselves in the process of redemption.

# COMMENT

## Another Battle of Britain

It was more than mere rhetoric when Prime Minister Attlee, addressing the House of Commons, spoke of another Battle of Britain. Britain, indeed, has to fight for her life again. However this new Battle of Britain did not begin a few weeks ago but started immediately after the war. England's struggle to endure, and especially to finance the war, destroyed the former bases of her existence. New bases have to be found. Stated more prosaically, England must find the means to pay for necessary imports. A temporary solution was to pay with borrowed money. The Government alarmed the country when the exhaustion of credit appeared to be in sight.

The causes are well known; the consequences could be and were foreseen. For instance, in the April issue of *Modern Review* H. N. Brailsford wrote: "The anxiety over our external balance comes to a climax when we face the fact that according to the conditions of the American loan, Sterling must be made freely convertible with the Dollar by July, 1947. If that undertaking is carried out, the consequences may be catastrophic."

How is it possible that the Government so long remained optimistic or careless and did not try to take measures to prevent an acute crisis? We admit not being able to provide a satisfactory explanation, nor to our knowledge has any one else supplied one. All the facts are not yet in. It is obvious that the Labour Government committed some grave errors, but the exact nature of those mistakes are not yet clear.

It was natural that the opposition tried to blame the crisis on the socialist aspects of the Government's program. This attempt was not convincing. The Tory and Liberal Opposition failed to present any valid evidence of the slightest connection between the measures of nationalization undertaken and the rapid dwindling of American credits. We say this not because we intend at all costs to defend all measures taken in the name of socialism. We even happen to believe that nationalization does not necessarily make for the realization of socialism. But we simply cannot see why nationalization as it was being carried out in England in anyway hindered production or resulted in superfluous imports.

More essential is another point connected with the fact that the present British Government is known as a socialist one. Such a Government finds it more difficult than any other to impose hardships on the working population, to take measures which mean lowering the workers' living standards. And there are good and sufficient reasons why such a government should be reluctant in this regard. The danger that it will become involved in a really tragic vicious circle is very great. The problem is not merely a British one. In many countries the sufferings caused by the war have resulted in physical and moral fatigue, even exhaustion of peoples. Men need rest, quiet for the nerves, nourishing food, some comfort, relaxation and pleasure. Instead of this more privation and work is demanded of them. They need better living standards to increase their production, but there cannot be better living without more production. That is the vicious circle which the Labour Government obviously tried to avoid as long as possible— perhaps longer than was allowed by the objective facts of the situation.

Britain is trying to find the solution by her own efforts. Alone, however, she can scarcely avoid the vicious circle we have depicted. Even less could this be done in most other countries. What is necessary is a great international effort, international cooperation with the participation of countries where the same problem does not exist — at least in such acute form. And this means particularly the most active participation of the United States.

## Indonesia and the Dutch

The official Dutch explanation for the beginning of hostilities in Indonesia was that continued lawlessness there made it imperative for them to come to the "defense of the common man" of Indonesia. Yet Dr. J. J. Vandervelde, Netherlands Commissioner for Northern Sumatra, declared on August 3 that the Dutch engaged in the conflict because they "were going bankrupt" without access to the rich products of the Indies.

We leave it to the reader to decide for himself as to the "mystery" of Dutch motivation. But whatever the motives, it is a matter of record that the Linggadjati agreement of last March provided specifically that in case of disagreement on interpretation, the two parties would submit to arbitration by a third party. The Dutch, by thus breaking the covenant which they themselves had freely concluded only a few months previously, have taken upon themselves a responsibility which they may find will become a heavier burden than they anticipated. What reasons will the countrymen of Hugo Grotius advance for their protests if they are again attacked by a Big Power, announcing that it has decided to interpret in its own peculiar fashion its treaty with the Netherlands and is obliged to invade the country in order to re-establish law and order and "protect" the common man of Holland? This is the kind of argument that small nations should be particularly careful to avoid these days.

In contrast to the many previous treaty violations by the Big Powers, this last violation by one of the smaller ones has aroused world public opinion and resulted in effective intervention by the UN. The fact that this time only lesser nations not enjoying the veto right were involved on both sides may not have been without bearing in this respect. But we should not begrudge ourselves the rare good things that come our way these days, and it certainly *is* good news that hostilities have ended — at least temporarily.

As this is written, the Dutch are sending to New York an imposing delegation of representatives of their colonial administration and a retinue of native chieftains favorable to the Dutch to plead their cause before the UN. They will seek to "prove" that the Indonesians are by no means unanimous in asking for independence or in their support of the Republic. But Sultan Hamid II of Pontianak and other native members of the delegation will find that it is not too easy to convince the world that they represent anything except the most backward and undeveloped parts of the islands.

Every good colonial administrator learns from his primer, of course, that the best means of securing his government in the colonies is to discover native sections that are racially or culturally distinct from the main population and that can be played up against the rest. The Dutch, among the oldest and most successful of colonial powers, have been experts at this game. But isn't all this ado slightly incongruous at this late date? After all, what is really in question are not minority rights but rubber, tea, oil, copra, and about 30 per cent of the Dutch national income formerly drained from the East Indies.

In the Linggadjati agreement the Dutch recognized the *de facto* authority of the Republic of Indonesia over the area under its administration. Several months later however, they demanded that a joint Dutch-Indonesian police force police the territory. International law has provided all sorts of interpretations of *de facto* authority, but the Dutch interpretation is indeed a novel one. A *de facto* authority which doesn't even control its own police force would certainly be a legal monstrosity.

If the Indonesian Republic had capitulated in this respect — if anything it has already gone too far in agreeing to all sorts of other exorbitant Dutch demands — it would have signed its own death warrant. The representatives of the Republic would have had no more independence than that now possessed by the aforementioned Sultan Hamid II of Pontianek.

The Dutch troops — most of them American trained and liberally equipped with American arms — had occupied a great part of Indonesia in a *Blitzkrieg* of a few days when UN intervention called a halt to the proceedings. It must not be forgotten that as yet it is only a temporary halt in hostilities. The Dutch can start again when, and if, they see fit.

The Indonesian Republic has now declared that it no longer recognizes the Linggadjati agreement which has been reduced to a scrap of paper by the Dutch offensive. It would thus seem that a lasting solution is possible only on the basis of recognition of Indonesian independence. If this is granted, the Indonesian Republican government may conclude later any sort of agreement with the Dutch it desires. After all, India, Burma, and the Philippines now offer varied examples of attempts to work out new and harmonious relations between colonial countries and their former masters. But the preliminary basis for any such understanding in the case of Indonesia can be established only by the prior withdrawal of Dutch troops.

The Dutch have a great reputation for stubborness. This may be a rather helpful personal attribute on occasions, but it may also engender such psychotic states (well understood by psychiatrists) that the patient no longer can face reality. This leads to complete defeat and disintegration of the afflicted personality. The realities of present-day world politics in general and the situation in Asia in particular make maintenance of a Dutch East Indies Empire in any form simply impossible. If the Dutch will recognize reality as represented at Lake Success by Mr. Sutan Sjahrir, delegate of the Indonesian Republic, instead of attempting to deceive themselves and the world with various sultans from far-off islands, they would eventually render themselves a service in addition to contributing to the prospects (dim as they may seem at times) of a peaceful world.

## The Shadow of the Ruhr

Day by day it becomes increasingly evident that if reconstruction is to be achieved and Europe not left hovering perpetually between life and death, "saved" only by an occasional shot of American credit, the revival of Ruhr industry is an essential prerequisite.

Before the war, Ruhr coal mines yielded approximately 400,000 tons of coal a day or almost as much as all the rest of Europe (excluding Russia) combined. Its steel mills produced nearly 14 million tons of steel annually. Today general production figures in the Ruhr average about one-third of those for 1936. Labor output at best is only about 45% of what it was before the war and frequently falls as low as 20%. Only 2.6 million tons of steel were produced in all Germany last year! During the war, the Ruhr alone produced almost as much (20 million tons annually) as France and Britain combined.

It is clear from these few facts that the problem of the Ruhr lies at the heart of the problem of Europe as a whole. Without a revival of Ruhr production to something approaching pre-war levels, there can be no revival of Europe's economy generally.

This is why discussions concerning the fate of the Ruhr have assumed such importance at international conferences. The shadow of the Ruhr hangs over all deliberations.

The Potsdam decisions and the Allied Level of Industries Plan were actuated by the desire to reduce the Ruhr to a vast junk heap. But after two years of what the London *Economist* aptly terms "an unparalleled essay in international machine wrecking," what was evident to any sensible person from the start is now becoming apparent even to our international statesmen. These "plans" have completely collapsed. The shortages of coal and steel from which Europe is suffering and dying today are remarkably near the volume of the decline of Ruhr production. Even the French, heretofore the most violent opponents of any revival of the Ruhr above the Level of Industries Plan, have come to recognize that Ruhr production must be stepped up if Europe is to live.

All sorts of incentive schemes have been advanced recently to increase Ruhr production. The coal miners, for instance, have been promised additional rations if they will increase their output. (Incidentally, there is something obscene about some of the announcements of the British-Ruhr coal administration in offering the starved miners an additional slice of buttered bread plus two slices of sausage and a glass of liquor if only they will work harder.) All incentive measures have met with negligible response. A miner whose family is suffering from hunger and living in a hovel will not measurably increase his output because he himself gets a few extra scraps. In a social body that is sick and exhausted, in a social and political situation that borders on chaos, it is impossible to isolate areas to be kept free from the infection that eats into the rest of the body.

In any case, revival of the Ruhr depends not upon any such petty schemes, but upon revival of Germany industry as a whole. All departmentalizing approaches, so dear to the bureaucratic heart, are destined to failure. The German transportation system is near a breakdown. German currency has become so worthless that a great part of agricultural and even industrial production moves through black market channels. Demoralization is prevalent in all strata of the German population. In such a situation it is sheer madness to try to treat the Ruhr as an isolated and separate problem.

It was almost a year ago (October 22, 1946) that Ernest Bevin announced to the House of Commons that England had taken over control of coal and steel production in the Ruhr and that these industries would never again be permitted to revert to private ownership. With this declaration, the battle for the Ruhr entered a new stage. Not the industrial level merely, but also its social structure became a matter for dispute. American pressure against any such scheme of nationalization has been constant. The U.S. contends that the German people have not been consulted and it would be undemocratic. Its real opposition, however, is based on the knowledge that if the nationalization pattern were instituted in the Ruhr, this would automatically determine the pattern for the rest of Europe.

As to the wishes of the German people, it should be noted that the parliament of North Rhine-Westphalia has passed a resolution demanding the return of the Ruhr coal mines to German hands and their transference to public ownership. Since no central German parliament exists, this is as close to an expression of the wishes of the people of the Ruhr as it would be possible to register through the channels now open to them. On the issue of nationalization, it is apparent that any attempt to rebuild the Ruhr under private ownership would mean the reinstatement of the coal and steel barons of pre-war days—i.e. the most powerful reactionary elements which materially aided the victory of Nazism. Furthermore, as the London *Economist* (certainly no socialist publication) recently pointed out, such a decision would force not only the Ruhr workers, but also French labor into the Communist camp.

Nationalization of the Ruhr and its return to German hands is the prerequisite for any progressive solution. But though this is a necessary condition, it is not, therefore, *ipso facto* a sufficient one. Even a nationalized Ruhr, hampered at every turn by the contradictory demands of the occupying powers, could not really alleviate the situation. What is necessary is an all-European organization (in which Germany would be admitted as a full partner) capable of coordinating the main industries of Europe on a supra-national level. Only such an organization can save Europe from collapse. Only such an organization can lay the ghost of future domination of Europe by a revived Germany and at the same time prevent the certainty of European decline which, without a revived Germany, is inevitable.

## Kurt Schmidt

Kurt Schmidt, one of the most promising political figures to emerge since the war, is dead. By an incongruous twist of fate this Socialist who had survived years of Nazi hell died from the aftereffects of an appendectomy.

Schmidt, who had entered the German Socialist youth movement at the age of 17, was 20 when the Nazis came to power. After the outlawing of the Social Democratic Party, he began organizing illegal activity. He soon became, and remained until his arrest in 1938, one of the most active leaders of the German underground. But it was with arrest and imprisonment that the full stature of this man began to be revealed. The Nazis tried to make him talk. After all other means had failed, they ordered him to dig his grave. When he had finished, they stood him before a firing squad and ordered the men to take aim. It was a trick in this case, but Schmidt didn't know that, *and he would not speak.*

Immediately after the fall of Berlin, Schmidt became active in the ranks of the Berlin Social Democratic Party. When the Russians tried to force the reborn party into a merger with the Communists, it was Schmidt who took the lead in frustrating the Communist maneuvers. While a number of the older top leaders of the Party allowed themselves to be drawn in, Schmidt never wavered. He had learned the meaning of totalitarianism the hard way — through torture and imprisonment. In vigorous speeches that may well become socialist classics someday, he defended the integrity of the socialist movement against the totalitarian onslaught. For him, socialism was not so much a method of economic organization as it was a great moral and human idea and ideal. He could not conceive of socialism without the fullest measure of democracy.

His stand during those days of the "battle of Berlin" against Stalinist pressure may well have saved both Berlin and German socialism. It was the first set-back given the wave from the East which seemed on its way to engulf all Europe. The stand of a few key figures in Berlin gave renewed courage to their comrades all over Germany.

With this battle won, Schmidt immediately turned to the two creative tasks which appeared to him most vital. He sought to re-establish the international connections of the German movement and to establish the educational machinery to train a new generation of German socialists.

With all his activities carried on against a background of mounting privation and chaos, Schmidt found time to study and discuss theoretical questions of import to the whole international movement. *Modern Review* had the privilege of publishing (April 1947 issue) one of his searching pieces in which he was groping toward a new concept of socialist planning.

Passionately intent on giving meaning to life in a world which placed ever-increasing emphasis on absurdity and death, Schmidt, who against incredible odds had survived the Nazis, died from the after-effects of an operation which has become so simple no one takes it seriously anymore.

# CAN EUROPE ACHIEVE POLITICAL UNITY?

**Raymond Aron**

Will Europe in these days of its decline find the unity which it never realized during the time of its greatness? It is to this simple question that all the controversies on the destiny of the Old Continent — which circumstances cause to be so frequent and so passionate — can be brought back.

The nostalgia for unity is born of the decline. Power-conflicts among those who were called the great European powers were accepted with ease during the period when, despite these conflicts, they together held an uncontested pre-eminence in the world. Neither the wars of the French Revolution and of the Empire, nor the Franco-German War of the last century, hindered the triumphant spread of European arms and merchandise throughout Africa and Asia. As long as Europe retained a quasi-monopoly of technology, and consequently of modern armament, it seemed sheltered from all the risks of existence, even from those brought about by its own overreaching.

This situation is no longer even approximated today Europe, from Moscow to the Atlantic, is covered with ruins, ruins of cities and ruins of states. Where one was accustomed to seeing a state of the first order one now finds only a sort of vacuum, a no-man's land. For the time being, there is only one center of power and it is situated on the periphery of Europe, in a land which cannot be completely separated from European history but which also cannot be considered an integral part of it. In other places, old border posts have been erected and even a few ones added — with the establishing of the occupation zone.

At present, not one nation among the victorious or the vanquished, among the liberated or the occupied, has gathered together enough forces to strike out for an autonomous role in world

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diplomacy. This time Europe has pushed its quarrels to the point of historical suicide. This time Europe itself has been the greatest victim of the war set off by Nazi folly.

The true victors are, to be sure, not alien to Europe: the United States and the USSR belong, from the point of view of civilization, to the dependencies, or, if one dares to say so, to the descendency of Europe. They owe it the spirit of their science, their industry, and their fundamental political and religious doctrines. Having great spaces at their disposal, they learned to apply the techniques of production on a larger scale and, at least in the United States, with superior efficiency. They remain heirs, in the double sense of the word. They may be destined to liquidate the reign of Europe, but at the same time they prolong it, and may perhaps ultimately enrich it.

They are historically younger than the nations of Europe. For more than two centuries Russia led an isolated existence under Mongol domination. She opened herself fully to occidental influence only in the eighteenth century; at the start of the twentieth century she was still ignoring the concentration of cities and factories, which were the social characteristics of the preceding century — or, at best, she was at least a century behind the occidental nations in experiencing the revolution of the West. The American nation is also young in an obvious way, formed as it was by European immigrants on a virgin continent whose original population was slowly pushed back and then exterminated. In short, in America and Russia, the great spaces; in the one and in the other, the frenzy of production, of technology, of gigantic factories; in one and the other, as compared to Europe, a lesser density of "living past," of experience integrated with the present, but also, as a compensation of this lesser refinement, a vigorous élan directed toward the days to come: confidence in an indefinite and glorious future.

These oppositions are schematic. One could elaborate them with more precision and subtlety — but then there would be the risk of their dissolving. Let's not hide it from ourselves: the slogan of European unity is born from simple, almost caricatured visions. The feeling that Europe is in danger stems not so much from the revolt of the European colonies as from the triumph of the two Colossus-States, the two Continent-States which dominate the world scene. It is in relation to these that thinkers and politicians define the unity of Europe and aim to awaken a European consciousness.

But, even to degree that one does surmount the inter-European conflicts of yesterday — only to encounter other conflicts on a superior level — still, the circumstances are not as favorable to that awakening of consciousness as is sometimes thought.

## II

So far, a conflict appears clearly at one point only: the dimension and nature of the political units. All the states between the Atlantic and the Russian border that have been reconstituted after the German defeat belong to the same species. They are national states: a historic community of language and culture expresses its will to live in a sovereign state. All other considerations, such as strategic and economic ones, are subordinated to the preoccupations of nationality and sovereignty. Not that the desires of the populations had been consulted, as in 1919. When there was doubt, the Big Powers decided; and the transfers of population tended to make the political map agree with the map of nationalities. In a sense, the transfers of population, inhuman as they may appear, logically follow the plebiscites of 1919 — human methods *par excellence.* Even more, the breakdown of the status of minorities leads to the radical method of population transfers. But, be it the one method or the other, the principle of nationalities in the twentieth century multiplies political units and reduces their dimensions. In the last century the same principle had an opposite effect. It led, instead, to the formation of great states in Italy and Germany and so appeared to be in harmony with economic evolution. This illusion is now dissipated: the movements of nationalities and economic development have continued, each in its own direction, and the contradiction has been aggravated.

We do not admit unreservedly the current formulas on the decisive advantages of large spaces. The living standards of New Zealand and Sweden and, before the war, of Holland, were among the highest in the world. The amplitude of the market is evidently an advantage for mass-production and, within a narrow economic unit, considerable productivity of labor is attained only by a specialization of production and extended possibilities of export. But what is catastrophic is a multiplication of small units with autarchic tendencies.

Just as much as economic reason, political reason also condemns the present organization of the European states. If it were willing to lose a greater or smaller part of its wealth, Europe might conceivably adapt itself to its own balkanization. But the inevitable price would be impotence because of the simple fact that the Heir States, or, according to Toynbee's expression, the semi-barbarian peripheral states which are destined to take over, are constituted according to another principle and another measure. The USSR is a continuous continental empire in which the metropolis and the dominated populations are in permanent contact — as if one could pass, without crossing the seas, from France to Dakar and Hanoi. And the "mode of population" of the United States has enlarged the sense of nationality, and federation has worked to prevent the partly given and partly acquired distinctions between the various states from crystallizing themselves in a will toward independence and sovereignty. We do not pretend to judge the relative value of these different principles — the national and the supra-national. The Soviet combination of cultural autonomy with economic and doctrinal centralization (centralization of the state and the Party) is not in itself necessarily superior to the European type of sovereignty. We simply take notice of the fact that the Russian-American formula at a time when it is applied to whole continents manages to make national states outmoded. They no longer exist at the advanced level of our epoch; their fate is similar to that of the feudal principalities in the age of national states. They become mere stakes in the game of power between the empires — just as the cities of Italy and Germany became pawns of the rivalry between the kings of France and Spain in the sixteenth century.

## III

But the present decadence of Europe exhibits a peculiar character. It does not stem from an exhaustion of creative energies: whether in the arts or in the sciences, in philosophy or literature, in painting or sculpture, the essential works until the thirties still came from the soil of Europe. American superiority was limited to the industrial utilization of scientific knowledge, to a special technique, that of organization. The military and, tomorrow, the industrial utilization of atomic energy has been realized in the United States — but with the help of scientists of all occidental countries. Until 1939, modern culture, whatever one might think of it, manifested the dominant impress of Europe.

Will this continue to be the case tomorrow? Nobody would dare to affirm this, and one perceives immediately two principal reasons for doubt and uncertainty. Europe prospered, despite its divisions and its wars, as long as these did not devour the substance of its existence. The limited wars of the eighteenth century left intact the indispensable human conditions for the flowering of its culture. The same cannot be said about the total wars of the twentieth century. The cost of the First World War is, above all, not to be measured in men: Europe (the USSR excluded) lost about 20 million men, that is, an amount nearly equal to the prospective increase for the years 1910-1920. But the heaviest costs of the war were the increased brutality of social relations; the destruction of the network of world economy; the deepening of economic crises; the contempt for liberal values; and the ruin of the middle classes — which are indispensable to moderate regimes and to the stability of civilization. But the consequences of the Second World War appear to be definitely more threatening still. For how many years will Europeans live in ruined cities? For how many years will intellectuals be crushed by material difficulties — so unfavorable to leisure and creative activities? When will that minimum of security and comfort — without which culture appears as something superfluous — be re-established? What social groupings will take over from those that have been crushed by crises, revolutions and years of occupation? It is probable that the supremacy of the United States and of Russia was inscribed in the nature of things, in the statistics of population and of economic resources: but the breakdown of Europe was not inevitable. Europe hasn't dried up like an old tree that is no longer able to produce enough new juices — no, Europe has destroyed herself by the excess of her own ardor, which carried her to the four corners of the planet and which, turning back on itself, continues the struggle between nations and ideas to the point of total destruction.

But these wars themselves, these collective suicides, do they not result from anachronistic policies? Wars of nationalities in the epoch of empires: Europe condemns itself to death, like Italy in the sixteenth century, like Germany in the seventeenth, because it remains a prisoner of the principle of yesterday. And in the long run will it succeed in the paradoxical junction, which has been so rare in the past, between political impotence and cultural richness?

## IV

The same reasons that make the realization of European unity desirable — do they not also make it improbable? Is not the need for unity felt with more acuteness as less possibilities appear for its realization? If the nations of Europe are comparable to the states, cities and principalities of the Italy and Germany of the past — in a word, if Europe is balkanized — what chance does it have to surmount its divisions? And is not the slogan of the United States of Europe or of Western Federation comparable to the dream of large spaces which haunts the sleep of the prisoner, comparable to the dream of power by which the weak compensate for their misery?

Let's state it right away — Europe has never had a consciousness of itself as a political reality. To be sure, Europeans undertook many actions in common, from the crusades to the exploration of the universe. But when those who were (or were going to become) Frenchmen, Germans, English or Italians — when these Europeans fought together to conquer the Holy Land, their community was that of Christianity, not of Europe. It may be that from the point of view of other continents and other races, the expansion of modern civilization appears as the collective work of the peoples of Europe, but the Europeans themselves have not experienced it as such. The kings of Europe extended to America their traditional quarrels. The only master which they recognized together and which all pretended to serve was Christ.

Those who governed the peoples of Europe retained the memory of a unity superior to that of the national states. The nostalgia of empire, sometimes repressed, sometimes imperative, maintained itself in the European consciousness through the centuries — even during periods in which the national idea was triumphant. But it is based either on the Roman idea, which survived the circumstances which made it a reality, or on a vague and fragile sentiment. The statesmen of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries sometimes spoke of the European Concert. From time to time, especially when this suited their particular purpose, they invoked the common interests of the European states. Talleyrand, anxious to re-establish a balance after the turmoil of revolution, talks in the name of European Concert and of European peace. But these supra-national concepts have little authority or weight, they merely serve to maintain the conflicts of the states within prescribed limits — as if it had been felt, vaguely, that if certain barriers were broken down the conflicts would carry away the system itself.

This has been the case in the twentieth century. The system has not re-established itself because this hyperbolic war, to use Ferrero's expression, has occasioned too much material and moral ruin to permit the re-introduction of the old balance. In its origin this balance had nothing original about it. Politically it concerned neither the division of the world nor the interior regime of the peoples; it was directly caused by the rivalry between the Germans and the Slavs in the Southeast of Europe: its object was the succession of Austria, the liquidation of the last Imperial states based on a supranational principle (the Dual Monarchy and the Turkish Empire). Through the play of alliances, all of Europe was implicated almost from the first day. As an effect of the application of technology to the means of combat, military operations underwent an unlimited extension. All the impediments that moral or political tradition had erected against the expansion of violence evaporated suddenly under the pressure of industry. The mode of combat had to adapt itself to the need of an indefinite accumulation and replacement of arms, just as the mode of production adapts itself to the accumulation and replacement of machines. Moral frenzy has followed in the wake of material over-reaching. Once millions of men had been thrown into the cauldron, one could not avoid justifying the sacrifices and trials, and proposing an ideal equal to the event. Beyond what Elie Halevy has called the organization of enthusiasm, the belligerents — especially the Allies — launched an ideology which enthroned not so much the specific ends as the *sense* of the war, democracy, self-determination of peoples, etc. Thus the domestic status of the states was put into question at the same time as the delimitation of borders. It was accepted that the destiny of regimes depended on the issues of battles.

## V

But, at the same time, the feeling of community which managed to survive in the earlier, confused crossing of arms has now disappeared. In the eighteenth century the consciousness of a European Concert was linked to the similarities of monarchical regimes. The *Sainte Alliance* quite clearly derived its justification from the will to maintain a certain social order. Among the nobles and bourgeois who governed the great powers in the nineteenth century there still existed the idea of a common civilization to which one belonged and which one aimed to continue. But what community could one conceive yesterday, when Europe was divided between Communist, fascist and democratic peoples? What community can one conceive today, when the opposition between occidental and oriental democracy divides not so much the continent but each nation within itself?

Even more, is one not led, because of this, to look for the principle of unity in an ideology — Communist or democratic — much more than in a reality that happens to be geographic rather than political? It may be that the nations of Europe have more in common on the plane of culture and value then they themselves think. It may be that the nations formed by similar spiritual influences constitute a real unity but, to speak the language of the philosophers, this unity is *in* itself, not *for* itself; is is a given datum of existence, not an idea in consciousness. But only the consciousness is decisive.

I am ready to believe that a French Communist is nearer to a French Radical or Socialist than to a Communist fashioned by 20 years of the Stalinist regime — but he doesn't know it. He is ready, if the line should change, to enthusiastically endorse the Union of European Soviet Republics; but he will stand up against any germ of European unity now because in the present state of the world Russia will not participate and since all that is done without Russia is, in his eyes, done against Russia.

In other words, it seems that even today the unity of Europe cannot be achieved in the name of Europe. There existed a certain form of European unity in the name of Christianity; there will perhaps be another form of European unity in the name of Communism; there has never been one in the name of Europe. Can there be one? *Can Europe become the key word of a political ideology?*

For the time being, whatever their intentions, the Communists have no chance of realizing this unity. As long as the tension between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Saxon world continues, the penetration of Communism into the West will appear in the eyes of the Western democracies as the equivalent of an advance of the Red Army. Each success of the Communist parties will mark a step toward a new intercontinental, planetary war. Furthermore, apart from outside pressure, Europe will not accept the unity that is offered by Communism as long as the Russian standard of life remains inferior to that of the peoples of the West. Of the two Heir-States, situated on the periphery of European civilization, the one contains at the same time power and wealth, the other power without wealth. It is true that the latter to a certain degree compensates for its poverty by the prophetic and messianic radiance of its doctrine. However this may be, the present curious situation tends toward an unstable equilibrium which signifies for Europe the persistence of division, anarchy and impotence.

The unity of Europe, it will be objected, marks the only road to salvation. The nations of Europe will not resign themselves to being objects of a conflict that goes on above their heads — they will not submit to the tearing apart of the universe. They will achieve their purpose only by rejecting both American capitalism and Russian Communism, the two horns of the dilemma, and by the elaboration of a solution of world problems that allows them to escape both alternatives. Let Europe be herself and she will escape decline. The program is alluring — but it remains rhetorical.

Let's admit that there is a third communitarian, socialist, laborite, solution — the name is of little importance. Let's admit that the nations of Europe could succeed in synthesizing the ownership of certain means of production and partial planning of the economy with the safeguarding of individual liberties and parliamentary forms. Nevertheless, the hostility of the Communists would not be attenuated by concessions made to socialist ideas. On the contrary. It is only too well known that Social Democracy remains the preferred target of Communist maledictions. The more that Western Socialism came to appear as valid, as capable of construction, the more the Soviet Union would denounce it. What has most import to the Soviet Believer is that Communism remain the sole outcome of the hopelessness of the masses. Should one look for a union limited to Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and France? Then the Stalinist would scream at the creation of a Western Bloc. Should one attempt to integrate a weakened and democratized Germany into the Western whole? The invectives against the Machiavellianism of the democracies which, obsessed by the Russian menace, try to erect a German bulwark and risk the rebuilding of the danger of yesterday which has just been eliminated, would multiply.

Whether in the domain of ideologies or in that of diplomacy, one always comes up against the same contradiction. A divided Europe, oscillating between opposed forces, cannot lean in one direction without provoking a violent reaction from the other. And if the United States would accommodate itself to a European Europe on the sole condition that it not be Communist, Russia will not accept a Europe that is organized without her, since she is convinced that such a Europe will eventually be hostile to her. The Great Powers also make themselves the defenders of the independence and "sovereignty" of minuscule nations which, according to their own theories, are anachronistic. Twenty-five years ago nationalities demanded their independence: today this independence is given to and imposed upon them. This paradox is easily understandable — since independence for the small is often the road to servitude.

## VI

We have not posed the antithesis of the need for unity and the lack of power to realize it in order to bring forth at the end, in the best of scholarly styles, a triumphant synthesis. The antithesis is real, inscribed in historic reality and in the passions of the masses. It does not allow of a theoretical solution; but it can be overcome, slowly, by the will of men.

The propaganda for the United States of Europe comes up against an insurmountable resistance, that of the Communists. Given the present state of Europe, it is condemned, furthermore, to remain vague and equivocal. As long as a line of separation runs through Germany, the organization of either half of Europe will seem directed against the other. But even if Germany is unified tomorrow, we still must ask what place is reserved for her in the Europe of tomorrow, or, better, on what conditions are we willing to offer her a place. Everybody will admit that no Europe is possible without the reconstruction of some kind of Germany. But it still remains necessary that this Germany be reconciled to a reduced destiny; that it have enough industrial power to allow 70 million men to live on a decent level, without its factories becoming the arsenal of a new *Wehrmacht;* that there be a renunciation of all over-reaching dreams and a dedication to a pacific future. This program certainly does not demand anything impossible, but it also contains nothing that can be immediately realized, nor anything that depends exclusively on the peoples of Europe, condemned for the time being to submit to the will of the Big.

Is this to say that Europe should passively accept the destiny that is imposed on it from the outside? Certainly not. The roads for action are open, and if at the beginning the action seems humble — limited not in time but in the amplitude of the hopes it might inspire — one nevertheless should not conclude that these efforts are vain. Italy and France are separated by remembrances, prejudices, by that reciprocal lack of trust which so often reigns among relatives. If France multiplies stupidities in the style of the border quarrel about Brigue and Tende, if she makes too strict use of her right to expel the Italians from Tunisia, the border disputes will start tomorrow with an increased violence, and invective will again be exchanged across the Alps. This would indicate that the two nations are incorrigible, that they are incapable of forgetting or of learning.

A policy inspired by the idea of Europe would use very different methods. It would assert that a frank reconciliation with Italy is much more valuable than two villages — the alienation of which has never troubled the peace of France: it would proclaim that the strategic lines of the Alps fail to make sense if one turns one's view toward the future and not towards the past. It would make use of the occasion of this quarrel to profer a gesture of generosity as a foundation of friendship. Italy is at present the only country that has a large surplus of manpower, whereas France, at home and in the colonies, has millions of jobs to offer. But an immigration agreement is insufficient, if necessary. In order to have the frank and complete collaboration of Italian labor, it is necessary that Italy feel herself called to a work which is her own as well as France's. How can the nations of Europe, faithful to their past, conscious of their singularity, overcome their particularism if they deny themselves the chance to work in common?

Belgium and Holland have concluded a custom's union. The Dunkerque treaty provides that French and British reconstruction plans will be compared and synchronized. It would be impossible to institute immediately a custom's union between France and Great Britain, but the direction of the trend has at least been indicated and the attempts at economic rationalization, slow and measured as they are, will not create too vivid an opposition. And this is of the essence. The European idea does not carry within itself a spectacular and immediate realization, but it can serve as a point of orientation for the daily actions of diplomacy.

It will be objected that limited economic agreements of an empirical character will never allow us to attain the goal of the United States of Europe, or a European Federation. I would answer that this aim will for years remain situated on the ideal rather than the objective horizon. But anyhow one doesn't dream of building a political unity comparable to the Collosus-States. It is not our wish that there appear a European giant capable of measuring himself with the Russian and American giants. There is no gain by increasing to three the number of rivals on the world scene. We are simply concerned to afford the European nations the possibility of a pacific co-existence, to create a zone of prosperity and neutrality where today there is a zone of misery for which the empires contend between each other. Neither prosperity nor neutrality demands a complete and final unity; neither the one nor the other will appear all of a sudden at the appeal of the prophets. The rebuilding of the devastated countries, the reconstruction of a pacific Germany, whose industry would be at the service of the European community, diplomatic collaboration, economic understandings, friendship between the national states — all these tasks demand time.

In the world concert Europe is now only a province. As peers of the Big Powers, the old nations are condemned to an inexorable decline — if they remain so obstinate as to cling to their particularism. These truths are too clear to be ignored. But passage from the memories of yesterday to the evidence of today is easy in reflection and difficult in action, since Europe has never known how to become aware, on the political plane, of the community of its destiny. And we no longer have the naiveté to believe that the need creates the organ, that necessity, recognized by intelligence, realizes itself inevitably. Circumstances erect obstacles just as much as they offer chances. The answer to the challenge of history must be given by men themselves.

# CHARLES DE GAULLE: A POLITICAL PORTRAIT

**Gelo and Andrea**

Until the recent crisis the same policy of seeking to insure national independence based on a directed economy has been followed by all governments of the Fourth Republic. Coherence of the government and social peace were to be secured through coalition of the three big parties (MRP, SFIO and CP) which dominated French society. This coalition was supposed to insure the success of a nationally directed economy, and also and more specifically, the success of a wage policy designed to limit purchasing power in order to decrease consumption in favor of investment. On the foreign policy plane, France was supposed to play the role of mediator between Russia and the United States. The accepted theory was that she could best insure her own particular interests by leaning first in one direction and then in the other.

However the crisis which occurred last May as a result of both foreign and domestic developments has placed a question mark after all the basic assumptions of this policy. The breakdown of the Moscow Conference and accentuation of tensions between the two Big Powers rendered the French policy of mediation immediately inapplicable and its pursuit in the future impossible. On the other hand, huge spontaneous strike waves demonstrated that the workers were no longer inclined to accept the conditions under which they had lived since the liberation. Then, with the departure of the Communists from the Government, the three-party coalition which had functioned more or less in support of governmental policies was shattered. At this point many serious observers asked themselves if the situation would not evolve into a fundamental crisis of the regime.

By the end of July, as these lines are being written, it is possible to report a certain relaxation of the social and political tensions. But it would be wrong to conclude therefore that the Government has mastered the difficulties. If a new incident occurs — be it of the

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nature of the recent breakdown in bread deliveries, in the monetary field, or anywhere else for that matter — the fragility of the present state of affairs will rapidly be revealed. And quite apart from such possible incidents, serious basic problems remain to be solved.

If the aim is to insure national independence — and the governmental parties are certainly agreed on this — then two conditions must necessarily be fulfilled. First, substantial U.S. aid must be assured. (This could only mean further "drawing back" from Russia and would undoubtedly stir up the most violent opposition from the Communists.) Second, the aid must be obtained on such terms that it does not result in economic and political subordination of France to the U.S. There is only one way to avoid this. The American credit would have to be utilized to realize the economic policies outlined in France's Four-Year Plan, i.e. to endow France as quickly as possible with an industrial potential sufficiently strong to insure her a position as an antonomous Big Power and the rallying center for the other countries of Western Europe. But even with American aid there would be the necessity for severe discipline on the part of all social strata as the *sine qua non* of carrying out such economic policies. And would not the Communists exploit the discontent and stir up ever renewed difficulties? How then can the situation be mastered within the framework of democracy and parliamentarism?

It is in this situation, which became apparent in the spring and in view of which the parties have been forced to reconsider their past policies, that General de Gaulle has reappeared in the foreground of political activity. He accuses the parties of being unable to master the problems of the hour and of precipitating the country into its decline. He attempts to create a huge movement that is to be united under the slogans — "We have had enough of impotent governments"—"Enough anarchy,"—"End the regime of the parties."

To evaluate the significance of this new political activity one has to understand de Gaulle as the representative of the nationalism of our epoch, this neo-nationalism which might perhaps insure the independence of France, but which could not help but accelerate and complete the decline of European civilization.

### *Neither Conservative Nor Revolutionary*

Under present conditions, the increase of national power cannot tolerate the economy being regulated according to the interests of the consumers, that is, of the large masses of the population. But it also cannot be regulated according to the desires of capitalist groupings — which does not mean that profit and national interests must at every moment be antagonistic. Every national policy, consequently must restrain those socio-economic groupings and forces that might pursue their particular interests as against the national interest.

If de Gaulle were "the man of the trusts" he could not become the authentic representative of present day national policies. But such is not the case: de Gaulle, on the contrary, measures every economic, social or political disposition essentially according to its utility in the pursuance of national power politics. No, General de Gaulle is not a prisoner of tradition, he is an "innovator," though certainly an enemy of revolutionaries (it is not fortuitous that he took part in 1919 in the war of Poland against the Russian revolution) and all his books show this only too clearly. But neither is he a friend of the conservatives. It is exactly his nationalism that has led him to disavow the conservative camp. For de Gaulle, property is not sacred. The abolition of the freedom of production, exchange and distribution, i.e., the restrictions on the right to dispose of one's property, that took place during the First World War were recognized by de Gaulle as being necessary for the conduct of modern warfare and were approved by him. And since the period of his well-known London speeches during the Second World War, de Gaulle recognizes the need for the continuance of the directed economy as a means of peacetime planning in the national interest. He did not hesitate to draw the logical conclusions from these statements and to ask that the key positions in the economy should definitely pass into the hands of the state. All this has led him to take the side of the planners against the liberals, and even to participate in nationalization policies which were accompanied by the expropriation of big capital. He has again reaffirmed, in a recent press conference (April 1947), his approval of the nationalizations and his desire to maintain them. If, on the other hand, he has never spoken against labor unions, it is nevertheless obvious that he includes them among the intolerable "coalitions of interests" that are to be extirpated inasmuch as they are instruments of the interests of the workers and not simply part of the state machinery.

But de Gaulle knows that force alone will not suffice to insure the subordination of particular interests to national ones. And if he recognizes the value of the ideological factor, of a reanimated nationalism, he is also enough of a psychologist to know that an appeal to individual interests should also be made. Industrialists, peasants and businessmen would have to conform to the directives of the state and to submit to its control, but the spur of profit would still be left to them. So as to compensate for the restrictions of individual liberties and for very heavy sacrifices that a nationalist policy would impose on the wage earners, social reforms would be indispensable: social security measures on the one hand, work councils and similar institutions on the other. In de Gaulle's conception, these reforms generally appear within a corporatist framework — in the tradition of Social Christianity.

The economic and social program of General de Gaulle, the realization of which is supposed to "open again to France the road to *grandeur,*" can be presented by quoting a few key sentences from his speeches.[1] France must "make up for her grievous delay of adaptation to the social obligations of modern nations," she must institute "an economic and social regime such that no monopoly and no coalition of particular interests can weigh on the state or press counter to the national interest"; France must exploit the "resources of the nation and the Empire by a directed technology."

It would seem unnecessary to demonstrate in detail that these reforms and this transformation of the structure of bourgeois society in no sense have any progressive meaning, nor anything in common with a defense of the human personality. Of course, de Gaulle attacks "collectivism" in the name of individualism — differing from the fascist and National-Socialist doctrines which make the absorption of the individual into the nation their declared principle. It is also true that de Gaulle, who has been raised in the tradition of Western civilization, and who has mastered the humanistic sciences possesses a much larger culture than any of the dictators of the twentieth century who have achieved power. But for all of that, his conception of the world and of man is not any more human than theirs. His ideology — like theirs — places power at its core. And his scale of values is determined by factors of power. That is why war is for him "an inevitable element of general activity." It is even, for him, a fructifying element — since from it stems the falls and the renewals, the new formations of society. And whatever is true for all states, according to de Gaulle, is especially true for France: "Our grandeur or our decline depends directly on the fortunes of battle. . . . France must be armed or she will not be."[2] The quintessence of the lesson that de Gaulle finds embodied in history is that in order for France to "stand upright," she needs the "conjunction of a strong government and a solid army."[3]

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[1] From de Gaulle's speeches of April 20, 1943, Oct. 2, 1941, Nov. 11, 1942, and from his declaration to the resistance organizations which appeared in the clandestine papers of both zones in June 1942.

How can the goals of his policies be pursued without the utilization of those tendencies present in the crisis of occidental civilization that are opposed to individualism, that lead to barbarism? Do not these goals demand that the great mass of citizens be reduced either to instruments of economic efficiency or to soldiers, that their value be measured by whether they fulfill these "missions" in a satisfactory manner?

### *The Man and the Historical Conditions*

When de Gaulle launched his appeal to Frenchmen over the London radio on June 18, 1940, and thus became the symbol of national independence, he did not act out of a sudden impulse. The capitulation was the event that finally allowed him to appear on the scene of history as the providential savior of the nation — to which role he had for a long time thought himself predestined. As early as 1929 he wrote: "In a few years people will hang on my coat tails to have me save the country."[4] This almost mystical belief in his exceptional destiny has always fortified de Gaulle, despite the resistance of the top army leaders against his person and his ideas. Many of them, including General Giraud, disliked him and considered him a "dangerous innovator." But he consoled himself with the fanatical belief in his mission: "A man who is made for high things," he wrote in 1934, "is little liked except in the days of difficulty; it is rare that he finds favor . . . (but) the hard springs of ambition sustain him. . . . Certainly not the desire for advancement and honors — that would be mere sycophantism — but certainly the hope that he will one day play a great role in great events."[5] It was clear from the context that he not only hoped one day to become a great military leader, but also a great statesman who would mark with his imprint the epoch in which he lived. There can also be no doubt that when he described in his works more than once[6] and with a clearly partisan ardor "the man of character" and the relations between the chief and those who follow him, he in reality designed the image he had of himself and of his own future: "The man of character incorporates in his person the rigor which is inherent in effort. . . . When events become threatening, the danger pressing . . . people's hopes and desires are immediately turned toward him as iron is attracted by the magnet. . . . A sort of groundswell pushes him to the fore."

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[2] Charles de Gaulle: *Vers l'Armée de Métier,* Paris, 1934. P. 39.
[3] Charles de Gaulle: *La France et son Armée,* Paris, 1938. P. 1.
[4] In a letter quoted by L. Nachin in *Charles de Gaulle,* Paris, 1944. P. 12.
[5] *Vers l'Armée de Métier,* Pp. 121-22.

Though impatient to occupy an exceptional place in society, de Gaulle could not attain his goal under any and all historical conditions — because his ambition is united to a cause: the struggle for the ascension of the nation toward a new position of power. But between the two World Wars an ambition of this kind could not find favorable ground either in the army or in the county at large.

Trying to secure by military force France's fragile system of European alliances, which was supposed to insure her domination over the continent, de Gaulle sought to renew the armament and strategy of the French army in order to re-invigorate its offensive capacities. But the generals clung to the strategy of defense and shrugged their shoulders at the idea that tanks and aviation would become the primary arms, thus transforming warfare — which had so recently become positional — once again into wars of movement.

If the terrain was unfavorable in the army, it was still more so in the country. The great majority of the population was clearly hostile to any nationalist policy. De Gaulle notes that "an anti-war psychosis that knows no bound has developed in our people"[7] and he hopes ardently that the class struggle, internationalism, and "the neurasthenia of pacifism" be eradicated by "some dream of national *grandeur.*"

These lines were written in 1934 — the same year that saw the birth of the great *elan* of the French worker's movement which, mounting like an irresistable wave, appeared for a moment in 1936 — closely linked to the Spanish revolution and echoing among the workers of the whole world, — as if it might be able to solve by revolutionary means the crisis of European capitalist society.

It is true that this wave was broken — but without being replaced by a vigorous reaffirmation of the power of the bourgeoisie.

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[6] See esp., Charles de Gaulle: "Du Caractère," in *La Revue Militaire Francaise,* June 1, 1930. Also, *Le Fil de l'Epee,* Paris, 1932. P. 46.

[7] *Vers l'Armée de Métier,* Pp. 92-3.

This bourgeoisie — it has often been repeated since the capitulation — had also lost the "national sense." And since there existed no new kind of national movement attuned to the conditions of the twentieth century, it seemed as if the French nation was destined to be subjected to the reign of a stronger power. No, there existed in the inter-war years no opportunities for Gaullist policies.

### *The Crucial Juncture?*

Did the capitulation and the resistance create the conditions that would allow de Gaulle to attain the aim of his ambitions?

The government of no other defeated country treated with the enemy. Only France remained an exception. To insure that France didn't succumb as a nation it was thus not sufficient that French forces continued to participate in the military operations against Germany. It was necessary in addition — and above all from the point of view of national independence — that the political continuity of the sovereign nation "which had never submitted," be preserved despite the capitulation.

Long-prepared for a juncture in the history of his nation in which those charged with its defense would fail in their task, de Gaulle suffered from no doubt and did not hesitate. The moment in which he could visualize the mingling of his own destiny with that of the nation had finally arrived. He understood that the great danger for the nation was not the threat of a final German victory — being familiar with the laws of a war of materiel he knew that such a victory was rationally impossible. The real danger was that France would be lowered by the victorious Allies to the rank of a satellite nation. In short, the fate of France, and consequently of de Gaulle, was to be decided much more on the political than on the military plane. Thus it was not as a simple military leader offering his professional knowledge and his troops that de Gaulle went to London. He went as a political figure who, on his own authority, assumed the role of representing and safeguarding the sovereignty of the nation.

If his activity was successful, de Gaulle certainly owes it in part to his intransigent nationalism and to all those qualities which he had earlier proclaimed as distinguishing the "man of action"— who "can hardly be conceived without a strong dose of egoism, pride, hardness and craftiness."

He played the cards that circumstances placed in the hand of France with great skill: the presence of Russia in the camp of the

Allies was a "guaranty of an equilibrium about which no country has more reason to be happy than France."[8] And he didn't hesitate to utilize the rivalries between the Big Allies. When he stated in his speech of November 11, 1942: "Surprises are in store for those who doubt our will to reform ourselves and to contribute powerfully to the coming world order. Yes, the French people also has a plan for the future . . ." — this was indeed like a threat to the Anglo-Saxon powers, especially America.

But if de Gaulle managed to insure for himself the leading position in liberated France, and to insure for France her sovereignty, he owed this in large part to the support that the French resistance movement gave him. And it is here that we find the worm in the apple. . . .

### *A Failure*

De Gaulle didn't have his own organization and so was forced to operate through the intermediary of the parties. But this did not run contrary to his conception, which was not totalitarian — for national reasons again. During the first stage of the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle's policies were based on the conviction that all forces, and especially the parties, would be submissive to his will. He thought that in the face of the tasks of national reconstruction, not less immense than those of the war itself, the nation would demand a chief who could control matters by his authority. And this role, which Clemenceau had played in 1917, and Churchill during the Second World War, would, he thought, necessarily fall to the chief of the resistance who held unequaled prestige. He was certainly not unmindful of the difficulties which arose because of the existence of the Communist Party, but he thought that the "union of the nation" had been forged during the resistance — that the "national spirit" had been reborn during the period of trial — and that therefore he would always emerge the stronger in any contest with the Communists.

But the greater part of the middle classes, as well as the mass of the workers and peasants, expected something else from the peace than merely a prolonged "national effort." At the election of October 1945 the majority of the population voted for the Communists and Socialists, not in order to renounce their basic demands, but because these two parties were supposed to bring back pre-war conditions, and, later, to lead to a progressive amelioration.

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[8] Speech of January 20, 1942.

The parties, on the other hand, had no intentions of abdicating in favor of de Gaulle. Even within the MRP (*Mouvement Republicain Populaire*) — although it sometimes looked as if it were *the* party of de Gaulle — it was, instead, the faction that stressed the independent character of the party that finally won the upperhand.

Thus de Gaulle, found himself facing, in January 1946, the alternatives of either giving in to the parties and accepting the lesser role which they assigned to him, or retiring from power.

Not to resign would have meant that de Gaulle had given up his entire previous conception. He was convinced, furthermore — and despite what he may have said — that the parties would not succeed in mastering the difficulties and that his departure was only the first step toward his return.

The referendum of May 1946 seemed to bear out his point of view immediately: the rejection of the constitutional project that was defended by the Communists and Socialists, was doubtless a sign of the withdrawal of the masses from the parties to which they had given their support in the October 1945 parliamentary elections.

But the parties managed to collaborate within the government more effectively and for a longer period than de Gaulle had expected. And when the second constitutional project was accepted in the October 1946 referendum, this seemed to mark the end of the provisional regime and the beginning of the possibility of stabilization. The General seemed condemned to lead a private and contemplative life on his property at Colombey-les-deux-Eglises — far from the capital. Within the framework of that "regime of the parties"— which de Gaulee had prophesized would precipitate the nation into the abyss — the Blum government decreed the reduction of prices, not without succeeding, for a time at least, in halting the race of prices and wages and the fall of the currency. Furthermore, the government was able to announce that the implementation of the Monnet Plan for the reconstruction of France had already begun. Looking only at the surface, one might have been led to believe that the stabilization could become a lasting affair.

But the truth of the matter is that the situation has never ceased to be tense; crises within the government occurred repeatedly. An incessant struggle has gone on between the parties, and especially between the Communist Party, which attempted to penetrate to the key-positions of power, and the other parties which in a common effort attempted to frustrate them in this respect. This continuous struggle for the essential positions of command within the state apparatus and the economy could not be carried on without hampering considerably the functioning of both the state and the economy. The rivalries between the parties made it impossible to take certain measures which a nationally directed economy imperiously demanded — for example with regard to the peasants who engaged in a strike of deliveries. All measures, including those taken by the homogenous Socialist government of Leon Blum, were only precarious compromises, expediences that gained a bit of time but finally could only increase the disorder. And soon the Indochinese and, a little later, the Madagascar conflicts posed again—and this time in relation to the very existence of the French Union — the question of whether the state was able, under the "regime of the parties," to pursue efficiently the renaissance of national power.

### *"A Strong, Coherent and Efficient State"*

Under the shock of the lightning defeat of June 1940, which had come in the wake of permanent social and political crisis, all the main tendencies of the resistance were forced to recognize that in order to make France into a strong nation again it would be necessary to insure the continuity of action and the authority of the state. How would this strong state be organized? Everybody stood for democracy — and by this one understood, above all, a regime that maintained the plurality of parties. But this should not be a "sickly" democracy, such as the Third Republic, but an "energetic and efficacious one."[9] That is why the relations that were to be established between the parties and the state became a crucial and disruptive problem. In reality, it was around this problem that all the discussions centered between de Gaulle and the parties apropos the constitution.

De Gaulle maintained that in order to represent the national interest the government should in no case be exposed to the pressure of particular interests. But he believed and may still believe (being in this respect similar to certain of his enemies) that the subordination of all the activities of society to the national interest, which is analogous to the war-time Sacred Union, would be compatible in peacetime with the granting of freedom to particular interests to organize and express themselves — would, in a word, be compatible with the plurality of parties (to the exclusion, of course — at least in the long run — of anti-national tendencies, representing either an authentic internationalism or a "foreign national party"). De Gaulle, however, put one condition upon this compatibility of the plurality of parties with a strong state — (and it is this which distinguishes him from his adversaries): The role of the parties should be limited to the right to make themselves heard in the parliamentary bodies through petition and remonstrance but without governing, without ever dictating directives to the representatives of executive power or to the organs of the state. The activities of the parties and of the executive would take place in two dissociated spheres.

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[9] Leon Blum: *A l'Echelle Humaine*, Paris, 1945.

These constitutional ideas were built therefore on two cornerstones: rejection of a totalitarian regime — but also of the influence of particular interests on the government. This is the reason for the central demand that the executive power must not be derived from the legislative assembly; because otherwise the minister would only be "the mandatory of the parties."[10] The principle of the separation of powers, which had been a bulwark against authoritarianism in the days of the absolute monarchy, is in de Gaulle's mind evidently destined to serve a diametrically opposite purpose today: to diminish the power of parliament, to return to the incontestable authority of the Chief of the State. De Gaulle foresaw, in consequence, a President of the Republic with the power to nominate the ministers, to preside over ministerial deliberations, to dissolve the parliament in "cases of need" and to call new elections. He furthermore would be empowered at his own discretion to call upon the people, over the heads of the parties, to voice themselves by referendum. In other words, he would be able to wield the plebiscite against the parties. Such a Chief of the Republic, being at the same time Chief of the Government, would wield a power that in reality would make him all-powerful.

The Socialist and Communist parties — for different motives — made common cause against de Gaulle and demanded that the executive must derive from the legislative. And indeed how else can parties insure for themselves a dominant role in the state and the government within the framework of parliamentary means? The MRP, in spite of its hesitations and with certain reservations, finally decided to join the other two parties on this issue. The real masters of government and state would thus be the parties — which in reality merely meant the consecration of the existing state of affairs.

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[10] De Gaulle's speech at Bayeux, June 17, 1946.

But how then could one keep the aims of the parties (which, despite a certain common program, diverge basically) and their competition for power and mass favor from making it impossible for the government to take its decisions according to the sole criterion of the reconstruction of national power? What guarantees are there that the action of the state will tend in the direction of subordinating everything and everybody to these national necessities? After all, this was the real problem of governmental politics, not the problem of how one could govern according to the balance resulting from the contradictory pull of particular interests. To govern so that each minister had one eye fixed on the national interest and the other on the particular interests of his party could only condemn govermental action to stumbling from one compromise to another. And a state that fell prey to the rivalries of the parties could acquire neither coherence, nor authority, nor efficiency.

This weakness of the executive certainly ran counter to the wishes of the parties themselves. But they resigned themselves to it because each was afraid that the greater independence of the executive would one day lead to a dictatorship which, dominated by others, would turn against them.

However, the chronic weakness of the executive in a regime where the state intervenes in all the domains of social life, leads practically to anarchy. The state is everywhere and the government nowhere.

### *"Rally of the French People"*

De Gaulle's criticism thus had a certain validity, if one considers the problem solely from the viewpoint of national power. But he made one grievous mistake: one doesn't master real forces by constitutional or other concepts. Neither does one organize a society according to plans inscribed in a constitution if, behind the texts, there is nothing more than the personal prestige of one man.

De Gaulle recognized his error in the spring of 1947. His Bruneval and Strasbourg speeches of March 30 and April 7 opened a new stage in his struggle for power. The campaign which he led after his resignation was concentrated entirely on the struggle against the party constitution and for institutions that conformed to personal ideas on the organization of the state. Now he is bent on creating a mass movement that will form the real basis, the solid foundation of Gaullist politics for national revival.

The Bruneval speech gave the signal: "The day will come when, discarding the sterile play of the parties and reforming the badly constructed framework in which the nation loses itself and the state disqualifies itself, the immense mass of Frenchmen will reassemble around France!"

As in 1940, De Gaulle now again speaks to Frenchmen in the language of one who wants to make them aware of the dangers which threaten the nation and at the same time wants to revive the will to concentrate everything on defense. Two enormous masses, both tending toward expansion, he explained in Strasbourg, dominate the world: "In such a situation, and given our place on the map, the most decisive, the capital problem for us is the maintenance of our independence." And he calls Frenchmen to unite around him.

A few days later, the Rally of the French People (*Rassemblement du Peuple Francais*) was founded. A new nationalist movement animated by the devotion to a Chief was born, the purpose of which is to carry him to power and to make his policies triumph against all resistance.

And yet it is still not a totalitarian organization that De Gaulle proclaims. He apparently still clings to his old views, which leave some room for the existence of parties. But he now thinks it necessary to erect an organization superior to the parties whose aims and directives would be binding on them. He most probably thinks in terms of the resistance struggle, where the same men may have belonged to this or that party but acted primarily as men of the resistance; where all organizations (except a few small groups) recognized "a sole chief, de Gaulle." On the other hand, de Gaulle no longer thinks it possible for an efficient national renovation policy to be undertaken without first eliminating the Communists.

With each new speech de Gaulle determines more clearly his present domestic and international policies. He progressively abandons the idea to build the independance and greatness of France on a policy of mediation between the two Big Powers. His policies continue to aim at the same goal but adapt themselves to the new international situation. His speeches of July 1 and July 27 especially designate Russia clearly as the enemy of tomorrow. He affirms that the rivalry between the two Great Powers "which appears everywhere in the world — threatens to lead — to a gigantic conflict in which no people . . . would this time be able to remain neutral."[11] And the tenor of the speech leaves no doubt concerning the choice that de Gaulle would want France to make in such a situation. Yet, while asking for economic aid of the United States, and while going over to their side, de Gaulle never even considers the possibility of sacrificing the independance of France. And in order to safeguard this independance he propagates the idea "of a Europe . . . organized as a whole susceptible to oppose all possible pretension to hegemony."[12] This Europe should, of course, be constituted under the aegis of France which should draw as much profit as possible from the French Union, incorporate certain parts of Germany and above all receive reparations in the form of huge deliveries of coal and other materials.

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[11] Lille speech of July 1, 1947.

For de Gaulle such a foreign policy is inseparable from a fight without mercy against the C.P. "When our future is engaged in very dangerous international dealings and when a huge oriental bloc is formed in Europe by the means of force, these people (the Communists) appear among us only in order to sustain, exclusively and with a lot of noise, the positions, the intentions and the interests of Soviet Russia."

Yet in preparing the ground for the policies he intends to pursue can de Gaulle be content with the elimination from social and political life of the Communists alone?

Even if one admits that even now de Gaulle sincerely does not want a totalitarian regime, what importance can this have as opposed to the logic of things themselves? Because, in order to succeed with his national policies, he must accomplish just what he reproaches the parties for being incapable of doing: he must make the actions of the state solely responsive to considerations of national interest. But nothing allows us to believe that all social strata will voluntarily accept the conditions of existence and the discipline that such policies would impose upon them. That is why de Gaulle would always need an organization ready to crush all resistance in the name of the national idea.

Either the RPF will become this instrument — that is, a mass organization of totalitarian character — or de Gaulle cannot realize his policies.

Will the RPF become the decisive force in the country? If one is to believe the statements of its secretary, Jacques Soustelle, its membership had already reached 1,200,000 at the end of July. This would more than equal the alleged membership of the Communist

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[12] *Ibid.*

Party. And it cannot be denied that the propaganda of the RPF is beginning to make itself felt in the larger cities.

The organization recruits primarily among petit-bourgeois layers, and has only a negligible number of workers in its ranks. There has, however, been quite successful recruitment among the miners in the Northern districts. The cadres of the organization come mainly from the former military and intelligence apparatus of the resistance. Those Vichyites who, on the other hand, were the sworn enemies of the labor movement and who had adopted a straddling position instead of a real collaborationist line, will certainly play a role in the RPF — just as also, in general, will a considerable part of the members of the old reactionary and fascistic leagues (de Gaulle has always had relations with these circles).

There can be no doubt that the general and growing discontent plays into the hands of de Gaulle. But the contrary forces are nevertheless considerable. The issue of the drama that is being played out depends less on the political parties at present, than on the development and action of the basic social forces that are engaged in it. The really dangerous adversary of de Gaullist policies would be a rapid renaissance of an authentic socialist movement. Only such a movement could in due time arrive at a liberating solution to the crisis of French and European society. But in order that such a solution be realized, the Union of the workers of Europe among themselves and with the workers of America — within an autonomous movement that would be neither opportunist nor Communist — must be achieved. Only such a union could insure for Europe the material aid that would allow her to engage in the work of reconstruction *for well-being.* This is also the only way of avoiding a Third World War.

# TOWARDS RECONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL

## UNDERLYING ISSUES

**Raphael R. Abramovitch**

In his article, "Socialism Between Two Conferences," in the London magazine, *Socialist Commentary* (July, 1947), Francois Bondy attempts to formulate the difference in approach to the problem of the International between British and continental socialists as follows: the socialists of continental Europe, especially those of France and Belgium, insist on the immediate reconstitution of the International in its completeness, while the British Labor Party, whose policy is determined by its great political strength and its "insular" position, is not in a hurry to reestablish the International and prefers free conferences, unrestricted by any formal ties.

To me this formulation seems inadequate. I think that the core of the matter lies far deeper. The difference between the tactics of th British Labor Party and the tactics of the continental socialists with regard to the question of the International merely reflects a more fundamental difference — the difference in approach to Bolshevik Russia.

I do not mean to say that the leaders of the Labor Party, or even the rank and file of the English party entertain greater sympathies towards the Soviet dictatorship and communism than, let us say, the French or the Belgian Socialist Party. But while the continental socialists must struggle for the very existence of their movement against powerful communist parties, British socialism, due to a series of historical conditions, wields almost unchallenged influence among the laboring masses, and communism in Britain has never succeeded in becoming a force of any consequence. As a result of this objective situation, the struggle against communism and, consequently, in certain measure also against the center of world communism — the Moscow dictatorship — is a matter of life and

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death to continental socialists; to the British socialists, however, it is a more or less theoretical problem, in the discussion of which they can allow themselves a good deal of impartiality and objectivity.

Those who will take the trouble to trace the attitude of the British Labor Party or the British labor movement as a whole towards Russian Bolshevism and Communism, will establish a remarkable fact: while the entire press of the German, Austrian, Hungarian, French, Belgian, Swedish and other Socialist Parties of the European continent was literally filled, during the interim epoch between the two wars, with the struggle against the ideas of communism, exposés of the Soviet dictatorship, and so on, the English Labor press scarcely mentioned these matters. Among the pamphlets issued by the British Labor Party and British trade unions in the period between 1919 and 1939, there is, as far as I know, not a single one directed against the Bolshevik dictatorship. On the other hand, among the trade union publications there is the famous *Report of the British Labor Delegation,* which is essentially an eulogy to the Soviet Government.

The reader may object that the question of the revival of the International after this past war is not directly bound with the question of the attitudes of the British Labor Party or of the other socialist parties to Bolshevism. However, this is precisely the thesis that I am proposing.

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The Bolshevik revolution split the world labor movement, and split it finally and irrevocably, although for long years many people failed to understand it and refused to believe it. The split was worldwide, but while in all other countries the split parts continued to exist side by side, engaged with fluctuating success in fratricidal warfare with one another, in the land of victorious communism the democratic branch of the socialist movement was destroyed by the force of governmental, economic and every other pressure. The Bolshevik Government, which degenerated into a totalitarian dictatorship that tolerates no opposition and no dissenting ideology, could not, of course, permit the continued existence in Russia of a socialist movement, differing from the official communist credo. Thus even then, beginning with the twenties of the present century, the world was already divided into two spheres insofar as the labor movement was concerned: one, ruled exclusively by the Communist Party by methods of terror and suppression of ideological opponents, and another, where both working class parties, the communist and the socialist, existed, or could exist, side by side. The second sphere at that time included almost the entire world, while the first consisted solely of Russia. Today, after the Second World War, unleashed in great measure by the Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia, the world split and that of the labor movement has deepened — again by fault of Moscow. The Soviet "sphere" embraces a vast area and includes a series of countries with well-developed labor movements of the social-democratic type. But the fate of these countries and of their labor movements is predetermined: these countries will, in the course of a more or less short period, be transformed in fact, if not formally, into Soviet provinces, ruled from Moscow, and the socialist parties will be wiped out and crushed to create room for monopolistic communist parties on the model of the VKP (All-Russian Communist Party).

This development is completely unavoidable and automatic, its direction and point of arrival are beyond dispute; the only question here is its rate of progress. And that depends on the plans and intentions of Moscow.

But even today, when this process has not yet reached its logical conclusion and legal socialist parties still exist in almost all countries of the Moscow sphere, even taking part in the government coalitions and supplying Ministers — occasionally even Presidents or Prime Ministers — these parties are in reality prisoners of the Communist parties, i.e. of Moscow.

Does this require proof? It seems to me that no sincere and informed person will venture to contest it. The degree of dependence, direct or indirect, upon the will of Moscow may differ in the various countries, but it is sufficiently great, at any rate on all decisive questions, to exact full obedience on the part of the socialists to the dictates of Moscow. And the situation will become worse and not better as time goes on. For there are no grounds whatever for supposing that the dependence of the Soviet "satellites" upon Moscow will decrease or weaken with time. On the contrary, all indications are that in the course of future development the Soviet "sphere" will become ever more closely "consolidated" and linked to the USSR, militarily, economically and politically. The struggle over the "Marshall Plan" has shown this with sufficient clarity.

But when small nations are driven by means of "pressure" and direct force into the framework of a powerful totalitarian empire, such as the USSR is today — an empire ruled by the terroristic one-party dictatorship of the monopolistic Communist Party, what chance have the socialist parties of these countries to survive as free, democratic mass organizations, with their own, non-communist ideology? The technique of "reducing to zero" all opposition parties has been developed by the Bolsheviks in great detail and has repeatedly been tested in practice: it will never misfire if applied in earnest. Russian Social-Democracy was the butt of this technique in the years between 1918 and 1921. We observed it being applied in the "Far-Eastern Republic" in the early twenties. We had yet another occasion to convince ourselves of the thoroughness of this work in 1939 and 1940, when Moscow "assimilated" the Baltic nations which were promised "full independence" at the moment of signing the "friendship pact."

The position of socialist parties in such cases is still further complicated by the fact of the seeming similarity of their program and the program of the dominant dictatorship. The latter utilizes this to drive a wedge between the left wing, which exists in every party, and its more resistant wing. The dictatorship "colonizes" the socialist party with its agents, it places in the key positions of the socialist party its adherents from among the socialists. It forces individual socialists into its service by direct bribes, blackmail, flattery, promises, skillful propaganda; it terrorizes those who are less pliant, kidnaps or kills others who are more dangerous. We saw all this occur in Eastern Germany, when the Soviet authorities forced the social democrats to unite with the communists into the "Unity Party."

There are no measures that Moscow will stop short of when it wants to attain something, and such a government has too many advantages over the labor party of a small, subject nation, gripped in the iron fist of Soviet occupation and the Soviet NKVD. The socialist parties of the "satellites" have in reality already ceased to be "free" politically, especially as far as problems of foreign policy and international relations are concerned.

But by this very token they cease to be acceptable partners to the free and autonomous socialist parties of the democratic countries of the West in the work of rebuilding the Socialist International. If anyone still entertains any doubts on this score, the experience of the Zurich Conference, which is so eloquently described by Zivko Topalovitch in the following article, should serve to dispel them.

The problem of the reconstitution of the Socialist International can correctly be posed and solved only in the perspective of general world developments. Where is the world headed? What are the general trends of socio-economic evolution? In what direction are international relations developing? What, specifically, is the outlook of that international organization, "The United Nations," which was so solemnly and hopefully founded at San Francisco?

Three different socio-economic systems have already arisen in the world: in the United States, on the American continent, and in certain countries of Western Europe, there continues to exist the system of "free" capitalism, — although it is a capitalism tempered and modified, even in the United States, by the presence of powerful labor unions, without which and against which capitalists can no longer rule, despite the attempts of certain groups to "cast off the yoke" of the trade unions; on the territory of the USSR, and increasingly in the entire Soviet sphere, we have the communist variety of the totalitarian economy; in a number of other countries of Western Europe (from the England of the Labor Government to Italy and Sweden), and, we may assume, in a number of former colonies and semi-colonies (India, China, Indonesia, etc.), there exist in different stages of development, or are arising, forms of a "transitional economy," characterized by ever greater expansion of planned, mixed, or state-owned economy based on political democracy. This latter type of economy is, historically, the transition from capitalism to socialism, as distinguished from the communist-soviet system which we, together with Rudolph Hilferding,[1] regard as an economy of the totalitarian type which in its essence has nothing in common with socialism and can never lead to socialism.

The future of the world and of mankind depends on the forms of co-existence or mutual relations that will develop between these three systems. If we approach this problem not from the viewpoint of our wishes or illusions, but facing stern reality as it has been taking shape since the end of the war, the following picture presents itself:

The totalitarian-Soviet territory is being transformed by Moscow's efforts into an ever more completely closed, economically and politically centralized and consolidated entity, segregated from the rest of the world by an "iron curtain." This unit is systematically and consistently being prepared for the coming "final struggle," which is depicted by communist propaganda as the result of an attack of world capitalism against the "land of socialism," but in reality will be a carefully planned and prepared aggression of the Moscow dictatorship seeking to establish its world domination.

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[1] Modern Review, June, 1947.

And we must not have any illusions regarding the target of Moscow's aggression. Its spearhead is directed against nations and forces representing true capitalism, i.e. primarily against the United States, but it will be aimed in equal measure against nations and forces embodying the "transition" to democratic soscialism. The idea that socialism (even of the non-Bolshevik type) is, after all, politically and ideologically nearer to the hearts of the Moscow dictators than capitalism has been thoroughly disproved by the entire history of the labor movement in the past thirty years. To Bolsheviks of Stalin's school, there is essentially no difference either between democracy and fascism or between social-democracy and the bourgoisie. Both are enemies, "reactionaries,"— the Left Socialists even more so than the Rightists — to be liquidated and exterminated, although the methods and the strategy of the struggle may sometimes vary. But even in those cases where the correlation of forces dictates to Stalin common actions with democratic forces, or, in the field of the labor movement, a "united front" with democratic socialists, he conducts this common struggle against fascism not in union with his democratic partners, but only parallel with them, — and conducts it always with an eye on the future struggle against his allies of today.

In essence, the war of the USSR against Hitler in "alliance" with England and the United States was to Stalin a war on *two* fronts: one against Hitler Germany, and the other against the "allies." The former was a shooting war; the latter, a political and strategic war, with the aim of occupying, extorting, seizing by force or cunning the greatest possible number of power, economic and strategic positions for that third war — against America and England. Stalin never for a moment forgot this war, for which he was preparing even while he was pleading with the allies for a "second front," and simultaneously — according to data that deserve attention — carrying on negotiations with Hitler about a separate peace with the object of dividing the British Empire and the world.

Similar tactics were pursued by the communists in all countries where, after June 22, 1941, they organized jointly with the socialists "resistance" against the German occupation. Engaged in this common struggle and fighting with greater or lesser energy, depending on "long-range plans," they simultaneously conducted an undercover war against their allies, the socialists, already preparing, politically and militarily, for the moment, at the end of the war, when the question of organizing the government would come to the fore. In Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland they systematically eliminated or rendered harmless all the more serious candidates for leadership who might become dangerous competitors to the communists sent in from Moscow to become in due time the leaders of the state. It is only in this light that we can understand the execution of the Polish-Jewish left-wing socialists, Erlich and Alter in 1941, as well as the Red Army's betrayal of the Warsaw uprising that came in 1944; the campaign against Mihailovich (and the socialists who worked with him) in Yugoslavia; the EAM uprising in Greece, and the whole affair of the "Unity Party" in Germany.

In his striving to establish the world supremacy of communism, Stalin regards the socialists not as possible allies, but as the most dangerous enemies, the most dangerous because they are enemies within his own "social base." It would be difficult for communism to win "outside," i.e. in a country or in the world, without first defeating democratic socialism "within," i.e. in the ranks of that class which proletarian totalitarianism has chosen as its social basis.

Without a clear realization of this fundamental feature of communism, it is impossible to understand either Moscow's tactics in the UN, or its policy in Greece, Germany, Asia, or its attitude towards the Marshall Plan, or finally, its policy with regard to international socialism. Why, for instance, does Moscow, which has granted amnesty not only to "small" Nazis but also to Hitler's generals and marshals guilty of all the crimes of Nazism, taken to its bosom von Paulus and other seasoned German reactionaries, Pan-Germanists and militarists, persistently refuse to withdraw its charges of responsibility for Nazism and even for the "extermination of the Jews" from the Socialist leader Kurt Schumacher, who heroically fought against Hitler from first to last? Only because Schumacher is an opponent of Stalinism in the ranks of the working class, while the Pan-Germanists are ready to enter into a bloc with Stalin in a "third war" against the western allies. (And the socialist parties of the "sphere" supported this policy at the Zurich Conference: they defeated Schumacher and did not protest against Paulus.)

It is clear therefore that there is not and cannot be in the future any *rapprochement* or unification between the forces and the parties of democratic socialism and all those forces and movements which directly or indirectly belong to Stalin's orbit. Neither can there be a Socialist International in which genuinely democratic socialists would sit side by side as allies and comrades with the pseudo-social democrats who in action — and it does not matter whether they do it with or without enthusiasm — follow the bidding of the Moscow dictatorship and who are not free to obey the dictates of their social democratic conscience. The conferences in London and Zurich are the best proof that it is impossible to build an International without a clear perspective and without realizing the actual situation of world and European history. The "Eastern" sphere is in the process of transformation into a territory of totalitarian dictatorship, i.e. a territory without socialist parties. In the course of some months or perhaps a year or two, depending on the speed of developments, the non-communist section of the labor movement will be forced to go underground, if it has not yet done so or been physically liquidated. It can then be represented morally and ideologically only by the socialist emigration from these countries, just as in the period between the two wars the socialist movement of Russia, which had been driven underground or into concentration camps, was represented abroad and in the International by Russian socialist emigres.

But on the whole the Socialist and Labor International will become a "Western" organization, and inescapably so. More than that: in anticipation of the broad line of world development that I spoke of earlier, the Socialist and Labor International will have to become not only an agency for coordinating the ideology and policy of the parties of democratic socialism in the "transitional" sphere, but also the instrument for the ideological and moral mobilization for the imminent and totally unavoidable struggle for existence which will be forced on it by Bolshevik aggression. And this struggle cannot be conducted successfully without ideological clarity.

How can we repulse the communist onslaught without deciding for ourselves whether Moscow and its foreign detachments are the hope of the world proletariat or its worst enemy? Can we resist the communist efforts to seize power unless we are certain that their power is deadly to the cause of socialism and democracy? Can we, generally, continue to remain social-democrats if we grant that Soviet

Russia and its methods lead after all to socialism. And conversely: can we retain "neutrality" in the struggle of a democratic nation against communist aggression if we regard present-day communism as a form of totalitarianism, inimical to the interests of socialism and freedom?

But all these questions, and many others — especially questions of world development and world organization of nations are connected with the problem of the Stalin dictatorship. We must seek to solve that problem. We must establish in our minds a realistic picture of the world, of Russia and of our attitude to the latter. Only an International that will face these problems and fearlessly undertake their solution, will find a correct answer to the question of its own composition and organization as well. And only then will the moment come for the genuine restoration of the Labor and Socialist International. Let us hope that in relation to this question, too, it will not be a case of "too little, too late."

# APROPOS THE ZURICH CONFERENCE

## Zivko Topalovitch

In certain Western European countries there were high hopes concerning the International Socialist Conference that met in Zurich in the beginning of June. The Socialist International was to be reconstituted and the German Social Democratic Party was to be accepted as a member of the new International. Leon Blum dedicated a series of articles in *Le Populaire* to this conference and urgently asked his party comrades to arrive at a clarification of their ideas concerning the chief political problems of the world: economic reconstruction of the destroyed regions of Europe; the American offer to help in this work of reconstruction; the creation of an economic and perhaps even political federation of Europe; collaboration in the work of improvement of the United Nations and its organs; etc.

But not all of those who attended this conference placed the same hopes in it. By a curious coincidence it happened that, just a

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few weeks before the Zurich conference, the Hungarian Socialist Party called a meeting of the Socialist parties of the Danube countries — that is, of those parties that are permitted to exist by the Russian occupational authorities. The conference that met in Budapest was ostensibly convened to achieve an even closer collaboration between the attending parties: its obvious purpose was to create an Eastern bloc that would act concertedly at Zurich. (All the parties that attended the Budapest meeting — the Polish, Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgarian and Austrian parties — participate in their national governments along with the Communists, who are in complete control, or else very powerful.) No practical conclusions could be reached, however. The Austrian party declined to accept any Eastern ties, and the only result of the conference, therefore, was the creation of a statistical bureau for mutual information. The attending parties reserved their freedom of decision concerning the Zurich meeting, which meant in fact that the Austrians were not to be caught. So the Eastern bloc was reduced to four members (since the Bulgarian party had not yet been accepted in the Socialist international community). The Yugoslav party, with 40 years of socialist activity behind it, was not represented at all because it has been suppressed by the Tito government; and attempts to create an *ersatz* Socialist grouping have miscarried.

It soon became apparent what the East really hoped to achieve at Zurich. The Polish governmental Socialist press took a sharp stand against the acceptance of the German Social Democratic Party in the International — as long as it refused to recognize the present border between Poland and Germany as definitive. The leader of the Czech Social Democratic Party declared in Prague that he opposed the reconstitution of the Socialist International — because the Communist International had not been reconstituted, and therefore such organizational measures would hamper the desired cooperation of the Socialist and Communist parties on a world scale. And finally, just before the opening of the conference, *Pravda* unleashed a barrage against the leaders of Western European Socialism, attacking them for allegedly wanting to split the world labor movement and thus to serve fascism and dollar imperialism. According to Moscow, what is needed today is a unified world organization of Socialists and Communists to fight against American imperialism — the enemy of the wonderful democratic order that is now blossoming in Eastern Europe and parts of Asia — and to fight "fascism" (meaning all those who are not willing to accept the guidance of Moscow). It was clear that the free Socialist parties of the West were also to be counted among the "fascist remnants," since it was expressly stated that genuine socialist policies were to be found only in the parties of Poland, Rumania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia — which collaborate so diligently in the building of Communist dictatorships in their countries.

## II

The lead in the organization of the Zurich conference was of course in the hands of the British Labor Party. All the preparatory work was done by the International department of the BLP; and the methods of work and procedure clearly reflected the preponderance of the British. The quite unnecessary slowness in the work of reconstructing the International, as well as the fact that parties with completely divergent political aims were called together, is also due to the influence of the BLP. There can be no doubt — the recent BLP conference has again shown this most clearly — that there are sharp lines of demarcation between the politics of the BLP and those of the Russian dictatorship and its satellites. It is apparent that the leaders of the BLP have a very clear conception of the aims of dictatorial Eastern socialism and its camp-followers. But in spite of this, the BLP follows a very prudent foreign political line avoiding conflicts and making concessions — the former concerning principles, and the latter when only the interests of *small* peoples are in question.

This explains why all those socialist forces that are in open opposition to the regimes of the Eastern zone were excluded from the conference at the very beginning. The delegation abroad of the Russian Social Democratic Party, which for 20 years has played an active role in the International, was passed over. Many groups of refugee Socialists, with the exception of the Spaniards, were ignored. The conference consented to take note of the existence of oppositional Socialist parties in Rumania and Bulgaria; but only the official parties — those that are tolerated by the Russians — were invited to assist in the work of the conference. *In fact, only those Eastern Socialists who previously had received permission from the Communists could participate in the creation of the new Socialist International!* While it would be an exaggeration to say that these Socialists received orders from the Communists to attend the conference in order to hamstring the building of a new International, it is nevertheless true that these Eastern Socialists do not dare to take part in anything without the approval of the Russians. One must ask oneself why these people participated in a conference to prepare the renewal of the International when they had stated beforehand that they opposed it. They will have to give an answer soon. It is to be presumed that it will run something like this: either an International together with the Communists or no International at all. If this should be their answer, one would have to ask them further why there exist separate Socialist and Communist parties in the various countries. How can we unite internationally if we are going to fight each other domestically? Or should we all transform ourselves into instruments of Russian policy, after the example of the Socialist parties permitted in the Russian sphere?

A more interesting question: why did the British and the other free Socialist parties of the West invite the Eastern parties while knowing very well that these latter were under direct Russian pressure? Did they hope to influence the policies of the Eastern governments? But the Russian authorities in command in the East don't depend on the "parties" that participate in the Eastern governments — quite the reverse! It is a mistake to take the great majority of Eastern Socialists for camouflaged Communists — as a matter of fact, people like the British Labor MP Zilliacus are much nearer to the Communist position. No, the majority of Eastern Socialists are simply opportunists, and they can direct their opportunism toward the Left just as well as they formerly turned it against the Left. Moreover, they are correct in a certain respect. It is absolutely impossible in the Russian zone of occupation for a party or any legal group to show the least sign of opposition to Russian policies. If one wants to go into politics there, one has to adapt oneself to Russian aims. Since these aims are in constant movement toward the complete bolshevization of these countries, many Socialists thought that it might be better to adapt oneself in order to be able, at least for a time, to play a role in public life. And who knows how long the Russian occupation may last?

We have the impression that the BLP is not too anxious to accelerate the rebuilding of the Socialist International as long as the relations between Russia and England remain unsettled. If the Russians allow the Socialists in their sphere to make contact with the Socialists of the West, so the British think, why should one hamper this? Furthermore, it might be rather desirable to have the rebuilding of the International slowed down because of *Eastern* objections — since this makes it easy to place one's pet skunk in someone else's backyard. Also, if one has people like Zilliacus in one's own party, why not meet the Eastern opportunists as well — especially in discussions which don't really bind anyone.

### III

The composition of the British delegation to the Zurich conference was rather curious. The four delegates represented the secretariat of the BLP very well, but there was no important political personality among them. This indicated clearly that the British didn't want any discussion of basic political questions, but only of technical and administrative ones. The young international secretary of the BLP, Denis Healey, who is credited with the authorship of the now famous pamphlet, "Cards On the Table," did important preparatory work for the conference; but, here again, this was limited to purely administrative matters.

Public interest concerning the deliberations of the conference was intense — so the decision to exclude the public from the deliberations and to sit behind closed doors like a papal conclave made a rather bad impression. Nothing was said that couldn't also have been said in public — the speeches were soon known outside, anyhow. But the conference would have gained considerably in significance if speeches like those of Schumacher, De Brouckere, Nenni, Philip and Grumbach had been held in public.

But quite apart from these technicalities, it was a great disappointment for the public when it discovered that an important international Socialist conference could meet without mentioning at all the essential international questions of the day. The appeal of Leon Blum had been of no avail. Every question of topical interest was eliminated from the agenda so as not to endanger the conference, whose composition made any agreement on these questions impossible from the outset. It was clear that the Eastern bloc would oppose any kind of American aid to such a federation, or the creation of an international police force, or the international control of atomic energy. The conference even refrained from asking the representatives of the Hungarian Socialist Party to give an account of the meaning of the Hungarian events which had just taken place.

Even the repression of the Bulgarian Peasant Party opposition, which became known on the first day of the conference, was not acknowledged openly; only the fact that the official Bulgarian Social

Democratic Party was not admitted to the conference expressed a tacit disapproval of the Bulgarian events. The complaints and accusations coming from the Palestine and Greek parties were shifted to the last day of the conference and then simply relayed to the secretariat without discussion.

## IV

The main interest of the conference centered on the admission of the German Social Democratic Party. First, long deliberations took place on the mode of voting on this question of admission. The Eastern bloc advocated the principle of unanimity. This would have meant the introduction of the right of veto even in the international work of Socialists — it would have meant that here also there would have been no possibility of effective international collaboration. It was finally decided to have a two-thirds majority — and this method made it impossible to admit either the Germans or the Bulgarians. The Eastern bloc voted against the Germans, and the Western against the Bulgarians.

Most of the delegates extended a friendly welcome to the German contingent led by Kurt Schumacher. One was eager to express gratitude and admiration to Mr. Schumacher, the handicapped, one-armed man who had fought with all his strength against Nazism and who for ten years had suffered unspeakably in Nazi concentration camps. He spoke quietly, to the point, and with dignified restraint. He grounded the necessity for the admission of the German Social Democracy in the interests of the International and in the imperatives of world socialism itself. His answer to the many questions put to him (the Polish delegate alone asked him 17 questions) was also full of dignity. Among the questions of the Polish delegate was whether German Social Democracy was willing to accept the German-Polish border as it had been established after the Russian occupation. Schumacher was also asked to agree that the German Social Democrats — of whom hundreds of thousands have been beaten, tortured and murdered by the Nazi — must share the responsibility for the coming to power of Hitler and for the terrible massacre of Europe's Jews. To this question Schumacher answered, in effect: German Social Democracy has given its all in the fight against Hitler, it has never made agreements with the Nazis or supported them (as the Communists have done on various occasions). But the German Social Democracy is a part of the German people and, inasmuch as the whole German people is to be blamed for the coming to power of Hitler and for his war policies, the German Social Democracy cannot free itself from the consequences that have followed the Hitler policies. There are also a number of Social Democrats who have personally made mistakes — they must be made personally responsible for them.

It was comforting to see the representative of France stress the need for reconciliation with the Germans: he was correct in stating that there can be no German democracy without a strong Social Democratic movement, and that without German democracy there can be no European peace. Almost all Western European parties were for the admission of the Germans, but the Eastern bloc, supported by the Jewish delegates, opposed admission: nine votes for admission and five against — only one vote was lacking for the two-third majority. The vote of the Palestinian delegation and the votes of the Eastern bloc had been expected to go against admission, but the abstentions of Belgium and Switzerland were not expected — especially since the most venerable figure of international Socialism, De Brouckere of Belgium, had for months been advocating the entrance of the Germans as soon as possible. But the Belgians justified their conduct by stating their fear that admission of the Germans would lead to great dissensions among the participating groups and thus would retard the foundation of the new international. These fears seem to have been quite unjustified, since the understanding of the need for firm collaboration among democratic Socialists is already so strong that it should not have proved too difficult to find an adequate form for the re-admission of the Germans. It is almost certain, however, that the next international Socialist conference, which is to meet in Brussels in December, will re-admit the German party.

## V

Contrary to the action on the German question, the Italian situation was more obscure after the conference than it had been before. The newly founded Socialist Party of Italian Workers (Saragat), which had been the foremost advocate in Italy of reconstruction of the Socialist International, asked to be admitted to the conference along with the official Socialist Party (Nenni). A committee that had been formed to discuss this question decided to favor the re-unification of the two parties and to send a commission to Italy to work toward this end. The Eastern bloc, which sees in Saragat and his friends "agents of dollar imperialism," opposed this proposal. Nenni succeeded in a shrewd maneuver to make the Western parties reject the bid of the Saragat group and admit only the Nenni group, while simply "recommending" a re-unification.

Nenni alleged that his group was quite in agreement with the aim of re-unification but that this could be brought about only from inside the Italian movement, not through foreign intervention. He also insisted that though there exists a common front of action between the Communists and his own party, they nevertheless had sharp differences, and his party had no intention of fusing with the Communists. According to Nenni, intervention by the International would only hamper the continued growth of the Italian Socialist Party and might be responsible for its failure to achieve power.

The British and the rest of the Western parties did not feel that they could assume the responsibility Nenni had thrust upon them, and so left the Italian Socialist movement to its own fate. This was, in my opinion, a big mistake, and will do great harm. Italy is exceedingly important for the future of Europe; and Italian democracy is weak primarily because there exists no mass Socialist party which aims at the victory of democracy. All social and ideological conditions for the existence of such a party exist in Italy. Nenni and his friends have taken a heavy responsibility by making it impossible for the Socialist parties of Europe to help in the rebirth of true democratic Socialism in Italy. By the time of the next meeting in Brussels it should be clear how far Nenni's allegations correspond to the truth. Representatives of the Saragat group who were in Zurich stressed that their only purpose was to safeguard the independence of Italian Socialism and to prevent its being swallowed up by Communism. It can only be hoped that this goal will be attained.

## VI

A rather quiet night session was devoted to the question of the reconstruction of the International. It was unanimously decided not to discuss the problem fundamentally until the Brussels meeting. An international commission was created and charged with preparing the ideological foundation and the organizational methods for the new International. Since this commission will not report before the Brussels gathering, we will have to wait another six months until a new International with a clear ideological basis — and one able to initiate specific Socialist activity — will be created. One hopes that this will be the last delay. In a few months it will be possible to see whether the liquidation of the peasant parties in the Eastern part of Europe has not already been followed by similar measures concerning the Socialist parties. It is an illusion to think that in countries where the CP has military power other parties can hope to exert real influence or even to avoid destruction. Their agony can be only more or less prolonged. Hungarian Communists who were an insignificant minority in 1945, gave two years to the Socialists "in order to make up their minds." This delay has almost come to an end. Even if toward the end of this year Socialist parties in the East are not yet fully liquidated they will at least be much more dependent than they now are. It is uncertain whether the Communists will finally decide to influence the new International through the Socialist groups which are dependent on them, or whether they will think it more desirable to attempt to sabotage our work directly. But we hope that the Western Socialists will have understood by then that it is an illusion to try to affect the overwhelming mass of a dictatorial state through concessions and maneuvers.

What is really needed today is an active fighting International with theoretical clarity. There can be no hope in dilatory maneuvers, and postponements, or in attempts to reconcile the unreconcilable. Those parties which have a common ideological basis and a common platform for socialist action in the world must get together. This circle, which might be small at the beginning, will expand in the course of time. The dream of outsmarting the Communists through the attraction of parties which exist in areas occupied by the Communists — this wishfulness has led only to the loss of precious time. It has led to the inane situation in which, after the numerous congresses of the past three years, we have only now begun to look for common "ideological bases" and common "methods of action."

We hope that the interested Socialist parties will not wait until the official founding of the International in order to take common action, but that they will begin now to work together in regional conferences. It is not true that those Socialist parties which stand for political democracy must wait many months in order to find a common ideological basis and common methods of action. Democratic Socialism wields a tradition of 80 years; it needs only to again take hold of itself, to regain its confidence and to remain unperturbed by the attacks of hostile and anti-democratic bolshevism.

# JEWISH LABOR AND THE "DAILY FORWARD"

### Victor Erlich

The *Jewish Daily Forward* has recently celebrated its 50th anniversary. In New York and Chicago, in Boston and Detroit, in Philadelphia and Los Angeles, impressive meetings were held to commemorate the birthday of the leading Jewish labor daily in America, the world's most prosperous Yiddish newspaper.

In the audience that filled Madison Square Garden to capacity there were a good many old and faithful readers of the *Forward.* To these elderly Jewish working men and women, the *Forward* —which has accompanied many of them from the moment they set foot on American soil — has come to mean more than a mere newspaper. The *Forward* has proved to be an invaluable guide through the political and social labyrinth of the New World, a badly needed link between the immigrant's East European tradition and the bewildering ways of the land of his adoption. Born in New York, an organic part of the American labor scene — but founded, edited and supported by immigrants — the *Daily Forward* has had an unique impact on its readers. But the milieu in which the daily originated was also unique.

### *The Great Migration*

Like all other institutions created and maintained by Jewish labor in this country, the *Daily Forward* owes its existence and growth to the greatest migration in Jewish history, which brought to the American shores, during the period 1881 - 1914, nearly 2,000,000 Jews from Eastern Europe (Russian "Pale of Settlement," Czarist-held Poland, Galicia and Rumania).

These immigrants differed markedly, in occupational structure as well as in psychic make-up, both from the German Jews who came to this country in the wake of the abortive revolution of 1848

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and from the non-Jewish East Europeans seeking economic opportunity in the New World. The former were predominantly middle-class people, respectable and industrious German *Kleinbürger* who had already acquired some commercial experience. The latter were mostly peasants, sturdy and hard-working, but strongly handicapped in their new, highly industrial environment; few of them ever rose above the status of unskilled workers.

The Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe were, socially and culturally, a more differentiated lot. However, as the statistical data clearly indicate, the bulk of them were *workers.* According to Professor L. Hersch,[1] nearly two-thirds of the gainfully employed among the Eastern European Jewish immigrants in the years 1899-1914 were engaged in industry and trades (less than ten percent of the arrivals earned their living by commercial pursuits). Having reached the American shores, the newcomers settled in the large urban centers of the East Coast (New York, Boston, Philadelphia) and soon became a huge reservoir of cheap labor for the rapidly expanding garment and shoe industries.

The motivating forces behind this mass migration were racial discrimination, political persecution and desperate economic conditions. The importance of each factor varied from one country to another. The exodus from Rumania at the end of the last century, which embraced nearly one-third of the country's Jewish population, was prompted by the viciously anti-Semitic policy of the Rumanian governments. A sizable contingent of this emigration was provided by the young Jewish intelligentsia. It was the latter who were, during the 1880's, the driving force behind the romantic movement of *fusgeyers* (walkers): large groups of Jewish youth were leaving their homes and walking ostentatiously through towns and villages of their native country, in a scornful demonstration of protest against the official anti-Semitism.

Those who arrived from Galicia were motivated primarily by economic reason: Jewish pauperism was growing at the end of the last century — a product both of Galicia's proverbial poverty and of the increasingly effective competition from the rising Polish middle class. Among these newcomers seeking in the new land the opportunity denied them by their native country there were a number of skilled artisans and experienced middlemen. Most of them were rather conservative in their general outlook, steeped in Jewish religious tradition and much less responsive to modern social ideologies than their Russian-born counterparts.

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[1] "Jewish Migration," in *Jewish People, Past and Present,* New York, 1946.

It was the latter, however, that largely determined, both by the sheer force of numbers — the Russian Empire contributed nearly 76 percent of 1,486,000 Jews who arrived in this country from Eastern Europe between 1899 and 1914 — and by their greater social dynamism, the habits and moods of the Eastern European immigration, at least of its more alert and politically conscious section. The reasons that made them leave the old country were political as well as economic. Many of these arrivals came to America in the wake of the anti-Jewish pogroms of 1881 and, later, of 1903 - 1905.

The prevailing mood of this heterogeneous mass was that of restlessness and revolt — which had begun to eat into the rotting foundations of the Czarist regime. This non-conformist tradition was kept alive on American soil by a small radical and intellectual minority among the immigrants. Some of these young firebrands received their political baptism in the underground revolutionary movement of Russia; others had a chance, before coming to the U.S., of trying their hand at Socialist propaganda in Germany or in England. Nearly all of them were revolutionary zealots with a passion for theoretical debates.

The workers — the tailors, the shoemakers, the tanners, the brushmakers — were, to be sure, less articulate and had less awareness of the finer ideological distinctions than the intellectuals. However, by the turn of the century, many a Jewish artisan in Russian Poland or from the Pale of Settlement had been drawn into the orbit of the revolutionary movement. At the end of the last century a political awakening occurred among the prostrate and poverty-stricken Jewish masses of Eastern Europe. A potent factor in this process had been the Socialist "Bund," founded in 1897 in Vilna.

### *Problems of Adjustment*

For the people who brought with them to the American shores the baggage of religious traditions, of social habits and political philosophies which originated or flourished in the peculiar climate of Eastern Europe, the adjustment to the new environment could not be easy. They had come from backward, half-feudal countries to find themselves in the very heart of a rapidly expanding industrial capitalism. They fled the despotism of East European police states and had America's seemingly unbounded political liberty suddenly thrust upon them. They left behind the continent of clear-cut, fairly homogeneous national cultures to witness an ambitious, if not entirely successful attempt to evolve a new, multicolored pattern out of a variety of linguistic and ethnic stocks.

But even more baffling — and certainly more disconcerting — was the glaring incongruence between the average Jewish immigrant's idealized image of America and the grim realities with which he was actually confronted. To a Jewish pauper in the Russian Pale, America was a streamlined version of paradise; how bitter must have been the newcomer's disappointment when he was faced with the squalor and filth prevailing in the East Side tenements and — even more so — with the appalling sweatshop system!

Paradoxically, it was this outrageous industrial set-up, a source of deep frustration for so many of its "green" victims, that facilitated the immigrant's integration into American economic life. The clothing industry which absorbed the bulk of the Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe, including many middle-class intellectuals, represented a transitory stage between the old country and the New World: the sweatshop racket spreading like a fungus in the garment centers of the U.S.A. combined the patriarchal homeliness of a Jewish artisan's shop in a small Russian or Polish town with the reckless tempo of American industrial capitalism. Moreover, the needle trades in this country were themselves largely a product of the immigration. The owner of a small garment shop was more often than not a comparatively recent arrival, and the manpower was largely provided by the ever-increasing army of "greenhorns"— mostly the so-called "Columbus tailors," who simultaneously discovered America and the art of tailoring.

The attraction which this branch of American industry held for the harassed and bewildered newcomers was due, in large part, to their linguistic handicap. Being ignorant of the language of the new land, they naturally shied away from factories where English was spoken and crammed into what was at that time an overwhelmingly Jewish industry.

The price they had to pay for this apprenticeship was heavy indeed: the needle trades were virtually an industrial jungle at that time. A complete lack of factory legislation, combined with the plague of outside "contracting," left the garment worker, particularly the unskilled one, at the mercy of his boss — who was often poverty-stricken himself.

This is how B. Stolberg describes the mechanism of the sweatshop system: "The contractor might be a Landsman who came from the same province or even the same village as his workers. Nine times out of ten the boss had worked in another sweatshop long enough to save up fifty dollars or less, which was enough to set him up in 'business.' All he needed was to get a few sewing machines on credit, install them in his own home, or in a near-by loft and cellar, and exploit himself, his family and as many workers as he could use."[2] Crowded together in an ill-ventilated and unsanitary shop, the members of this wretched team worked for 15-18 hours a day to eke out an average weekly wage of two to five dollars.

These conditions of life were bound to engender, in the first stage, an oppressive feeling of helplessness and apathy. But at the end of the century a certain change could already be discerned. Under the guidance of the Knights of Labor, the Jewish cloak-and dress-makers were painfully learning to stand up for their industrial rights, as the first walkouts took place in the large garment centers of the East Coast. These strikes, however, were marked by extreme modesty of demands and a kind of patriarchal informality of the settlements. A. Rosenberg, one of the leaders of the ILGWU in its early days, paints a vivid picture of the movement's rugged beginnings: "When the boss came to the shop and discovered his workers were absent, he knew just where to find them, and after long negotiations settled the argument. Usually the boss would raise prices five cents on the garment and roll out a barrel of beer. Thus ended almost every strike."[3]

This state of affairs was certainly a bitter disappointment to the average immigrant who came to this country in quest of a golden economic opportunity and rapid social advancement. The weakness of American labor in groping for some form of protection against exploitation was, moreover, a doubly disconcerting sight to the more socially conscious and militant among the newcomers. Some of them had a chance to witness in their homelands impressive demonstrations of the power wielded by the underground revolutionary movement — to see entire towns being paralyzed for a day or two by a call to strike issued by the local Socialist organization. The contrast could not help but be disheartening.

This puzzling enigma underscored in the minds of the radical

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[2] *Tailor's Progress,* p. 10.

[3] *Memoirs of a Cloakmaker.*

Jewish-Russian workers and intellectuals the inner contradictions of American life as they saw it. They were baffled and taken aback by the incongruence between the American promise and the obvious failure to implement this promise in the only America they then knew, the land of slums and sweatshops; between unlimited political liberty and equally unlimited labor exploitation; between complete freedom of expression and the incapacity of American labor to exercise this freedom fully and consciously.

The young Russian-Jewish libertarians had dreamed about freedom and were determined to fight for it. They could not help being startled, therefore, when the cherished liberty suddenly fell in their lap — simply by virtue of their setting foot on American soil. Vaguely grateful as they were for the precious gift, they felt at the same time that this was not the ideal democracy they set out to achieve back in the old country. Admiring and apprehensive at the same time, they were at a loss in trying to correlate the obvious advantages of American democracy with the evils of American capitalism which they were observing at very close range.

### *Groping for a Synthesis*

This complex attitude reflected, on a relatively high level of social awareness, the basic ambivalence which, according to M. Hillquit, characterized the Jewish immigrant's frame of mind at the end of the nineteenth century. He was resentful and embittered by the drudgery and squalor which he found upon his arrival in America. And at the same time he was determined somehow to adjust himself to the new environment. But, as we have seen, few if any immigrants came empty-handed to the New World. Most brought with them some kind of spiritual heritage with which they were not ready to part. Thus, Americanization became essentially a problem of *synthesis* rather than of opportunistic mimicry. Oscillating painfully between two worlds, the mass of newcomers were — consciously or unconsciously — groping for some way of integrating themselves into American life without relinquishing their old-country values.

A similar process was discernible in the sphere of linguistic patterns. The upper stratum of the new immigration — the young intelligentsia — had been assimilated to the majority cultures of the countries they lived in, whether Russian, Polish or German culture. Not so the "common people"— the workers, the artisans, the small storekeepers from central Poland, Galicia or the Russian Pale. Their language was Yiddish — the tongue of the Jewish masses throughout the whole of the Eastern and part of Central Europe. At the first stage of the great migration there was still in use a crude, provincial lingo, abundant in regional features, but lacking many terms essential to industrial civilization. The preservation in the New World of the language which originated in the town ghettos of Eastern and Central Europe was somewhat facilitated by the Jewish immigrants' tendency to settle in compact masses and to confine themselves to the predominantly Jewish trades. On the other hand, the status, and even the verbal texture, of Yiddish could hardly remain unaffected by the growing linguistic assimilation or, to be more exact, Anglicization of the weaker ingredients of America's "melting pot." Thus, a unique linguistic phenomenon known as "American Yiddish" came into being.

At the same time, the opposite trend was at work. The Jewish cultural renascence — which came as a sequel to, rather than as a preparation for, the modern Jew's political awakening — was making itself felt in America. In both the New and the Old Worlds Yiddish eventually grew from a folk dialect into a bona fide literary language, capable of serving as a medium of artistic creativity, scientific discourse and political propaganda.

### *A Newspaper is Born*

It was in this synthetic idiom that the *Jewish Daily Forward* addressed, in 1897, the Jewish working men and women of New York and Chicago, Boston and Philadelphia. The emergence of the *Forward* was closely linked to the factional strife that was raging at the time in the American labor movement — the struggle between the democratic socialists of Western European variety and the followers of the autocratic and doctrinaire Daniel De Leon. It was this ideological conflict that brought about, in January 1897, the split in the "Publishing Association," which for seven years had been putting out the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, the organ of the New York Jewish Socialists. Three months later, on April 22, 1897, in a wooden shack at 23 Canal Street, a new labor daily, the *Forward*, came into being. Launched as it was by the leaders of the anti-De Leon faction in the "Association" (A. Cahan, L. Miller, Morris Vinchevski, M. Zametkin), the *Forward* dissociated itself emphatically from the Socialist Labor Party. Though during the first few years of its existence it was not affiliated with any of the parties which were then struggling for hegemony in American Socialism, the daily leaned strongly toward the moderate "Social Democratic Union." Shortly after the latter joined forces with Eugene V. Debs' Social Democratic Party of America, the *Forward* became the official Jewish organ of the Socialist Party which sprang from the merger.

From its very inception, the *Forward* maintained a close contact with the growing Jewish trade union movement. The daily gave emphatic support and wide publicity to the great strikes of the garment workers which took place during the first decade of this century. At first the going was far from smooth for the young paper. Serious financial difficulties, complicated by the bitter feud with the pro-De Leon *Abend Blatt,* taxed severely the ingenuity of the *Forward* managers. But the newspaper finally established itself as a going concern. In 1903, six years after it had been founded, the *Forward* was able to move from the shabby little store at 23 Canal Street to a 12-story building of its own at 175 East Broadway, which has been known ever since as the "Forward Building."

### *A Bridge Between Two Worlds*

It was, perhaps, more than a mere coincidence that this palpable proof of the *Forward's* growing prosperity was provided on that very year which marked a new era in the history of Jewish immigration to the U.S.A. At the time when the *Daily Forward* came into being, the yearly rate of this immigration was about 30,000; between 1903 and 1914 it rose to 100,000. For the Yiddish Socialist daily in New York, struggling for its existence, such an influx of old-country Jewish working men and women, deeply radicalized by Russia's revolutionary movement, meant many thousands of new, eager and responsive readers. But, if the *Forward* needed the newcomers, the latter certainly needed the *Forward.* It was precisely this last huge wave of immigration that underscored and lent particular urgency to the synthetic social mission of the *Forward* — that of a link between the East European Jew's spiritual heritage and the slowly evolving pattern of American labor politics.

The *Daily Forward* was certainly well equipped for the difficult task it had undertaken. Its founders and editors were Russian-Jewish intellectuals who had been initiated into the Socialist movement back on the old continent; thus they were able and eager to bring to the American worker the European-born political creed. At the same time they had accumulated enough political experience in America to be in a position to adapt the gospel of militant Socialism to the conditions prevailing in the New World. They were, above all, the ones who could *interpret America to their bewildered newcomers in East European terms.*

For the masses of the new immigration — particularly for its Yiddish-speaking and radical section — the *Forward* became a rallying center and a spiritual home. By providing the newcomer with information about the new land, its mores, its politics, and above all its labor movement, it rendered him invaluable assistance in his efforts to adapt himself to the American environment. By keeping the immigrant abreast of the latest developments in modern Jewish culture and the vicissitudes of European Jewry, the newspaper helped him to salvage those old-country values he was not ready to relinquish.

This was certainly more than a newspaper is expected to do for its readership. Indeed, in its determination to fill the multiple social and cultural needs of its consumer, the *Forward* found itself faced with many "extra-curricular" tasks. It had to offer not only political guidance, but also practical advice; it had to supplement orientation on burning social issues with the rudiments of general knowledge about America and about the world, substituting itself, thus, for a people's university — or, more often, for elementary school. An early issue of the *Forward* was likely to contain articles on problems as divergent as a forthcoming electoral campaign in New York, the economic grievances of the garment workers, the latest development in the Dreyfus affair, Darwin's theory of evolution, how to get around in the New York subway, and why it is imperative to use a handkerchief. . . . The homeliness of the subject matter was often matched by a folksy style which deliberately sacrificed crispness and literary effectiveness for the sake of simplicity and "plainness."

This tendency toward a plain, understandable presentation of news and issues, coupled with a profound distrust of anything that smacked of intellectual sophistication, has been a salient feature of the *Forward's* manner ever since 1903, when A. Cahan became its permanent editor-in-chief. The *Forward's* lack of sophistication is hardly an instance of talking down to a "crude" reader; it is rather a product of the basic affinity between the newspaper and its audience. In spite of the obvious differences in political articulation and social awareness, the *Forward* essentially has remained a part of the unique milieu from which it had sprung and which it has served for so many years. That is why in the course of its 50-year career, the newspaper could reflect so faithfully, for better or worse, the ideological and psychological transformation of the Jewish workman in America.

The *Forward* has been both a potent factor in — and the adequate expression of — the gradual Americanization of the Jewish masses in the U.S. The political outlook of the Jewish tailor and capmaker has undergone a significant evolution during the last four-five decades. The unyielding anti-capitalism brought out of the old country and fed, for a while, on the shameless exploitation of the sweatshop, has been tempered by actual gains in the country of free enterprise and, to a lesser extent, by the American myth of unlimited opportunity. The revolutionary militancy of the earlier days has given way to gradualism in the sphere of politics, and to a more conciliatory, business-like attitude toward the employer in the trade union movement. The mood of the average ILGWU "brother" or Workmen's Circle member has "mellowed." And so has the general tenor of the *Daily Forward* — as the *New York Times* approvingly remarked in a short editorial acknowledging the paper's anniversary.

Though still committed to the principles of Social Democracy, the *Forward* has been inclined, since the beginning of the Roosevelt era, to state its plea for a better America in terms of a dynamic "New Deal" rather than orthodox socialism. The latter, it must be admitted, has remained thus far the creed of a relatively small minority of America's organized labor. And it has been the *Forward's* ambition all along to speak for the bulk of the workmen rather than for the vanguard. While it has somewhat mellowed on the issue of anticapitalism, it has maintained its vigorous opposition to all kinds of dictatorship and totalitarian ideologies — Communist as well as fascist.

The same is true of the paper's basic approach to Jewish problems — the *Forward* voices the feelings of the Jewish man in the street in New York and other urban centers. It expresses unequivocally his enthusiasm for the country of his adoption, and his nostalgia for the relics of his native land. America's biggest Jewish newspaper shares its average reader's pronounced pro-Zionist sentiment, coupled with profound concern with the plight of the Jewish communities in Eastern Europe — the motherland of the American Jew and the repository of his old-country values.

# INTERNATIONAL PRESS

## *RELIGION TODAY*

The London *New Statesman and Nation* for June 28, 1947 carried an exceedingly interesting discussion, by the noted British philosopher C. E. M. Joad, of the findings of a recent *Mass Observation* inquiry concerning the religious opinions of a typical group of Englishmen:

*Mass Observation* has recently conducted an inquiry into the religious beliefs and opinions of people living in a London suburb. Questions were also asked which throw light upon people's attitude to morals, politics and "progress."

About one person in ten in "Metrop" is associated more or less closely with some Church, while about two-thirds never go to Church at all. Of the Church-goers, less than one-third give definite assent "to three basic affirmations of the Apostles' Creed" and over 40 percent "express doubt about the possibility of an afterlife." There is, however, a general attitude of good will towards religion, expressing itself in the conviction of the majority that religion should be taught in schools—we don't believe it ourselves, but it is just possible there may be something in it and we might as well be on the safe side and give the children the benefit of the doubt, especially as it doesn't cost anything—coupled with hostility to the established Churches and a vague "personal religious faith."

The Churches are censured because they are mere appendages of the State and, therefore, apologists for State policy and, more particularly, for war; because they are identified with the maintenance of the political and economic *status quo*—a little out of date this last charge, one cannot help feeling, especially since 1945 — because they don't move with the times; and because persons don't practice what they preach.

Christianity is, for most, a not very interesting mystery; it would be difficult to say whether ignorance in regard to its doctrines is or is not more marked than scepticism in regard to their truth. "Easter? What is it in aid of?" asked a factory worker, while opinions as to Christ himself varied between the views that He did not exist, that He was "just a carpenter" and that He was "quite a good chap" but "nothing extra," and, most surprisingly, that He was "a lady." Although, however, they don't believe in Christianity, most people believe, or would like to believe in something. It is perhaps for this reason that the general attitude to religion is characterized by a benevolent tolerance: "Many people look upon religion as something quite harmless and purely personal—an innocuous hobby, like collecting stamps." Although only one in four openly doubts His existence, it is rarely that there is any definite belief in God, who is invoked, if at all, in times of crisis for much the same reason as prompts the atheist to pray as the ship goes down. The general conclusion of *Mass Observation* is that "ordinary people are looking for something to believe in"; their condition is one of wistful agnosticism.

"People," the Report concludes, "cannot carry on for long in their profoundly negative frame of mind"—and this because of a comparatively new feature in the contemporary situation, scepticism in regard to science and scepticism in regard to progress. As the Report points out, these scepticisms are not two scepticisms but one scepticism, since most people have come to identify science with progress. Their unspoken thoughts run much as follows: 1) science is advancing; 2) science means progress; 3) science is doing more harm than good; therefore 4) progress is bad and ought to be stopped and is expressed in such phrases as: "Mankind's progressing to destroy itself, I should say." "I think we are going around in circles." "We're going forward, though not in the right direction."

The common view seems to be that science is being abused and misdirected with the result that in the end it will destroy us. Hence, our generation is accused of being too clever, of going too far and too fast, or choosing wrong ends and so on, the tendency being to compare the social and moral atmosphere of our day unfavorably with that of 30 or even 20 years ago.

When all allowance is made for the effects of the war, and in wartime the Ten Commandments are always the first casualties, it is hard to resist the conclusion that in most people's view progress has somehow gone awry, and that life is not so much worth living as it used to be. Hitherto the gap which has been left by the decline of orthodox Christianity, has been partially filled by a belief in "progress." As the view of the next world grew hazier, the prospects for this one grew brighter. Man's future was in his own hands and assisted by science he could be trusted to shape it to his own liking. The disappearance of this belief has been to leave men's minds a waste land, empty of hope, lacking in ideals, devoid of aspirations; in a word, scepticism, apathy and disillusion go wider and cut deeper than they have ever done before.

At this point the conclusions of the Report suggest a new thought. A common factor which plays its part in inducing all these scepticisms and disillusions is the size of the organizations by which people's lives are today controlled. "Current loss of faith (in religion, in politics, in progress, in science, and so on ) is very largely a loss of faith in the unwieldy, centralized, remote organization which increasingly monopolizes the potential realization of ideals and which seems so distant and uncontrollable to ordinary people."

I think this is right; people want to feel that they count and that their wills and wishes can be made to matter; that it is within the bounds of possibility that they should be able to influence the course of events in however humble a sphere. In the old days the Church, and still more the Chapel, gave them this sense; so did the embryo political organization of the then idealistic and aspiring labor movement. Now, for a variety of reasons, neither religion nor politics fills the bill and people have the feeling that they are puppets twitched into weal and woe by invisible showmen who pull the strings. Their reaction is cynicism, apathy and disillusion.

## *NATIONALIZATION — IS IT PROGRESSIVE?*

The Berlin Social Democratic monthly *Das Sozialistische Jahrhundert* (March 1947) carries a provocative article by Franz Rotter on the subject of nationalization which provides refreshing evidence that the "pure and simple" acceptance of any kind of nationalization as "progressive" is being replaced by a more differentiating attitude.

There scarcely exists a highly developed capitalist country in Europe (writes Mr. Rotter) where one can fail to observe a tendency toward nationalization of the means of production. This development coincides with the revival of the European labor movement which in many cases had been physically or ideologically destroyed or decimated.

The socialist parties are now the main bearers of the idea of nationalization and this very fact has given them fresh impetus and enabled them to gain a new hold on the masses. But one must not overlook the fact that today nationalization is not only favored by wide circles among the bourgeoisie but that even large layers of Big Business, which is directly affected by these measures, have given their assent. This lack of resistance has lead numerous socialists to conclude that the owning classes are open to socialist ideas. Is this really so?

The wave of nationalization which we are witnessing today is limited almost entirely to basic industries. Light and processing industries have scarcely been touched. Since this nationalization has encountered as little resistance from the owning classes as the earlier nationalization of postal and—in many countries—railway services, one is lead to seek the real causes for this nationalization not in any socialist tendencies but rather in the general needs of present-day capitalist society. The key industries, in fact, had gained a monopoly position which enabled them to force all other branches of production into a position of dependency. This situation endangered the proper functioning of the economy as a whole and caused constant turmoil. But it has now become the supreme law of the total economy to maintain the functioning of basic industries and to guarantee their orderly development *even if this entails unprofitable operation temporarily.*

Only the state, however, can assume such a responsibility. Only the state is capable of maintaining, temporarily or permanently, great enterprises which are unprofitable from the capitalistic point of view. Also modern warfare demands that the state dominate completely those means of production which are essential to it. The state can best insure stable functioning of the war machine if it is master of the basic industries.

These tendencies are inherent in present-day nationalization. And this fact is in no way altered by the additional fact that socialists — not reactionaries — are presently the active agents of this nationalization process. This is not to imply that the socialist parties have thus become reactionary. What we are witnessing is a development similar to that which took place in Russia in 1917. The class whose task it is to overthrow the existing society is forced first to complete a development that should have been implemented by the class against which it struggled.

In Russia in 1917, with capitalism only emerging, the Russian working class already well organized and the peasantry in a revolutionary mood, the bourgeoisie was unable to create the conditions for its own further development. On the other hand, the proletariat soon discovered that conditions did not exist for the creation of a socialist society — precisely because capitalism had not yet developed them. The working class, therefore, was forced to utilize the conquered state power to push through that economic development which the bourgeoisie had not been able to accomplish. Thus the Russian proletariat with the aid of the Russian peasantry became the bearers of capitalist development in Russia. What emerged, however, was not ordinary capitalism, but a special brand — state capitalism.

The Western parallel runs along the following lines: The present economic setup endangers the existence of capitalist society as a whole. The capitalist economy stands in need of reinforcement. Both the material and ideological forces which press toward breakdown of the capitalist economy have increased enormously. But the political pre-conditions have reached a point at which the bourgeoisie is *no longer able* to maintain itself alone either in the political or economic sphere, but neither is the working class *able as yet* to impress its stamp on society.

In this situation, there is thus grounds for compromise between the two. Nationalization of certain branches of industry means for the owning class a securing of its endangered position and for the working class all that is presently possible in the direction of progress and toward safeguarding its future possibilities.

Even though nationalization of postal and railway services in the 19th century was pushed by reactionaries whose only concern was that a special monopoly should not endanger the smooth functioning and development of the whole capitalist economy, this early trend was nevertheless progressive in terms of the further development of capitalism. Today nationalization is not only progressive from the point of view of those who seek further capitalist development. It *can* also become an element in socialist development.

At this point Mr. Rotter hastens to point out that particular stress must be placed upon the word "can." The wave of nationalization might also mean the beginning of a trend most dangerous to the development of democracy and socialism. All will depend on the forms in which nationalization takes place. Neither under Bismarck nor under the Bolsheviks did nationalization change the position of the worker in the process of production and this is the decisive criterion for Marxists. Such nationalization did not abolish wage labor, the basis of capitalist exploitation, or hinder the creation of capital. Accumulation of capital merely takes a different form in Russia than under classical capitalism. In Russia, also, planning has replaced anarchic forms.

We must never forget that even though nationalization may look very progressive for a time, it nevertheless may turn out disastrous in the long run. History proves that the form in which nationalization is accomplished determines the inherent content. All presently available historic examples demonstrate that when the state takes over the economy and adds to the already existing state bureaucracy a new branch whose hierarchical structure, independence and special role in the economic and social sphere remains bound up with the capitalist mode of production, the special interests of this new bureaucracy become the same as those of the older one. Both groups amalgamate automatically into a special caste which may, as in the case of Soviet Russia, come to assume the character of a special class.

The present form of democracy does not furnish sufficient means to counteract the numerical growth and increasing power of a bureaucracy which develops autonomously. On the contrary, this bureaucracy armed with tremendous economic and political power finds it easy to turn on political democracy and to destroy it completely.

*Nationalization which means simply that the state takes over and dominates production lacks all socialist content—even if it is implemented by socialist parties.* Such nationalization does not create the conditions for socialization; it even blocks the further development of the economy in a socialist direction.

This is the reason we must be vitally concerned with the forms under which nationalization takes place. The state should not *take over* the means of production; its task should be only to create the legal prerequisites for the utilization of production in the interest of all, to create the basis for the planned economy.

The economy must be democratized through the creation of a *self-administration of the economy.* Ownership and control over the means of production should rest in the hands of producers and consumers with participation of the state. Ownership and control of the various nationalized enterprises should be vested in a body in which the unions and employees of the enterprise (i.e. the producers), municipal administrators and consumers cooperatives (i.e. the consumers), and the state as the highest administrative organ are to be represented. The planning organs should be constituted from those basic bodies which have the power to dispose of the means of production.

An economic parliament with members from all branches of production would be charged with issuing all laws and regulations concerning production and distribution. The state would be charged with upholding and implementing these laws and regulations. Under such conditions, the state would not be the sole owner of the enterprise; neither would the state bureaucracy control the means of production. The power of the state bureaucracy could not then grow to infinite proportions.

Such democratization of the economy would block the development not only of state but even of economic bureaucracy. The state would become simply the executor of the change in ownership and its guarantor. This form of nationalization would be a step on the road toward socialization.

## *MOSCOW "UNMASKS" SARTRE AND EXISTENTIALISM*

Since the beginning of the year, the Soviet press has paid considerable attention to Existentialism and especially to the personality of its leading French exponent, Jean-Paul Sartre. As is usual for this press, there is not the slightest divergence of opinion on the subject. A single article suffices to inform the reader of the general pattern of criticism directed against Sartre and his philosophy. According to an article which appeared in the February 1947 issue of *Novy Mir* (*New World*), Existentialism "combines very old forms of idealism with new forms of demagogy and hypocrisy."[1] The author, Alexander Leites, does not find anything new in this "philosophy of pessimism and despair." The most consistent representatives of such philosophy, we are informed, were those who, as in the case of the German, Meinländer, and the Japanese, Runoske, committed suicide after having completed their works. The others found at least some way to escape from contemporary life. They became mystics and retired to Nirvana. But in the case of Sartre, Leites points out, the "philosophy of despair" becomes a philosophy of activity. Sartre tries to intervene in the political life of contemporary France. He even makes the "ridiculous pretense" of being capable of correcting and complementing Marxism from which (concludes the Russian) his philosophy is separated by the same abyss that separates Reaction from Progress.

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[1] In *Pravda* Existentialism was violently attacked by David Zaslavsky. In *Les Temps Modernes* Sartre replied by the simple (and in this case effective) process of printing the Zaslavsky article in full without any comment.

Sartre's activity (continues the *Novy Mir* article) reflects one of the typical characteristics of bourgeois literature after World War II. It is marked by "a socially aggressive cynicism." Whereas after World War I bourgeois literature was of the Lost Generation school, it now becomes aggressive because of the anti-fascist character of the recent war. The new generation of bourgeois writers are flirting with the anti-fascist movement, are becoming its fellow-travelers. Sartre even participated in the French Resistance. However he was less a fellow-traveler of the Resistance than an intelligence agent sent into the camp of anti-fascist struggle by reactionary forces.

During the last war, Leites continues, millions came to understand that the Communists alone were able to safeguard human dignity and the freedom of the peoples.

There were some clearsighted representatives of the bourgeoisie who foresaw the coming crisis in their society — a situation which did not permit the luxury of a "lost generation." Now these are trying to save capitalism at any price, are proposing programs of a "limited capitalism," and employing every kind of demagogy. This is the *real* role of Sartre.

Translated into "political language," Sartre's philosophy "testifies that while reflecting the world-outlook of the degenerated and dying bourgeoisie, Existentialism aims to disarm the forces of Democracy and Progress." Sartre particularly, in teaching that Man is responsible to himself for every given moment only, provides a very convenient philosophy for "renegades, opportunists and temporary fellow-travelers of various popular movements."

## *REIGN OF TECHNICS*

The leading liberal magazine of South Germany, *Die Gegenwart*, (March 31, 1947) carries an extremely interesting article by one of its editors, Benno Reifenberg, on the role of technics in modern civilization. The article makes frequent reference to a recent book by Friedrich Georg Juenger (brother of Ernst Juenger who wrote *Marble Cliffs*) entitled *Perfection of Technology*.[1]

The word "progress" (declares Mr. Reifenberg) was once surrounded by an aura of hope. But the march from the 19th into the 20th century has been a trek of misery. Thus "progressive thinking" has become a somewhat dubious blessing and technology, which was once the incarnation of hope, is looked upon with the same feelings one has for an undetonated grenade. The descendents of Prometheus have only the bomb-shelter as their last refuge. They are chased below ground and even a view of the firmament now tends to be denied them.

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[1] *Perfektion der Technik* by Friedrich Georg Juenger. Frankfurt-am-Main, 1946.

But do we not commit an injustice by equating technics and war? Did not technology create and distribute an abundance of goods in peace-time? This, Mr. Reifenberg says, suggests a story that a prominent economist once told him about Henry Ford. While standing before a conveyor belt, Mr. Ford had said: "I do not object to the eight-hour-day provided the worker gets eight-hours' rest. The only real problem is what the worker should do in the remaining eight hours." Mr. Ford then went on to say that the only solution he could see was for him to put on the market a cheap Ford car — the automobile could best solve the problem of the workers' eight hours of leisure.

The economist confessed that it was then that he had been thrown into a panic by the advance of technology. He could not overlook the fact that the precious gift of freedom was now to be granted in hourly instalments, that it was considered a state of emptiness, as something which had to be "spent" as efficiently as possible. Freedom had come to be considered a burden.

If we suppose that Mr. Ford correctly appraised the state of mind of his workers, Mr. Reifenberg continues, then freedom has indeed become a sort of "vacuum of the soul," and the question of whether or not technology itself has created this emptiness arises with increased urgency.

Friedrich Georg Juenger's book, Mr. Reifenberg reports, brings these questions into sharp focus. Juenger believes that it is of the essence of technology to further and further "improve" the world of machines that it has created. This drive toward "perfection" has no goal other than to bring the apparatus itself into higher and higher gear. We now discover that further improvement stands in inverse ratio to the advantages Man formerly expected from the advance of technology. But even more, Man is misled, because of the fascination technology has come to have for him, to look for advantage in the wrong direction. Machines run quicker and thus save time. But they also rob Man of leisure (i.e. human time which is something different from "rest periods"). Machines extract enormous riches from nature, but they have served in the end only to spread misery and distribute poverty. Wealth has been transformed into greed. It is forgotten that true wealth is that which frees Man whereas greed can only enslave him.

The most appaling effect of technology, however, lies not so much in the machine as in the organization of human society as it reacts to the impress of technology. Traffic, for example, demands traffic regulation, and the public is thus conditioned to automatism. Those who attempt to revolt against this automatism are eliminated — witness the traffic accident rates reflecting losses that border on war casualty figures.

Juenger's thesis culminates in the challenging sentence: "To think socially means to uphold belief in apparatus and organization — it is the reverent bow that Man makes before the ideology of technical progress."

In a world which aims at the highest efficiency, there can be no maturing; the mature man, who preserves in his individuality the dignity of the specifically human, has died. Juenger draws an appalling picture of our technological landscape. Factories eat deeper and deeper into the natural realm, changing the color of rivers and sky; the worker armies march to the factories under the pitiless sign of the time-clock. Within the factories special appliances see to it that all possible sources of human error are eliminated. Just as it is only in "reservations" that certain forms of plant and animal life are artifically preserved, a few hours of divertisements are artifically maintained to make the drab existence of the worker bearable. An immense administrative apparatus is created to provide security for the atomized individual who, in fact, has forever lost any real sense of security. The economy, though straining for ever-increasing consumption, serves nothing finally but the senseless business of pushing technology to higher and higher levels.

This, continues Mr. Reifenberg, is where Juenger's icy logic leads us. The all-embracing activities of economic man are not formed by his will, are not even lead by it, but are driven by laws that are inherent in technology. Whether men want it or not, technology determines the mad race of the world. If Man gives in, will technology then by itself become a sort of mysterious subject of development? If technology knows only slaves and discounts the free decision of the individual, does that mean that we are simply automatons?

"There is no way back," writes Juenger, "only a way through."

But how can we get through, asks Mr. Reifenberg, if technics have blocked all exits? Juenger gives no answer. And finally it is senseless — even ridiculous — to shudder in the face of machines. Rather one should shudder in the face of men who have robbed themselves of the idea of humanity.

Destroyed Germany stands on the threshold of an era of new industrialization. This process is to take new forms. Germany must at all costs avoid the repetitions of the patterns of the 19th century. Industrialization then was brutal and unconcerned with human values. It is with shame that one reads of the request of the Chinese, when the first railway was being planned for China, that rails were never to come nearer than one mile of temples and cemeteries.

But we should not regard the machine as inherently a weapon from the arsenal of hell. Technologically speaking, Germany lives today in prehistoric times. There are few Germans who today would not recognize that a well-functioning central heating system is a mark of progress.

The sort of hypnosis that stems from the technology of our epoch must be avoided. If Ford looked upon his workers as mechanized material whose leisure time had to be filled, this is exactly the attitude that we must avoid. Those who think in terms of "rest periods" and "leisure time" have lost the concept of freedom and are themselves already victims. The weapon that can best combat dehumanization and the technological death of the psyche is the weapon of human solidarity. A solidarity that springs from a new social order can make technology its servant.

Juenger sees in the struggle of socialists a senseless defense against the technics of destiny. Yet, asks Mr. Reifenberg, even if socialism were only the means of bettering our immediate conditions and offered no lasting solution, would we still not have to act in the sense of socialism? Even if all around us we see nothing but the threat to human values, we who can visualize this threat are not Gods and are not justified in abandoning those others, the blind, the poor, the guilty *sans* guilt, to their suffering.

# BOOKS

## *SOCIOANALYSIS OF NAZI CONCENTRATION CAMPS*

### *Nicolas Calas*

David Rousset's two books, *Concentrationary Universe* and the sequent voluminous *Days of Our Death*,[1] give us a penetrating account of the war's most tragic chapter. There are of course other chapters in the history of World War II which abound in gruesome incidents but none achieves the tragic horror of that which deals with life in the Nazi concentration camps. Unlike the persecuted masses of the Ukraine, the starving people of Greece, or the victims at Hiroshima, the concentrationees never appear to be struggling against an impersonal fate, but wage their battle for survival against plain men, their SS guards. They are responsible men who can become heroes.

The SS guards usually warned the newly-arrived concentrationees that they must not mistake their new abode for a sanatorium. After reading a few pages of Rousset's books one realizes that more than sinister humor is contained in this statement. Thomas Mann revealed to the world at large the universal "otherness" of a sanatorium in his *Magic Mountain*. In Davos, where the victims of tuberculosis have been concentrated, Severini plans to write a sociology of suffering. He believes that there is a need "to classify human suffering according to classes and categories, and to treat it systematically and exhaustively . . . [so that] the first steps towards the mastery of the subject could be achieved."

The task of providing the Severinis of our day with material to add new chapters to a sociology of suffering has been undertaken by the journalist-minded writers who describe the horrors of concentration camps. But now Rousset has proven that this method does not help us achieve that "mastery of the subject" which Mann's alter ego expected. We can no more count on understanding the sociology of concentration camps by listing the horrors perpetrated in its torture chambers than we can hope to understand the human soul by describing, listing and classifying perversions.

When Rousset says, "You do not know the depths of the camps," we realize that his object is to explain how concentration camps actually functioned and not how the Nazis *planned* them to function nor even how some concentrationees themselves *believed* them to have functioned. It is no more reasonable to expect the average prisoner to be aware of the secret life of the camp than it is to

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[1] *Concentrationary Universe* has been published in English under the title: *The Other Kingdom*. Reynal and Hitchcock. $2.50. French editions: *L' Univers Concentrationaire* was published by *Editions du Pavois*, Paris, 1946; *Les Jours de Notre Mort* by the same, 1947.

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expect the victim of a phobia to understand the mechanism of his soul.

Several explanations concerning the social role of concentration camps have been suggested but, after reading the works of Rousset, it becomes apparent that none of the widely-accepted ones is satisfactory. It is false to say, as many have, that the Nazi camps were established so that degenerate members of the party could satisfy their sadistic cravings. If this were true, it would be impossible to account for the fact that sometimes the prisoners were well-treated and all acts of brutality strictly forbidden. But if it is misleading to exaggerate the importance of sadism in the camps, it is also misleading to underrate it as do those who compare the concentrationees with slaves, human beings who have lost their juridic personality and have thus fallen to the status of mere chattels. For if concentrationees are but *things,* then why torture them? It is the *threat of pain,* I believe, rather than sadism, that is typical of the concentrationary universe. This threat is a tool and a weapon that can be used only against human beings and must not be confused with sadism because often the accomplishment of a given task under the threat of pain actually removed the danger of suffering. Finally, it is false to identify the concentrationees with slaves because the primary function of slavery is economic while the basic function of concentration camps is political. They are the means by which the state pursues its terroristic aims through a systematic abuse-of-pain policy.

In *Days of Our Death* Rousset makes a profound observation which helps us to understand why the German ruling class was led to adopt an abuse-of-pain policy. In the Twenties the German middle class had been virtually dispossessed owing to inflation, and was threatened with being assimilated by the proletariat, a class which the German bourgeoisie had been taught to consider alien to its cultural and political aspirations. For the man of the German middle class to become assimilated by the workers implied a loss of his identity and sense of superiority. Rousset helps us to realize that it is this fear of loss of identity, which when translated into political terms means a loss of political power, that led the representatives of the German middle class to espouse a political doctrine that promised them survival in the ranks of the ruling class on the condition that terroristic methods of government be substituted for democratic ones. In other words, I believe that the German middle class hoped that by entrusting its interests to the Nazis, it would maintain its identity and enough freedom of action to avoid becoming politically *declassé.* It was its *will to be free* which gave the German middle class the political strength to militate in the ranks of a terroristic party.

Conversely, after the establishment of the Nazi regime all who were or felt themselves to be threatened by the new terroristic policy of abuse-of-pain came to realize that their immediate political objective must be to reduce the tyrant's power-to-pain while their ultimate goal consisted in a struggle for power and the overthrow of the Nazi regime. The startling revelation that Rousset makes in his books is that this policy of struggle for the reduction of power-to-pain coupled with the long term policy of struggle-for-power was actually systematically pursued *within* the camps.

Viewed in this light the concentration camp problem assumes a twofold aspect. On the one hand all struggle for power within the concentration camp was inevitably conditioned by the national and international situation which, in the last analysis, dictated both the degree and the extent of the Nazis' use of the abuse-of-pain policy. On the other hand all resistance on the part of the concentrationees to this abuse-of-pain strategy had to be regulated in relation to the political conjuncture. We learn from *Days of Our Death* that upon two occasions the Nazis were compelled to curtail the use of torture. The first was early in the war when Germany had to economize man-power and avoid sacrificing human life unnecessarily. The other such occasion occurred in 1943 when, due to production demands, more rational methods of work were inaugurated in the camps by the Nazis under pressure of the nation's military and industrial top command.

It can be said that prior to Rousset one viewed concentration camps the way one appraised primitive people before totemism had been understood —that is, in the most fanciful and unscientific manner. The fact that many of those who lived in concentration camps will not recognize the picture Rousset draws must surprise no one. There are still anthropologists who refuse to accept totemism as a general phenomenon and a phase of social evolution simply because they lack the power of abstraction which alone could enable them to interpret the dynamics of a situation.

For Rousset the phenomenon of the camps must not be confined to a study of Nazi Germany but must serve as a warning. "It would be blindness," he concludes at the end of his first book, "and criminal blindness to believe that . . . it would be impossible for any other country to try a similar experiment. . . ." Rousset attributes the origin of concentration camps to "the crisis that demolished Germany" and that is "inherent in the economic and social foundations of capitalism and imperialism." But this is only a half-truth and, like all half-truths, a dangerous lie. The meager information we have concerning the sinister *lagiers,* or penal camps, of Soviet Russia where millions and millions of concentrationees are terrorized by the NKVD is sufficient to make it clear that the abuse-of-pain policy is a predominant characteristic of the Soviet regime.

The concentration camp system, like totemism or any other institution, follows its own laws and logic. On the basis of Rousset's abundant information and his clear analysis of the inner struggles within the camps, I believe that concentration camps will arise wherever forced labor is subjected to the three following conditions: 1) the enforcement of a rule of terror, 2) the concession of certain basic powers to a representative of the concentrationees elevated for this purposes to the rank of overseer or *Kapo* as he was called in the Nazi camps; and 3) the delegation to the *Kapo* of the right to terrorize. These three conditions exist also in the Soviet *lagiers.*

One of Rousset's most valuable contributions consists in explaining how and why contradictions inevitably develop in the concentration camps and why the concentrationees *should* take advantage of them. "The intensive life of the camps," he writes in his first book, "has its laws and logic. The race of concentrationees recognizes motives of its own that have little in common with the existence of an inhabitant of Paris or Toulouse, New York or Tiflis. But the very fact that this concentrationary universe exists at all is not without importance for the meaning of the universe of ordinary people. It is not enough to establish a sort of physical contact with this life so totally separated from the accepted structure of the twentieth century. There still remains its rules to be grasped and its meaning to be understood."

Rousset, therefore, after analyzing the conditions of work in the camp, the various aspects of daily life and the different kind of camps proceeds to describe the various "clans" of concentrationees, such as the political prisoners or "reds" (so called because they wear a red badge), the "greens" or professional criminals; the different national groups such as the Germans, Poles, French, Russians, etc.; the different classes, the aristocracy with its *Kapos* and the common masses. However, the most important chapters are devoted to the study of the structure of the concentrationary community and more particularly of the role and function of a privileged minority and bureaucratic aristocracy that is headed by the *Lagerältester,* the concentrationee who by his position "controls the main activities of the camp and is thus placed at the center of intrigues and information."

In *Concentrationary Universe* Rousset concerns himself primarily with an analysis of the four essential factors of concentration camp life: (1) the framework of organization, (2) the character of internecine conflicts, (3) pain, and (4) humor, or rather that particular type of humor which obtains a release from pain through the discharge of laughter provoked by the realization of the incongruity of a situation that is basically tragic rather than comic. These four elements control the aesthetic character of the work which, with its terse exposition and carefully woven pattern of tragic themes, is destined to become a classic.

Totally different in mood and treatment of the subject is the second voluminous (over 300,000 words) *Days of Our Death.* In this book we are spared nothing, neither the description of the most appalling atrocities nor the exposition of endless political discussions. Sometimes the latter are treated as the *leitmotiv* of the life of the Poles or French, at other times repeated in connection with the adventures of groups living in other camps, or in the same camp but in a different time, at other times serving as background to the activities of familiar protagonists who in the terrible drama of the struggle for power in the concentrationary universe have been forced to retreat or advance to other positions. To become an overseer, to remain a *Kapo,* to overthrow the *Kapo* of the kitchen or the infirmary or of a battalion working in the salt mines; to choose, omit or substitute names of men destined by their overlords to a particular form of labor that in an hour or day or month means certain death; to defend or accuse, to betray one in order to save many; to torture some so that others may not be tortured,—these are the tragic struggles of which the existence of terrorized, exhausted, sick, famished, supremely anxious men and women is constituted. In this tragic setting Rousset narrates and discusses the various phases of that struggle for power that is waged by the political *avant garde* of the camps. The political and moral implications of this book are tremendous. In the final analysis it is a most eloquent defense of the strategy, tactics and leadership of the German Communist faction. The author rightly says that the acceptance of the correctness of their tactics in no way implies an adherence to the general party line as it was evolved either before or after 1933, in Germany, outside the camps, or elsewhere in the world. The author does not say, but one cannot avoid the implications that if the tactics followed by the Communists in the camp were on the whole the right ones, this was due to the fact that the decisions of the leaders were based on the realities of life in the concentrationary universe. They used their own wits instead of the advice or suggestions coming from the outside world.

However, the Communist tactics were often violently criticized by other political prisoners. Rousset deals with these objections and convincingly disposes of them. It was natural for many liberal-minded prisoners to find it difficult to reconcile themselves to the idea that the only effective way of resisting the terrorism of the SS was to use terror for different ends. To them all *Kapos* were fascists because they were terrorists and they failed to see that the abuse-of-pain policy was a prerequisite of all struggle in the concentrationary universe. Clear-sighted men living under terroristic regimes cannot afford to let themselves think in democratic or Tolstoyan terms but must calculate all their moves in strategic terms, *i.e.,* in relation to the struggle for power. It is only by acquiring a power that would permit the leaders to save some from torture, starvation or exhaustion, that they could serve the interest of the oppressed and oppose most effectively the plans of their inhuman masters. For the politically conscious prisoner the whole problem of existence and work in the concentrationary universe is reduced to the examination in every concrete situation of the advantages that can be obtained by acquiring a strategic position in an infirmary or a "good" working brigade. Every gain obtained by the politically advanced minority was always obtained by bribing or terrorizing an opponent, an SS guard or a "green" *Kapo.* In the terroristic world of the concentration camps the struggle against terror implies — this is the great and tragic lesson Rousset and so many others had to learn — both the use and abuse of terror.

The validity of this argument was not only realized by the Communists but also by those political prisoners who had learned before the war to value illegal activity — as was the case, according to Rousset, with the Poles.

Further, the conditions in which the struggle for power is pursued in a terroristic environment makes it impossible to adhere to the democratic principles of equality and freedom. In the atmosphere of terror equity is substituted for equality. It is in the name of equity, I believe, that the leaders of underground movements are morally justified in protecting the lives of the most valuable members of the organization even if this implies the sacrifice of the lives of others. In the last analysis this is a militaristic principle which has to be applied each time the problem of a struggle for power becomes a matter of life and death for the conflicting parties.

The great advantage held by the Communists (whether of the Stalinist or anti-Stalinist variety) in organizing resistance or in planning a general insurrection was due to the fact that their strategy had always been appraised in the light of a broad political conjucture. More precisely, in relation to the problem of the struggle for power, we can discern on the basis of Rousset's data four different attitudes within the camps: (1) that of the "greens" who lacked all sense of social consciousness other than that of the consciousness of the gang (the danger of gang solidarity was one of the most serious that the political prisoners had to face), (2) the attitude of those "reds" who adopted a passive attitude in relation to the authorities instead of joining the secret organizations that struggled against them, (3) the attitude of certain groups such as the Poles who, although they understood the terroristic situation, lacked a broader appreciation of the political problems involved and therefore avoided political cooperation with Germans and Jews, and (4) the Marxist attitude which is the one defended by Rousset.

Rousset has entitled the penultimate chapter of his second book "Men in the Hour of Defeat." These men are not only the SS guards and the Gestapo agents. Defeated — and here lies the tragic denouement of a situation Rousset has so masterly described — are both the tyrants *and* their victims. The "logic" of the political situation seemed to require that during the last months of the war the concentrationees should be in a position not only to disobey their guards but also to overthrow them and seize power within the camps. But for an uprising of the prisoners to have a chance of success the insurrection would need to be coordinated with outside forces. The Communist leaders had expected that the Red Army upon entering Germany would undertake to play the revolutionary role that the German people were "unable" to play. It is a great pity that Rousset did not deem it necessary to explain why he thinks that the Red Army failed to justify the hopes of his co-thinkers. If he had attempted to do so perhaps he would have come to the conclusion that the strategy of the Allied Command, owing to the policy of unconditional surrender, could in no sense tolerate the outbreak of insurrections in Germany, even in concentration camps, for insurrections are contagious. If this is the case, as I believe it to be, then the prisoners' ideas of revolt must have appeared to the officers and men of the Allied Armies as a disease contracted in the camps and one that had to be cured as if it were a plague. On no condition evidently were the prisoners to be allowed to become the bearers of the pest of revolution.

While the SS warned the prisoners that a concentration camp must not be mistaken for a sanatorium, the Allied authorities made the concentrationees realize that they were the unhappy inhabitants of a lazaretto. And what greater folly could be imagined than to encourage the lazars to revolt? Well intentioned doctors of the body, the soul and the mind were to impress the concentrationees with the idea that their role was to let themselves be saved (freed and cured). The physical and moral filth the prisoners had wallowed in for so long had made them sick, as diseased in body and mind as the inhabitants of Thomas Mann's *Magic Mountain,* as the inhabitants of the epidemic-ridden city described by the existentialist Camus in his latest political novel *La Peste*.

Fortunately we have the testimony of Rousset who raises his voice above the insidious murmur of the defeatist-minded writers. Here we have the testimony of a man who opposes to the behavior of the diseased and the martyred, the attitude of the hero who takes his fate in his own hands and thus acquires a destiny — an "impure" one obviously for what can be expected of men who learn to live among horror without flinching and whom necessity has taught to alloy evil with good. Necessity, the unshakable cornerstone of morality!

## *ASIA'S FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE*

**Frank Fisher**

The peoples of Asia are on the march again. After many unsuccessful attempts to free themselves from foreign domination and their own arrested feudalism, it now seems that they are well on their way to realize at least part of their aims. The end of colonialism in Southern and South Eastern Asia is in sight, and the daily newspaper accounts of war, rebellions, civil wars, riots, "police actions" and other violent events in that region describe an important phase of the transition from imperialistic domination to independence.

But their progress toward self-government and the possibility of basic social improvement coincides with the increasing split of the world into two camps which try to dominate and organize as much territory as possible, in preparation for the next world war. American influence is increasing throughout Asia and meets at many points the expanding Soviet "Security Zone." These two forces determine the world's fate today and furnish the background for Asia's struggle.

Can China and India, Burma, Indonesia, Korea and Indochina have liberty and peace while the world is divided and arming for another war? How can the rich areas of Asia finally start the enormous task of overcoming economic misery and starvation, disease and squalor, illiteracy and superstition; how can they free themselves from the dead burden of their own past and external coercion; how can they go forward while the dominant powers of the world are taking great steps backward in an age of fear, reaction and insecurity?

These are the principal questions which Harold Isaacs raises and partly answers in his new book.[1] Mr. Isaacs is well equipped to deal with these problems. A student of Asiatic affairs for many years and the author of the excellent and far too little known book *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (London, 1938), he spent many years in South and East Asia as an editor and foreign correspondent. He is one of the few American observers without the political naiveté which is so typical of most of the current journalistic and literary output dealing with Asia. Mr. Isaacs fully knows Chiang's personal history as well as the social forces represented by the Kuomintang bureaucracy. On the other hand, he does not belong to the journalistic school of short-term visitors to wartime Yenan who became conscious or unconscious propagandists for the Chinese Communists. He has watched the many twists and turns of the party line in China and the subjection of formerly bold programs for agrarian reform, planned industrial development and political freedom to Soviet political expediency and stifling of internal opposition. His book is thus based on extensive background knowledge and a great deal of personal experience and observation.

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[1] *No Peace For Asia.* Macmillan, New York, 1947. $3.50.

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The last decade witnessed first the collapse of most of the old colonial powers before the onrush of Japan, thereby showing that they could not even claim the ability to preserve peace as a compensation for their exploitation; then, the breakdown of the Japanese "Co-Prosperity Sphere." From Korea to India, the people hoped that a new day was starting for them. American propaganda for democracy everywhere and remembered remnants of Russian propaganda for colonial independence bolstered these many hopes, though not the will to resistance.

Korea is the classic example where the opportunity for national freedom was sacrificed to the new pattern of imperialism. As a next door neighbor to Russia, Korea is part of its "security zone"; the American desire to contain this zone as much as possible, clothed in the same lofty language of diplomacy as the Russian imperialistic demands, made the division of the country necessary. The result is economic paralysis and different ways of political suppression in the north and south. Freedom for Korea is not in sight until the present state of tension between the US and the USSR is resolved in one way or another. This is equally true of China where both powers have vital military interests, besides the old American dream of opening up a great potential market.

The meaning of "independence" is likewise perverted in Southern Asia. Great Britain is reluctantly liquidating the empire, but holding on to Hong Kong and Malaya, giving the minimum of independence to Burma, freeing India only at the cost of partition, and even trying to expand her economic and political influence in Siam. France and Holland are waging war to reestablish at least partial domination of their rich colonies. They have no prospect of regaining and holding Indochina and Indonesia in the long run, but their stubborn attempts to resume the profitable exploitation of rubber, tin and oil with the help of cheap native labor result in violence, destruction and new misery added to old.

In these areas the United States policy is most ambiguous, as Mr. Isaacs shows in some of the best passages of his book. He describes the role of Americans in Asia, where they came unwillingly and in full ignorance, added contempt for the natives and misinformation, and left full of confirmed prejudices as ambassadors of ill will. To the inhabitants of Asiatic countries, on the other hand, they first appeared as liberators, men of good will and technical knowledge and riches, an impression which quickly wore off. But more disturbing than the role of individuals was and is the policy of the government. America as a power without colonies was a symbol of freedom, engaged in a war of liberation. How was it then possible that this same country could help the old colonial powers in their attempts to crush freedom in Asia? Actually, American arms and uniforms, airplanes, tanks and rations made it possible for France and Holland to carry on their colonial fights; America even provided training for marines to make amphibian landings on colonial islands. Thus the United States missed its greatest opportunity to gain and keep the friendship of the peoples of Asia. America has ceased to be the symbol of liberty and is now regarded as opposed to the changes which the peoples of Asia want and need. They see that America is more interested in keeping colonial exploiters going, in the hope of getting important raw materials from them, than in helping the people to establish their own governments. Therefore, American neutrality has become suspect and US efforts to mediate in current colonial disputes are no longer welcomed by the Asiatic nations.

Mr. Isaacs' book contains some equally revealing pages about Russia's policies in Asia. He effectively contrasts the short period in which the young Soviet Republic tried to help colonial nations to become independent and voluntarily gave up its prerogatives abroad, with the current nationalistic policy of exploitation and domination of foreign territory, as shown especially in Manchuria. He quotes Lenin who in 1905 hailed the defeat of the Czarist Government at the hands of Japan as "the catastrophe of our worst enemy" and called Russian policy in China a "criminal policy which is impoverishing, corrupting, and oppressing the people more than ever." This he contrasts with Stalin's radio speech of September 2, 1945:

"The defeat of the Russian troops in 1904, in the period of the Russo-Japanese war, left grave memories in the minds of our people. It fell as a dark stain on our country. Our people trusted and awaited the day when Japan would be routed and the stain wiped out. For forty years we, the men of the older generation, have waited for this day. And now this day has come."

Even more informative is a document submitted by French Communists in Indochina to their native comrades in 1945.

"It advised the Annamite Communists to be sure, before they acted rashly, that their struggle met the requirements of Soviet policy. It warned that any premature adventures in Annamite independence might not be in line with Soviet perspectives. These perspectives might well include France as a firm ally of the USSR in Europe, in which case the Annamite independence movement would be an embarrassment. Therefore it urged upon the Annamite comrades a policy of patience. It advised them in particular to wait upon the results of the French elections, coming up the following month, when additional Communist strength might assure the Annamites a better settlement. In the meantime it baldly proposed that an emissary be sent not only to contact the French Communist Party but also the Russians 'in order to acquaint yourselves with the perspectives of coming events'."

This is perhaps the most cynical statement of Stalinist policy outside Russia that has appeared lately. It clearly shows that the once progressive role of the Soviet Union in Asia has given place to a policy of self-aggrandizement and "security" which is the form that imperialism takes under the system of bureaucratic collectivism.

Mr. Isaacs' recommendations for solving Asia's problems strike me as an afterthought which the author had to put in the book so that it would not be too gloomy. He realizes that peace and freedom in Asia and elsewhere depend on the end of the division of the world between Russia and America and their satellites. He therefore proposes that both powers withdraw from the advanced strategic positions outside their own countries, disarm, and cooperate in a sensible positive program of economic and social progress in the vast Asiatic areas. While this is an excellent idea, Mr. Isaacs somewhat casually, though correctly, remarks that its execution depends on a fundamental change of political power within both major countries. I realize that this is a problem beyond the scope of his book, but it is obvious that the required changes are fairly unlikely to happen in the immediate future for which Mr. Isaacs' program is designed. The title of the book indicates that the author himself is not very confident either.

Actually, there is a possibility that at least India and South Eastern Asia may have a period of comparative tranquillity while the major powers are arming for war and cannot do much to support or combat the minor imperialistic powers like Holland, France, or even England. This would result in an end of the fighting as the domestic resources of these European countries can no longer sustain a prolonged colonial war, and thus the native peoples would be left alone to a large extent. This would help them to establish their political independence, but the broad measures of developing their resources and transportation and improving hygienic conditions which are urgently necessary cannot be undertaken without outside, i.e. American help. It is unlikely that the United States would give enough assistance as the security of American investors is not too good without an equal degree of security for the existing Dutch or French investments. Moreover, American economic help would be contingent on "stability" of the government and its friendliness to private investment. It is rather obvious that any development in those backward areas can only come about through a high degree of government intervention and control, measures of nationalization which are not pleasant in the eyes of the State Department and even less so to the Republican Congress.

The independence, such as it is likely to be, of some South Asiatic countries, poses many other political problems. Some countries, like Indochina, have not much class differentation, since most of their wealth was in foreign hands. In India, on the other hand, there is likely to be an increasingly open class struggle, which may break the present coalition of forces in the Congress Party. In all countries there is a fairly strong trend toward some form of Socialism, which would guarantee the best road toward social improvement, but in any prolonged struggle between the large majority of peasants and workers and the upper classes the issues would soon be distorted by ideological influences from abroad. Up to now, the Communists do not play a major role in Southern Asia, except in Indochina, but they are likely to gain influence in such a case. Similarly, the landholding and commercial classes would count on American backing. Thus the struggle for world hegemony would be reproduced, to the detriment of the people involved.

However, even if this can be avoided, Socialism in backward countries faces great difficulties, as the Russian example shows. The fact of almost universal illiteracy and no tradition of even local self-government, presents a perfect opportunity for the development of a powerful bureaucracy, which may start with the best intention but would eventually degenerate. However, this is just one of many risks of a colonial revolution, and awareness of it is a small measure of protection against its happening.

It is among these many snares and pitfalls and in opposition to most of the world, entirely depending on their own forces, that the peoples of Asia have to fight for liberty and peace.